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This dissertation examines the operation of Islamic insurance (Takaful) in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. Its focus is on business and retail insurance. Health and life insurance which 
involve unique considerations are not considered. 
Islamic insurance had been debated since 1961 and was accepted only very recently by the 
International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) conference held in Saudi Arabia in 1985. The 
first Takaful insurance company was officially established in Sudan in 1979. Consequently, 
the principles and standards that govern Takaful are still being established in Islamic 
scholarship with no uniform or fixed Takaful standards accepted by all Islamic countries at 
this point in time. A key issue for the thesis is how Takaful can operate under the umbrella of 
a joint-stock company (required by legislation) whilst simultaneously maintaining Sharia-
compliance. Takaful principles, unlike conventional (commercial) insurance, do not involve 
risk transfer, and policyholders share risk under the mutuality principle. Takaful principles set 
strict rules relating to profit sharing, and give primacy to the interests of policyholders. The 
modern conventional stock company, in contrast, operates for profit and has a duty to act in 
the best interests of its shareholders. 
The main focus of this thesis is whether Takaful insurance as practiced in Saudi Arabia is 
Sharia-compliant. To answer this question, this thesis critically analyses Saudi insurance laws 
and regulations, Saudi insurance companies, and Takaful principles based on Sharia (Islamic 
law). 
A general finding of this thesis is that Saudi insurance laws and insurance companies do not 
appear to be in the line with Takaful principles and that the operation of Takaful under joint-
stock companies (JSCs) is problematic to the point where it is probably impossible to achieve 
in practice. There is the added problem that Takaful principles are not enforced or 
implemented in practice. This poses particular difficulties for the Saudi insurance market, as 
Saudi insurance laws require insurance companies to operate though JSCs and to comply 
with Sharia. 
The available evidence suggests that the Saudi insurance market does not provide sufficient 
insurance protection in relation to potentially catastrophic risks such as risks to petroleum 
pipelines, oil installations, and other energy infrastructure. Moreover, re-insurance or re-
Takaful (Islamic re-insurance) in these sectors of high risk appear to be non-existent. One 
reason perhaps is that Takaful is not sufficiently competitive with conventional (commercial) 
insurance in providing cover for these types of risks; another reason may be that compliance 
with Takaful principles inhibits the use of conventional re-insurance which would be needed 
to cover these types of catastrophic risks. 
In the light of these limitations and as a means of overcoming the disadvantages that Takaful 
faces vis a vis conventional insurance, and as a means of modernising Takaful to be 
sufficiently competitive with conventional insurance, the thesis proposes a Sharia alternative 
which may resolve these issues. This Sharia alternative to conventional (commercial) 
insurance and Takaful has its parallels in work done by Islamic jurists such as the late 
xix 
 
Professor Mustafa Al-Zarqaa’s scholarship. Al-Zarqaa has argued that conventional insurance 
companies comply with Sharia law as long as Sharia prohibited investment activities such as 
alcohol, pork, riba (interest), maysir (gambling), are specifically excluded. 
Furthermore, by use of the principle of qiyas (reasoning by analogy as a Sharia source), the 
thesis also argues that the same Sharia alternative applying to Takaful be applied to re-
Takaful. The thesis proposes the adoption of Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach as 
a Sharia alternative to conventional (commercial) re-insurance and re-Takaful. Al-Zarqaa’s 
modified re-insurance approach allows Islamic re-insurance to operate in a similar way to 
conventional re-insurance and under joint-stock companies—but insists on the requirement of 

























In Islamic countries,1 Islamic insurance, known as Takaful, provides insurance protection that 
complies with Islamic law.2 Takaful insurance is the Islamic equivalent of conventional 
(commercial) insurance in Western countries. It is based on Islamic principles and is used by 
the majority of Islamic countries.3 Takaful bears many similarities to mutual insurance. It is 
an agreement between a group of people to co-operatively create a non-profit fund (pool) to 
provide insurance and compensation against potential risks. The fund (pool) has its own rules 
that determine its responsibilities for accepting funds and deposits and paying compensation.4 
“Takaful” means insurance in Arabic. As it is quite common for references to use the terms, 
“Takaful insurance”, “Islamic Insurance”, or just “Takaful”, the thesis uses these terms 
interchangeably throughout the thesis.  The terms “Sharia law”, “Islamic law”, and “Islamic 
Sharia” are also used interchangeably. Policyholders and participants are further used 
interchangeably. 
In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Takaful insurance is particularly sensitive on the 
issue of Sharia-compliance as the Saudi legal system derives its authority from Islamic law. 
Sharia takes priority over other Saudi Arabian laws; Sharia must be followed.5 Saudi Arabia 
only authorises Sharia-compliant Takaful insurance to be offered by listed joint-stock 
companies (JSCs).6 The Takaful insurance industry in Saudi Arabia in 2016 comprised 35 
                                                             
1 The Islamic world refers to all Islamic countries where most of the people are Muslims and the main religion is 
Islam. See Abdulaziz Othman Altwaijri, 'The Islamic World and Millennium Challenges' (2014) Islamic 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), 11; WorldAtlas, Islamic Countries of the World 
(2019 ) <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/islamic-countries-in-the-world.html>. 
2 Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel-Karim and Volker Nienhaus, Takaful Islamic Insurance: Concepts and 
Regulatory Issues (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) 1-2. 
3 Fellague Saliha, '[ يلفاكتلا نیمأتلا تاكرش ءادأ لیعفت يف ةمكوحلا تایلآ رود ] The Role of Governance Mechanism in 
Activating Takaful Insurance Companies Performance' (2014)(11) Academic Journal of Social and Human 
Studies 51, 53. 
4 Abdurrazaq BinAlzawy and Eman Naamon, 'Establishing Corporate Principles in Cooperative Insurance 
Companies [ ينواعتلا نیمأتلا تاكرش يف ةمكوحلا ئدابم ءاسرإ ]' (Paper presented at the Corporate Governance as a 
Mechanism to Minimize Financial and Administration Corruption [ يرادإلاو يلاملا داسفلا نم دحلل ةیلآك تاكرشلا ةمكوح ], 
University of Biskra  in Algeria, 6-7 May 2012) 4; Aziza BinSaminah and Tobni Meriem, 'Corporate 
Governance and its Role in Activating Supervision Law on Cooperative Insurance Companies [  تاكرشلا ةمكوح
ينواعتلا نیمأتلا تاكرش ىلع ةباقرلا ماظن لیعفت يف اھرودو ]' (Paper presented at the Insurance Industry, Practical Truth and 
Development Horizons–Countries Practices [ لودلا براجت–ریوطتلا قافآو يلمعلا عقاولا ةینیمأتلا ةعانصلا ], University of 
Hassiba Benbouali de Chlef in Algeria, 3-4 December 2012) 6-7 <http://www.univ-
chlef.dz/LABORATOIRES/LSFBPM/seminaires_2012/intervention_aziza_bensmina_merieme_2012.pdf>. 
5 Basic Law of Governance 1992 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Order No. A/90), arts 1, 8. 
6 Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 2, 1-2. 
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listed Takaful insurance companies in operation.7 Currently, there are 33 Takaful companies 
as two companies have failed.8 
This thesis distinguishes early forms of Takaful insurance based on mutual insurance with no 
shareholders from modern forms of Takaful operated by joint-stock companies (JSCs) with 
shareholders. The thesis argues that efforts to mould a mutual non-profit model of insurance 
to fit for a profit stockholding company insurer are practically unworkable. The early forms 
of Takaful envisaged dominance of the policyholder interests with entitlement to surpluses in 
the underwriting fund and participation in decision-making. But under a JSC, the duties of the 
Board of Directors (elected by shareholders) are to its shareholders who expect a reasonable 
return on investments through dividends. The interests of policyholders are pitted against 
shareholders. This thesis argues that except for industry type funds a Takaful model operating 
under JSCs is, as a matter of practicality, not possible. 
This thesis examines the regulation of Takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia, and puts forward 
recommendations for reform of Takaful practices in Saudi Arabia. These recommendations 
can contribute to the governance and regulation of Takaful in other Islamic countries and to 
Western countries where Takaful insurance is offered by conventional insurance companies. 
1.2. Aim of Research   
This thesis examines the problems associated with Takaful insurance compliance with Sharia 
law in Saudi Arabia with particular emphasis on current Takaful models, the effect of 
corporate status, and conflicts of operator interests. It explores the rights and obligations of 
Takaful participants and shareholders, and the issues of risk management and profit 
distribution. Finally, it examines whether there is scope for Sharia-compliant reforms that 
could be introduced to modernise Takaful insurance.   
1.3. Significance of Research 
The insurance system in Saudi Arabia is new by comparison with other countries; the 
principal laws relating to insurance were enacted in 2003.9 Since Saudi insurance is such a 
recent phenomenon, it has not undergone a critical analysis of whether it fulfils the 
requirements for Takaful insurance. Undertaking such critical analysis is a key task of this 
thesis.     
Another important task relates to the need to examine the evidence for the financial stability, 
viability, and competitiveness of Takaful insurance compared with conventional 
(commercial) insurance, especially the problems that arise if Takaful insurance can only 
operate on a non-profit basis—like some forms of mutual insurance. Since Saudi insurance 
                                                             
7 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Licensed Companies (2020) SAMA <http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-
us/insurance/pages/licensed_companies.aspx>. 
8 Albilad Capital, Saudi Insurance Sector 2017 (2018), 1 <http://www.albilad-
capital.com/Research_EnglishReport/InsuranceSectorQ417EN.pdf>; Atlas Magazine, 'Insurance News from 
Africa and the Middle East', Atlas Magazine: Insurance News Around the World, May 2018, 30-4 
<https://www.atlas-mag.net/sites/default/files/AtlasMagazine_2018-05_en.pdf>. 




must be Sharia-compliant and is only available through listed joint-stock companies (JSCs), 
the thesis explores serious difficulties involving conflicts of interests between operators, 
shareholders, and insured participants/policyholders. 
1.4. Research Questions 
The central research question is whether Takaful insurance companies in Saudi Arabia are 
Sharia-compliant. If they are not, whether this reflects the modernising influences arising out 
of the need for competitive and profitable Takaful insurers. Accordingly, the thesis 
investigates the issues of the following sub-questions:  
(1) Are Takaful insurance models and the regulatory framework consistent with Sharia 
law? 
(2) How are conflicts of interest managed in the operation of Takaful insurance between 
shareholders, operators, and policyholders (participants)? 
(3) Are stability, cost, and competitiveness issues for Takaful insurance companies? 
(4) If Takaful insurance requires reform, what reforms should be undertaken to ensure 
Sharia-compliance, or alternatively, what reforms are needed to modernise Takaful 
insurance in order to compete commercially? 
1.5. Research Methodology  
The thesis adopts an analytical doctrinal approach as the primary methodology. This critical 
analytical doctrinal approach identifies, collects, and critically analyses relevant Saudi legal 
materials on the regulation of insurance. These documents establish the context for discussion 
of insurance laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia.  
The thesis identifies relevant laws and principles concerning Sharia (Islamic law), the legal 
structure of Saudi Arabia, and Saudi laws and regulations—especially insurance laws, 
companies law (CL), capital market laws/regulations (CMLs), and implementing regulations.  
The thesis also collects, assesses, and analyzes materials on the institutional regulatory 
framework relating to Saudi insurance. These include materials from the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) as the authorised body issuing insurance laws and monitoring 
insurance companies in Saudi Arabia.10 It also refers to insurance quasi-judicial committees 
which operate under the authority of SAMA.11 Further, as all insurance companies are joint-
stock companies (JSCs) listed on the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul),12 the thesis also 
collects materials from the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and Tadawul.  
All insurance companies in Saudi Arabia must comply with Sharia, so the thesis collects and 
evaluates materials setting out what is required for insurance to be Takaful or Sharia-
                                                             
10 Ibid arts 2, 8, 9, 11, 19. 
11 Ibid art 20; Issuing the Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations 2005 (Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia by Royal Decree No. 71). 
12 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 9, art 3 (1). 
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compliant. Accordingly, data is collected from: the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB); 
the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI); and 
the International Cooperative and Mutual Insurance Federation (ICMIF). The analysis 
involves a comparison made with conventional (commercial) insurance. 
The thesis also collects and analyses data from a selection of annual reports of Saudi 
insurance companies listed on the Saudi stock exchange to determine whether they comply 
with Sharia and other legal requirements.13  
The thesis further refers to legislation relating to Takaful in other Islamic countries. It does 
not attempt to place this legislation in a broader legal, political, and socio-economic 
framework which would be required if an in depth comparative law approach were to be 
adopted.14 References to legislation and religious rulings in other Islamic countries offering 
Takaful insurance involve a selective collection and evaluation of relevant legislation and 
rulings. The thesis refers to the position in Malaysia which has long experience with offering 
Islamic financial products—Islamic banking, sukuk (Islamic bonds),15 and particularly 
Takaful products since 1984—16 and Sudan which is the first Islamic country that established 
a Takaful company in 1979.17 
1.6. Research Scope and Limitations 
The focus of this thesis is Takaful insurance companies in Saudi Arabia. This thesis does not 
consider other forms of insurance such as social insurance, health insurance, and life 
insurance, where different principles, regulations, and rules apply.  
1.7. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The current chapter provides the introduction to the 
thesis. This includes highlighting the aim and significance of the research, the research 
questions and sub-questions, the research methodology, and the research scope and 
limitations. 
Following the introduction, chapter 2 sets out the existing legal framework in Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter 2 is divided into two parts. First, it sets out the general legal framework of Saudi 
Arabia. Second, it examines the key regulatory bodies relevant to insurance companies in 
                                                             
13 The research was limited in the information it acquired from SAMA. While several visits were made in 
person to SAMA to obtain information and materials related to Takaful insurance, particularly insurance 
companies’ annual reports and legal insurance cases, the researcher was directed to SAMA’s online websites. 
14 Jonathan Hill, 'Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory' (1989) 9(1) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 101, 101-2. 
15 Serap O Gönülal, Takaful and Mutual Insurance: Alternative Approaches to Managing Risks (World Bank 
Publications, 2013) 199. 
16 Takaful Act 1984 1984 (Malaysia). 
17 Gönülal, above n 15, 83-4; Jamie Reid, 'Takaful Insurance an Introduction' (2008) 31(5) Finity Publications 
36, 36; Ajmal Bhatty, 'The Growing Importance of Takaful Insurance' (Paper presented at the Asia Regional 
Seminar Organized by OECD and Bank Negara Malaysia under the Sponsorship of the Government of Japan, 
Kuala Lumpur, 23-24 September 2010) 1 
<http://www.isfin.net/sites/isfin.com/files/the_growing_importance_of_takaful_insurance.pdf>; Archer, Abdel-
Karim and Nienhaus, above n 2, 63. 
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Saudi Arabia which include the Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI), the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA), and particularly the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA).  
Chapter 3 provides the main platform for modern Takaful in Saudi Arabia. This is achieved 
by examining insurance regulations in Saudi Arabia as well as risk management. Particular 
attention is paid to the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (LSCIC), 
the Implementing Rules for the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law (IR), the Insurance 
Corporate Governance Regulation (ICGR), the Risk Management Regulation (RMR), and the 
Regulation of Reinsurance Activities (RRA). The chapter also examines the two tiers of 
Quasi-Judicial Insurance Committees under SAMA. It further explores the financial stability 
of the conventional insurance industry globally. This includes establishing the main 
principles and standards particularly the European Union’s Solvency II. Solvency II deals 
with risk management, capital adequacy, and solvency. Takaful insurance faces the same 
issues raised by conventional insurance. Unlike conventional insurance, Takaful insurance 
encounters issues related to Sharia-compliance. The chapter also examines how solvency and 
stability are dealt with under the laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter 4 examines the requirements for Takaful insurance. This includes a definition of 
Takaful, the discussion of the main and secondary sources of Sharia permitting Takaful, and a 
historical overview of Takaful companies. It discusses the three prohibited elements for 
Takaful—riba (interest), gharar (uncertainty), and maysir (gambling). It also critically 
examines the main Takaful models—wakalah (agency), mudharabah (profit-sharing), and 
hybrid (wakalah and mudharabah). The chapter also sets out the key Takaful principles 
beginning with: tabarru (charity/donation) and non-profit, mutual co-operation, and 
provision of welfare. It explores how these mutuality principles underpin the operations of 
Takaful, particularly in relation to the rights of policyholders. This is elaborated in the 
examination of the requirement that policyholders’ funds be segregated from the 
shareholders’ fund. This necessitates a separate policyholders’ underwriting fund (PUF) and 
policyholders’ investment fund (PIF). The chapter also discusses the issues where there are 
deficits in the underwriting fund. Where Takaful can only operate as a joint-stock company 
(JSC), there is a potential for conflict of interests between policyholders and shareholders.  
Reflecting the underpinning mutuality principles, policyholders have a role in decision-
making but unless there is some form of governance committee there is no formal mechanism 
under the standard JSC for this to occur. The thesis provides some responses to this issue. 
Takaful principles also require establishing Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSBs). The chapter 
queries the practicality of applying prohibited elements, principles, and models of Takaful to 
joint-stock companies (JSCs) which is examined in later chapters. It adopts a Sharia 
alternative approach espoused by the international Islamic scholar, Professor Mustafa Al-
Zarqaa. Al-Zarqaa’s model permits conventional insurance on the condition that it avoids all 
Sharia prohibited investment activities. 
Chapter 5 compares Takaful insurance with other forms of insurance, particularly mutual 
insurance and conventional insurance. Takaful insurance and conventional insurance have the 
same legal form as joint-stock companies (JSCs), but Takaful insurance theoretically 
functions similar to mutual insurance. In both Takaful and mutual insurance, the members 
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(the insured) are the owners and the insurer of the insurance pool. The chapter examines the 
limitations and restricted capacity of mutual insurance to provide protection on specific types 
of risks and the difficulties in providing coverage for potentially catastrophic risks. 
As re-insurance is an inseparable part of insurance, chapter 6 discusses conventional 
(commercial) re-insurance and re-Takaful (Islamic re-insurance). It re-iterates the application 
of Takaful insurance principles to re-Takaful. It questions whether Takaful insurance 
companies are permitted to re-insure with conventional re-insurers under the Islamic 
principle of darura (necessity or dire need). Saudi re-insurance regulations are also critically 
analysed in the chapter. It adopts a Sharia alternative approach modified from Al-Zarqaa’s 
insurance model, as elaborated in chapter 4. Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach 
permits conventional re-insurance provided that all Sharia prohibited investment activities are 
avoided. 
Chapter 7 examines whether Takaful insurance and Takaful legislation in Saudi Arabia are 
Sharia-compliant. The chapter provides a critical review of SAMA, the Quasi-Judicial 
Insurance Committees, and insurance laws and regulations. Central to chapter 7 is the 
analysis of a selection of annual reports of Saudi Takaful companies to determine whether 
those companies are Sharia-compliant. The chapter argues that Takaful principles and models 
may be impossible to apply in practice. The chapter concludes that Al-Zarqaa’s models are 
Sharia alternatives that, if adopted, can avoid all the difficulties and obstacles facing Takaful 
insurance and re-Takaful in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular. 




Saudi Arabia – Legal Framework 
2.1. Introduction 
The first part of this chapter outlines a general overview of the legal system in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. It explains how the Basic Law of Governance underpins and emphasizes the 
importance of Sharia (the religion of Islam) and the role of the King. This is necessary to set 
the context for the discussion of how Takaful (Islamic insurance) is regulated in Saudi Arabia 
and the need for compliance with Sharia. 
The second part of the chapter examines the key legislation and regulatory framework 
governing the financial system in Saudi Arabia; this sets the context for the discussion of 
insurance regulation in Saudi Arabia. It first details the principal powers and functions of the 
key regulator, the Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI), as well as the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) and its related laws: the Capital Market Law (CML) and the 
Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR). Reference is also made to the Committee for the 
Resolution of Securities Disputes which sits under the umbrella of the CMA. 
The second part also examines the role of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) as 
the peak financial system regulator. It gives a brief history of SAMA, its functions, main 
goals, and the four Quasi-Judicial Committees that come under its umbrella. SAMA is a 
governmental body that regulates and supervises banks, insurance companies, finance 
companies, and credit information companies. SAMA includes the four Committees 
responsible for dealing with disputes related to banking, insurance, finance, and credit 
information. 
The next section provides an overview of the Saudi legal and political structure. 
2.2. An Overview of the Legal System 
The governing laws of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are derived from the religion of Islam 
and must comply with the Holy Quran (Allah Book) and the Sunnah (the traditional practices 
of the Prophet Mohammed, Peace be upon him and his family).1 The King is authorised to 
legislate and enact complementary regulations through Royal Orders or Royal Decrees, 
provided that these Royal Orders and Decrees are not in conflict with Sharia.2 For example, 
the King cannot issue a Royal Order or Decree that would legalize maysir (gambling) which 
                                                             
1 Basic Law of Governance 1992 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Order No. A/90), art 1. 
2 Esther van Eijk, 'Sharia and National Law in Saudi Arabia' in Jan Michiel Otto (ed), Sharia Incorporated A 
Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Leiden 
University Press, 2010) 139, 145-6. It also explains that the Sunnah which is the Prophet Mohammed’s (Peace 
be upon him and his family) deeds and teachings has many Islamic doctrines and schools throughout the Islamic 
history. King Abdu-Aziz applied the Hanbali Doctrine as Islamic jurisprudence; Fouad Al-Farsy, Modernity and 
Tradition, the Saudi Equation (Kegan Paul International, 1990) 37 explains that there are four main Islamic 
Doctrines (Schools): Hanbali, Shafii, Hanafi and Maliki. Saudi Arabia applies the Hanbali Doctrine, however, 
judges can rely upon the other three Doctrines if the Hanbali’s theories and books cannot solve the case or the 
dispute. The sake of this chapter is to give a general overview of the Saudi legal system. 
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is prohibited by Islamic Sharia.3 Similarly, Takaful and other insurance laws must not 
conflict with Sharia. However, as there is a lack of knowledge and research on Takaful 
insurance, its application, and its compliance with Sharia, the rules in this area are not widely 
understood. This is addressed by this thesis. 
The political system of Saudi Arabia is based on an absolute monarchy.4 There is no formal 
written constitution restricting the absolute power of the monarch, except the provision not to 
breach the Holy Quran and the Sunnah, nor is there a democratically elected parliament to 
make laws for Saudi Arabia. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and the Majlis Al-Shura 
(Consultative Council) may only make proposals for laws. 
Here, it will be useful to define several basic terms to elucidate the legal system and the 
legislation governing Takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia. 
Royal Order: this is a law or regulation made by the King of Saudi Arabia without 
consultation with the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) nor the Majlis Al-Shura (Consultative 
Council or Shura Council).5 
Royal Decree: this is a law or regulation made by the King of Saudi Arabia after consultation 
with the Council of Ministers and the Majlis Al-Shura (Shura Council).6 
Ministerial Order: this is an administrative policy or internal regulation issued by a Minister 
in relation to matters within that Ministry. The Minister must be delegated and authorised by 
the King to issue a Ministerial Order, either through a Royal Decree or a Royal Order. 
Ministerial Orders have the force of law.7 Most insurance laws, regulations, and 
implementing rules are issued by Ministerial Orders, particularly by the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA). 
The modern structure of the Saudi legal system is founded on Royal Orders issued in 1992.8 
In 1992, the King issued three Royal Orders enacting three laws: the Basic Law of 
Governance, the Shura (consultation) Council Law, and the Provinces (Regional) Law.9 This 
was followed in 1993, by a Royal Order enacting the Council of Ministers Law.10 The Basic 
Law of Governance, discussed in the following section, delineates the structure of the Saudi 
legal system. 
 
                                                             
3 The Holy Quran. Al-Maidah. Verses 90 and 91. 
4 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, art 5 (b); Al-Farsy, above n 2, 12, 15, 16. 
5 For example, the Basic Law of Governance, above n 1; The Shura Council is a government’s body providing a 
consultation process for the creation of laws and regulations prior to the King issuing Royal Decrees. See, Shura 
Council Law 1992 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Order, No. A/91), arts s 1, 2, 18. 
6 For example, Capital Market Law 2003 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No. M/30). 
7 For example, Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation 2015 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)). 
8 These were proposed much earlier during the reign of King Khalid (1975-1982) but only implemented much 
later, see Abdullah F Ansary, 'Update: A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System' (2015) Hauser 
Global Law School Program, New York University School of Law. 
9 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1; Shura Council Law, above n 5; Law of Provinces 1992 (Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia by Royal Order No. A/92).    
10 Law of the Council of Ministers 1993 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Order, No. A/13). 
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2.3. Basic Law of Governance 
The Basic Law of Governance contains 83 legal articles across nine chapters. The first 
chapter sets out the general principles of the Saudi legal structure. First, Saudi Arabia is 
declared an Islamic State governed by the Islamic principles.11 The second chapter 
establishes the monarchy as a hereditary monarchy.12 The third chapter deals with the Saudi 
society, culture, families, and education based on the Islamic principles.13 
Chapter fourth establishes economic principles. It protects property and private ownership.14 
The fifth chapter provides rights and duties applied to Saudi Arabia and its citizens in 
accordance with Sharia.15 The sixth chapter deals with the authorities of the State (Saudi 
Arabia).16 Chapters seven, eight, and nine deal with financial affairs, monitoring government 
agencies, and concludes with general provisions.17 The focus of the following section is on 
State authorities. 
2.4. State’s Authorities (Saudi Authority) 
Saudi Arabia consists of three authorities: the Legislative (Regulatory) Authority, the 
Executive Authority, and the Judicial Authority. These three authorities, discussed in turn, 
must co-operate in order to perform their duties. The King is the final and absolute 
authority.18 
2.4.1. Legislative (Regulatory) Branch 
In the Saudi legal system, no term corresponding to the English “legislation” is used. Rather, 
the terms “regulation” and “regulatory” are used.19 This thesis when referring to other 
jurisdictions uses the word ‘legislation’ but in reference to Saudi Arabia refers only to 
regulation.   
The Regulatory Authority is delegated (or competent) to propose and draft laws and 
regulations derived from Sharia that are necessary for protection of citizens and the country.20 
The process of the Regulatory Authority engages the King, the Shura (consultation) Council, 
and the Council of Ministers21 as follows. First, the King is the absolute monarch and has 
                                                             
11 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, arts 1, 8. Arts 2, 3, and 4 handle the holidays, calendar, flag, language 
and the capital city of Saudi Arabia. 
12 Ibid art 5. 
13 For example, that males and females shall attend separate institutions, see Ibid arts 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. 
14 Ibid arts 17, 18. 
15 Ibid arts 23-43. 
16 Ibid arts 44-71. 
17 Ibid arts 72-83. 
18 Ibid art 44. 
19 Eijk, above n 2, 139, 146; Ayoub M Al-Jarbou, 'The Role of Traditionalists and Modernists on the 
Development of the Saudi Legal System' (2007) 21(3) Arab Law Quarterly 191, 201-2; Ansary, above n 8. The 
Saudi Ulama (religious consultative scholars) do not refer to the word “legislation” because the Saudi legal 
source is based on the Islamic Sharia derived from the Holy Quran and the Sunna so “legislation” is only used 
by Allah who would legislate laws. Whereas human-made laws are not made by Allah so Ulama would use the 
term regulation instead of legislation. 
20 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, 1, 67. 
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ultimate power over all the authorities of the State to make final decisions based on Sharia.22 
Second in the hierarchy is the Majlis Al-Shura, the Consultative Council, here is referred to 
as the Shura Council. The Shura Council provides a consultation process for the creation of 
laws and regulations.23 It issues its consultative advice through fatwas (religious decisions) 
made by Ulama (religious scholars) appointed by the King.24 Royal Decrees to be issued by 
the King are first reviewed by the Shura Council.25  
The King has full power to appoint and dismiss members of the Majlis Al-Shura 
(Consultative Council).26 During the process of regulating laws and regulations, the King—as 
Prime Minister—refers State policies to the Shura Council; the Shura Council, as a 
regulatory body, revises laws and regulations and interprets them.27 The Shura Council 
makes its resolutions (decisions) and submits them to the King, who refers them to the 
Council of Ministers (Cabinet) for further review. If the Cabinet agrees with the Shura 
Council’s resolutions, these will become laws and regulations after the King’s final approval. 
If the Cabinet disagrees with the Shura Council’s resolutions, these resolutions will be sent 
back to the Shura Council. The Shura Council will again have to make its resolutions and 
then submit them to the King, who will make the final decision on whether or not to approve 
them as laws or regulations.28 
The Shura Council will not only revise laws and regulations, but also can propose and draft 
new laws as well as proposals to amend existing laws.29 
Third in the hierarchy is the Council of Ministers (Cabinet), presided over by the King in his 
position as Prime Minister.30 By issuing a Royal Decree, the King can appoint or dismiss 
members of the Cabinet.31 The Cabinet is considered a regulatory authority in Saudi Arabia.32 
Its regulatory duties are to approve and amend laws that have been revised and submitted by 
the Shura Council.33 Throughout the process of enacting laws and regulations, the regulatory 
duty of the Cabinet is to review the Shura Council’s resolutions. Once the Shura Council has 
made its resolution or decision regarding drafting or proposing a law, this resolution or 
decision is sent to the Cabinet to be reviewed. The Cabinet, as a regulatory authority, can 
either approve or reject the resolution. If the Cabinet approves the resolution, it becomes a 
law subject to the King’s final approval. If the Cabinet rejects it, it is returned to the Shura 
Council. The Shura Council will review the Cabinet’s refusal and make its resolution which 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
21 Ibid art 67; Ansary, above n 8. 
22 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, arts 44, 48, 55, 60, 61, 65, 66. 
23 Shura Council Law, above n 5, arts 1, 2, 18. 
24 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, art 45; David J Karl, 'Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign 
Attorneys Should Know' (1991) 25(1) George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 131, 
143. 
25 Shura Council Law, above n 5, art 18. 
26 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, art 68; Ibid arts 3, 7, 10. 
27 Shura Council Law, above n 5, art 15. 
28 Ibid art 17. 
29 Ibid art 23. 
30 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, art 56; Law of the Council of Ministers, above n 10, arts 7, 29. 
31 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, arts 57, 58. 
32 Law of the Council of Ministers, above n 10, art 1. 
33 Shura Council Law, above n 5, art 17; Ibid art 19. 
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is then submitted the King. The King will either send it to the Cabinet or make his own final 
decision on whether to make it a law.34 
The Cabinet must apply and implement Islamic Sharia and government laws,35 and also assist 
the King in carrying out his duties and policies.36 The Cabinet must review laws and 
international treaties before a Royal Decree is issued.37 All ministers may draft and propose a 
law relevant to the appropriate ministry.38 
2.4.2. Executive Branch 
The Basic Law of Governance, Law of the Council of Ministers, and Law of Provinces (Law 
of Regions) deal with executive authority. The King has the power to supervise the 
implementation of Islamic Sharia39 and the authority to monitor the extent of implementation 
of laws, regulations, and resolutions.40 
The Council of Ministers (Cabinet) is the direct executive authority after the King41 and has 
full power over the administrative and executive affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
This power includes, for example, monitoring the implementation of laws and regulations and 
monitoring governmental organisations’ performance and functions.42 Each government 
ministry, agency, authority, and body providing services to citizens and non-citizens is 
considered to be a part of the Executive Authority.43 
Each province in Saudi Arabia must have a Governor who is accountable and responsible 
before the Minister of Interior.44 The Governor is responsible for administering the province 
within that jurisdiction.45 
2.4.3. Judicial Branch 
The Judiciary Authority consists of courts and judges46 who are required to apply Islamic 
Sharia and the King’s laws.47 Judges are appointed or dismissed by a Royal Order from the 
King based on a proposal submitted by the Supreme Judicial Council.48 
                                                             
34 Law of the Council of Ministers, above n 10, art 19. 
35 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, art 57. 
36 Ibid art 56. 
37 Law of the Council of Ministers, above n 10, art 20. 
38 Ibid art 22. 
39 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, art 55. 
40 Law of the Council of Ministers, above n 10, art 29. 
41 Ibid arts 19, 24. 
42 Ibid art 24. 
43 King Khalid Foundation, [ ةكلمملل ةیلخادلا ةسایسلا يف ةسارد ] A Study of the Kingdom's Internal Politics 
<http://www.kingkhalid.org.sa/Gallery/Text/ViewBooks.aspx?View=Page&PageID=24&PageNo=1&BookID=
57&cntrlId=1>. 
44 Law of Provinces, above n 9, arts 4, 5. 
45 Ibid art 7 (b). 
46 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, art 46; Law of the Judiciary 2007 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal 
Decree No. M/78), art 1. 
47 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, art 48. 
48 Ibid art 52; Eijk, above n 2, 139, 144, 145; Al-Jarbou, above n 19, 201. 
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Under Sharia, legislative, executive, and judicial powers cannot be exercised by a single 
authority. Especially important is to grasp the Islamic principle of judicial independence 
which requires courts to be independent of government and prohibits any interference from 
authorities.49 According to the Grand Mufti (Islamic Imam) of Saudi Arabia and other 
Imams, the independence of the judicial system and the judges is compulsory and absolutely 
indispensable. To achieve justice, judges must make their judgements and rulings without 
influence from individuals or government bodies.50 Similarly, the Saudi law insists on the 
principle of judiciary independence, separate from any influence or pressure that might affect 
judgements. This is evident in the Basic Law of Governance that states: 
The Judiciary shall be an independent authority. There shall be no power over judges in their 
judicial function other than the power of the Islamic Shari[a].51 
The Law of the Judiciary states: 
Judges are independent and, in the administration of justice, they shall be subject to no authority other 
than the provisions of Sharia and laws in force. No one may interfere with the judiciary.52 
The Saudi court system is composed of three tiers: (1) the Supreme Court, (2) Courts of 
Appeal, and (3) First Instance Courts such as General Courts, Criminal Courts, Family 
Courts, Commercial Courts, and Labor Courts.53 
2.4.4. Other Dispute Resolution Bodies 
(1) The Board of Grievances (Administrative Appeals) 
The Board of Grievances (otherwise known as the Court of Administrative Appeals) was 
created in 1955.54 It was an administrative court that was competent to hear citizens’ 
complaints against the government’s officials, ministries, and agencies.55 
                                                             
49 Saleh Fawzan Al-Fawzan, [ مالسإلا يف يئاضقلا ماظنلا ] The Judiciary System in Islam (1997) Sahab Salafi Network 
<https://www.sahab.net/forums/index.php?app=forums&module=forums&controller=topic&id=36320>; 
Islamweb, [ مالسإلا يف ءاضقلا ةیلالقتسا ] The Judiciary Independence in Islam, Fatwa No. 159065 (2011) Islamweb 
<http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=159065>. 
50 Saleh Fawzan Al-Fawzan, [ مالسإلا يف يئاضقلا ماظنلا ] The Judiciary System in Islam (1997) Sahab Salafi Network 
<https://www.sahab.net/forums/index.php?app=forums&module=forums&controller=topic&id=36320>; 
Islamweb, [ مالسإلا يف ءاضقلا ةیلالقتسا ] The Judiciary Independence in Islam, Fatwa No. 159065 (2011) Islamweb 
<http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=159065>. 
51 Basic Law of Governance, above n 1, art 46 
52 Law of the Judiciary, above n 46, art 1. 
53 Ibid art 9. Arts 10 to 14 give more details about the Supreme Court in term of numbers of judges, its Chief 
and his responsibilities, panels and jurisdictions. Arts 15 to17 give more details about Courts of Appeals. Arts 
18 to 30 give more details about First Instance Courts and their panels. However, the purpose of this section is 
to give an overview of the Saudi legal framework without getting into some other details that may not be 
directly relevant to this section. 
54 Forming an Independent Court in the Name of the Board of Grievances [ ملاظملا ناوید مسأب لقتسم ناوید لیكشت ] 1955 
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree, No. 7/13/8759). 
55 Eijk, above n 2, 139, 147; International Business Publications, Saudi Arabia Investment, Trade Laws and 




The King has full power over the Board of Grievances. The Board’s judges and judgements 
have the same advantages granted to the judges and their judgements by the Law of the 
Judiciary.56 
The Board of Grievances is composed of three courts in hierarchical order, the High 
Administrative Court, the Administrative Courts of Appeal, and the Administrative Courts.57 
The High Administrative Court has jurisdiction over judgements and sentences that have 
been appealed at the Administrative Courts of Appeal;58 the Administrative Courts of Appeal 
have jurisdiction to review appeals made by litigants against judgements issued at the 
Administrative Courts (that is, the Administrative Courts of First Instance).59 The 
Administrative Courts have jurisdiction over administrative disputes or any case involving 
the government (either civil or military) as a litigating party.60 
(2) Quasi-Judicial Committees 
In the judicial structure, courts and Ulama refuse to accept and apply regulations 
independently of Sharia law. Ulama are the Saudi religious scholars who are Islamic 
specialists responsible for giving the King Islamic advice (called fatwa) on any subject.61 
Judges take fatwas into consideration when making decisions and imposing sentences62 but 
this causes particular problems with the regulation of commercial entities and disputes. As a 
consequence, in Saudi Arabia there are a number of Committees which have functions similar 
to those of the tribunals and courts applying the regulations. 
Such Committees are quasi-judicial; their purpose is to solve specific types of disputes. These 
Committees include, but are not limited to, the Tariffs Committee (1953); the Committee for 
Commercial Paper Disputes (1963); and the Committee for the Settlement of Labor Disputes 
(1969).63 The Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (LSCIC) 2003 
established a committee for insurance disputes to be issued,64 and the Capital Market Law 
(CML) 2003 established a committee for the resolution of securities disputes.65 This is 
important for this thesis in examining the regulation of insurance companies in Saudi Arabia. 
The role of the Committee to resolve insurance disputes is discussed when dealing with the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and in chapter 3.3. 
The next section examines the regulatory framework that applies to insurance companies in 
Saudi Arabia, in particular the Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI), the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA), and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). 
                                                             
56 Law of the Board of Grievances 2007 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No. M/78), art 1. 
57 Ibid art 8. 
58 Ibid art 11. 
59 Ibid art 12. 
60 Ibid art 13. 
61 Eijk, above n 2, 139, 146; Al-Jarbou, above n 19, 193. 
62 Eijk, above n 2, 139, 172. 
63 Ibid 139, 146. 
64 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 2003 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree 
M/32, art 20. 
65 Capital Market Law, above n 6, art 25 (A). 
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2.5. The Regulatory Framework 
The institutions that are responsible for the regulation of Saudi Arabian insurance companies 
are: the Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI), the Capital Market Authority (CMA), 
and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). Their interrelationship and organisational 
structures are set out in the Table following. 













As will be discussed below and in detail in chapter 4, SAMA is the insurance supervisor and 
regulator. Insurance companies are also subject to laws governing joint-stock corporations 
(Capital Market Authority, CMA) and the regulatory authority of the Ministry of Commerce 
and Investment (MCI). 
As will be discussed below, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) is the principal supervisor 
and regulator for securities.67 The CMA is responsible for setting securities regulations, 
regulating the stock market and issuance of securities, protecting the market from fraud and 
non-disclosure, and granting JSCs with securities licences.68 Since the law requires all 
insurance companies to be JSCs,69 the CMA is, therefore, a supervisor and regulator for 
insurance companies as JSCs in relation to securities matters and the capital market 
                                                             
66 The Table is made by the thesis researcher. 
67 Capital Market Law, above n 6, art 2. 
68 Capital Market Law, above n 6, art 5. 














laws/regulations (CMLs) only while SAMA is a supervisor and regulator for insurance 
companies in relation to insurance matters.70 
The next sections look in more detail at the regulatory authority of the Ministry of Commerce 
and Investment (MCI), the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA). 
2.6. The Functions of the Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI) 
The MCI is responsible for the registration of all companies and the issue of commercial 
licences in Saudi Arabia.71 In Saudi Arabia, the following types of companies can be 
registered: General Partnership, Limited Partnership, Joint Venture, Joint-Stock Company 
(JSC), Limited Liability Company (LLC), and Holding Company.72 All types of companies 
must be registered under the MCI except Joint Venture Companies.73 Insurance companies 
are required to be registered as joint-stock companies (JSCs).74 Violators of regulations can 
be penalised by the MCI. MCI’s decisions can be appealed in the Grievance Court 
(Administrative Court).75 
The MCI has full authority over commercial, trading, and company matters except for 
matters related to joint-stock companies (JSCs) listed on the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) 
which have been transferred to the Capital Market Authority (CMA),76 see 2.6.4 below. 
Although the CMA is responsible for supervising and regulating JSCs, the MCI is the 
relevant authority for granting JSC commercial permits (licences).77 Under the MCI, the 
Companies Law (CL) 2015 is the relevant law regulating and granting commercial permits to 
all types of companies.78 In relation to insurance, all insurance companies are required to 
have  an MCI permit to operate in Saudi Arabia.79 
The next important constituent of the financial regulatory system in Saudi Arabia is the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA). 
2.7. Regulatory Structures - the Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
2.7.1. Introduction 
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) was formally established in 200380 as an independent 
statutory body under the supervision of the Prime Minister (the King). Its powers and 
                                                             
70 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 'Financial Stability Report' (2017) SAMA, 39. 
71 Companies Law 2015 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No. M/3), arts 12, 13.  
72 Ibid arts 3, 182. 
73 Ibid art 14. 
74 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 64, art 3 (1); Implementing Rules for the 
Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 2004 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Ministerial Order 
No. 1/596), art 1 (13). 
75 Companies Law, above n 71, art 16. 
76 Ibid arts 1, 109, 219, 221. 
77 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 64, arts 2 (1), 3 (1), 18. 
78 Companies Law, above n 71, arts 14-15. 
79 Ibid arts 12, 13; Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 64, arts 2 (1), 3 (1). 
80 Capital Market Law, above n 6. It had an unofficial status prior to this decree. 
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functions are set out in the Capital Market Law (CML).81 The CMA is the principal regulator 
for securities82 and has a Board of Directors responsible for its operations.83 In exercising its 
powers, the CMA must co-operate with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA).84 Its 






                                                             
81 Ibid art 4. 
82 Ibid art 2. 
83 Ibid art 7. 
84 Ibid art 6 (b). 




2.7.2. CMA’s Principal Functions 
CMA’s main functions are:86 
1) issuing regulations, rules, instructions, and implementations subject to the Capital 
Market Law (CML); 
2) regulating the stock market exchange; 
3) regulating and supervising the issuance of securities and securities’ activities; 
4) protecting the capital market against unfair activities, cheating, and fraud; 
5) regulating and supervising disclosure; 
6) licencing companies dealing with securities.87 
2.7.3. Securities 
Under the CMA, “securities” mean convertible shares of companies, tradable debt 
instruments, investment units issued by investment funds, any instruments related to 
shareholders’ profits rights and assets distributions, or any other instruments made and 
considered by the CMA’s Board to protect the Saudi stock exchange (including the financial 
system) and investors.88  
The exclusions from securities, which the CMA does not deal with, are commercial bills 
(cheques, bills of exchange, and order notes), money transfers, banking transactions, and 
insurance policies.89 
Insurance companies are subject to regulation and supervision by the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), explained below in the following section, and as a listed joint-
stock company supervised and regulated by the CMA.90 
2.8. Regulatory Structures – Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was established in 1952. SAMA fills dual 
roles, as the central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and as its regulator.91 
2.8.1. Organisational Structure 
The organisational structure of SAMA is illustrated in the Table below.92 
 
 
                                                             
86 Capital Market Law, above n 6, art 5. 
87 Ibid art 5. 
88 Ibid art 2. 
89 Ibid art 3. 
90 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 'Financial Stability Report', above n 70, 39. 
91 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), SAMA Functions (2020) SAMA <http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-
US/About/Pages/SAMAFunction.aspx>. 





2.8.2. Functions of SAMA 
SAMA’s principal functions are: 
• issuing the Saudi currency, dealing with banking transactions for the Saudi 
governmental bodies, and regulating and monitoring commercial banks and currencies 
exchange;93 
• supervising and monitoring co-operative insurance companies, re-insurance 
companies, and all insurance activities. It has a total authority over insurance and re-
insurance companies, any insurance agencies, and all matters related to insurance;94 
• supervising finance companies;95 and 
• supervising credit information companies.96 
                                                             
93 Charter of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 1957 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No. 23), 
arts 1, 3.  
94 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 64, arts 2, 8, 9, 11, 19. 
95 Finance Companies Control Law 2012 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No. M/51), arts 1, 4, 5, 
21; Implementing Regulation of the Finance Companies Control Law 2013 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by 
SAMA Ministerial Order), art 2. This implementing was issued based on art 39 of the Finance Companies 
Control Law issued by Royal Decree No. M/51. 
96 Credit Information Law 2008 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No. M/37), arts 1, 8, 11. 
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SAMA also applies Islamic Sharia to commercial banking activities.97 SAMA is the relevant 
authority for dealing with international standards such as those comprised in the Basel 
Accords98 and standards contained in the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)99 for risk 
management, corporate governance, and internal control.100 These are important to the thesis 
as discussed in the next chapter. Many aspects and fundamentals of insurance are similar to 
those in banking, and risk exposure in conventional insurance also occurs in Takaful 
insurance. It is also important to examine whether Takaful insurance companies in Saudi 
Arabia can comply with international insurance standards while maintaining Sharia-
compliance. 
2.8.3. Quasi-Judicial Committees under SAMA 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) has control and jurisdiction over four quasi-
judicial committees which have a similar function to Tribunals. A fifth committee dealing 
with securities disputes is under the supervision of the Capital Market Authority (CMA), 
discussed earlier. The committees can issue enforceable rulings (resolutions) and have their 
own appellate quasi-judicial committees. These four quasi-judicial committees are: 
• Committee for Banking Disputes responsible for solving disputes between banks and 
their clients;101 
• Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations responsible for solving 
disputes arising between insurance companies (insurers) and their consumers 
(insured) and disputes arising between insurance companies (insurers);102 
                                                             
97 Mohammad Sulaiman Al-Jasser, 'Speech of SAMA's Governor' (Paper presented at the Fifth Conference of 
Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions [ ةیمالسإلا ةیلاملا تاسسؤملاو فراصملل سماخلا رمتؤمل ], Damascus, Syria, 15-16 
March 2010) <http://www.sama.gov.sa/ar-
sa/News/Pages/Speech_by_SAMA_Governor_in_The_Fifth_Conference_for_Islamic_Banks.aspx>. 
98 Ibid.  
99 The IFSB’s website defines itself as:  
[A]n international standard-setting organisation that promotes and enhances the soundness and stability 
of the Islamic financial services industry by issuing global prudential standards and guiding principles 
for the industry, broadly defined to include banking, capital markets and insurance sectors. The IFSB 
also conducts research and coordinates initiatives on industry related issues, as well as organises 
roundtables, seminars and conferences for regulators and industry stakeholders. 
The IFSB is an organisation located in Malaysia and contains 189 members in which SAMA, as the Saudi 
government insurance regulator and central of bank, is a member of it. Since the IFSB specializes in Banking, 
Capital Market, and Insurance, SAMA is the Saudi government insurance regulator and central of bank and all 
insurers are listed companies in the stock market, it is important and relevant to explain the IFSB. 
100 Al-Jasser, above n 97. 
101 Banking Control Law 1966 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No. M/5), art 25. It was formerly 
known as the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes. See, Amending the Title of the Committee for 
Settlement of Banking Disputes [ ةیكنبلا تاعزانملا يف لصفلا ناجل ىمسم لیدعت ] 2012 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by 
Royal Order  No. 37441). This Committee can also impose penalties on any bank breaching banking laws. See 
Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes [ ةیفرصملا تافالخلا ةیوست ةنجل ] 1987 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
by Royal Order No. 8/729). 
102 Establishing the Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations [  تاعزانملا يف لصفلا ةنجل لیكشت
ةینیمأتلا تافلاخملاو ] 2005 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No. 71); Law On Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies, above n 64, art 20. Also, this Committee can impose penalties on insurers, reinsurers and 
other insurance agencies that have violated insurance laws. 
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• Committee for Finance Disputes and Violations responsible for imposing penalties for 
breaches of the Finance Companies Control Law, the Finance Lease Law and their 
implementation;103 and 
• Committee for Considering Violations and Solving Credit Information Disputes 
responsible for applying the penalties for breaches this law (Credit Information Law). 
It is also responsible for solving disputes arising between the credit companies and 
their consumers.104 
These Committees function as quasi-judicial Tribunals. Sharia courts and religious judges 
refuse to accept disputes related to banks and insurance alleging that these banking and 
insurance matters are prohibited under Sharia law.105 These quasi-judicial committees are run 
by legal judges called (investigators) rather than religious judges. 
The most important aspects for this thesis are SAMA’s regulation, supervision of insurance 
companies, and the Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations. More detailed 
information concerning this committee is in chapter 3.3. 
2.8.4. SAMA as the Insurance Regulator 
As discussed in chapter 4, SAMA is the insurance supervisor and regulator. Insurance 
companies, insurance brokers, consultants, inspectors, loss adjusters, experts in settling 
insurance claims, and actuaries are required to apply to SAMA for a licence to operate in the 
Saudi insurance industry.106 Once the application is approved by SAMA, the application is 
forwarded to the Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI) which ensures that the 
application complies with the Companies Law (CL) and other MCI’s requirements.107 An 
insurance/re-insurance company cannot operate without a licence from the MCI.108 Once the 
MCI grants a licence to an insurance company or to occupations in the insurance industry, 
supervision and monitoring are undertaken by SAMA.109 SAMA can impose penalties on 
insurance companies acting in breach of SAMA’s laws and regulations and, in extreme cases, 
SAMA may order the dissolution or winding up the company110 (examples are provided in 
chapter 4). The insurance company can appeal SAMA’s decision to the insurance Committee 
(Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations).111 
SAMA is the exclusive source for insurance laws. This authority derives from its 
authorisation and delegation under Saudi law to issue internal rules and other insurance 
related matters.112 Saudi law also states ‘The instructions needed to apply supervisory and 
control requirements to the insurance sector shall be issued by the Governor [the head of 
                                                             
103 Establishing Banking Comittees and Finance Committees [  ىلوألا ةرئادلاو ةیفرصملا تاعزانملا ةنجلل ىلوألا ةرئادلا لیكشت
ةیفرصملا تافلاخملاو تاعزانملل ةیفانئتسالا ةنجلل ] 2015 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Order No. A/24). 
104 Credit Information Law, above n 96, arts 9 (7), 14. 
105 Eijk, above n 2, 139, 146; Al-Jarbou, above n 19, 193. 
106 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 64, art 2. 
107 Ibid 24.  
108 Ibid arts 3, 18. 
109 Ibid arts 2 (a, b, c, d and e), 3 (3) and 18. 
110 Ibid art 19. 
111 Ibid art 20. 
112 Ibid arts 2, 14, 16-18. 
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SAMA].’113 This delegation enables SAMA to issue rules, regulations, and laws without the 
requirement to go through the complicated bureaucratic processes for laws and regulations 
enacted by Royal Decrees, see 2.2 and 2.4.114 
This thesis asserts that the ability of SAMA to issue regulations without consultation might 
be seen as problematic. The basic concept of the legal system of Saudi Arabia is based on an 
absolute monarchy where only the King has the power to issue laws without consultation, see 
2.2. In relation to insurance, SAMA appears to enjoy the same power. But since the 
authorising regulation (which has been subject to consultation) permits SAMA to make 
regulations and rules without consultation, that should be sufficient. Another issue relates to 
whether SAMA regulations are Sharia compliant. This is taken up in chapter 3.6.115 
SAMA is the government’s supervisory body of insurance companies. It can impose fines for 
violations. Insurers can appeal to the Insurance Committee against those penalties. The 
LSCIC states: 
The committee shall undertake to resolve…violations of regulatory and supervisory 
instructions issued to insurance and re-insurance companies.116 
These Saudi Insurance Committees are active and have an independent operation. The 
General Secretariat of the Committees for Resolution of Insurance Disputes and Violations 
claims that the Committees have enjoyed and have been provided with total independence 
when making rulings as their members are not appointed by SAMA but by the King and the 
Council of Ministers (Cabinet).117 
Their independence from SAMA may be called into question. Studies, in 2018 and 2015, 
indicated that the Insurance Committees are not independent from SAMA as they operate as a 
part of SAMA.118 Although the members of the Committees are appointed independently (by 
the King or the Council of Ministers), the employees of the General Secretariat of the 
Committees for Resolution of Insurance Disputes and Violations are considered SAMA staff 
- but without the privileges of Committee members’ appointments.119 The potential for lack 
                                                             
113 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 74, art 82. 
114 SAMA’s authority is evident in the following examples. The LSCIC (Law on Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies) was enacted by Royal Decree in 2003. But other insurance laws, regulations, guidelines, 
and circulars have been solely issued by SAMA, as described in chapter 3.2. 
115 In Islam all laws must be subject to Sharia, see 4.3. As far as corporations and organisations are concerned, 
compliance with Sharia is usually achieved through a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB), as discussed in 4.6.6. As 
far as Saudi laws are concerned, the Majlis Al-Shura (Consultative Council), introduced in 2.4, ensures Sharia-
compliance. Yet SAMA has no SSB, and its laws and regulations are not either reviewed or discussed with the 
Majlis Al-Shura. 
116 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 64, art 20. 
117 General Secretariat of the Committees for Resolution of Insurance Disputes & Violations, Guiding Manual 
[ يداشرإلا لیلدلا ], 2-3; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), How to File a Claim against Insurance 
Companies ]نیمأتلا تاكرش ىلع ىوكش مدقت فیك[  (2018) SAMA <https://samacares.sa/guides/complaint-against-
insurance-companies/>. 
118 Wissam Hachem et al, 'Insurance and Reinsurance in Saudi Arabia: Overview' (2018) Practical Law Country 
Q&A, [33]; Clyde & Co (C&C), 'Insurance and Reinsurance in Saudi Arabia: Overview' (2015) (C&C), [33]. 
119 It is also significant that the General Secretariat was located in the SAMA building for many years, and has 
only recently moved into its own building. The government providing a building to the General Secretariat is 
acceptable, but the unusual is the General Secretariat staying in the SAMA building for many years. 
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of independence of these Committees is important. The problem is not unique to Saudi 
Arabia. In many countries, government ministers have powers of appointment and can refuse 
to reappoint members who are considered to have made ‘incorrect’ decisions contrary to 
government policy.120 
If these Committees are not independent, then SAMA becomes both the prosecutor and the 
decision-maker. If this is the case, the lack of independence of the Committees may be 
contrary to the Islamic principle of judicial independence requiring impartiality of decision-
makers, see 2.4.3. 
The next institution relevant to Takaful insurers, but not a formal part of the regulatory 
framework, is the Saudi Arabian stock exchange (Tadawul). 
2.9. The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) 
The Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) has been established for securities trading. The legal 
status of Tadawul is as a joint-stock company (JSC) not listed on the Saudi stock exchange. It 
is the only entity authorised by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) to carry out securities 
trading.121 Unlike stock exchanges in countries such as Australia, the Saudi stock exchange is 
tightly controlled by government. Tadawul has a Board of Directors that consists of nine 
members nominated by the CMA’s Board and appointed by the Council of Ministers 
(Cabinet).122  
Being authorised by the CMA, Tadawul is responsible for operating the Securities Depository 
Centre Rules (SDC).123 The SDC is responsible for the transactions of deposits, transfers, 
settlements, and clearing and registering securities ownership in relation with exchange 
trading.124 Tadawul may charge the issuers of listed securities, investors, and others fees for 
its services pursuant to the Capital Market Law (CML).125  
The CMA is the body responsible for listing rules and corporate governance rules. Through 
its Board, Tadawul can propose important regulations, rules, and instructions for the stock 
market and submit them to the CMA for approval.126 Tadawul also operates as a quasi-
regulator of insurance companies as all insurers in Saudi Arabia are listed on the stock 
exchange.127 
                                                             
120 See for example in Australia where the Minister for Immigration did not reappoint members of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal who were considered to have ideologically opposed views to the government 
of the day. See Guardian News & Media, Refugee Tribunal Members Lose Contracts after Peter Dutton 
Criticisms (2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jun/02/contracts-wont-be-renewed-for-
refugee-review-tribunal-members>. 
121 Capital Market Law, above n 6, art 20 (a). 
122 Ibid art 22 (b). 
123 Securities Depository Centre Rules 2012 (Capital Market Authority by Resolution No. 2-17-2012), art 1; Ibid 
art 26 (a). 
124 Securities Depository Centre Rules, above n 123, art 2 (1); Capital Market Law, above n 6, arts 26, 27. 
125 Capital Market Law, above n 6, arts 24, 30. 
126 Ibid art 23. 
127 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 64, art 3 (1). 
23 
 
The next section provides a brief overview of the relevant laws governing corporations in 
Saudi Arabian financial system. It focuses on the Capital Market Law (CML) and the 
Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR). 
2.10. Capital Market Laws and Regulations (CMLs) 
Capital market laws/regulations (CMLs) refer to all laws and regulations that are subject to 
the Capital Market Authority (CMA). This means that CMLs are not limited to the Capital 
Market Law (CML) but also extend to the extensive list of laws, regulations, and rules 
relating to and regulating entities operating within the capital market.128 
2.10.1. The Capital Market Law (CML) 2003 
The Capital Market Law (CML) is the key instrument regulating the capital market. Its 
provisions regulate: 
• the Capital Market Authority (CMA);129 
• the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul), market manipulation, insider trading,130 and the 
procedures for purchase and sale of shares;131 
• the Security Depositary Center (SDC);132 
• security brokers’ organizations;133  
• investment funds, collective investment schemes;134 and 
• disclosure requirements, prevention of market manipulation and insider trading,135 
and the power to impose sanctions and penalties for violation any of capital market 
laws/regulations (CMLs).136  
2.10.2. The Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR) 2006 
The Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR)137 form part of capital market 
laws/regulations (CMLs) governed and regulated by the CMA.138 The CGR sets out specific 
                                                             
128 The Capital market laws/regulations (CMLs) are: Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR); Listing Rules; 
Securities Depository Centre Rules; Prudential Rules; The Resolution of Securities Disputes Proceedings 
Regulations; Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Rules; Merger and Acquisition 
Regulations; Real Estate Investment Fund Regulations; Investment Fund Regulations; Securities Business 
Regulations; Authorised Persons Regulations; Market Conduct Regulations; Glossary of Defined Terms Used in 
the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market Authority; Offers of Securities Regulations; Credit Rating 
Agencies Regulations; Rules for Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions Investment In Listed Shares; 
Investment Accounts Instructions. See Capital Market Authority (CMA), Implementing Regulations (2020) 
CMA <https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/Regulations/Pages/default.aspx>. 
129 Capital Market Law, above n 6, arts 4-19. 
130 Ibid arts 20, 49-50. 
131 Ibid arts 20-25, 51-54. 
132 Ibid arts 26-30. 
133 Ibid arts 31-38. 
134 Ibid art 39 (a, b, c). 
135 Ibid arts 40-50; Listing Rules 2004 (Capital Market Authority (CMA), Amended in 2012), arts 40, 41, 42. 
136 Capital Market Law, above n 6, arts 55-67. 
137 Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2006 (Capital Market Authority (CMA), 
Amended in 2010). 
138 Capital Market Law, above n 6, art 1. 
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standards for exchange listed joint-stock companies (JSCs).139 It addresses shareholders’ 
rights: general rights, exercise of rights, attendance at the general assembly, voting, and 
dividends.140 The CGR deals with disclosure and transparency141 and sets out requirements 
for the Board of Directors: its main roles and functions, its responsibilities, its formation, its 
committees (Audit Committee, and Nomination and Remuneration Committee), its meetings, 
Directors’ remuneration, and conflicts of interest.142 
Insurance companies as listed JSCs143 are subject to capital market laws/regulations (CMLs) 
including the CML and CGR. There are special regulatory requirements for insurance 
companies, as discussed in chapter 3. 
2.11. Summary 
This chapter explained the hierarchy of law making in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
importance of Sharia law, and the Basic Law of Governance as providing the basic structure 
of the Saudi legal system. It is important in this thesis to distinguish the source of the law—
whether by Royal Order, Royal Decree, or Ministry Order—as well as processes for 
regulatory changes. 
This chapter also defined the Saudi regulatory framework. It explained the role of the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) under the capital market laws/regulations (CMLs). This is 
important as Saudi insurance companies are joint-stock companies (JSCs) listed on the Saudi 
stock exchange (Tadawul) and are therefore subject to supervision by the CMA as the 
securities regulator and supervisor of all exchange listed JSCs. Insurance companies, as 
registered companies, are also subject to supervision and control by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Investment (MCI) as the regulator of all companies. Consequently, the 
regulation of insurance companies in Saudi Arabia is multilayered and requires consideration 
of the overlapping roles of SAMA, MCI, and CMA. 
This chapter provided the context for the following chapter examining the specific 
regulations relating to insurance in Saudi Arabia. 
                                                             
139 Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, above n 137, art 1. 
140 Ibid arts 3-7. 
141 Ibid arts 8, 9. 
142 Ibid arts 10-18. 






In Saudi Arabia, there are three important types of insurance: general insurance, health 
insurance, and life insurance.1 The principal types of general insurance are accident and 
liability insurance (A&L), automobile, property, marine, aviation, energy, engineering and 
other insurance.2 General insurance is provided by 30 of the 33 insurance companies.3 As 
noted in chapter 1.6, the thesis is limited to general insurance. Chapter 4 discusses Islamic 
insurance (Takaful) which is the only insurance permitted in Saudi Arabia4 and is the focus of 
the thesis. 
The following Table 3.1 sets out Takaful companies’ classification by insurance segments.5 
In the Table, P&S refers to life insurance; A&L refers to accident and liability insurance. The 










                                                             
1 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 2004 (Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia by Ministerial Order No. 1/596), art 3. 
2 Ibid. Art 3 also lists types of accidents and liability insurance (A & L) that includes: insurance for personal 
accidents, work related accidents, employer liability, third-party liability, general liability, products liability, 
medical liability, professional liability, theft and burglary, breach of trust (fiduciary duty), and others.   
3 Aljazira Capital, Insurance Sector Report (2016), 2-3 <http://www.aljaziracapital.com.sa/report_file/ess/SEC-
349.pdf>. Aljazira Capital is a closed joint-stock company (JSC) authorised by the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) to deal with securities conduct; Clyde & Co (C&C), 'Insurance and Reinsurance in Saudi 
Arabia: Overview' (2015) (C&C), 4. The total was 35, but two companies have been suspended by SAMA from 
providing insurance. See Albilad Capital, Saudi Insurance Sector 2017 (2018), 1 <http://www.albilad-
capital.com/Research_EnglishReport/InsuranceSectorQ417EN.pdf>; Atlas Magazine, 'Insurance News from 
Africa and the Middle East', Atlas Magazine: Insurance News Around the World, May 2018, 30-4 
<https://www.atlas-mag.net/sites/default/files/AtlasMagazine_2018-05_en.pdf>. 
4 Serap O Gönülal, Takaful and Mutual Insurance: Alternative Approaches to Managing Risks (World Bank 
Publications, 2013), 18. 




Company Aviation Energy Marine P&S A&L Engineering Property/ 
Fire 
Motor Health Reinsurance 
Bupa Arabia         Yes  
Co. for Co-op 
Insurance 
 Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Med Gulf   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Al Alamiya   Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Al Sagr  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Aljazira 
Takaful 
   Yes       
Al Rajhi Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
SABB Takaful   Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Alinma Tokio   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
MetLife AIG 
ANB 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
AXA   Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
UCA Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Allianz SF Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Saudi Re          Yes 
Saudi United   Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Alahli Takaful 
Co. 
   Yes       
Solidarity 
Saudi 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Arabian 
Shield 
    Yes   Yes Yes  
Buruj   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Saudi Enaya         Yes  
SAICO Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ACE Arabia   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Wataniya 
Insurance 
  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Trade Union   Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Weqaya 
Takaful 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Saudi Indian 
Co. 
  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Malath   Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Amana   Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Salama   Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Allied   Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
GGI Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Sanad 
Insurance 
  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Gulf Union   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Al-Ahlia 
Insurance 
  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Arabia 
Insurance 





                                                             
6 The Table is taken from Ibid 3. This 2016 Table is the latest one available. 
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In chapter 7, a selection of the annual reports of Saudi insurance companies are critically 
examined including the Cooperative Insurance Company, known as Tawuniya, which is the 
largest insurance company. Tawuniya is the only insurer with mixed government and private 
ownership;7 all other insurers are privately owned.8 Tawuniya was established in 19869 and is 
listed and traded on the Saudi stock exchange. It was the first insurer in the country to offer 
various types of insurance.10  
All insurance and re-insurance are provided by joint-stock companies (JSCs).11 Insurance 
companies, including government and privately owned insurance companies, are listed on the 
Saudi stock exchange as JSCs.12 Insurance companies, like other corporations, are subject to 
capital market laws13 and regulations of the Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI) 
particularly the Companies Law (CL) 2015, as discussed in chapter 2.8.14 
                                                             







Vu/>; Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), Financial Statement and Independent Auditors’ Report for 
the Year Ended December 31, 2015 Tawuniya <https://www.tawuniya.com.sa/docs/default-source/Financial-
Reports-Documents/tawuniya-2015-fs-en.pdf?sfvrsn=0>. Tawuniya is owned by two government bodies (the 
Public Pension Agency that owns 23.79 per cent of shares and the General Organization for Social Insurance 
that owns 22.83 per cent of shares) and the public (shareholders) who own 53.37 per cent of shares. See 
Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), The Board of Directors' Report (2018) Tawuniya, 62 
<file://ad.uws.edu.au/dfshare/HomesPTA$/90932136/Desktop/Takaful%20Resources/Board%20reports%20201
8/ ةینواعتلا .pdf>. 




Ym5QMVWRiYGOiHEzK1IDsop6zSUREAfCHfOg!!/>. Allianz Saudi Fransi Cooperative Insurance Co is 
owned by the Banque Saudi Fransi, the SNI Holding Company, and the IGF International Company; Tadawul, 




Ym5QMVWRiaGuiHEzK1IDsop6zSUREAUjFhsw!!/>. Allied Cooperative Insurance Group (ACIG) is owned 
by the Islamic Development Bank and the Company of ACIG; Also, the Mediterranean & Gulf Insurance & 
Reinsurance Co. is owned by the Mediterranean & Gulf Insurance & Reinsurance Co. and the Saudi Investment 
Bank. The Islamic Arab Insurance Company (SALAMA) is owned by the Islamic Arab Insurance Company. 
The Saudi United Co-operative Insurance Company (Walaa) is owned by the IGI Company. 
9 Company for Cooperative Insurance (Tawuniya), Abdout Tawuniya (2020) Tawuniya 
<https://www.tawuniya.com.sa/en/about-us/about-tawuniya>. 
10 Tadawul, above n 7; Cooperative Insurance Company, above n 7. 
11 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 2003 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree 
M/32), art 3 (1); Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 
1, art 1 (13). 
12 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 3 (1); Implementing Rules for the 
Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 1, art 1 (13). 
13 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 2 (2.a); Insurance Corporate 
Governance Regulation 2015 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)), art 4 (c). 
14 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, arts 2 (1), 18, 24; Insurance 
Corporate Governance Regulation, above n 13, art 4 (b). 
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In Saudi Arabia, insurance companies must be registered before they can offer insurance.15 
The registration process requires approval from the Ministry of Commerce and Investment 
(MCI) in association with SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency), whereupon insurance 
and re-insurance companies will be granted a licence. Insurance is regulated and supervised 
by SAMA and, for health insurance, the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance (CCHI).16 
As noted in chapter 1.6, health insurance is not considered as this would involve special 
considerations outside the scope of this thesis. 
The next section (3.2) explains the regulatory framework and governing laws for insurance, 
which are: the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (LSCIC) 2003; the 
Risk Management Regulation (RMR) 2008; the Regulation of Reinsurance Activities 2010; 
the Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation (ICGR) 2015; and the Surplus Distribution 
Policy 2015. It then discusses the financial stability of Takaful insurance through the 
discussion of international conventional insurance standards such as the EU (European 
Union) rules contained in Solvency II and adopted by the European Commission (EC) and 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). In Takaful insurance, these 
standards and rules are important as preconditions to satisfy and access the regulatory 
framework for ensuring stability and solvency of Takaful companies as well as examining 
capital requirements regulation in relation to them. In Saudi Arabia, insurance regulations set 
out rules to ensure the capital adequacy and financial viability of insurers and re-insurers.   
Although the EU rules are not formally applicable to Takaful insurance, they provide a point 
of comparison with the existing Saudi regulations.   
The section then examines risk, and goes on to examine risk management particularly 
insurance as a risk management technique from a commercial point of view as well as from a 
Takaful perspective. It then examines risk management regulation in Saudi Arabia 
specifically.  
3.2. The Saudi Insurance Regulatory Framework17  
SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) administers all insurance laws in Saudi Arabia.18 
There is a long list of laws that apply to insurance,19 including anti-fraud regulation, and anti-
money laundering and anti terrorism regulation.20 There are also rules relating to 
                                                             
15 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 1. 
16 Ibid arts 2, 18; Cooperative Health Insurance Law 1999 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No. 
M/10), arts 1, 2. 




18 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, arts 1-2, 18. 
19 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Insurance (2020) SAMA <http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-
US/Laws/Pages/Insurance.aspx>.  
20 Anti Fraud Regulation for Insurance Companies 2008 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Ministrial Order); Anti-




outsourcing21 and corporate governance rules for insurers.22 Other Saudi insurance 
regulations govern motor insurance information, complusory motor insurance, branches for 
insurers and re-insurers, actuarial work, audit committees, surplus distribution, investment, 
online insurance activities, insurance intermediaries, re-insurance activities, and supervision 
and inspection costs.23 Especially important for insurance companies is the Risk Management 
Regulation (RMR) 2008,24 as detailed below at 3.2.4. Regulations also set out the 
requirements for senior positions in financial institutions supervised by SAMA.25 It must be 
noted that SAMA’s insurance circulars, guidance notes, and the like are binding and are 
generally considered to be equivalent to regulations and laws.26 Later sections of this thesis 
discuss issues for Takaful, particularly surplus distribution, risk management regulation, 
investment, and re-insurance activities and supervision.   
The thesis concentrates on specific Saudi insurance regulations: the Law on Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies (LSCIC) 2003, Insurance Corporate Governance 
Regulation (ICGR) 2015, the Surplus Distribution Policy 2015, the Risk Management 
Regulation (RMR) 2008, and the Regulation of Reinsurance Activities (RRA) 2010. The 
Implementing Rules for the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law (IR) 2004 is concerned 
with general and internal regulated procedures for insurance companies such as terms and 
definitions, requirements for granting licences, rules for conducting business, effective 
management, and the like. So, the chapter only discusses some of the IR’s key provisions 
affecting Takaful; the most relevant provisions of the IR are critically examined from a 
Sharia viewpoint in Chapter 7. 
3.2.1. Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (LSCIC) 2003 
The LSCIC, enacted in Saudi Arabia in 2003, was the first Saudi insurance law to regulate 
insurance/re-insurance companies.27 The LSCIC consists of 25 articles and must be consistent 
                                                             
21 Outsourcing Regulation for Insurance and Reinsurance Companies and Insurance Service Providers 2012 
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Ministerial Order). Outsourcing rules are related to service providers who provide 
any services to the insurance company such as accounting services, investment management, information 
system management, utilities for telephones and electricity, etc. 
22 Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation, above n 13,. 
23 Rules on the Collection and Exchange of Motor Insurance Information, The Unified Compulsory Motor 
Insurance Policy; Investment Regulations, Regulations for Branches and Points of Sale Annual Expansion for 
Insurance and/or Reinsurance Brokerage and Agency Companies, the Actuarial Work Regulation for Insurance 
and Reinsurance Companies, the Audit Committee Regulation in Insurance and/or Reinsurance, Surplus 
Distribution Policy, Investment Regulations, Online Insurance Activities Regulation, Insurance Intermediaries 
Regulation, The Regulation of Reinsurance Activities, Regulations for Supervision and Inspection Costs, and 
Insurance Market Code of Conduct Regulation. 
24 Risk Management Regulation 2008 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA)). 
25 Requirements for Appointments to Senior Positions in Financial Institutions Supervised by the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) 2013 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)); Finance Companies Control Law 
2012 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree No. M/51), art 8; Law On Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 6.  
26 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), FAQs: General Insurance Information (2018) SAMA, [25] 
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/Insurance/Pages/FAQs.aspx>. 
27 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11. 
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with Islamic Takaful principles.28 SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) is authorised by 
the LSCIC to regulate insurance and re-insurance companies.29     
SAMA also regulates, monitors, and issues licences to insurance and re-insurance companies, 
and insurance self-employment occupations such as insurance brokers, insurance consultants, 
inspectors and loss adjusters, experts in settling insurance claims, and insurance actuaries.30  
Insurance and re-insurance activities cannot be suspended by insurers and re-insurers without 
SAMA’s consent to do so.31 The level of control is indicated by the requirement that SAMA 
accepts and confirms the appointment of the Board of Directors of insurers and re-insurers.32 
All insurers and re-insurers must pay zakat33 each year as required by Islamic Sharia.34 
SAMA requires insurance/re-insurance companies to appoint two licensed auditors annually. 
The auditors’ financial statements and annual reports must be published to the public.35 
Apparently, not all insurance companies’ annual reports are available on their online websites 
so there is an issue of compliance, see discussion in chapter 7.  
In order to avoid systemic risk, discussed below at 3.6, insurers and re-insurers are prohibited 
from cross ownership, that is ownership of shares in other insurers, unless this is authorised 
by SAMA.36 Insurers and re-insurers are also prohibited from directly owning insurance/re-
insurance brokerage companies.37 Insurers may own a re-insurance brokerage company only 
after obtaining SAMA’s consent (confirmation).38 
SAMA, as the insurance regulator, can request insurers and re-insurers to provide any 
information that SAMA considers necessary such as a statement of revenue, detailed 
information about an insurance/re-insurance activity, statistical information, and information 
about their investments.39 SAMA can also inspect insurers’ and re-insurers’ records and 
accounts.40 SAMA sets rules for investments and the distribution of any surpluses of insurers 
and re-insurers. Following Sharia-compliance measures with regard to Takaful, SAMA 
(through the LSCIC and the Implementing Rules, IR) requires the operator’s account to be 
                                                             
28 Ibid art 1. 
29 Ibid art 2. 
30 Ibid arts 2, 18. 
31 Ibid art 5. 
32 Ibid art 6. Art 7 of the same law (LSCIC) explains that the Board chairman, managing director, Board 
members and general manager are responsible for any violations of insurance laws and their implementations. 
33 Zakat is similar to Western taxation and is defined: 
one of the five tenets of the Islamic teachings, which appears in the form of an obligatory tax aimed at 
purifying a person’s soul and wealth in establishing social justice in society. This Islamic institution 
can be regarded as one of the chief rivals to the welfare systems of today’s capitalism. 
See Mohd Ma'sum Bilah, Applied Islamic Law of Trade and Finance: A Selection of Contemporary Practical 
Issues (S&M Malaysia, 3 ed, 2007) 219, 229. 
34 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 13. 
35 Ibid art 10; Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 1, 
art 73 (2, 3). 
36 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 3 (2). 
37 Ibid art 3 (2). 
38 Ibid art 3 (2). 
39 Ibid art 11. 
40 Ibid art 8. 
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separate from the policyholders’ accounts,41 see chapter 4. Whether this funds separation is 
tangible and applies in practice is critically examined in chapter 7.  
In order to ensure the solvency of insurance and re-insurance companies, SAMA determines 
the required capital and reserves for insurance/re-insurance operations, standard insurance/re-
insurance policies, minimum and maximum premiums paid by the insured, and rights of the 
insured.42 The minimum capital for the establishment of an insurance company is SAR100 
million (US$26,7 million) and the minimum capital for establishing a re-insurance company 
is SAR200 million (US$53,4 million).43 SAMA further requires insurers/re-insurers to issue 
an ‘irrevocable bank guarantee’ equivalent to the required capital and to deposit it into a 
Saudi local bank. This irrevocable bank guarantee must be renewed every year until the 
required capital is paid-up.44 Capital requirements for insurance companies globally are 
discussed below in 3.4.3. 
SAMA also sets the required minimum reserves under the LSCIC (Law on Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies) and the Implementing Rules (IR). SAMA restricts 
underwriting which must not exceed 10 times of the insurer’s/re-insurer’s paid-up capital and 
reserves unless previously approved by SAMA.45 There is also the requirement that twenty 
per cent of ‘the net shareholders’ income’ must be set aside as a statutory reserve until the 
total reserve equals 100 per cent of paid-up capital.46 These requirements and the nature of 
this statutory reserve are discussed in detail below under the capital solvency requirements at 
3.2.2. 
Insurance regulations also provide a surplus distribution mechanism. Under the surplus 
distribution mechanism and implementation contained in SAMA’s Implementing Rules for 
the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law (IR)47 and Surplus Distribution Policy,48 90 per 
                                                             
41 Ibid art 2 (2 a, d); Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, 
above n 1, art 70 (1). 
42 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, arts 2 (2 b,c,e,f), 14. 
43 Ibid art 3. 
44 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 1, art 4 (8). In 
Western economies, bank guarantees enable the insurance company to take out loans to fund its operations. 
Interest payable on those loans is typically deductible from taxation. In this respect, Saudi insurance companies 
are disadvantaged as against conventional insurance companies. Amounts available by way of bank guarantee 
are not necessarily converted into paid-up capital. Note also the Implementing Rules art 58 that 10% of paid-up 
capital (up to 15%) must be deposited into a nominated SAMA account within 3 months of licence being 
granted. 
45 Ibid art 48. 
46 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 15 (applying also to re-insurance 
companies); Ibid art 70 (2g) (applying also to re-insurance companies, see art 1(13)). 
47 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 1, art 70 (2.e). 
It states: 
The following shall be regarded by the Company upon preparation of the statements of insurance 
operations: … e. 10% of the net surplus shall be distributed to the policyholders directly, or in the form 
of reduction in premiums for the next year. The remaining 90% of the net surplus shall e transferred to 
the shareholders’ income statement. 
48 Surplus Distribution Policy 2015 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)), art 1. Art 1 states ‘This Policy 
presents general principles for distribution of surplus to policyholders in accordance with Article 70 (2e) of the 
Implementing Rules for the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law [IR].’ 
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cent of funds from the net surplus is distributed to the shareholders’ account and 10 per cent 
to the policyholders’ account. The importance of these provisions is discussed in chapter 7. 
SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) can impose penalties and sanctions for violations 
of insurance laws. Such penalties, indicated in art 19 of the LSCIC (Law on Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies), are imposed for dismissing consultant/advisors; 
suspending any member of the Board; and preventing or limiting acceptance of new investors 
or subscribers by the company.49 If an insurance company persists in violating insurance 
laws, SAMA can deregister the company, in effect resulting in the company’s dissolution.50 
SAMA’s penalty decisions can be contested in the Insurance Quasi-Judicial Committees,51 as 
explained below in 3.3. It is clear that SAMA is active in enforcing legal requirements,52 
including the Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation (ICGR), as discussed in the next 
part. This insurance law (LSCIC) is critically examined in chapter 4. 
3.2.2. Implementing Rules for the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law (IR) 2004 
This part only discusses key provisions of the Implementing Rules for the Cooperative 
Insurance Companies Law (IR) related to capital, solvency, and technical allocations. 
                                                             
49 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 19. 
50 Ibid art 19. 
51 By arts 20 and 22 of the LSCIC, this was formerly delegated to the Board of Grievances (Administrative 
Appeals) the jurisdiction over insurance appealed cases, amended by Appellate Committee for Solving Insurance 
Disputes and Violations [ ةینیمأتلا تافلاخملاو تاعزانملا يف لصفلل ةیفانئتسالا ةنجللا لیكشت ] 2013 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
by Royal Order No. 35258). Arts 23 to 25 of the LSCIC discuss the publication of the LSCIC in the official 
gazette and the issuance of its implementation. 
52 SAMA recently suspended the Broker Vision Company for Insurance Brokerage from offering any type of 
insurance effective from 13 September 2017 in response to violations of the Law on Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies (LSCIC) and other SAMA’s regulations. SAMA did not give details about the type of 
violations. The suspension continues until the insurer complies with the law. See Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA), SAMA’s Announcement for Suspending the Broker Vision Company for Insurance Brokerage 
from Practicing its Activity ]2020) ]اھطاشن ةسرامم نع نیمأتلا ةطاسول طیسولا ةیؤر ةكرش فاقیإ نأشب دقنلا ةسسؤم نالعإ) SAMA 
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/ar-sa/News/Pages/news13092017.aspx>; Sabq Online Newspaper, [  ةیؤر ةكرش فقوت دقنلا





%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%A7>; Aldmadaen Online Newspaper, [  فقوت دقنلا ةسسؤم
ةبعالتم نیمأت ةكرش ] SAMA Suspends a Violating Insurance Company (2017) Aldmadaen 
<http://www.almadaen.com.sa/267021/>. In January 2016, the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance (CCHI) 
in association with SAMA suspended the Alsagr Insurance Company (Alsagr) for nine months from issuing or 
renewing health insurance policies as a result of a violation of insurance laws. The CCHI and SAMA did not 
provide details about what the violations were. See Alsagr Insurance Company (Alsagr), Board of Directors’ 
Report of 2016 Alsagr, 6 <file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/2017-03-17-11-Arabic.pdf>. However, a resource 
published the violations committed by an insurer without mentioning the name of “Alsagr”. The resource 
declared that the violations of an insurer were: receiving low premiums without issuing insurance policies, 
dealing with non-authorised agents who would sell insurance policies for the insurer, not providing adequate 
information about the policyholders on the insurance policies, and not providing the policyholders with 
insurance cards and guiding/instruction books. See Ajel Electronic Magazine, Suspending an Insurance 
Company through an Official Decision by ‘the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance (CCHI)’ [  ةكرش فاقیإ
نامضلا سلجم نم يمسر رارقب نیمأت ] Ajel Electronic Magazine <https://www.ajel.sa/local/1692086>. 
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In Saudi Arabia, there are detailed regulatory requirements relating to reserves and technical 
allocations. It has been noted earlier that there is a required statutory reserve which 
effectively is a statutory qard facility. Art 47 of the Implementing Rules (IR) provides that 
minimum capital can only be allocated to cover claims when technical allocations are 
inadequate. Solvency is assured through two different mechanisms, statutory deposits and 
legal reserves, as detailed below. 
Table 3.253 
 Implementing Rules Articles  
Technical Allocations   
Statutory Deposit Art 58: 
10% of paid-up capital (up to 
15%) within 3 months of 
licence. 
Invested by SAMA who 
receives income from 
investment. 
Legal Reserve Art 70(2.e, 2.g), art 15 of 
LSCIC: 
90% of annual net surplus is 
paid to the shareholder’s 
income list. Of that 20% 
allocated as a statutory 
reserve until total reserve 
reaches 100% of paid up 
capital.  





As noted in Table 3.2 above, first there are required technical allocations, including a 
solvency margin; second a statutory deposit of 10 per cent of paid-up capital can increase to 
15 per cent depending on the company’s risk profile. This must be deposited in a bank 
specified by SAMA within 3 months of being granted a licence. The funds are invested by 
SAMA who is entitled to invest the deposit and receive income from this investment.54 If 
insurers have the minimum required for the licence, SAR100 million (US$26.7 million), and 
if all is paid up, only SAR10 million (US$2.6 million) needs to be deposited. These are quite 
small amounts and presumably operate as a buffer if the insurance company is unable to meet 
its obligations and the government is called upon to bail them out. But it should be noted that 
the 10 per cent relates to paid up capital which may be considerably less than the minimum 
amount required for a licence. As noted above, it would be very unlikely that insurance 
companies in Western countries would have fully paid-up capital on establishment. Bank 
guarantees for the minimum amounts allow insurers to borrow in the open market to fund 
their operations. There is no available evidence on whether Takaful insurance companies in 
Saudi Arabia have followed the lead of their Western counterparts. 
There is the further requirement of a “legal reserve” which is drawn from shareholder 
allocations of surpluses, as discussed below.  
                                                             
53 The Table is derived from the Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies, above n 1, arts 58, 69-70. 




The Implementing Rules (IR) set out the required technical allocations (reserves) and the 
minimum allocations required, as detailed below.55 
Table 3.3 
Premiums not received Net revenues – premiums 
and commissions on 
issuance due in the next 
period. 
3 months for maritime 
transport; 365 days for other 
insurance; or 40% of total 
net premiums and 
commissions. 
Claims under settlement & 
claims settlement expenses 
Settlement costs & 
settlement expenses. 
Equal to total estimated 
value of outstanding claims 
for each type of general 
insurance. 
Risks realized but no claim 
yet made 
Total claims under 
settlement less re-insurers 
portion, see next column. 
1. Vehicles & property, 
engineering, energy, medical 
and general accident 
insurance excluding 
liabilities and physical 
damage: 15%. 
2. Liability insurance & 
other insurance: 20%. 
3. Insurance from other 
companies: 25%. 
Risks not realized   
Catastrophes  No specific minimum 
allocation. 
General expense  No specific minimum 
allocation. 
 Doubtful debts provision. Implementing Rules 69(2.e). 
 
Solvency Margin 
Insurers in Saudi Arabia must maintain the required solvency margin that permits them meet 
unforeseeable contingencies and unexpected risks. While the technical rules for valuing 
assets and the mechanisms for working out solvency margins require specialist expertise56 
beyond the scope of this thesis, there are general guides. If the solvency margin drops below 
what is required, in the more extreme cases (reduction between 25 per cent to 50 per cent), 
SAMA can require the company to take remedial measures which can include, increasing 
capital, amending prices, reducing costs, refusing any new underwriting, liquidating asset, or 
other measures deemed appropriate. If the margin goes below 25 per cent, SAMA can 
withdraw the license from operating as insurer.57 There is the overriding rule that the 
                                                             
55 Ibid art 69. 
56 See Ibid arts 63-69, Table 2. 
57 Ibid art 68. 
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company’s underwriting must not exceed 10 times the total paid-up capital and reserves 
without SAMA’s prior written approval.58 
Legal Reserve 
Twenty per cent of ‘the net shareholders’ income’ must be set aside as a statutory reserve 
until the total reserve equals 100 per cent of paid-up capital.59 
It should be noted that this provision is contained in the Implementing Rules in art 70 under 
the heading dealing with distribution of the surplus from insurance operations which indicates 
the character of this statutory reserve. Chapter 4 explains that under Takaful rules the 
operator (shareholders) are required to provide a repayable loan to the participants 
underwriting fund (qard hasan) where there is a shortfall in the underwriting fund. This 
statutory reserve may provide a substitute fund for the qard facility. 
It is important to note the following in relation to this required statutory reserve. Firstly, the 
statutory reserve is created out of ‘net shareholders’ income’. Secondly, it requires that funds 
be paid into the reserve until it reaches the equivalent of paid-up capital. The level of paid-up 
capital may be considerably less than the purchase price or nominal value of shares.60 The 
reserve is effectively a substitute statutory qard facility. This means that if there is a shortfall 
in the policyholders underwriting fund and after utilising technical allocations for reserves, 
this statutory reserve is available to meet the deficit.61 Thirdly, the statutory reserve is also 
important in assessing whether the insurance company has adequate capital and liquidity to 
ensure its solvency and ability to meet claims. The statutory reserve may serve two purposes, 
as a reserve against future contingencies, unforeseen claims etc causing losses in the 
underwriting account and a reserve which ensures continuing liquidity62 of the insurance 
company so that it is able to meet claims. Fourthly, the advantage of a statutory reserve is that 
it avoids insurance companies not making sufficient reserves for future and unforeseeable 
claims. Fifthly, the statutory reserve is unavailable for payment of shareholder dividends. 
This contrasts with conventional insurance which has no similar requirement independent of 
capital adequacy and liquidity requirements. This additional reserve seriously impedes the 
ability of Saudi insurers to be competitive in an open market.63 From a shareholder point of 
view, the prospect of limited dividends may make insurance companies less attractive as an 
investment in comparison to other investment opportunities. Sixthly, this reserve is distinct 
                                                             
58 Ibid art 48. 
59 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 15 (applying also to re-insurance 
companies); Ibid art 70 (2g) (applying also to re-insurance companies, see art 1(13)). 
60  Balance of payments may be at call or according to a timetable. 
61 The insurance regulation provides that minimum capital can only be allocated to cover claims when technical 
allocations are inadequate. See Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies, above n 1, art 47. 
62 Liquidity will depend on the nature of the investments and whether they are readily convertible into cash, see 
discussion restrictions on investments below at 3.2.2. 
63 The provision does not restrict investment of this reserve for the benefit of shareholders. This is subject to the 
restrictions on investments. Contrast the legal reserve which is required to be deposited in a nominated SAMA 
account with all profits accruing to SAMA is referred to in art 58 of the Implementing Rules for the Law on 
Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (see below 3.2.2). 
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from the funding requirements for establishing an insurance company and the requirements of 
providing technical allocations and a legal reserve. 
Capital Adequacy and Restrictions on Investment 
The stability and solvency of the Takaful insurance company are also assured through the 
investment rules. Saudi Takaful insurance companies must have a written investment policy 
approved by the Board of Directors. That policy must take into account and analyse the risks 
that affect the stability of the company: market, credit, interest rate, foreign exchange, 
liquidity, operations, country, legal, re-insurance, and environmental risks64 (see discussion at 
3.2.4). The insurance company is required to ensure that invested assets are available in time 
to meet its obligations.65 It must submit to SAMA an investment plan. If it does not, it must 
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Investment Instruments Percentage Permitted to 
General Insurance 
Deposits with domestic 
banks 
Minimum of 20% 
Government bonds Minimum of 20% 
Investment funds in Saudi 
Riyals 
Maximum of 10% 
Investment funds in foreign 
exchange 
Maximum of 10% 
Foreign government bonds Maximum of 5% 
Bonds issued by domestic 
companies 
Maximum of 5%  
Bonds issued by foreign 
companies 
Maximum of 5% 
Stocks Maximum of 15% 
Real estate in Saudi Arabia 0 
Loans secured by real estate 0 
Loans for policyholders 
guaranteed by policies 
0 
Other investments Maximum of 15 percent 
 
Table 3.4 of the Implementing Rules (IR) are the default investment plan if none is provided 
and approved. What is remarkable is that Table 3.4 almost entirely excludes risky 
investments. Table 3.4 requires 40 per cent of liquidity in the form of cash and government 
bonds. This contrasts with the Basel requirements for Banks which require only 4 per cent in 
liquid assets. This means that Saudi insurers are very low risk. But on the other side of the 
coin, the restrictions on investments mean that Saudi insurers would never be able to be 
globally competitive in an open market. It should also be noted that obtaining insurance from 
                                                             
67 The Table is taken from Ibid Table 1. 
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outside Saudi Arabia is subject to SAMA’s consent.68 There is no information available on 
the extent to which Saudi business interests have insured outside Saudi Arabia. 
The stability of Saudi insurers is further supported by restrictions on risky investments. Saudi 
insurance companies are prohibited from investing in financial instruments such as financial 
derivatives and off-balance sheet items without SAMA’s prior written consent.69 This reduces 
the types of risks undertaken by US insurance companies that led up to the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC). Insurers are required to invest in Saudi Riyals 50 per cent of the total assets 
available for investment unless SAMA approves otherwise.70 Investments outside Saudi 
Arabia cannot be greater than 20 per cent in total of investments.71 These provisions ensure 
that in the event of another GFC, Saudi insurers will largely not be affected by external 
factors. In addition, SAMA can review premium pricing and make directions if required.72 
3.2.3. Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation (ICGR) 2015 
Before discussing the Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation (ICGR) 2015, it should 
be noted that the more general Corporate Governance Regulation (CGR) 2006 has been 
discussed in chapter 2.6.6.  
This regulation (ICGR) consists of three parts: (1) Introduction, (2) General Provisions, and 
(3) Specific Provisions.73  
The ICGR sets out the legal (binding and enforceable) rules applying to insurers and re-
insurers. It is monitored, supervised, and enforced by SAMA.74 The ICGR must be consistent 
with the Companies Law (CL) 2015 under the MCI, the Corporate Governance Regulations 
(CGR) 2003 under the CMA, the Listing Rules 2004 under the CMA, and insurance laws 
under SAMA such as the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (LSCIC) 
2003, the Implementing Rules for the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law (IR) 2004, and 
other relevant laws,75 as explained in chapter 2.8.  
To ensure their compliance with the ICGR (Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation) 
and other related laws, it is mandatory that insurance and re-insurance companies establish 
internal policies and procedures.76 Non-compliance with ICGR articles and requirements is a 
breach of the LSCIC (Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies) and its IR 
(Implementing Rules) which will expose insurance and re-insurance companies to SAMA 
                                                             
68 Ibid art 14. Note also art 17, that companies cannot participate in insurance funds outside the Saudi Arabia 
without SAMA’s prior written consent.  
69 Ibid art 62. It is further restricted under art 62 to ensure that the insurer can readily liquidate assets if needed. 
70 Ibid art 59 (2). 
71 Ibid art 61 (1). 
72 Ibid arts 33, 46. 
73 Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation, above n 13. 
74 Ibid arts 1, 2. 
75 Ibid art 4. 
76 Ibid art 7. Art 8 of the ICGR indicates that in order for insurers to ensure compliance and non-violation to 
ICGR requirements and other related insurance laws, they have to keep some records such as the insurer’s cod 




legal penalties.77 The legal penalties are indicated in art 19 of the LSCIC,78 as noted above. 
An important issue is whether insurers are able to comply with ICGR rules while 
simultaneously being compliant with Takaful principles, see discussion in chapter 7. 
The ICGR makes provisions for the following matters: (1) Shareholders,79 (2) Board of 
Directors,80 (3) Board’s Committees,81 (4) Control Functions,82 (5) Appointed Actuary,83 and 
(6) Senior Management.84 
The Board of Directors must draft a code of corporate governance in accordance with the 
ICGR and present it at the general assembly for approval (confirmation); if the code is 
approved, a copy must be submitted to SAMA.85 There is no compulsory template for 
corporate governance for insurance and re-insurance companies. 
The insurance/re-insurance company and its Board of Directors must set up a code of ethics 
addressing the following: conflicts of interest, integrity and honesty, compliance with laws, 
confidentiality, fair dealing, protection of company’s assets, and guidelines for ethical 
behavior, and mechanisms for reporting illegal behavior.86 The Board is responsible and 
accountable for the company’s compliance and discipline even when some duties have been 
delegated to its committees.87 
The general provisions deal with Board members’ remuneration,88 compensation policies, 
and the organisational structure.89 The nomination and remuneration policy is subject to strict 
standards: members of the Board, committees, and senior management must be 
acknowledged for trustworthiness, integrity, competence, knowledge, and experience.90 The 
issue of remuneration is relevant to the discussion of Takaful principles in chapter 7. 
To fulfil their roles, the company’s management must comply with the code of ethics and all 
relevant SAMA insurance laws and regulations.91 SAMA exercises significant control over 
insurers/re-insurers. First significant shareholders must be persons of good reputation.92 The 
ICGR (Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation) defines “significant shareholders” as 
‘natural or legal persons that, directly or indirectly, alone or in association, [control] 5% or 
                                                             
77 Ibid art 9. 
78 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 19. 
79 Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation, above n 13, arts 42-45. 
80 Ibid arts 46-88. The Board of Directors includes Chairman, Board’ members, and Board’s secretary. 
81 Ibid arts 89-114. Board’s Committees include Executive Committee, Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee, Audit Committee, Risk Management Committee, and Investment Committee. 
82 Ibid arts 115-124. Control Functions include Risk Management Function, Internal Audit Function, and 
Compliance Function. 
83 Ibid arts 125-126. 
84 Ibid arts 127-132. 
85 Ibid art 10. 
86 Ibid art 12. 
87 Ibid art 15. 
88 Ibid art 34. Arts 35 to 41 explain more detailed information about remuneration. 
89 Ibid arts 11, 13, 34, 35. 
90 Ibid arts 23, 26. 
91 Ibid art 23. 
92 Ibid art 24. 
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more of the Company’s shareholding.’93 The appointment of Board members and senior 
management must be approved by SAMA.94  
The Board must set up formal policies and procedures for disclosure in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations.95 The Board is responsible for guaranteeing appropriate 
transparency and disclosure in relation to matters that might affect the company’s financial 
performance.96 The disclosed information must be ‘comprehensive, meaningful, relevant, 
timely, consistent, reliable, and accessible by [the] public without undue expense or delay.’97   
The Board has to provide the general assembly with a company performance report 
consisting of: an analytical review; list of important decisions made; the company’s strategy; 
names of other joint-stock companies (JSCs) where a Board member also has membership; 
penalties imposed on the company or Board members by any judicial body; management 
risk; and future performance.98 
In addition to disclosure requirements, the ICGR requires the company’s annual report to 
include full information about the Board, Board members (whether Executive, Non-
Executive, or Independent), significant shareholders, Board’s committees, each member’s 
resume, all compensation paid to members of the Board and Senior Management, ownership 
of members of the Board and Senior Management in the company, any potential conflict of 
interest, and results of the annual audit.99 
The company’s governance structure requires independent decision-making by the Board. To 
achieve this, the Board’s duties are required to be separate from management duties, the 
independence of control functions should be enhanced, and the risk of conflicts of interest 
should be avoided.100 
The company also has to take reasonable steps to note the probabilities of conflicts of interest 
and lay down transparent solutions.101 Members of the Board and Senior Management must 
have no direct or indirect personal interest (or relationship) in any contract or business 
undertaken for the company except as approved by the general assembly.102 With regard to 
public tenders (or general bidding), any member who has a personal interest in the company’s 
contracts must notify the Board about the personal interest and must not vote on that 
matter.103 If there is a breach of the ICGR, penalties will be imposed104 under the LSCIC 
legislation.  
                                                             
93 Ibid art 6. 
94 Ibid art 25. 
95 Ibid art 16. 
96 Ibid art 17. 
97 Ibid art 18. 
98 Ibid art 19. 
99 Ibid art 20. 
100 Ibid art 27. 
101 Ibid art 29. 
102 Ibid arts 30, 32. 
103 Ibid arts 30, 33. 
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These provisions are important as they aim to ensure that insurance companies in Saudi 
Arabia operate in accordance to regulations and ethically manage financial risk. 
Takaful insurance companies are a critical element in the security of Saudi Arabia’s financial 
system. Like banks, insurance companies are subject to significant risks and consequently 
subject to capital and liquidity requirements, as examined in the following paragraphs. 
3.2.4. Risk Management Regulation (RMR) 2008105 
Risk management for insurers/re-insurers in Saudi Arabia is controlled by the Risk 
Management Regulation (RMR) which consists of three parts: A) Introduction, B) General 
requirements, and C) Risk management standards: risk identification, risk measurement, risk 
mitigation, and risk monitoring.106 
In the introduction, the RMR sets out general principles and standards for risk management 
for insurers/re-insurers and all other related insurance services providers.107 The RMR adopts 
the definition of risk management by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS).108 Insurers are required to set up appropriate internal controls.109 Records such as a 
risk management strategy and organisational structure must be held by insurers.110 Non-
compliance with RMR requirements is considered a breach of the LSCIC (Law on 
Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies) and its IR (Implementing Rules). This 
breach will render insurers liable to legal penalties actively enforced by SAMA;111 this is 
indicated in art 19 of the LSCIC,112 as noted above.113 
                                                             
105 Risk Management Regulation, above n 24. 
106 Ibid art 2. Art (2) indicates that the RMR is read in conjunction with the Law on Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies (LSCIC) 2003 and its Implementing Rules (IR) 2004. 
107 Ibid arts 1, 2, 4, 6. 
108 Ibid art 5, n 1. 
109 Ibid art 7. 
110 Ibid art 8. 
111 Ibid art 9. 
112 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 11, art 19. 
113 An evidenced example for applying penalties is that SAMA suspended the United Cooperative Assurance 
(UCA) company from issuing automobile insurance policies commencing from 15/09/2017 and released the 
suspension on 11/01/2018. SAMA announced that the reason for the suspension was that the UCA had violated 
some of SAMA’s provisions and conditions such as the continuous development for internal control systems, 
non-compliance management, and internal control procedures (all these risks are discussed below). No more 
details have been provided by SAMA in that regard. See Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 
Announcement from SAMA with Regard to Releasing the United Cooperative Assurance (UCA) Company from 
the Suspension for Issuing and Renewing any Compulsory Automobile Policy [  فاقیإ عفر نأشب دقنلا ةسسؤم نالعإ
ةدیدج تابكرم ىلع يمازلإ نیمأت ةقیثو يأ دیدجتو رادصإ نم ينواعتلا نیمأتلل ةدحتملا ةكرشلا ] (2018) SAMA 
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/ar-sa/News/Pages/news011012018.aspx>. Another example of SAMA impositions is 
related to IT risk and internal control procedures, discussed below. On 20/08/2017 SAMA suspended the Watani 
Takaful Company-Insurance Agency from issuing and renewing any insurance policy but released the company 
on 03/01/2018. The suspension resulted from the company’s violations of IT risk and internal control 
procedures. No further details have been provided by SAMA in that regard. See Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA), Announcement from SAMA with Regard to Releasing the Takaful Company Insurance Agency 
Company from the Suspension for Issuing and Renewing any Insurance Policy [  فاقیإ عفر نأشب دقنلا ةسسؤم نالعإ




The RMR (Risk Management Regulation) establishes general requirements for risk 
management across six areas. First, insurers must set up a management strategy for all types 
of risks taking into account market conditions, experience or expertise in dealing with risks, 
and all other risks in relation to insurers’ activities.114 Updates to the risk management 
strategy must be periodically taken.115  
Second, the Board of Directors and senior management are both responsible for assessing, 
mitigating, and monitoring the risks exposed by the insurer.116 The Board should understand 
the types of risks related to the insurer’s activities, approve the risk management policies, 
ensure proper implementation of the control system of risk management, review risk 
management processes, and reassess the insurer’s capability to bear and encounter risks.117 
Third, insurers must clearly determine the responsibilities of senior managers. Insurers set up 
a mechanism ensuring that the risk management department has received all important 
information that would manage the risks.118 The risk management department should have 
risk management expertise to manage the risks.119 Insurers must appoint two responsible 
officers for risk management, one responsible for general and health insurance, the other 
responsible for life insurance.120 
Fourth, insurers must set up appropriate policies and control systems to determine their 
capabilities to manage the risks.121 The RMR obligates policies and control systems to 
include some techniques such as determining employees’ responsibilities for risk 
management, determining an appropriate mechanism to measure the risks, determining 
appropriate internal policies, and determining a management information mechanism to 
monitor risk exposure.122     
Fifth, insurers must set up a contingency plan. The RMR stipulates an obligatory contingency 
plan to include recognition of the presence of risk, setting detailed procedures, determining 
responsibilities for each action, and assessing all probabilities of each action.123 
Sixth, insurers must provide SAMA with an annual report detailing the risk management 
plan.124 
The RMR (Risk Management Regulation) also establishes risk management standards 
requiring: 1) risk identification, 2) risk measurement, 3) risk mitigation, and 4) risk 
monitoring,125 as discussed in turn. 
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Risk identification, as the first risk management standard, recognises 14 types of common 
risks set out in the Table 3.5 below.  
Table 3.5126 
 Types of Common 
Risks 
Explanation 
1 Product Development 
Risk 
Within a competitive environment, the insurer attempts to add 
changes to a particular existing product to improve its quality 
and make it more desirable and attractive to costumers. This 
may affect the insurer’s liabilities and capabilities to cover the 
losses. In this situation, the risk of product development will 
probably occur, so the insurer must address the risk though 
actuarial studies to avoid its negative consequences.127 
2 Underwriting Risk This is related to evaluation and acceptance of insurance risks. 
Here, insurers must establish clear policies and adequate 
guidelines thoroughly, note down the insured’s information, 
ensure premiums received are sufficient to cover all insurance 
undertakings, especially the re-insurance portion (discussed 
below), and establish the responsibilities of each insurance 
department.128 
3 Claim Handling Risk This is related to the risk of compensating the insured for their 
claims. Here, insurers must periodically evaluate the 
procedures for claims handling and ensure adequate sharing of 
the risk with the re-insurer.129 
4 IT Risk This occurs with a system information failure. Insurers in this 
situation must have a professional, secure IT system with 
necessary back up procedures.130 See example above under 
3.2.4. in footnote 113. 
5 Pricing Risk This occurs when insurers do not set out an appropriate 
premium for a covered risk.131 
6 Liquidity Risk This is when insurers do not have adequate funds to pay out 
claims without liquidating assets.132 Further discussion about 
liquidity risk is referred to below at 3.6 (Risk Management for 
Takaful Companies). 
7 Credit Risk This is when one party may be unable to fulfil its 
obligations.133 This type of credit risk may not occur to 
insurers as the other party (the insured) pays his/her 
obligations (premiums) in advance. If the insured does not pay 
premiums in advance, there is no coverage. Thus, the insured 
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127 Risk Management Regulation, above n 24, art 20. 
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130 Ibid art 23. 
131 Ibid art 24. 
132 Ibid art 25. 
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is more affected by credit risk than the insurer. 
8 Interest Rate Risk This is the risk of a change in investment values (amounts) 
based on a change in interest rates. In order for insurers to 
manage the interest rate risk, they have to address the reasons 
affecting the interest rate change. Factors affecting interest 
rate risk include i) basis risk which happens when the 
company’s investment income differs from the company’s 
liabilities (outcome), ii) curve risk which happens when the 
income of the company’s short term investments differs from 
the income of the company’s long term investments, and iii) 
re-investment risk which happens when the company is 
required to re-invest its assets at a low rate or repay its 
obligation at a high rate.134 
9 Currency Exchange 
Risk 
This is related to the change of investment values (amounts) 
based on a change in currency rates. This might negatively 
affect import and export businesses and international 
investments. Insurers must have strategies to deal with the 
currency exchange risk such as using position limits and loss 
limits. Position limits determine the highest limit on a specific 
currency and reserve it throughout the regular trading time. 
Loss limits determine a specific level to stop losses resulting 
from currency changes in order to avoid further losses.135 
10 Corporate Governance 
Risk 
This is the risk related to the mechanism used to distribute and 
share the rights and the responsibilities among managers, the 
Board of Directors, shareholders, and other financial 
stakeholders. The RMR (Risk Management Regulation) refers 
to the CGR (Corporate Governance Regulation) under the 
CMA (Capital Market Authority) for further details about 
corporate governance including rights and responsibilities for 
Board members, general assembly, managers, shareholders, 
any other financial stakeholders as well as disclosure and 
transparency and the like,136 see chapter 2. However, it is 
remarkable that the policyholders, the focal point in Takaful 
(see chapter 4), are not mentioned in the law (RMR). Since all 
insurers in Saudi Arabia are joint-stock companies, issues 
related to corporate governance are critically analysed in 
chapter 7. 
 
11 Re-insurance Risk This occurs when the re-insurer is unable to fulfil its 
obligations (i.e. unable to reimburse the insurer for the risk 
occurrence that has been agreed to). The Regulation of 
Reinsurance Activities (RRA) provides further details about 
re-insurance,137 as discussed below in 3.2.6. 
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12 Reputation Risk This is the risk of negative public perceptions which can affect 
insurers’ ability to retain existed business and attract new 
business.138 
13 Country Risk This is another type of risk occurring inside the country where 
insurers operate. Country risk is influenced by business 
markets and the economy of the country such as economy 
mismanagement, wars, unemployment, and price increases.139 
14 Non-compliance Risk This is when insurers breach the regulations.140 An example 
for a breach of non-compliance risk is the case of the United 
Cooperative Assurance (UCA) company, referred to above at 
3.2.4. This provision of the RMR, however, is incomplete as it 
only focuses on the risk of non-compliance with local 
regulations while it should include the risk of “non-
compliance with Sharia” which is the most critical risk 
exposed to Takaful insurers, as discussed below in 3.6.   
 
Risk Measurement, Risk Mitigation, and Risk Monitoring 
The second, third, and fourth risk management standards are risk measurement, risk 
mitigation, and risk monitoring. In risk measurement, risk is measured through its impact (or 
results) once risk occurs and its probability of occurrence.141 Risk measurement processes 
require insurers to gather similar risks and perils, determine causes and sources of risk, 
estimate risk exposure, and rank risks based on priority.142 The risk then is evaluated; risk 
evaluation determines the risks and proposes an appropriate solution for each risk.143 This 
contrasts with the third risk management standard - risk mitigation. 
Risk mitigation includes: avoiding risks and risky activities; risk retention (to accept risk 
rather than transferring it); risk reduction (to reduce the severity and frequency of losses); risk 
exploitation where the risk will have a positive impact on insurers if it occurs—such as the 
risk an insurer takes when advertising its insurance products—; and transferring risk through 
re-insurance.144 In relation to re-insuring risk, insurers must retain at least 30 per cent of 
premiums and re-insure at least 30 per cent of premiums.145 This is discussed in more detail 
in chapter 6. 
The fourth risk management standard is risk monitoring. Insurers must have an active 
structure to monitor compliance with risk standards. Committees, such as the internal control 
committee, are responsible for monitoring compliance with risk management standards.146 
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3.2.5. Re-Takaful (Islamic Re-insurance) Regulation 
In Saudi Arabia, the Regulation of Reinsurance Activities147 (RRA) regulates activities of re-
insurance companies as well as insurance companies. This regulation (RRA) consists of three 
parts: introduction, general requirements, and re-insurance principles.148 The Board of 
Directors is required to provide a re-insurance risk management strategy and submit it to 
SAMA.149 The re-insurance risk management strategy must include the percentage of 
retention for each risk, and the method of dealing with known and unknown accumulations 
for each risk.150    
Re-insurers must have a strong internal control policy to monitor re-insurance activities that 
will include identifying all re-insurance policies, re-insurance obligations, re-insurance 
losses, insurers’ capacity or capability to meet current and future claims, and insurers’ 
capacity to develop and improve these re-insurance topics.151 Re-insurer ratings must be 
based on “Standard & Poor’s Global” ratings.152 Each re-insurer is required to appoint a “re-
insurance officer”. The responsibilities of the re-insurance officer include developing the re-
insurer’s strategy, dealing with the re-insurer’s reports and records, and developing the re-
insurance section. If the re-insurer breaches the re-insurance risk management strategy, the 
re-insurance officer is responsible to report this to SAMA,153 and penalties apply.154 Non-
compliance with RRA requirements is considered a breach of the LSCIC (Law on 
Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies) and its IR (Implementing Rules). This 
breach will expose re-insurers to legal penalties imposed by SAMA,155 as  shown in art 19 of 
the LSCIC,156 noted above. More detailed discussion of re-insurance is provided in chapter 6. 
3.3. Insurance Quasi-Judicial Committees 
As noted above at 3.2.1, SAMA regulates and supervises the insurance industry in Saudi 
Arabia.157 
There are two tiers of Quasi-Judicial Insurance Committees under SAMA (see 2.8.3). The 
first is the Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations. It is a quasi-judicial 
first instance committee  dealing with insurance disputes (except health insurance disputes) 
between insurers and their insureds, insurers and other insurers (insurance subrogation 
disputes), insurers and re-insurers, re-insurers and other re-insurers, or SAMA and any 
insurance agency for breach of insurance laws.158 The Committee for Solving Insurance 
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Disputes and Violations comprises three specialist and expert members appointed by the 
Council of Ministers (Cabinet) on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance.159  
The second tier is the Appellate Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations. 
The Appellate Committee has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Committee for Solving 
Insurance Disputes and Violations (quasi-judicial first instance committee). The decision of 
this Appellate Committee is final. The Appellate Committee is made up of two members who 
are legal insurance specialists appointed by the royal decree.160 Chapter 2.8.4 raises the 
question whether the Committee was sufficiently independent of SAMA in making its 
decisions. 
In relation to the jurisdiction of Insurance Committees, an issue occurs. The Committee for 
Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations have ruled in health insurance claims despite them 
being under the jurisdiction of the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance (CCHI),161 as 
noted above at 3.1. In 2012, the Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations 
ruled in a case where the insured claimed compensation from his insurer for dental treatment 
that took place in the USA based on an international travel care insurance policy.162 In 2014, 
a health insurance case between an insured and an insurer over reimbursement for pregnancy 
coverage under a health insurance policy was ruled by the Committee.163 
The following sections discuss the solvency of conventional insurance companies as 
established by international insurance standards, the solvency of Takaful companies as 
established by international Takaful standards, risk management for Takaful companies, and 
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3.4. Financial Stability and Capital Adequacy 
3.4.1. Introduction 
This section begins by referring to the key principles underpinning the stability of financial 
institutions. In relation to banks, relevant standards have been set by the Basel Accords.164   
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)165 established international standards 
to ensure the financial stability of the banking system. These international standards were 
established under three accords beginning with the Basel I Accord (Basel I) in 1988, Basel II 
in 2004, and Basel III in 2010.166 Basel I established standards for required capital for 
financial stability.167 The second accord, Basel II Accord (2004), was adopted and 
implemented by banks in 2008.168 Basel II established three requirements (Pillars) to ensure 
the financial stability of banks. These are minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1), 
supervisory process (Pillar 2), and market discipline (Pillar 3).169 The minimum capital 
requirements (Pillar 1) dealt with risk exposure. It set out rules for banks to calculate the 
required capital for three particular types of risks: credit risk, market risk, and operational 
risk.170 The supervisory process (Pillar 2) aimed to ensure banks managed Pillar 1 risks by 
having adequate capital as well as the capacity to improve and apply advance mechanisms to 
manage and supervise other risks stated on Basel II under the title of residual risk. These risks 
were systemic risk, pension risk, concentration risk, strategic risk, reputational risk, liquidity 
risk, and legal risk.171 The market discipline (Pillar 3) supplemented Pillars 1 and 2. It dealt 
with the importance of banks’ disclosures and required them to follow specific disclosure 
principles. Such disclosure included disclosing information about capital adequacy, risk 
exposure, and risk assessment processes. Pillar 3 aimed to achieve good corporate 
governance through assessing the bank by industry stakeholders such as investors, customers, 
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Standards', above n 169, 12; O’Shea, above n 167, 14. 
171 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards', above n 169, 204; O’Shea, above n 167, 16. 
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rating agencies, other banks, etc.172 In 2010, Basel III was promulgated to enhance and 
improve banks’ regulation, supervision, and risk management.173 The Basel Accords (I, II, 
and III) have been adopted by all members of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).174 
SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) is one of its members.175  
In 1997, the Basel Core Principles (BCPs) were created by the BCBS (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision). The BCPs have set the major standards for regulating banks.176 The 
BCPs provide standards to ensure the financial stability of conventional banks.  
Special provisions were made for Islamic banks based on their compliance with Islamic 
Sharia.177 The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) issued guidelines to deal with Islamic 
banks based on the Basel Core Principles (BCPs) and taking into account Islamic rules.178 
There are differences and similarities in BCPs’ and IFSB’s guidelines for Islamic banks. The 
fundamental difference between them relates to Islamic banks’ compliance with Sharia, such 
as the Islamic requirements and restrictions for some investments and certain products. 
Conventional and Islamic banks are alike in their goal to be profitable and stable.179 
In Saudi Arabia, reports on the Saudi banking system in 2011 (the latest available),  made by 
a Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in association with the International 
Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank,180 assessed whether Saudi Arabia, as 
represented by SAMA, complied with the BCPs (Basel Core Principles) for effective banking 
supervision. The reports found that Saudi banks provide simple Sharia-compliant products 
rather than sophisticated products.181 Consequently, financial risks of the kind that led to the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) were significantly reduced.  
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These standards, while only applying to banks and beyond the scope of this thesis, were the 
forerunner to setting standards for ensuring the stability of insurance companies.182 Similar 
considerations apply to Takaful insurance companies to ensure their stability and liquidity. 
3.4.2. Financial Stability of the Insurance Industry 
Insurance companies bear much the same financial risks as banks which requires regulation 
to assure minimum capital requirements to ensure stability and protect against failure.183 In 
addition, there are industry specific risks which in some jurisdictions have led to separate 
rules. In relation to insurance, international standards have been promulgated by the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) with its Insurance Core Principles 
(ICPs) providing the benchmark for internationally active insurance companies.184 In relation 
to insurance solvency requirements, the IAIS has issued three supporting papers on insurance 
solvency assessments.185 They are the IAIS Common Structure Paper for Assessment of 
Insurer Solvency,186 Standards on the Structure of Regulatory Capital Requirements,187 and 
Guidance Paper on the Structure of Regulatory Capital Requirements188 (provides 15 
regulatory capital requirements for insurers). They concentrate on ‘a) the structure of 
regulatory capital requirements; b) enterprise risk management for capital adequacy and 
solvency purposes; and c) the use of internal models for risk and capital management by 
insurers.’189    
The IAIS is a voluntary organisation with its membership representing regulators and 
supervisors from 200 jurisdictions which at last report constituted 97 per cent of insurance 
premiums.190 The EU regulates insurers and re-insurers in the EU through the Solvency II 
directive191 with detailed rules reflecting the Insurance Core Principles (ICPs). The EU 
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directive resembles Basel II/III as it is largely structured and modelled on the three Pillars of 
Basel II.192 
In relation to the Insurance Core Principles (ICPs) and the other IAIS principles, these are 
only binding in Saudi Arabia if adopted by Saudi regulatory authorities; they are, however, 
relevant to the issue of Saudi Takaful insurance companies being able to meet international 
insurance standards to ensure their stability as financial institutions. 
3.4.3. Insurers’ Solvency Regulation 
There are many goals for insurance regulation, including availability and pricing 
affordability, with insurers’ solvency being the most essential element for insurance 
regulation.193 The most essential parts of insurers’ solvency are capital and reserves.  
There are three reasons for insurers to hold capital. First, capital is important to meet 
unanticipated future claims. Second, holding sufficient capital enables insurers to compete in 
the global insurance markets as they will be rated by professional international rating 
agencies, such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. Third, holding capital is an obligation to 
meet the minimum capital requirements for insurance supervision. The aim of minimum 
capital requirements is to protect policyholders’ rights and to ensure the financial stability of 
insurance companies.194 
As a part of insurers’ solvency and required capital, insurers are required to hold reserves to 
ensure a sound financial stability of insurers. Insurers are required to hold a significant 
proportion of premiums available in reserves to meet current and future claims.195 Insurers’ 
investments play a key role in insurers’ solvency, so insurers invest premiums in order to 
meet future claims. Insurers’ solvency is concerned with both the contingency reserves and 
the capital held by way of investments.196 
Insurance also provides benefits to capital and reserves for business companies. The 
insurance mechanism provides more contributions to businesses, such as reducing the capital 
and reserves required on business companies. Without insurance, business companies would 
have to bear the burden of providing larger capital and reserves to fulfil risk assumption 
requirements. With the insurance mechanism, these additional capital and reserves (in the 
hypothetical case) are invested by the business companies instead of being set aside, as 
insufficient requirements, to ensure they will be able to meet future risk assumptions.197  
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In selecting an insurance company, an insured must consider two things. First, the insured 
must ensure that he/she is not under or over-insured. Too little insurance will not provide full 
coverage or compensation. The rest of the loss will be borne by the insured. Buying too much 
insurance means that all risks are transferred to an insurance company while some 
unimportant risks should be retained instead. So, mistakes in buying insurance can be made, 
and thus decisions must be taken very carefully.198 Second, the financial stability of the 
insurer is the most important factor in selecting an insurer. What most concerns the insured is 
the insurer’s financial capacity and solvency to compensate the insured for the claim(s).199 
Insurance companies must be licensed. Regulation requires insurers to meet local regulatory 
capital and reserve requirements to be eligible for a licence.200 The precise amount of capital 
and reserves differs from country to country, from stock company to mutual company, and 
from small company to large company.201 Local regulators can impose capital to be held 
above the usual required minimum.202 Insurers have to include a financial analysis in their 
annual reports so that the regulator can detect prospects of any future insolvencies. The 
financial analysis of insurers’ capital is examined by the Risk-Based Capital (RBC) 
requirement which is one technique, among others, used to examine insurers’ insolvencies. 
The RBC determines the presumed and required minimum amount of capital to be held by 
each insurer based on the risk exposure each insurer faces.203  
With respect to insurance solvency, the most recognised international standards are those of 
the United States and Europe. In the USA, insurance is regulated by each state. Among the 
states, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is the regulatory policy 
co-ordinator.204 Solvency regulation in the USA applies a prescriptive approach which is 
particularly concerned with regulating the financial system of insurance companies through 
setting up rules and laws. Solvency regulation requires compliance with the prescriptive 
approach but it does not pay attention to insurers’ risk management.205 In respect of capital 
requirements, insurers need to comply with fixed capital requirements and risk-based capital 
(RBC) standards, noted earlier, as set by the USA NAIC.206 
European countries deal with a principles-based approach which focuses on insurers having 
adequate solvency systems and reasonable risk management. To do so, the principles-based 
approach requires regulators to supervise insurers to ensure good management of their 
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financial risks and avoid excessively risky activities.207 This approach is adopted by EU 
Solvency II, issued by the EC (European Commission), along with the IAIS (International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors).208  
Solvency II aims to adopt standards similar to the US RBC (risk-based capital) approach. In 
order to achieve adequate solvency, all risks and enterprise risk management take capital 
standards into account.209 The EC (European Commission) describes Solvency II as a regime: 
[that] introduces for the first time a harmonised, sound and robust prudential framework for 
insurance firms in the EU. It is based on the risk profile of each individual insurance company 
in order to promote comparability, transparency and competitiveness.210 
Solvency II includes three pillars for insurance companies similar to what the Basel Accords 
do for banks. Pillar 1 establishes quantitative requirements such as the valuation of assets and 
liabilities. Pillar 2 establishes requirements for risk management. Pillar 3 establishes 
transparency and disclosure for market discipline.211  
The following Table 3.6 summarises the three pillars of Solvency II:212 




Governance & Supervision 
Pillar 3 
Reporting & Disclosure 
• Two thresholds:  
- Solvency Capital 
Requirement (SCR)[;]  
- Minimum Capital 
Requirement (MCR). 
• SCR is calculated using 
either a standard formula or, 
with regulatory approval, an 
internal model. 
• MCR is calculated as a 
linear function of specified 
variables: it cannot fall 
below 25%, or exceed 45% 
of an insurer's SCR. 
• There are also harmonised 
standards for the valuation 
of assets and liabilities. 
• Effective risk management 
system. 
• Own Risk & Solvency 
Assessment (ORSA). 
• Supervisory review & 
intervention. 
• Insurers [are] required to 
publish details of the risks 
facing them, [especially] 
capital adequacy and risk 
management. 
• Transparency and open 
information are intended to 
assist market forces in 
imposing greater discipline 
on the industry. 
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By 1 January 2016, insurance companies in the EU were to have implemented the three 
pillars of Solvency II.213  
The assessment of capital requirements under the IAIS insurance capital standard (ICS) and 
the EU Directive, Solvency II requires specialist expertise beyond the scope of the thesis so 
that only general observations will be made. Both Solvency II and the IAIS214 insurance 
capital standards set out rules for assessing what qualifies as capital, how it is valued and 
relevant methodologies. When assessing the capital required, a margin of risk is added to 
cover unforeseen future events. As with the Basel Accords applying to banking, the IAIS 
rules are intended to set rules for globally significant insurance companies. These principles, 
issued by international organisations, are particularly important to Takaful insurance, as 
demonstrated in the following section. 
In Saudi Arabia, the 2016 Aljazira Capital Company report states ‘Should insurance 
regulations move toward Solvency II, we expect diversified insurance firms to benefit.’215 It 
can be indicated that Solvency II has not been adopted by Saudi insurance regulations. 
Rather, SAMA adopts its own insurance laws and regulations. As noted above, Saudi 
insurance laws require insurers and re-insurers to provide large capital and to have large 
reserves. In relation to solvency requirements, for example, some insurers in Saudi Arabia 
have been suspended by SAMA for a decrease in capital and not meeting the solvency 
requirements.216 Saudi insurance laws also restrict insurers’ investments, subjecting them to 
Islamic principles, as discussed in chapter 4. Saudi insurance laws relating to capital 
adequacy and solvency requirements are discussed above at 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
To answer the central research question, examination of insurers’ compliance with Islamic 
principles is provided in chapter 7. 
3.5. International Standards for Takaful 
In 2009, the IFSB (Islamic Financial Services Board) issued the Guiding Principles on 
Conduct of Business for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services, which set guidelines 
for all Islamic financial corporations such as banks and Takaful companies.217 IFSB’s 
Guiding Principles aim to support investors’ and policyholders’ interests and to contribute to 
a sound and stable Islamic finance market.218 IFSB’s Guiding Principles set out ethical 
business conduct based on Sharia. They do not create new standards for business conduct. 
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Rather, they take the internationally recognised standards—such as those adopted by the 
BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development), IAIS (International Association of Insurance Supervisors), and 
IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions)—and modify them to 
recognise Islamic principles and rules.219 
There are other principles issued by international organisations such as the International 
Conduct of Business Principles by the IOSCO220 and the Insurance Core Principles (ICPs) 
by the IAIS.221 In addition to IFSB’s Guiding Principles related to conduct of business, the 
IFSB also issued Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions 
Offering Islamic Financial Services.222  
The above discussion about Takaful organisations (e.g. IFSB) and the international insurance 
organisations (e.g. the IAIS, EU insurance approach, IOSCO) and their insurance principles 
and standards provides general guidance. The discussion of solvency, applicable 
internationally, is also related to Takaful insurance as Takaful organisations rely on and apply 
the same international solvency standards to ensure the stability of Takaful companies.223  
In relation to compliance with international insurance standards, the IFSB along with other 
Takaful organisations adopt international insurance standards but subject them to Sharia and 
Takaful principles;224 if a provision or condition contravenes Sharia or Takaful principles, 
that particular matter will not be adopted. This is further supported by the IFSB which states 
there is no specific type of corporate governance that works for each country as each country 
develops its own system. However, all models of governance must be efficient and 
demonstrate good corporate governance in compliance with Takaful principles.225 
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Takaful organisations such as the IFSB (Islamic Financial Services Board) and AAOIFI 
(Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions) provide instructive 
and recommended rules and guidelines to countries and Islamic financial institutions.226 Eight 
countries have agreed to be bound by AAOIFI principles but not Saudi Arabia where the 
standards are considered only recommended guidelines.227 In relation to IFSB’s rules, 
standards, and guidelines, full time members agree to be bound by these standards and 
guidelines.228 
SAMA and the CMA (Capital Market Authority), as Saudi government authorities, are full 
members while some Saudi banks such as Al-Jazira Bank and National Commercial Bank are 
observer members.229 The IFSB application form binds its members to comply with IFSB’s 
standards.230 For example, art 78 states: 
[A] TO [Takaful operator] shall apply the IFSB’s Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business 
for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services, particularly those relating to honesty and 
fairness and information to clients.231 
Also, provision 3.1., under Member’s Undertaking, states: 
The Member undertakes to the IFSB to comply in all respects and at all times with and to be 
bound by the Agreement and the By-laws in force as at the date hereof and as amended from 
time to time.232 
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Many Islamic scholars have concluded that IFSB’s standards and rules (except where the 
IFSB states ‘recommendations’) are binging in all Takaful insurance institutions.233 
Compliance with the IFSB’ Takaful standards and rules is important for two reasons. First, 
the IFSB provides principles and standards for Takaful companies. These principles are directed 
to ensuring that Takaful companies are financially stable.234 Second, regardless of whether 
IFSB’s standards and rules are legally binding or legislated or become part of the domestic 
law in particular jurisdictions, IFSB’s standards should be used by Takaful operators and 
regulators as Takaful rules set by the IFSB are made by Islamic scholars and are subject to 
Islamic Sharia. From a Sharia perspective, since all IFSB’s standards and rules are based on 
Islamic principles and rules, to argue (or reject) against them must require that at least some 
of its provisions be critically analysed based on Islamic principles and rules. Islamic Sharia 
always prevails over domestic laws. 
From a legal perspective, Takaful principles and models adopted by Islamic jurists and 
scholars (discussed in chapter 4) are not legally binding in Islamic countries unless 
incorporated into binding regulations. This means that local laws or regulations might over 
write Takaful principles.235 From a Sharia perspective, however, compliance with Sharia 
requires countries to adopt and apply these Takaful principles and models, at least in so far as 
these IFSB’s principles express Islamic principles. If, for example, IFSB’s principles set 
different solvency standards from those set by the local regulator, unless there is a breach of 
Islamic principles (such as riba), they should not be binding. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
232 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 'By-Laws', above n 228, Appendix III 3.1; Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB), above n 230.  
Also, art 17 binds the decisions made by the majority of full members attended the general meetings. It states: 
At any meeting of the General Assembly, whether pursuant to Article 15 or Article 16, the necessary 
quorum for such a meeting to make valid and binding decisions shall be two-thirds of all Full 
Members. Each Full Member shall have one vote. Resolutions of the General Assembly shall be 
effective with a simple majority of Full Members present. 
See, Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 'Governing Documents', above n 228, art 17. 
Provision (d) states:  
[T]he Membership Agreement has been properly signed and delivered on behalf of the Applicant and 
the obligations on the part of the Applicant contained in the Agreements, assuming them to be valid 
and binding according to Malaysian law by which they are expressed to be governed, are valid and 
legally binding on and enforceable against the Applicant under the laws of (jurisdiction of applicant) 
and the courts of jurisdiction of applicant. 
See, Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 'By-Laws', above n 228, Appendix II (d); Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB), above n 230. 
233 Zidan, above n 219, 739; Moammar Hammdy, The Role of Applying the Principles of Governance in 
Supporting the Activity of Cooperative Insurance Companies - Study of some Arab Experiments [  ئدابم قیبطت رود
ةیبرع براجت ضعب ةسارد - ينواعتلا نیمأتلا تاكرش طاشن معد يف ةمكوحلا ] (PhD Thesis, Hassiba Benbouali University of 
Chlef, Algeria, 2017) 128, 132; David M Eisenberg, Islamic Finance: Law and Practice (OUP Oxford, 2012) 
302. For example, David Eisenberg states that ‘The IFSB therefore requires that takaful operators …’ where it is 
compulsory for Takaful operators to do so. Elsewhere, where it is recommended for Takaful operators to do 
something, David states ‘the IFSB recommends that …’ See, David M Eisenberg, Islamic Finance: Law and 
Practice (OUP Oxford, 2012) 302.  
234 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 224, art 1. 
235 For example, alcohol is strictly prohibited under Islamic Sharia. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and 
Bahrain are Muslim countries. Alcohol in Dubai, a city in the UAE, and Al-Manama, a city in Bahrain, is 
legally allowed by the local regulator. Nevertheless, alcohol is still prohibited under Sharia. To illustrate, a 35 
year-old person can go to a bar and drink alcohol as alcohol is legally permitted. However, this person is 
considered a sinner under Sharia. 
58 
 
3.6. Risk Management for Takaful Companies 
The IFSB (Islamic Financial Services Board) issued the ‘Standard on Risk Management for 
Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings’ in 2013.236 This Standard is divided into five 
parts: A. Introduction, B. Risks, C. Enterprise risk management, D. Elements in risk 
supervisory review process, and E. Systemic risk consideration.237 
3.6.1. Introduction  
The ‘Standard on Risk Management for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings’ aims to 
suit all Takaful and re-Takaful (Islamic re-insurance) operational frameworks.238 As risk is an 
issue for Takaful companies, this Standard aims to set out minimum standards of risk 
management in Takaful companies based on Sharia.239 This Standard requires the Takaful 
fund to be segregated into participants’ funds (participants’ investment fund (PIF) and 
participants’ underwriting fund (PUF)) and a shareholders’ fund,240 as discussed in chapter 4. 
Risks in the shareholders’ fund—e.g. qard hasan (interest-free loan)—are borne by 
shareholders while risks in the participants’ funds (for example, risk of payment for claims) 
are borne by participants (policyholders), as discussed below at 3.8. If risks are caused by the 
Takaful operator’s negligence, the Takaful operator is then held responsible.241 The Takaful 
operator is also responsible to keep participants’ funds solvent through providing a qard 
hasan in the case of deficit.242 
3.6.2. Risks 
The IFSB’s Standard refers to risk management in the Insurance Core Principles (ICPs), 
referred to earlier, issued by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).243 
In risk management of conventional insurance, the ICPs require conventional insurers to set 
up a corporate governance system, risk management system, internal control system 
                                                             
236 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 224. 
237 Ibid p v. 
238 Ibid arts 5, 8. 
239 Ibid arts 2-4, 7, 10. 
240 Ibid art 13. 
241 Ibid art 14; Eisenberg, above n 233, 281; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 225, art 20; 
Abdurrazaq BinAlzawy and Eman Naamon, 'Establishing Corporate Principles in Cooperative Insurance 
Companies [ ينواعتلا نیمأتلا تاكرش يف ةمكوحلا ئدابم ءاسرإ ]' (Paper presented at the Corporate Governance as a 
Mechanism to Minimize Financial and Administration Corruption [ يرادإلاو يلاملا داسفلا نم دحلل ةیلآك تاكرشلا ةمكوح ], 
University of Biskra  in Algeria, 6-7 May 2012) 5; Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 223, 11, 59, 
181. 
242 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 224, art 14; Maha-Hanaan Balala, Islamic Finance and 
Law: Theory and Practice in a Globalized World (I.B. Tauris, 2011), 27-8; Frank E Vogel and Samuel L Hayes, 
Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return (Kluwer Law International, 1998) vol 16, 130-1, 221-2; 
Gönülal, above n 4, 6, 70; Nico P Swartz and Pieter Coetzer, 'Takaful: An Islamic Insurance Instrument' (2010) 
2(10) Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics 333, 338; Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, 
above n 223, 14-5; Jamie Reid, 'Takaful Insurance an Introduction' (2008) 31(5) Finity Publications 36, 37. 
243 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 224, art 16; International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), above n 221. 
59 
 
(compliance, actuarial system, internal audit), monitoring system, managing and reporting 
risks, and enterprise risk system for solvency requirements and insurance activities.244  
Risks related to Takaful insurance are similar to those in conventional insurance.245 The 
exceptions are the risks of Sharia non-compliance, funds segregation, and re-Takaful. Each of 
these risks is now discussed in turn.246 
First, a breach of Takaful principles247 might void the policy or cause penalties to be imposed 
by the local regulator in each respective country.248 As discussed in chapter 4, the main 
insurance laws in Saudi Arabia, the LSCIC (Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies) and its IR (Implementing Rules), do not refer to, or impose penalties on any 
breach of Takaful principles. Also, interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and among Islamic jurists. This creates a probable risk of conflicts 
when one Islamic country may not consider an action a breach of Takaful when another 
Islamic country does.249 Further, some regulations in certain countries breach Takaful 
principles and force Takaful insurers to breach these principles.250 This might be the position 
under some Saudi insurance laws, e.g. the IR with the case of surplus distribution, as noted 
above in 3.2.3. Furthermore, all Takaful products and investments must be Sharia-compliant 
all the time.251 Risk of Sharia non-compliance might also have a negative effect on 
investments. Since investments are restricted to Sharia limitations and rules, doubtful (or 
questionable) investments should be avoided,252 see chapter 6. Takaful competitiveness with 
conventional insurance can also be negatively affected by risk of Sharia non-compliance.253 
The second risk relates to funds segregation. Separating participants’ funds (PUF and PIF) 
from each other and separating them from the shareholders’ fund creates an agency 
relationship risk. This agency relationship risk is a problem of conflict of interest under 
corporate governance,254 as explained in chapter 4. To avoid the risk of Sharia non-
compliance, expenses of participants’ funds must not be mingled with the expenses of 
shareholders’ in which each party is responsible for their own funds.255 This requirement 
creates some issues. Funds segregation requires more capital,256 because the shareholders’ 
fund bears the obligation of providing a qard hasan (interest-free loan) where there is a 
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deficit.257 As noted previously at 3.2.2, in Saudi Arabia , there is a substitute qard facility 
from the shareholders’ fund. Although this disadvantages shareholders by withdrawing 
money from profit earning capacity and dividends, it provides additional capital in meeting 
capital adequacy rules. Another issue or risk relates to Takaful operators’ fees. These issues 
are taken up in chapter 4, and the practical operation by JSCs in Saudi Arabia is examined in 
chapter 7. 
Third, there are also risks with re-Takaful (Islamic re-insurance). The IFSB’s Standard also 
refers to the ICPs (Insurance Core Principles) issued by the IAIS (International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors).258 The IAIS requests government supervisors to set up standards 
for re-insurance undertakings and other forms of risk transfer. This monitors whether risk 
transfer forms are regularly controlled and reported by the insurers. In doing so, supervisors 
should consider each type of re-insurance undertaking subject to their local regulations.259 
Under Takaful, dealing with conventional re-insurance is a risk facing Takaful companies as 
it has been a long debate between Islamic jurists of whether it is Islamically permissible to 
deal with conventional re-insurance.260 See  discussion in chapter 6.    
This Standard, in association with other standards issued by the IFSB, highlights other types 
of significant risks which are the usual risks faced by all insurers whether conventional or 
Takaful as follows.261 First, operational risk (such as operational failure, mismanagement, 
assets and capital failure, and IT systems) is a risk exposed by Takaful operators.262 The 
second is underwriting risk such as participants’ contributions, claim settlements, and 
insolvency including the inability to retain the participants in the Takaful pool (also known as 
withdrawal risk) and the inability to repay the qard hasan (interest-free loan) from future 
surpluses of participants’ funds.263 The third risk is market risk which arises from changing of 
prices and values based on market fluctuations. Thus, Takaful operators must have a 
management mechanism for market risk.264 Fourth, credit risk arises to a Takaful undertaking 
when either party fails to fulfil its obligations such as investments risks and re-Takaful 
risks.265 Also, risks affecting capital are considered credit risk – qard hasan for example.266 
Fifth, liquidity risk arises from the inability to pay out claims or financially support the 
Takaful funds (participants’ funds or the shareholders’ fund) without liquidating assets.267 
Qard hasan (compulsory loan to underwriting fund) is also classified under liquidity risk.268 
Sixth, legal and compliance risk is related to failure to fulfil the regulatory obligations and 
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requirements to protect the rights of both participants and shareholders. Conflicts of interest 
might occur, so the regulator must establish a clear mechanism to avoid issues arising from 
conflicts of interest.269 Below at 3.7 is a brief discussion about whether Takaful insurance in 
Saudi Arabia conforms to these rules.   
3.6.3. Enterprise Risk Management 
Takaful undertakings face and are exposed to risks, so management frameworks known as 
“enterprise risk management” are required.270 Enterprise risk management requires Takaful 
operators to establish risk management policies and strategies for their investments and 
underwriting activities271 taking into account that the aims of participants differ from the aims 
of shareholders.272 Risk identification, discussed earlier at 3.2.4, is also important under risk 
management.273 Risk assessment may be seen as the next step following risk identification, 
where the identified risk must be assessed and categorized.274 Takaful operators must respond 
to the identified risk by determining a specific strategy that will deal with that risk.275 Also, 
Takaful operators must establish systems to regularly monitor each identified risk and report 
it.276 An internal control framework must also be set up by Takaful operators. Internal control 
frameworks ensure that Takaful undertakings are managed properly.277 The risk management 
framework must be disclosed to all stakeholders.278 
Asset-liability management ensures that the Takaful operation’s assets and liabilities are 
sound and stable. Asset-liability management also ensures that assets are Sharia-compliant 
and liabilities such as solvency requirements are fulfilled.279 In practice, asset-liability 
management should not be expected to achieve perfect results, so it is one method to mitigate 
risk.280  
Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) is a mechanism falling under enterprise risk 
management.281 ORSA assesses the financial system, capital requirements, and risk 
management framework of the Takaful operation and reports them to the Board of Directors, 
taking into account the separation of Takaful funds and the qard hasan (interest-free loan).282 
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ORSA has been enforced in the USA since 2015.283 The IFSB recommends ORSA be 
established by each Takaful operator, and some regulators make ORSA mandatory for 
Takaful operators.284 
Public disclosure and transparency are also required for Takaful operators. Takaful operators 
disclose the risk management framework to the public and stakeholders. The risk 
management framework discloses the nature of risk, the risks exposed to the Takaful 
operator, and the decision made by the management regarding the risk management 
framework.285 
3.6.4. Elements in Risk Supervisory Review Process 
The risk management framework, discussed above, must be reviewed for approval by the 
government supervisory authority.286 SAMA is the insurance supervisor reviewing insurers’ 
risk management frameworks in Saudi Arabia. The government supervisory authority can 
approve this or require the Takaful operator to make corrections on its risk management 
framework.287 During the review process, the government supervisory authority should focus 
more on certain issues to ensure the framework exists; ensure risk governance is managed 
properly; ensure funds are separated to participants’ funds and the shareholders’ fund; ensure 
compliance with Sharia; ensure all re-Takaful issues are addressed appropriately; and ensure 
the Takaful operator sends the reports regularly including, if mandatory, ORSA (Own Risk 
and Solvency Assessment).288 The position in Saudi Arabia is discussed below. 
3.6.5. Systemic Risk Consideration 
Systemic risk is any risk that might affect the Takaful financial system.289 For example, 
dealing with re-Takaful may result in a systemic risk to Takaful insurers (cedent/ceding 
insurers) once the re-Takaful market is reliant and controlled by the same re-Takaful 
provider. In this case, the prevailing re-Takaful provider might be exposed to excessive high 
risks, so failure of that re-Takaful provider may create a systemic risk exposed to the ceding 
Takaful insurers.290 Thus, the regulatory authority must carefully supervise and monitor the 
re-Takaful market and may impose stricter requirements on prevailing re-Takaful operators 
such as requiring them to hold a greater capital.291 This applies to Saudi insurance regulations 
that require the minimum capital of re-insurers to be more than the capital of ceding 
insurance companies,292 as indicated above. Another example of systemic risk is in relation to 
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Takaful insurers dealing with IT system providers. Takaful insurers may be exposed to 
systemic risks if they use the same IT provider/s.293  
In Saudi Arabia, a 2015 survey examines insurance risk management of Saudi Takaful 
insurers.294 In general, insurers’ risk management showed advances due to SAMA’s role of 
supervising the insurers and enforcing insurance laws.295 For example, the risk governance 
structure indicated positive developments on improving Takaful insurer’s risk policies and 
enhancing some risk related matters.296 The survey also showed that SAMA’s monitoring 
resulted in improvements on insurers’ enterprise risk management.297 In respect of insurers’ 
regulatory compliance frameworks, SAMA’s insurance laws force insurers to consider 
minimum capital adequacy as the most important requirement.298 Some insurers claimed that 
SAMA regulatory requirements were vague and ambiguous, so penalties were not to be 
imposed by SAMA on some of insurers’ violations.299 However, the examples indicated 
earlier (under 3.2.1 in footnote 52 and 3.2.4 in footnote 113) show that SAMA has imposed 
and suspended some insurers for violations some of its risk management requirements. Other 
insurers, indicated in the survey, also claimed that ORSA (Own Risk and Solvency 
Assessment) is not required by SAMA and not applied by insurers.300  
This survey examines risk management regulation in Saudi Arabia based on international 
models for risk management. For example, some external rating agencies such as S&P 
(Standard & Poor's Financial Services), AM Best (A.M. Best Rating Services), and Moody’s 
(Moody's Investors Service Research) were used by the survey.301 It is evident that risk of 
Sharia non-compliance was not examined. For example, the qard hasan (interest-free loan), 
as a Takaful requirement and falls under different types of risks such as underwriting risk, 
credit risk, and liquidity risk (noted above) was not examined by the survey. 
The Risk Management Regulation (RMR) of Saudi Arabia is critically examined from a 
Takaful risk management viewpoint in the following section.  
3.7. An Analysis of the Saudi Risk Management Regulation (RMR) from a Sharia 
Perspective 
IFSB’s (Islamic Financial Services Board) risk management rules are mostly reflected in the 
Saudi RMR (Risk Management Regulation), see discussion at 3.2.4. For example, the IFSB 
highlights many important aspects in risk management to be fulfilled by Takaful insurers—
such as corporate governance systems, risk management systems, internal control (e.g. 
actuarial and internal audit) systems, monitoring systems, reporting risks, enterprise risk 
management strategies and policies for investments and underwriting activities, operational 
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risk (e.g. operational failure, mismanagement, IT failure) systems, underwriting risk systems, 
market risk systems, credit risk systems, liquidity risk systems, legal and compliance, risk 
identification, risk assessment, and disclosure. The IFSB also highlights the importance of 
supervisory authority on insurers. It is evident that all these rules have been reflected in Saudi 
RMR (Risk Management Regulation), but with some varying terminology. However, the 
IFSB further highlights three specific risks (risk of Sharia non-compliance, risk of funds 
segregation, risk of re-Takaful) only applicable to Takaful insurers. These risks are not 
reflected in the Saudi RMR, as now examined. 
3.7.1. Risk of Sharia Non-compliance in the Saudi RMR 
An objective of the RMR is ‘to promote high standards of risk management.’302 This does not 
appear to be Sharia-compliant as the objective encourages following conventional risk 
management standards instead of Sharia risk management standards adopted by Takaful 
organisations, for example, the IFSB. Also, art 5 of the RMR defines risk management from 
the IAIS (International Association of Insurance Supervisors)303 which is an international 
conventional insurance organisation. The terminologies used by the RMR throughout its 
entire articles are the conventional terms “insurance” and “re-insurance” rather than 
“Takaful” and “re-Takaful”. This suggests that the RMR has adopted a conventional risk 
management approach. It is significant to note that risk of non-compliance indicated under 
the RMR only addresses the risk of non-compliance with local regulations304 while the risk of 
Sharia non-compliance is not addressed. The RMR also sets penalties for breaching the local 
regulations305 while no such penalties are imposed for a breach of Sharia-compliance rules. 
This is because Sharia requirements are not legally enforceable. 
As noted earlier, a substitute qard facility is required by the Implementing Rules for the 
Cooperative Insurance Companies Law (IR). The RMR makes no reference to this. Nor does 
the RMR refer to investments under Sharia as it seems to be secularly focused. Nor is the 
Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) required under Takaful principles, discussed in chapter 4, 
addressed under the RMR. But it could be argued that the very restrictive investment rules 
and capital adequacy may indirectly address the issue. As noted at 3.2.2, if an insurer does 
not have an investment plan approved by SAMA, the default model under Table 1 of the 
Implementing Rules (IR) requires a minimum of 40 per cent to be invested in cash deposits or 
government bonds. Additional provisions reduce the risk that investment is non halal. There 
is the requirement that 50 per cent of investments are required to be in domestic currency 
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unless SAMA approves otherwise. Investments cannot be made in derivatives or off-balance 
sheet items unless SAMA approves. Although this does not directly prohibit non halal 
investment, its requirements provide mechanisms which may largely achieve this result.  
3.7.2. Risk of Funds Segregation in the Saudi RMR 
While the RMR (discussed above at 3.2.4) does not refer to separation between the 
participants’ funds (PUF and PIF) and the shareholders’ fund, the effect of other rules and 
regulations clearly recognises that the “operational” account must be separated from the 
shareholders’ fund account, particularly in the Surplus Distribution Policy, referred to in 
chapter 4. Although the LSCIC (Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies) 
and the IR (Implementing Rules) require funds segregation, noted above at 3.2.1, Saudi 
insurance regulations do not require separate capital for each fund. See discussion of separate 
capital for each Takaful fund below at 3.8. Chapter 7 examines whether the separated funds 
are tangible in practice.  
3.7.3. Risk of Re-Takaful (Islamic Re-insurance) in the Saudi RMR 
The RMR provisions relating to re-Takaful are similar to conventional (commercial) re-
insurance. The RMR raises issues related to violations of Takaful principles such as risk 
transfer to a re-insurer.306 Saudi insurers are exposed to risk of re-Takaful in which they deal 
with conventional re-insurers instead of re-Takaful operators. These issues are discussed in 
chapter 6.4. 
The RMR has applied conventional (commercial) standards on insurance risk management. 
Other regulatory provisions may indirectly reduce some of these specific Sharia risks but not 
all of them. This is reflecting in the Implementing Rules and the Surplus Distribution Policy. 
The key area not addressed is that there is no requirement that insurers have Sharia 
Supervisory Boards (SSBs). 
The operation of these Saudi insurance regulations in practice and the compliance with 
Takaful principles are discussed in chapters 6 and 7.  
3.8. Capital Solvency Requirements for Takaful 
Very litter literature has discussed regulatory philosophies for capital in Takaful. As sources 
are limited and this matter is beyond the scope of the thesis, this part provides a general 
platform only without details. 
Regulation of capital for Takaful insurers has been argued among Islamic scholars and local 
regulators.307 The arguments are divided into three views. 
The first view argues that capital for the shareholders’ fund and the Takaful participants’ 
funds should be regulated. Shareholders are obligated to provide a qard hasan (interest-free 
                                                             
306 Ibid art 30. 
307 Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 223, 193-4, 220; Abdulrahman Khalil Tolefat and Mehmet 
Asutay, Takaful Investment Portfolios: A Study of the Composition of Takaful Funds in the GCC and Malaysia 
(John Wiley & Sons Singapore, 1 ed, 2013) 120. 
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loan), discussed in chapter 4, that supports the Takaful participants’ funds during a deficit. 
The shareholders’ fund bears more financial responsibilities to facilitate the participants’ 
funds, so regulation for capital of the shareholders’ fund should be stricter and tougher than 
capital for the Takaful funds.308 The second view claims that there is no need to regulate the 
shareholders’ fund. This is because risks are borne by the Takaful participants’ funds only. 
The shareholders’ fund does not bear risks, as the shareholders’ role is only as an agent who 
collects premiums and pays claims on behalf of the policyholders.309 The last view asserts 
that capital for both the shareholders’ fund and the Takaful participants’ funds should be 
regulated equally as each fund is as important as the other.310 
In practice, Takaful companies are required to provide minimum capital for the shareholders’ 
fund as well as maintaining the shareholders’ fund sufficient to support the participants’ 
funds in the event of a deficit.311 As noted earlier, the exact required amount of minimum 
capital for Takaful companies differs from country to country. In Saudi Arabia, SAMA 
regulates insurance and sets required minimum capital for Takaful and re-Takaful companies, 
particularly for the shareholders’ fund. As also noted earlier, Saudi insurance regulations do 
not require separate capital for each fund. 
In relation to capital requirements for Takaful companies, the IFSB (Islamic Financial 
Services Board) emphasises the importance of keeping adequate reserves to maintain good 
solvency and sustainability.312 The IFSB does not provide specific solvency capital 
requirements for Takaful insurers. Instead, it relies on the standards issued by the IAIS 
(International Association of Insurance Supervisors),313 as referred to earlier at 3.4.3. This is 
because the international solvency capital requirements applicable to conventional insurance 
have also been applied to Takaful insurance.314 The IFSB only highlights and establishes 
important elements of solvency capital requirements for Takaful based on Sharia-
compliance.315 The IFSB does not aim to change Takaful operators’ mechanisms in dealing 
with risks either, as long as these mechanisms used for minimum capital requirements are 
appropriate and based on Sharia.316 It is worth noting that minimum capital requirements 
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.317 
Takaful companies face potential risks of paying claims against insured events. These risks 
are paid out of the policyholders’ contributions, Takaful participants’ funds. Thus, Takaful 
operators are required to have adequate management mechanisms to mitigate future risks.318 
Also, the Takaful undertaking must have sufficient capital and adequate reserves enabling the 
                                                             
308 Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 223, 220; Tolefat and Asutay, above n 307, 120-1. 
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company to fulfil its obligations.319 This is because the objective of regulatory capital 
requirements is to ensure that insurance companies are stable and solvent.320 Similarly, 
Takaful operators are required to maintain adequate reserves to ensure solvency and 
sustainability.321 A proportion of participants’ contributions (premiums) is put aside as a 
regulatory reserves requirement to further support insurers’ solvency.322 In order for Takaful 
companies to ensure sufficient solvency and sustainability, Takaful companies must disclose 
in the annual reports their reserve, surpluses sharing and distribution, and risk management 
strategies. Also, it is highly recommended Takaful insurance companies meet the reserve 
requirements in a shorter time to be capable of paying future policyholders’ claims.323 In 
Saudi Arabia, the required allocations for reserves, requirements for solvency margins, the 
restricted investment rules, required disclosure in insurers’ annual reports, and requirements 
for risk management are referred above at 3.2. Chapter 7 examines Saudi Takaful insurance 
companies’ annual reports.  
Since future claims are paid out of the participants’ funds (not the operator’s fund), there 
must be a separation between the policyholders’ funds (PUF and PIF) from the shareholder’s 
fund, explained in chapter 4.6.4, to distinguish participants’ and shareholders’ rights.324 In 
relation to Takaful solvency capital requirements, this separation raises an issue. Once the 
pool in a Takaful policy is segregated into two funds (participants’ funds and shareholders’ 
fund), each fund requires its own capital.325 In principle, policyholders are responsible for 
bearing the risk of future deficits in the participants underwriting fund (PUF), while the 
Takaful operator is not responsible unless involved in misconduct, negligence or recklessness 
in relation to the fund.326 
The issue arising is that the policyholders’ underwriting fund (PUF) is constituted from 
policyholders’ contributions (premiums) only. This may not be sufficient enough to meet 
solvency requirements.327 In practice, one of the mechanisms for managing this is the 
obligation for the operator (through its shareholders’ fund), in the event of a deficit, to 
provide the participants’ underwriting fund with a qard hasan (interest-free loan),328 as 
explained in chapter 4. The qard hasan functions as an additional solvency capital to meet the 
solvency requirements for the participants’ underwriting fund, but not for the shareholders’ 
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fund.329 This is because the participants’ underwriting fund is built up on policyholders’ 
contributions (premiums) only,330 so it needs a qard hasan as a further required capital to 
support its solvency.331 
The qard hasan is not the only requirement for the capital solvency of policyholders’ funds 
as the regulatory authority can set up additional requirements for the capital solvency.332 
Since Takaful solvency regulation requires the Takaful operator (shareholders’ fund) to 
provide a qard hasan to the policyholders’ underwriting fund (PUF), the Takaful operator in 
relation to its shareholders’ fund is required to provide additional capital to the solvency 
capital requirements.333 Thus, solvency requirements for separation of funds in Takaful are 
important to make sure that the PUF has sufficient income and reserves to pay for potential 
claims and that the shareholders’ fund has sufficient income to provide a qard hasan to the 
PUF.334  
The Takaful regulation of solvency or minimum capital requirements is an obstacle facing 
Takaful insurance companies. This is because Takaful requires segregation between 
policyholders’ funds and the shareholders’ fund.335 Since all Takaful funds are segregated, 
there are also other needs and reasons for requiring a separate capital for each fund. Assets 
and values accounted for the regulatory solvency capital requirements of policyholders’ funds 
cannot be accounted for the regulatory solvency capital requirements of the shareholders’ 
fund, and vice versa. Thus, assets must be separately accounted for each particular fund 
(policyholders’ funds and shareholders’ fund).336 In Saudi Arabia, insurance regulations (the 
LSCIC and the IR) require funds to be separated (discussed earlier at 3.2.1) but no specific 
capital is required for each Takaful fund. 
The above discussion shows that the requirements for Takaful are very complicated. 
Malaysia, as one of the experienced leaders on Takaful (see chapter 1.5), has been facing 
difficulties in finding a proper way to structure solvency capital in Takaful insurance 
companies.337 In Saudi Arabia, insurance laws set minimum capital requirements and adopt 
rules for maintaining adequate reserves. There also seems to be no tangible segregation 
between the value of assets belonging to the policyholders’ funds and those belonging to the 
shareholders’ fund, as discussed further in chapter 7. 
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The chapter provided a general outline of the regulatory framework governing Takaful 
insurance companies in Saudi Arabia. It discussed the key legislation regulating insurance in 
Saudi Arabia: the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (LSCIC), the 
Implementing Rules for the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law (IR), the Insurance 
Corporate Governance Regulation (ICGR), the Surplus Distribution Policy, the Risk 
Management Regulation (RMR), and the Regulation of Reinsurance Activities.  
The chapter also discussed risk and risk management in general and identified how insurance 
plays an essential role in managing risks. It highlighted the key risks for Takaful insurance 
companies, the issues relating to the stability of Takaful insurance companies, and the 
influence of international insurance standards to ensure the stability, such as those referred to 
in the discussion of Solvency II and IAIA standards. The chapter looked at the key issues for 
Takaful, referring to IFSB’s (Islamic Financial Services Board) standards and rules. Takaful 
companies are exposed to the same risks as conventional (commercial) insurance subject to 
the caveat related to risks of non-compliance with Sharia which would not apply to 
conventional insurance. 
Similarly, the chapter further discussed solvency capital requirements for Takaful insurers, 
the specific requirements in Saudi Arabia, and the more general international capital and 
solvency requirements adopted by Solvency II and IAIA standards. 
The chapter concluded that the Saudi Risk Management Regulation (RMR) whilst setting out 
rules relating to risks in conventional insurance, makes no reference to unique risks of non-
compliance with Sharia. Chapter 7 further examines how Takaful insurers in Saudi Arabia 
and the Saudi insurance laws deal with these unique risks, and whether they are Sharia-
compliant. 




Islamic Insurance (Takaful) 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of Sharia (Islamic law) and its main and secondary 
sources relevant to Takaful (Islamic insurance). The chapter provides a working definition 
and a brief history of Takaful insurance. It sets out basic rules for compliance with Sharia and 
discusses the prohibitions against riba (interest/usury or money for money), gharar 
(uncertainty), and maysir (gambling). It then explains the majority view of Islamic jurists for 
Islamically permitting Takaful insurance. The unique view of Al-Zarqaa, which takes an 
alternative approach to the Islamic majority opinion, is fully considered and discussed as a 
Sharia alternative to conventional (commercial) insurance as well as to Takaful insurance.  
Models (forms) of Takaful insurance—wakalah (agency), mudharabah (profit-sharing), and 
hybrid wakalah and mudharabah—, Takaful principles, Takaful operators’ rights, and 
Takaful participants’ (policyholders’) rights are also explained. 
4.2. Definitions of Takaful (Islamic Insurance) 
Takaful insurance does not have a specific definition agreed upon by all Islamic scholars.1 
This is to be expected because of its relatively modern origins. The definitions emphasise co-
operation and mutuality as well as the concept of tabarru (donation/charity) and non-profit as 
underpinning Takaful principles. This is clear from the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB) definition: 
Takaful is the Islamic counterpart of conventional insurance, and exists in both Family (or 
“Life”) and General forms. Takaful is derived from an Arabic word that means joint 
guarantee, whereby a group of participants agree among themselves to support one another 
jointly for the losses arising from specified risks. In a Takaful arrangement the participants 
contribute a sum of money as a Tabarru’ [donation/charity] commitment into a common fund 
that will be used mutually to assist the members against a specified type of loss or damage. 
The underwriting in a Takaful is thus undertaken on a mutual basis, similar in some respects 
to conventional mutual insurance.2  
The emphasis is different in the definition of Takaful insurance by the International 
Cooperative and Mutual Insurance Federation (ICMIF). As will be discussed later at 4.6.1, 
the payment of premiums for insurance covers raises some issues of compliance with Sharia 
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which have been side-stepped by describing premiums paid by those seeking insurance as 
donations. The ICMIF defines Takaful in this way: 
Takaful is an Arabic word meaning “guaranteeing each other” or “joint guarantee”. The 
Tabarru' system is the main core of the takaful system making it free from uncertainty and 
gambling. Tabarru' means “donation; gift; contribution”.3 
Takaful insurance is an agreement between a group of people to co-operatively create a non-
profit fund (pool) against potential risks where the fund will have its own policy determining 
its responsibilities for accepting moneys and deposits and paying compensation. This fund 
can be delegated to a specific company subject to Sharia laws.4 Takaful insurance is an 
alternative to conventional (commercial) insurance; it is based on Sharia perspectives of 
shared responsibilities and mutual co-operation against specific risks.5 
4.3. Sharia (Islamic Law): Main and Secondary Sources 
Islamic jurisprudence is derived from the two primary sources of Sharia, the Holy Quran and 
the Sunnah (Prophet Mohammed’s practices and sayings).6 Many Quranic verses exhort 
believers to obey the law, for example:  
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger [Prophet Mohammed] and 
those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the 
Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in 
result.7 
The Holy Quran also says ‘O you who believe! obey God, and obey the Messenger 
[Prophet Mohammed], and do not let your deeds go to waste.’8 It further says ‘Say, Obey 
Allah and the Messenger [Prophet Mohammed]. But if they turn away - then indeed, 
Allah does not like the disbelievers.’9  
                                                             
3 International Cooperative and Mutual Insurance Federation (ICMIF), Takaful Insurance ICMIF 
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6 Muhammad Muslehuddin, Philosophy of Islamic Law and the Orientalists: A Comparative Study of Islamic 
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The application of Sharia is based on the interpretation of Islamic doctrines and schools 
within the Sharia umbrella (Quran and Sunnah). There are, among others, four main Islamic 
doctrines and schools: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali.10  
There are also secondary sources of Sharia which must be interpreted strictly in accordance 
with the Holy Quran and the Sunnah as the two primary sources.11 The most important 
secondary sources are ijmaa (consensus) and qiyas (reasoning by analogy). Ijmaa involves 
consensus by Islamic scholars to solve an issue or a dispute provided that it does not conflict 
with the Quran or the Sunnah.12 In practice, however, it is difficult to achieve ijmaa and cases 
where ijmaa has been fully agreed are very rare; thus the majority opinion has been taken as 
sufficient, see discussion below at 4.3.1. Qiyas is intended to solve a problem or an issue that 
cannot be resolved through the Quran and the Sunnah. Qiyas deals with similar problems 
solved by the Quran or the Sunnah and applies the solutions to similar, but not identical 
problems.13 Other secondary sources of Sharia are masalah mursalah (public interest) and urf 
(custom) provided that they do not contravene the primary sources. Islamic financial 
transactions rely on these Sharia primary and secondary sources.14 Under Sharia, the 
permissibility of Takaful is analysed by reference to the primary sources (Quran and Sunnah), 
and also the secondary sources (ijmaa, qiyas, masalah mursalah, and urf) that are consistent 
with the primary sources.15 
4.3.1. Sharia Sources Permitting Takaful 
Takaful insurance is justified on the basis of Sharia primary and secondary sources.  
Mutual co-operation is one of the key principles underpinning Takaful. This is based on the 
statements in the Holy Quran that encourage mutual co-operation among people.16 The 
Quranic verse states ‘… cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and 
aggression.’17 Takaful contracts, like other contracts, are based on a promise and fulfilling 
contract promises is compulsory under Sharia.18 The Holy Quran enjoins ‘O you who 
believe! Fulfill your commitments (contracts).’19 The Quran also enjoins ‘And honor your 
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pledge, because the pledge involves responsibility.’20 The Holy scripture further states ‘O you 
who believe! Why do you say what you do not do? It is most hateful to God that you say 
what you do not do.’21   
Takaful is based on mutual co-operation which is also permitted by the Sunnah.22 The 
Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him and his family) encouraged mutual co-operation when he 
said:  
Whoever removes a worldly grief from a believer, Allah will remove from him one of the 
griefs of the Day of Resurrection. And whoever alleviates the need of a needy person, Allah 
will alleviate his needs in this world and the Hereafter.23 
Takaful is also based on mutual promises. The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him and his 
family) obliged and required people to fulfil their promises as he said: 
The signs of a hypocrite are three: when he speaks, he lies; and when he makes a promise, he 
breaks it; and when he is charged with a trust, he deceives.24 
The Prophet (Peace be upon him and his family) also said:  
There is no faith for one who cannot be trusted. There is no religion for one who cannot 
uphold a covenant.25 
The Sunnah also provides support for Takaful based on the justifications of alawaqel 
(compensation for unintentional killing), and tawakul (trusting Allah),26 as explained below 
in this section.  
The third foundation for Takaful insurance is Islamic jurists’ opinions based on qiyas 
(reasoning by analogy). Qiyas, provided that it does not contravene the Holy Quran and the 
Sunnah, is recommended for use in deciding new disputes, such as Takaful insurance.27 
Takaful is very recent in its origins, and Islamic jurists continue to debate whether the 
concept of insurance providing protection is permissible under Sharia. There are two key 
arguments. 
One argument is that insurance contravenes the Islamic principle of al-qada & al-qadar (fate 
and destiny of Allah).28 Al-qada & al-qadar is a part of Islamic faith that should not be 
challenged and rejected, as emphasised by the Quran and the Sunnah.29 
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The Holy Quran says ‘No calamity occurs on earth, or in your souls, but it is in a Book [the 
Holy Quran], even before We make it happen. This is easy for God.’30 The Quran also says 
‘[T]he command of God is an absolute decree.’31 In the Sunnah, the Prophet Mohammed 
(Peace be upon him and his family) said ‘To believe in God, … and to believe in al-qada & al-
qadar [fate and destiny].’32 The Prophet also added ‘Nobody is a believer unless believes in 
four: … al-qada & al-qadar.’33 
The now accepted view of Islamic jurists is that Takaful insurance (with some reservations 
with regard to conventional insurance) does not challenge, resist or prevent al-qada & al-
qadar from occurring, nor does it contravene the Quran and the Sunnah. Insurance does not 
prevent risks (events or incidents) from happening; rather, it accepts al-qada & al-qadar but 
tries to reinstate the status of the insured after the risk has occurred. The insured’s intention in 
taking on insurance is to mitigate or reduce the consequences of an event or incident under 
risk; it is not to challenge Allah’s will.34 This creates co-operation which is encouraged by 
Sharia as the Quranic verse says ‘… cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not 
cooperate in sin and aggression.’35  
In this regard, a second related argument has been advanced to claim that insurance 
contradicts the Islamic principle of tawakul (trust in Allah) as people must put their trust in 
Almighty Allah but the insured person relies on insurance instead.36 The Holy Quran, in this 
regard, says ‘And put your trust in the Living [Allah], the One who never dies’37 and ‘God, 
there is no God but He; and in God let the believers put their trust.’38 In response, Islamic 
jurists have argued that Takaful insurance does not contradict the Islamic principle of tawakul 
as it requires people first to take precautions and then to put their trust in Almighty Allah.39 
This reasoning is based on the Quranic verses ‘ … so avoid them, and put your trust in God. 
God is Guardian enough’40 and ‘But if they incline towards peace, then incline towards it, 
and put your trust in God.’41 The reasoning is also based on the Sunnah. The Prophet 
Mohammed’s (Peace be upon him and his family) answer to a man’s question whether he should 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Evidence from the Malaysian Market' (2014) 5(1) Insurance Markets and Companies: Analyses and Actuarial 
Computations 22, 27. 
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30 The Holy Quran, Al-Hadid, Verse 22. 
31 Ibid Al-Ahzab, Verse 38. 
32 Al-Hajjaj, above n 23, No. 10. 
33 Mohammad At-Tirmidhi, Sunan At-Tirmidhi [ يذمرتلا ننس حیحصلا عماجلا ] (Dar El-Trath El Araby For Printing & 
Publishing, 2003) No. 2145; Alhusayn Masud Al-Baghawi, Tafsir Al-Baghawi [ يوغبلا ریسفت ] (Dar Taibah for 
Publishing and Distribution, 1991) vol 7, 436. 
34 Mustafa Ahmed Al-Zarqaa, Insurance Regulation: Its Truth and its Sharia Opinion [  يأرلاو ھتقیقح نیمأتلا ماظن
ھیف يعرشلا ] (Al-Resalah Foundation, 1 ed, 1984) 47-8; Tolefat and Asutay, above n 15, 40-1. 
35 The Holy Quran, Almaadah, Verse 2. 
36 Tolefat and Asutay, above n 15, 10-1; Bilah, above n 5, 72; Bilah, above n 11, 159, 164. 
37 The Holy Quran, Al-Furqan, Verse 58.  
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leave his camel untied and seek the protection of Allah (tawakul); the Prophet responded ‘Tie 
your camel and then tawakul [rely on Allah].’42 Consequently, Sharia permits and encourages 
the taking of precautions, such as Takaful insurance, and then tawakul (reliance on Allah).43  
The fourth basis for Takaful insurance is ijmaa (consensus) where decisions are made by 
Islamic scholars. By including ijmaa as one of the Sharia secondary sources, Islamic scholars 
have permitted the concept of insurance and subjected it to Islamic principles.44 Although 
some claimed the decision was made through consensus (ijmaa), it was not as a few Islamic 
scholars rejected both Takaful insurance and conventional insurance. To be accurate, the 
decision should be classified as being decided by the majority.45 This is an important point as 
it is argued below that provided there is no direct contradiction with the Quran or the Sunnah, 
Islamic jurisprudence permits a diversity of views. This was the situation starting from 1961 
when leading Islamic scholars came together in a series of conferences and seminars that 
have been held in relation to Takaful insurance.46 The most recognised conference was held 
by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) in Saudi Arabia in 1985. At this 
conference, the majority of Islamic jurists (not ijmaa) authorised Takaful insurance and 
prohibited conventional insurance.47 The minority argument that Takaful insurance is not 
permissible is discussed further below. 
Abdulhay El-Ghomari (an Islamic Imam) argued against the majority or ijmaa (consensus) as 
a secondary source of Sharia. El-Ghomari reached the conclusion that the majority opinion of 
Islamic jurists or even the ijmaa (consensus) opinion of Islamic jurists should not be 
                                                             
42 At-Tirmidhi, above n 33, No. 2517. 
43 Tolefat and Asutay, above n 15, 10-1; Bilah, above n 5, 75, 77; Bilah, above n 11, 164; Htay et al, above n 29, 
206. 
44 Bilah, above n 5, 58; Bilah, above n 11, 152. 
45 Badreddine Berrahlia, 'Insurance under the Executive Decree 09/13 between Commercial and Co-operative 
[ ينواعتلاو يراجتلا نیب 09/13 يذیفنتلا موسرملا لظ يف نیمأتلا ]' (Paper presented at the International Forum: Conventional 
Insurance Companies and Takaful Insurance Institutions between Theoretical Bases and the Practical 
Experiment [ ةیقیبطتلا ةبرجتلاو ةیرظنلا سسألا نیب يلفاكتلا نیمأتلا تاسسؤمو يدیلقتلا نیمأتلا تاكرش :ةیلودلا ةودنلا ], Ferhat Abbas 
University in Algeria, 25-26/04/2011) 9; Bilah, above n 5,  54-5; Bilah, above n 11, 148; Abdulrahim 
Abdelhamid Alsaati, '[ ؟يراجت مأ ينواعت نیمأت بكرملا يمالسإلا نیمأتلا لھ ] Is Traditional Islamic Insurance a Commercial 
Insurance?' (2009) 22(2) King Abdulaziz University Journal: Islamic Economy 125, 135.  
46 Bilah, above n 5, 58; Bilah, above n 11, 152. 
47 There have also been meetings, such as the conference held in 1965 in Cairo discussing the permissibility of 
insurance. In 1972, the permissibility of insurance was discussed in a seminar held in Morocco and also in a 
Symposium held on Islamic Jurisprudence in Libya. In February 1976, the discussion of the insurance was held 
at the First International Conference on Islamic Economics in Macca. In October 1976, another Islamic 
conference was held in Macca. In 1985, a conference was held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, permitting Takaful 
insurance and prohibiting conventional insurance. In 1996 in Dubai, the permissibility of insurance was 
discussed at the First International Summit on Islamic Insurance. In 1997 in Malaysia, the Labuan International 
Summit on Takaful was held. In 2007 in Singapore, an Asian conference on Takaful was held. See Berrahlia, 
above n 45, 8; Bahlooli Faisal and Khouiled Affaf, 'Islamic Takaful Insurance as an Alternative to Commercial 
Conventional Insurance in Algeria [ رئازجلا يف يدیلقتلا يراجتلا نیمأتلل لیدبك يمالسإلا يلفاكتلا نیمأتلا ]' (Paper presented at 
the Seventh International Forum: Insurance Industry, Practical Truth and Development Horizons –Countries 
Practices- [ لودلا براجت– ریوطتلا قافآو يلمعلا عقاولا ،ةینیمأتلا ةعانصلا ], University of Hassiba Benbouali de Chlef in 
Algeria, 3-4 December 2012) 4 <http://www.univ-
chlef.dz/LABORATOIRES/LSFBPM/seminaires_2012/intervention_behlouli_faical_2012.pdf>; Moulay 
Khaleel, 'Takaful Insurance: Reality and Future [ قافآلاو عقاولا يلفاكتلا نیمأتلا ]' (Paper presented at the First 
International Conference: Islamic Economics, Reality and Future Bets [ لبقتسملا تاناھرو ،عقاولا ،يمالسإلا داصتقإلا ], 
University of Ghardaia in Algeria, 1/3/2011) 5-6; Bilah, above n 5, 58; Bilah, above n 11, 152.  
76 
 
considered as a Sharia source. This is because under Sharia, there is no explicit or literal 
meaning requiring adherence to the majority or ijmaa. Islamic jurists’ majority opinion or 
ijmaa (consensus) may not always be the correct view under Sharia as it is impossible for 
Islamic jurists to comprehensively take into account every single detail in the Holy Quran and 
the Sunnah. Rather, Sharia requires pursuit of correct and definitive evidence for every 
dispute in Islamic jurisprudence even if the result goes against the majority or even ijmaa 
(consensus).48 
By qiyas, Al-Zarqaa’s insurance view goes against the majority but its result provides 
definitive evidence pursuant to Sharia, and thus it should be considered a Sharia insurance 
alternative. The chapter also discusses and adopts Al-Zarqaa’s Sharia alternative to Takaful, 
(see 4.4.4, and to re-Takaful, see chapter 6). Although Al-Zarqaa takes a different approach 
from the majority views of Islamic jurists, his views are consistent with primary sources for 
Sharia and should be considered as Sharia-compliant.  
A further basis for justifying Takaful insurance is that Takaful is necessary for the public 
interest (masalah mursalah). Masalah mursalah protects people from unanticipated future 
risks or perils that might occur, that may cause harm or loss. The permissibility of Takaful 
insurance practices is based on masalah mursalah to fulfil people’s needs and necessities as 
well as easing their life.49 The principle of masalah mursalah originates from the Quranic 
verse ‘… God desires ease for you, and does not desire hardship for you.’50  
Custom (urf) or social usage is another secondary source of Sharia which can also validate 
Takaful practices. If a matter does not contravene the Quran and the Sunnah and is useful to 
society, Sharia tends to allow it.51 This is reflected in the same Quranic verse ‘… God desires 
ease for you, and does not desire hardship for you.’52 The Holy Quran also guides the Prophet 
Mohammed (Peace be upon him and his family) to follow the easier way as it cites ‘We [Allah] 
shall ease you to follow the way of ease.’53 This is also reflected in the Sunnah when Aishah, 
the Prophet’s wife, reported: 
Whenever the Prophet (Peace be upon him and his family) was given a choice between two 
matters, he would always choose the easier as long as it was not sinful to do so; but if it was 
sinful he was most strict in avoiding it.’54 
The customary practices of Alawaqel (compensation for unintentional killing), explained 
below, was practiced and approved by the Prophet. Since alawaqel, as a source of custom 
(urf), was used in ancient times and did not contravene the Quran and the Sunnah, it is used 
as a justification for Takaful insurance contracts.55 
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Whether Takaful insurance can exist under Sharia has long been debated. Early precedents 
for insurance confirm that Takaful was permissible under Sharia, based on the key principles 
of co-operation and shared risk. Three early examples of Islamic insurance existed during the 
early Islamic era: 1) alawaqel (compensation for unintentional killing), 2) guarantees for the 
poor and others,56 and 3) expenses or support between relatives or families.57  
In the case of an unintentional manslaughter (alawaqel), in the early Islamic era, blood 
money (compensation) would be paid to the family of the deceased. It would be paid by the 
killer’s tribe and kinsmen by dividing the amount amongst them. This type of Sharia law was 
based on tribal and family associations to protect and benefit both the killer’s family and the 
deceased’s family.58 This type of alawaqel practice, in the Islamic community, is a form of 
third-party Takaful insurance.59 The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him and his family) also 
confirmed alawaqel60 by ruling that blood money should be paid where a woman by mistake 
killed another woman by throwing a stone at her.61 
Based on alawaqel practice, various forms of liability insurance are acceptable in Takaful 
insurance. Such Takaful liability policies include, for example, automobile accident insurance 
and workers’ compensation insurance.62 
The second example of an insurance form in the early Islamic era concerns guarantees for the 
poor and those unable to work. The inability to work or to earn a livelihood is a universal 
risk.63 In Western countries, this is reflected in social security payments to the unemployed 
and to those unable to work. Sharia protects people from these risks from a variety of sources, 
including the zakat or sadaqa (charity) pool. Sharia requires each person, and especially 
those with means such as merchants and business traders, to annually pay zakat (or sadaqa) 
to the government (as practiced by the Prophet), in a way similar to Western taxation.64 The 
purpose of zakat is distributive to help provide for the poor and assist those in need without 
any duty to repay to the zakat pool.65 There are eight categories of the poor who deserve 
payment from zakat,66 as determined by Sharia through Quranic verses such as:  
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Charities [zakat/sadaqa] are for the poor, and the destitute, and those who administer them, 
and for reconciling hearts, and for freeing slaves, and for those in debt, and in the path of 
God, and for the traveller in need - an obligation from God.67  
Another Quranic verse states ‘Pray regularly, and give regular charity [zakat/sadaqa], and 
obey the Messenger [Prophet Mohammed].’68 
The zakat is also determined by the Sunnah, when the Prophet (Peace be upon him and his family) 
sent one of his companions, Muadh ibn Jabal, to Yemen to collect zakat/sadaqa telling them 
‘Allah has made it obligatory for them to pay the sadaqa [zakat] from their property and it is 
to be taken from the wealthy among them and given to the poor.’69 Takaful insurance— as a 
co-operative mechanism to protect those in need—can be seen as analogous (by qiyas) to 
zakat/sadaqa where Takaful payments are made from pooled funds to those who have 
suffered losses.70  
The third precedent concerns expenses or support between relatives or families. Sharia 
requires prosperous family members to support poor relatives financially (the exact amount 
and detailed provisions have been argued among Islamic jurists). Sharia requires them to co-
operatively participate together to provide a financial support to poor relatives. This co-
operation bears some resemblance to today’s Takaful insurance.71 
In more recent times, Ibn-Abidin, an Islamic jurist from the Hanafi school in the early of 19th 
century, first engaged in practices akin to insurance.72 In the case of goods owned by 
shipowners, the payment of insurance known as “sokra” (premium) was made to protect the 
shipment traders from any loss caused to the good. This can be seen a precedent for Takaful 
insurance.73 
The literature above indicates that older forms of Takaful insurance emphasise the 
importance of social welfare, co-operation, and shared risk taking. These are the principles, 
among others, required for Takaful insurance, as examined below at 4.6. 
These early forerunners of insurance support the majority view of Islamic jurists that a 
mutual form of insurance is Islamically permissible. A few Islamic scholars argue that 
Takaful insurance is not Islamically permissible on the basis of the three prohibited elements 
                                                             
67 The Holy Quran, Altuabah, Verse 60. Sharia has specific requirements and conditions that must be fulfilled 
by those debtors in order to be eligible for Islamic zakat, but the details are outside the scope of this thesis. 
68 Ibid An-nur, Verse 56. 
69 Albukhary, above n 24, No. 1395. 
70 Al-Zarqaa, above n 34, 159-60. 
71 Ibid 116-8. 
72 Senior Scientists, Research of Senior Scientists in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [  رابك ةئیھ ثاحبأ ةكلمملاب ءاملعلا
ةیدوعسلا ةیبرعلا ] (General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta (GPSRI), 3 ed, 2011) vol 4, 40, 72; Bilah, 
above n 5, 9, 53-4; Bilah, above n 11, 148. 
73 Mohammad Amin Ibn-Abidin, Radd Al-Muhtar Ala Al-Dur Al-Mukhtar [  ىلع راتحملا در نبا ةیشاح/راتخملا ردلا
نیدباع ] (Printing House-Egypt, 1855) vol 3, 249-50. After Ibn-Abidin, a number of Islamic jurists permitted the 
idea of insurance such as Mohammed Abdu (Mufti of Egypt) in 1900-1901, and then Mohammed Bakhit (Mufti 
of Egypt) in 1906. Contemporarily, many Islamic jurists have accepted the permissibility of insurance such as 
Mohammed Musa, Ahmed Ibrahim, Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Mustafa Ahmed Al-Zarqaa (who also 
permitted conventional insurance), and others. See Bilah, above n 5, 10, 54-5; Bilah, above n 11, 148. 
79 
 
(riba, gharar, and maysir),74 as explained below at 4.4. They further argue that Takaful 
insurance companies, or their subsidiaries, may become involved in Sharia prohibited 
investments, for example businesses involving alcohol or pork. This would make Takaful 
insurance impermissible under Sharia. The majority of Islamic scholars reject this minority 
view on the grounds that if a term or condition in a Takaful policy is against Sharia, that term 
or condition will be invalid yet Takaful insurance itself remains Sharia-compliant.75 
Islamic scholars’ opinions about both Takaful insurance and conventional (commercial) 
insurance can be summarised as follows. The majority of Islamic scholars permit Takaful 
insurance and prohibit conventional insurance; a few Islamic scholars permit conventional 
insurance without restrictions or conditions; and a small number of Islamic scholars permit 
conventional insurance with some restrictions and conditions.76 The latter is the position of 
Professor Mustafa Al-Zarqaa which is discussed below at 4.4.4.  
4.3.2. Overview of Takaful Insurance Companies 
In 1979, the first Islamic insurance company was opened in Sudan. This company inspired 
other Islamic countries to establish Takaful insurance .77 Five years later, in 1984, the first 
Malaysian Takaful company was created.78 This was followed, as mentioned above, by the 
majority decision made by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) in 1985 which 
permitted Takaful insurance and prohibited conventional insurance. Saudi Arabia took longer 
to establish insurance laws and Takaful companies. In 2003, the first insurance law was 
enacted in Saudi Arabia79 although the first Takaful insurance company, known as Tawuniya 
(discussed in chapter 7) was created in 1986.80 The development of insurance regulations in 
Saudi Arabia took place after the Saudi nation obtained membership to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).81 Even though many Islamic companies worldwide handle both 
Takaful insurance and conventional insurance, in Saudi Arabia all companies are restricted 
by law to Takaful insurance with no option allowing them to provide conventional 
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insurance.82 Takaful operators are incorporated as joint-stock companies (JSCs) listed on the 
Saudi stock exchange.83 
Takaful insurance has spread rapidly in the Middle East, North Africa and Southeast Asia.84 
Notably, Saudi Arabia has the largest total of Takaful premiums, including all types of 
insurance, of US$3.86 billion while Malaysia is second with total premiums of US$1.15 
billion.85  
The Takaful insurance industry has also been taken up internationally. It has been recognised 
by the American Insurance Group, Allianz SE, Hannover Re, Swiss Re, and Lloyd’s. The 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries account for two-thirds of international Islamic 
assets and have the most Takaful insurance companies in the world.86 Takaful insurance 
occupies an important place among other Islamic financial industries such as growing 
importance of Islamic banking which has encouraged Islamic banks to deal with Takaful 
insurance instead of commercial insurance to ensure Sharia-compliance.87 
4.4. Rules for Compliance with Sharia 
In Islamic contract law, there are no general Sharia standards for contracts.88 Similarly, there 
are no specific Sharia standards in relation to insurance contracts. There are, however, some 
requirements affecting all contracts.89 Islamic contracts and transactions are limited and 
restricted by Islamic principles that prohibit some activities and investments related to 
gambling (maysir), alcohol,90 pork,91 etc. Assets based on payment of riba (interest), and the 
like, are also prohibited.92 There is not a complete or universally accepted list of Islamic 
prohibited activities but prohibition is decided based on Islamic principles.93 The three 
accepted prohibited elements in Islamic contract law are: riba (interest/usury or money for 
money), gharar (uncertainty), and maysir (gambling).94 These are discussed in turn. 
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4.4.1. Riba—Prohibition of Interest 
Riba is the giving or receiving of interest and understood as “money for money” often in the 
context of usury.95 Riba is prohibited by the Quranic verse ‘Allah has permitted trade and has 
forbidden riba.’96 Thus, insurance companies are prohibited from investing in products such 
as bonds and deposits which may involve giving or receiving of interest.97 
Insurance premiums paid in exchange for compensation are viewed as money for money 
trade contracts (insured pays premiums as “money” for receiving future compensation as 
“money”). This is also another type of forbidden riba known as riba alfadl.98 The Prophet 
Mohammed (Peace be upon him and his family) said ‘Do not sell a dinar for two dinars nor a 
dirham for two dirhams.’99 He also said ‘Dinar for dinar with no preference among them, and 
dirham for dirham with no preference among them.’100 He further said ‘Do not sell gold for 
gold nor silver for silver nor wheat for wheat … unless like by like and weight by weight, and 
who gets more is riba.’101 
Thus, the payment or trading of a specific amount of money in return for an additional 
amount of money is a type of riba  prohibited by Sharia.102 The same prohibition, riba alfadl, 
applies to insurance as premiums paid (money) in return for compensation received (extra 
money). This result is avoided in Takaful insurance if the money paid (premiums) is 
characterised as tabarru (donation/charity) rather than giving rise to a trade contract. There is 
no type of riba (interest/usury) or riba alfadl (money for money trade) involved in Takaful 
funds,103 see discussion below at 4.6.1 The contrary argument is set out below at 4.4.4. 
4.4.2. Gharar—Prohibition of Uncertainty 
Sharia prohibits speculative contracts which are characterised as gharar (uncertainty). In the 
Sunnah, the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him and his family) said ‘whoever buys food, let 
him not sell them until he has possession of them.’104 Gharar is defined as a contract 
involving uncertainty, risk trading, risk-taking, or excessive speculation.105 Gharar is said to 
be involved in insurance contracts since there is uncertainty whether compensation will be 
                                                             
95 El-Gamal, above n 89, 46-60, 144-5. The author also discusses in details types of riba forbidden by Sharia; 
Gönülal, above n 1, 60. 
96 The Holy Quran, Albaqarah, Verse 275. 
97 Tolefat and Asutay, above n 15, 19. 
98 Khaleel, above n 47, 4; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 2, art 14. 
99 Al-Hajjaj, above n 23, No. 1585. One dinar equals 10 dirhams. 
100 Ibid No. 1586. 
101 Ibid No. 1587. Also, see No. 1594, 747-8. When a companion named “Bilal” sold two bad bags of dates for 
one good bag of dates. The Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him and his family) objected to this and called 
it riba. The Prophet suggested selling the two bad bags of dates and then with the money obtained buying one 
good bag of dates. 
102 Yusuf Abdallah Mohammed (Ibn Abd-Albarr) Al-Andalusi, The Memorization Collecting all Doctrines in 
the World [ راصمألا بھاذمل عماجلا راكذتسالا ] (Dar Qutaibah for Printing and Publucation, 1993) vol 19, 207-8. 
103 Khaleel, above n 47, 4; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 2, art 14. 
104 Al-Hajjaj, above n 23, No. 1525; Albukhary, above n 24, No. 2132. 
105 Tolefat and Asutay, above n 15, 16-7. 
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payable, the quantum, and the time for receipt.106 Gharar occurs where neither party knows 
whether the contract is beneficial for them or not. For example, selling a pregnant cow is 
Islamically valid, but selling a calf before the calf is born is Islamically invalid because of 
excessive gharar.107 Other examples of contracts containing gharar are contracts for advance 
purchase of the fish a fisherman might catch before fishing, and purchase of un-ripe fruit still 
on the trees. These are examples of gharar because it is not known how many fish will be 
caught or how much fruit the trees will produce, and so there is the potential for severe 
financial harm to one party.108 Gharar is forbidden in Sharia if it may cause severe harm 
(excessive/severe gharar) to others, but minor harm (minor gharar) as may occur in any 
business contract is Islamically permitted.109   
However, gharar (uncertainty) does not apply to Takaful insurance as payments (premiums) 
are treated as tabarru (donation/charity) where the uncertainty regarding the exact 
compensation and the exact time is not important. A donation is made for which there is no 
expectation of return.110 This indicates the importance and acceptability of characterising the 
premiums paid as tabarru to avoid gharar.111 
Ghaben (exploitation or taking advantage) in Islamic contracts is another form of gharar 
(uncertainty). In insurance, ghaben may occur if the insurance company denies compensation 
where a specified event occurs. In theory, this form of gharar or ghaben does not apply to 
Takaful insurance as the insureds are themselves the insurers who own the Takaful pool,112 as 
explained below at 4.6.2.  
4.4.3. Maysir—Prohibition of Gambling 
The third prohibition is maysir (gambling). It is prohibited by the Quranic verse ‘intoxication, 
maysir … you must avoid’113 because it leads to hatred and enmity between people and the 
breakdown in social relationships.114 Islamic jurists take the view that Takaful insurance does 
not breach the concept of maysir. This is because maysir involves either winning or losing 
while Takaful insurance is a contract of tabarru (donation/charity) where there is no winning 
                                                             
106 Ali Mohey Aldeen Daghi, 'Cooperative Insurance its Definitions and its Principles and its Obstacles [  نیمأتلا
ھتاقوعمو ھطباوضو ھتیھام ينواعتلا ]' (Paper presented at the International Islamic Foundation for Economics & Finance 
(IIFFEF) and Islamic Research Training Institute (IRTI) [ يمالسالا ملاعلا ةطبار–لیومتلاو داصتقالل ةیملاعلا ةیمالسالا ةئیھلا ], 
InterContinental Riyadh, 22-25/1/2009) 14 <http://www.kantakji.com/media/1011/001.pdf>; Khaleel, above n 
47, 4. 
107 El-Gamal, above n 89, 46-60, 144-5; Gönülal, above n 1, 101. 
108 Al-Zarqaa, above n 34, 48-9, 157-8; Gönülal, above n 1, 101-2. 
109 Ibn-Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, Zad Al-Maad [ داعملا داز ] (Alresalah Publishers, 1998) vol 5, 727; Al-Zarqaa, above 
n 34, 49, 135-6; Tolefat and Asutay, above n 15, 16-7. 
110 Daghi, above n 106, 14; Khaleel, above n 47, 4. 
111 The Takaful operator would nevertheless be required to pay on the occurrence of an insured event, even if the 
premium is regarded as a donation. 
112 Faisal and Affaf, above n 47, 5; Fellague Saliha, '[ يلفاكتلا نی مأتلا تاكرش ءادأ لیعفت يف ةمكوحلا تایلآ رود ] The Role of 
Governance Mechanism in Activating Takaful Insurance Companies Performance' (2014)(11) Academic 
Journal of Social and Human Studies 51, 53; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 2, art 14 (n 8). 
113 The Holy Quran, Almaadah, Verse 90. 
114 Vogel and Hayes, above n 87, 87-8. 
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or losing. Besides, maysir cannot be involved in Takaful insurance as the policyholders are 
themselves the insurers owning the Takaful pool,115 see 4.6.2. 
Chapter 7 examines whether Saudi insurance companies, through a selection of annual 
reports, are compliant with these Sharia requirements. These three Islamic prohibitions (riba, 
gharar, and maysir) are important to illustrate the key differences between Takaful insurance 
and conventional insurance, as explained in the next chapter. 
4.4.4. A Sharia Alternative Approach to Takaful and Conventional Insurance 
The majority opinion of Islamic jurists is that conventional (commercial) insurance is not 
permissible under Sharia because it is based on riba (interest/usury or money for money), 
gharar (uncertainty), and maysir (gambling). By contrast, Takaful insurance is Sharia-
compliant as it is based on tabarru (donation/charity), mutual co-operation, and avoids Sharia 
prohibited elements,116 see 4.6. 
Professor Mustafa Al-Zarqaa takes a different view. He disagrees with the Islamic majority 
opinion and asserts that both Takaful insurance and conventional (commercial) insurance are 
Sharia-compliant because both are based on mutual co-operation.117 By qiyas (reasoning by 
analogy), Al-Zarqaa likens commercial insurance contracts to other Islamic contracts such as 
alawaqel (compensation for unintentional killing, discussed above at 4.3.1), al-muwalah (a 
client relationship with friendly co-operation, or a contract issued between the manumitter 
and the slave during pre-Islamic times118), al-waad al-mulzim (promises according to the 
Maliki doctrine), al-kafalah (bailment), retirement pensions,119 dhaman khatar altariq (risk 
on the highway), and Takaful insurance.120   
Al-Zarqaa concludes that the Sharia prohibitions of the three elements (riba, gharar, and 
maysir) are not breached by commercial insurance.121 Maysir (gambling) causes harm to 
either party while insurance protects people from future catastrophes and potential risks. 
Insurance is considered to be a trade (business) contract that benefits both parties (insured 
and insurer). The insurer will gain money, and the insured will be safe and secure knowing 
that they will be compensated if any damage occurs, as covered by the policy. In relation to 
maysir, the risk is created by the gambler. The risk in insurance is not created by the insured 
but arises out of natural events or the business economy, in relation to matters the insured 
cannot control.122  
                                                             
115 Masud, above n 10, 1140-1; Tolefat and Asutay, above n 15, 21-2.  
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In relation to the prohibition of gharar (uncertainty), Al-Zarqaa argues that while excessive 
or severe gharar is prohibited by Sharia, minor gharar is not.123 As discussed above, buying 
a cow is Islamically acceptable but not its unborn calf. This is because if the calf dies before 
birth, the buyer loses money with no return at all which results in excessive/severe gharar. 
Similarly, contracts to purchase the next day’s fish still in the sea, or to purchase un-ripe fruit 
still on the trees imply excessive/severe gharar. This is because the fish buyer will receive 
nothing if the fisherman fails to catch the fish, and the fruit buyer will lose money in return 
for receiving no fruit or damaged fruit. Minor gharar, on the other hand, is acceptable by 
Sharia as Islamic contracts such as business trades and farming are inevitably exposed to 
risks. Thus, Islamic contracts law prohibits the sale of things that cannot be received by the 
buyer as this involves excessive or severe gharar.124 
Al-Zarqaa continues that from the perspective of the insured, insurance provides security 
against future risks in return for premium payments. This security has been received by the 
insured on signing the policy, and this makes conventional insurance free of gharar 
(uncertainty) as it eliminates both excessive/severe gharar and minor gharar.125 From the 
commercial insurance company’s point of view, insurance involves pooled risk, on the basis 
of the “law of large numbers”. The law of large numbers aims to distribute risks. It relies on 
statistics to anticipate the probabilities of risk occurrence based on the aggregate and 
collective level of all insurance policies (the entire pool); it is not based on an individual case. 
The probabilities of risks at the aggregate level for the entire pool are more predictable (more 
certain) than at the individual case (less certain). This means that because insurers can better 
anticipate risks for the entire insurance pool (at the aggregate level), there is less overall 
uncertainty (gharar); minor gharar is accepted by Sharia.126 For example, whether a 
particular car will get into an accident or a specific house will burn to the ground during the 
year is unpredictable. On the other hand, the probability for large numbers of car accidents—
particularly young drivers—or for large numbers of house fires is more predictable.127 
With respect to riba (interest/usury or money for money), Al-Zarqaa adds that insurance 
contracts, just like other Islamic contracts, must avoid all types of riba. Sharia prohibits and 
voids any riba provision or any riba investment involved in insurance contracts, but the 
insurance contract itself still remains Sharia-compliant.128 Riba alfadl (money for money 
trade) does not apply to commercial insurance as insurance is based on mutual co-operation 
against future risks. Al-Zarqaa further argues that if the majority of Islamic jurists insist on 
prohibiting commercial insurance based on riba alfadl, they would have to prohibit other 
Islamic contracts as well (for example Takaful insurance and retirement pensions) as both 
                                                             
123 Ibid 48, 135. 
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function similarly, that is, the policyholder/employee pays a small amount in return for the 
prospect of larger sums of money.129  
Another issue relates to the distribution of surpluses (explained below in 4.6.3) from the 
underwriting account. Al-Zarqaa takes the view that failure to distribute the underwriting 
surplus to policyholders (as is conventional insurance) is not against Islamic principles. Just 
as with any other Islamic business companies, Sharia permits conventional insurance 
companies to gain financial benefits (surpluses) in return for insurance services.130 Al-Zarqaa 
continues that when accepting conventional insurance by Sharia, this does not mean that all 
conditions and provisions in conventional insurance policies are Sharia-compliant. While 
conventional insurance itself may be accepted by Sharia, what conventional insurers apply in 
practice may not be acceptable. So, all conditions and provisions made by insurers must be 
subject to Islamic principles. If an insurance policy involves a condition or provision that 
violates Sharia—such as including a provision to deal with riba (interest/usury or money for 
money) or alcohol investment—that provision will be void, but the actual insurance policy 
itself remains valid. Al-Zarqaa likens insurance contracts with any other Sharia contracts of 
sale. If a Sharia contract of sale contains a prohibited provision, regulations for contracts of 
sale under Sharia will void only the prohibited provision.131 
The difference between Al-Zarqaa’s insurance and conventional insurance is that 
conventional insurance does not exclude Sharia prohibited activities—for example where an 
insurer invests in alcohol companies, piggeries, and so on—while under Al-Zarqaa’s 
insurance view, a conventional insurer does not engage in Sharia prohibited investments or 
include any prohibited provision in the policy. 
Al-Zarqaa’s views have not gained acceptance by a majority of Islamic scholars.132 But the 
issues Al-Zarqaa raises are important in discussing whether Takaful insurance in Saudi 
Arabia operating under JSCs is able to remain competitive in the insurance market, and 
whether future developments in Takaful insurance are possible while remaining Sharia-
compliant. This is discussed further in chapter 7. Al-Zarqaa’s arguments are also important in 
considering whether there is room for reform of Takaful insurance so as to make it more 
competitive and to meet the needs of business and the public based on Sharia. If Al-Zarqaa’s 
insurance views were to be accepted, this could lead to three possible forms of insurance: 
• Takaful insurance: this is permissible by the majority of Islamic jurists; 
• Conventional (commercial) insurance: this is prohibited by the majority of Islamic 
jurists; and 
• Al-Zarqaa’s insurance model. 
In Islamic jurisprudence, minority opinions are acceptable as long as they are not considered 
to be against Islamic Sharia. As noted earlier, there are (among others) four main Islamic 
doctrines and schools: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali where a Sharia decision (fatwa) 
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made within one Islamic doctrine can be decided differently in another school. This Islamic 
pluralism is regarded as one of the strengths of Islamic jurisprudence as it allows Sharia law 
to develop and change as needed for modern circumstances. For instance, al-waad al-mulzim 
(promise according to the Maliki doctrine) is Islamically accepted by the Maliki doctrine 
while Islamically rejected by the other doctrines.133 This indicates that Sharia does not totally 
ignore al-waad al-mulzim but rather, Sharia accepts it under the Maliki doctrine. Acceptance 
of insurance under Al-Zarqaa’s doctrine or school would follow this analogy. There are a 
number of other illustrations where minority opinions have been considered to be valid under 
Sharia (to further illustrate this point, three other examples are provided in this footnote 
here).134  
The examples indicate how Sharia deals with different views taken by Islamic jurists. In 
complex cases, Sharia accepts conflicting decisions where it does not impute sin to followers 
of any decision. This flexibility and simplicity of Sharia is derived from many Quranic 
verses, noted above, such as a verse ‘… God desires ease for you, and does not desire 
hardship for you…’135 It is also derived from the Sunnah (Prophet Mohammed’s sayings), 
noted above, such as when the Prophet’s wife reported ‘Whenever the Prophet (peace be 
upon him and his family) was given a choice between two matters, he would always choose 
the easier as long as it was not sinful to do so …’136 The Prophet also said ‘Make things easy 
and do not make them difficult …’137  
By qiyas (reasoning by analogy as a Sharia source explained earlier), Al-Zarqaa’s insurance 
can be regarded as an example of this Islamic jurisprudence. The majority opinion of Islamic 
jurists prohibits conventional insurance while Al-Zarqaa’s view permits it with some Sharia 
restrictions. Thus, Sharia permits people to choose an opinion whether the opinion is made by 
the majority or the minority. This strongly suggests that it is preferable to choose Takaful 
insurance, but it is not Islamically mandatory. Those who choose Al-Zarqaa’s insurance 
approach are not in breach of Islamic law.  
The thesis in chapter 7 in its analysis of insurers in Saudi Arabia examines whether insurers 
in Saudi Arabia are Sharia-compliant. It also examines whether Saudi insurers are in reality 
offering conventional insurance or following Al-Zarqaa’s approach.  
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4.5. Models (Forms) of Takaful Insurance 
Since Takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia can only be offered through listed joint-stockholding 
companies (JSC),138 participants engaged in Takaful insurance transactions include the 
insured, the insurer, the operator of the scheme (usually the insurance company), and the 
shareholders. The Takaful literature indicates that three models of Takaful insurance are 
generally in use. These are wakalah (agency), mudharabah (profit-sharing), and  hybrid 
models.139 There are significant country-specific variations on these models. The models set 
out below are the “pure” models generally agreed on as Sharia-compliant.140 
4.5.1. Wakalah (Agency) 
The wakalah (agency) model is best described as an agency contract between the participants 
(those paying tabarru (donations) as premiums)141 and the Takaful operator who manages the 
Takaful fund. The Takaful fund is divided into (1) the Takaful operator fund (shareholders’ 
fund) and (2) the participants’ fund. The participants’ fund is divided in turn into two funds: 
the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) and the participants’ investment fund (PIF), see 
Table 4.1. 
The participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) comprises premiums/donations by the 
participants/policyholders (insured), and the participants’ investment fund (PIF) is where 
those premiums/donations are invested. The participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) is the 
source of payment for all claims. The Takaful operator will be paid (compensated) by a 
wakalah fee (a percentage fee calculated from the PUF or a predetermined absolute amount) 
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This model creates an agency contract in which participants (principals) delegate to the 
operator (agent) the authority to manage the Takaful operation in return for fees. Under this 
model, the Takaful operator does not share in the surpluses from the participants’ 
underwriting fund (PUF) nor profits from the participants’ investment fund (PIF). If the 
underwriting fund is in deficit, the Takaful operator effectively becomes the underwriter by 
providing a qard hasan (interest-free loan) to be repaid out of later premium receipts. In the 
case of a listed joint-stock company, the deficit would be funded from shareholders’ funds.144 
A qard hasan is provided after the re-Takaful operator (Islamic re-insurer) has paid and 
fulfilled its responsibilities and the deficit still exists.145 
In Saudi Arabia, the qard hasan is no longer available.146 But Saudi regulations require a 
statutory fund equivalent to 100 per cent of paid-up shareholder capital to be established 
which in effect provides a statutory qard (loan) facility, see 3.2.2. The provisions of art 70 
(2e) of the Implementing Rules for the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law (IR) and art 1 
of the Surplus Distribution Policy (see 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) are not consistent with a wakalah 
(agency) model. These insurance regulations are critically examined in chapter 7. 
4.5.2. Mudharabah (Profit-Sharing) 
Mudharabah (profit-sharing) contracts are based on a partnership between the two parties 
(participants and the operator) under which profits from the participants’ investment fund 
(PIF) are shared with the operator. Under the mudharabah model (profit-sharing), the Takaful 
operator does not receive a percentage fee (wakalah fee) of premiums (donations) but will 
share the profit from the PIF only.147 The Takaful operator does not share in the surpluses 
from the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF). With the exception of Malaysian Sharia 
scholars,148 the majority of Sharia scholars prohibit Takaful operators from sharing surpluses 
in the underwriting fund (PUF). This is because under Sharia the underwriting surplus is not 
considered “profit” to be shared with the operator, unlike the investment fund (PIF) that 
produces profits.149 
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If there is no profit, the Takaful operator bears the expense in managing the funds (PUF and 
PIF) and if there is a deficit in the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF), the Takaful 
operator also provides a qard hasan (interest-free loan). In the context of a joint-stock 
company (JSC), any deficit is funded from the shareholders’ fund.150 Notably, the qard hasan 
is provided after the re-Takaful operator (Islamic re-insurer) has paid its share and fulfilled its 
obligations and the deficit still exists.151 It has been noted above that in Saudi Arabia, there is 
a statutory qard facility. 
The wakalah and mudharabah models both operate in a similar way. The only difference 
between them is the method of remunerating (compensating) the operator. In wakalah, the 
operator is paid a wakalah fee while the operator in mudharabah shares the profit from the 
participants’ investment fund (PIF) only.152 Chapter 7 examines whether the Saudi current 
regulatory requirements are consistent with the mudharabah model. 
4.5.3. Hybrid (Wakalah and Mudharabah) 
The hybrid (mixed) model combines elements from both models (wakalah and mudharabah). 
It provides the Takaful operator a compensating percentage fee (wakalah fee) just like the 
wakalah (agency) model and a share of profits like the mudharabah (profit-sharing) model 
from the participants’ investment fund (PIF) profits only, and not from the participants’ 
underwriting fund (PUF) surpluses. The earlier comments about the qard hasan (interest-free 
loan) to the PUF apply equally here,153 see above. 
In all models (wakalah, mudharabah, and hybrid), the costs of re-Takaful (Islamic re-
insurance) are borne by the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF).154 Re-Takaful is discussed 
in chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 explores the difficulties in applying these models in the modern context of 
insurance companies with their duties to shareholders. 
4.6. Takaful Insurance Principles 
Principles of Takaful insurance are based on compliance with Sharia concepts and rules (the 
Quran and the Sunnah). These principles make Takaful distinctly different from conventional 
insurance. These principles are examined in the next sections. 
4.6.1. Concept of Tabarru (Charity/Donation) and Non-Profit 
The purpose of Takaful insurance is to provide insurance to protect society against any 
potential risks, and not to earn profits. The intention must be to share and contribute wealth to 
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the Takaful pool as tabarru (charity/donation) and help others in need.155 Takaful insurance is 
based on the principle of social welfare and not making profit,156 see below at 4.6.9. The non-
profit principle is not possible under insurers constituted as JSCs. Takaful operators would 
unlikely take on this approach when little profit is gained and where shareholders are entitled 
to profits through dividends. A 2013 study found that making profits have become the main 
purpose for many Takaful operators, who impose high fees and charges.157 This is further 
examined in chapter 7.  
The premiums paid by participants are called, and paid as, tabarru (charity/donation).158 This 
characterization means that, in principle, the relationship between the insurer and insured 
(policyholder/participant) is not a contractual relationship which can be impugned as either a 
money for money contract (riba), or a contract involving gharar, (uncertainty) or maysir 
(gambling). The non-profit principle is compatible with the investment as Takaful insurance 
accepts the investment of surpluses.159 The premiums (tabarru/donation) are invested to 
support and fund the Takaful pool. The investment of premiums is subject to Sharia law. As 
noted above, this prevents investing in certain types of businesses or investments involving 
riba (interest/usury or money for money), gharar (uncertainty), maysir (gambling), etc.160 
Since all premiums are paid as tabarru (charity/donation), this effectively means that Takaful 
insurance is not bilateral but a unilateral (one-sided) contract where the operator’s role is only 
to manage the Takaful funds on behalf of the policyholders.161 In Saudi Arabia, however, 
characterizing Takaful insurance contracts as unilateral is problematic because the insurers 
are compelled to operate as joint-stock companies (JSCs) involving shareholders, and the 
insurers are obliged to pay in the event of a claim.     
With respect to the concept of tabarru (charity/donation), it has been argued that under 
Sharia, once a donor makes a donation, there must be no expectation of anything in return, 
and there is no enforceable contract. In Takaful insurance, the insured (donor) receives 
compensation in the case of loss. The critical difference is that Takaful insurance is 
considered as a collective undertaking and the insurance claim is paid from the Takaful fund 
and not from an individual contribution. This makes the Takaful insurance contract 
permissible under Sharia. Consequently, treating premiums as tabarru in Takaful insurance 
contracts is accepted by the majority of Islamic jurists.162 
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The conclusion reached in the previous paragraph is important in relation to general attitudes 
to insurance, as it would seem to be at odds with standard insurance businesses to regard 
insurance arrangements as anything less than enforceable contracts. 
It should be noted that the non-profit approach of Takaful is inconsistent with a company’s 
duty to earn profits for its shareholders. Two questions arise: whether the non-profit approach 
is sustainable in the case of a joint-stock companies (JSC) and its shareholders; and whether 
Takaful insurance can ever be economically competitive. These two questions are taken up in 
chapter 7 where particular emphasis is placed on the Saudi Arabian insurance market. 
4.6.2. Mutuality, Participants (Policyholders, the Insured) as Insurers  
One of the most important Takaful principles is based on mutuality, where risks are shared 
rather than transferred to a third party. Financial responsibilities are shared among the 
members in the Takaful pool to provide mutual assistance and co-operation. Takaful 
insurance is thus an agreement binding its members to mutually compensate for each 
member’s losses and damages. This mutual co-operation is based on an equitable 
contribution of wealth so that all members are treated equally, in accord with the Arabic 
definition of “Takaful” as people taking care of one another or guaranteeing each other. 
Therefore, mutual co-operation makes the position of participants (the insured) the same as 
the insurer as mutual owners of the Takaful pool.163 As noted above at 4.4.2, ghaben 
(exploitation) by insurers who refuse to pay compensation does not apply to Takaful 
insurance because the insurer is also the insured owning the Takaful pool.164 The question of 
whether this concept of mutual co-operation can be achieved in the context of a joint-stock 
company (JSC) with obligations to shareholders is discussed in chapter 7.  
4.6.3. Surpluses Belong to Participants 
Under all Takaful insurance models, surpluses (including profits) in the participants’ 
underwriting fund (PUF) and the participants’ investment fund (PIF) are shared among the 
policyholders (participants). This is because the purpose of Takaful insurance is intended to 
be purely for non-profit and mutual co-operation between participants. Surpluses do not 
belong to the Takaful operator. According to the majority opinion among Islamic jurists, the 
Takaful operator can share the profits from the participants’ investment fund (PIF) under the 
mudharabah and hybrid models. The Takaful operator cannot share surpluses in the PUF, 
except by receiving a wakalah fee under the a wakalah and hybrid models.165 
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Surpluses can be used for various purposes. They can be used to pay for welfare services 
(explained below at 4.6.9), be distributed among policyholders, be reinvested to reduce 
contributions in the following period, or be used for reserves.166 In Saudi Arabia, statutory 
required reserves are drawn from surpluses of the policyholders’ funds. The distribution of 
surpluses from the underwriting fund are distributed according to the Implementing Rules for 
the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law (IR) and the Surplus Distribution Policy, see 
discussion in 3.2.2 and chapter 7. 
4.6.4. Deficit in the Takaful Underwriting Fund 
In the case of a deficit in the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) in all Takaful insurance 
models, policyholders are primarily responsible for the deficit as they own the Takaful funds. 
The Takaful operator’s responsibility is to manage the operation and  is only responsible for 
the deficit in the case of its negligence.167 
Under general Takaful principles, the Takaful operator as the insurance company makes a 
qard hasan (interest-free loan) to the PUF. The qard hasan will be repaid by the participants 
(policyholders) from future surpluses of the underwriting fund (PUF) and profits of the 
investment fund (PIF). In relation to a joint-stock company (JSC), the deficit is usually made 
up from a statutory qard (loan) facility sourced from the shareholders’ fund.168 This statutory 
qard facility can be called upon where there is a deficit in the underwriting fund.169 It is only 
available after statutorily required allocations have been exhausted and any re-Takaful funds 
recovered.170 In Saudi Arabia, insurance regulations require a statutory qard facility to be 
sourced from the shareholders’ fund, see 3.2.2. Sharia permissibility of the qard hasan under 
a JSC is also criticised in chapter 6.171 
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4.6.5. Segregation of the Takaful Fund 
Takaful principles require the segregation of the Takaful operator’s fund from Takaful 
participants’ funds. As noted in Table 4.1, participants’ funds are further divided into the 
underwriting fund (PUF), where the participants pay premiums (tabarru/donations) and 
claims are paid out and the investment fund (PIF), where participants’ contributions 
(premiums) in the PUF are invested.172 
As noted above, the Takaful operator is prohibited from sharing surplus in the underwriting 
fund (PUF) but is allowed to share in the participants’ investment (PIF). 
It is worth noting that the policyholders’ funds have no legal personality separate from the 
Takaful company. In a case of a dispute between a policyholder and the Takaful operator, the 
policyholder sues the Takaful insurance company (that is, the operator) and not the 
policyholders’ funds (PUF and PIF).173 Chapter 7 considers whether segregation in Saudi 
Takaful companies is achieved in practice. 
4.6.6. Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) 
Takaful insurance companies must be supervised by a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) in 
relation to Sharia matters. An SSB is a prerequisite for the establishment of Takaful insurance 
companies.174 The SSB’s role is to ensure that the Takaful operator comply with Sharia.175 
The SSB will have access to the records, management, and actions of the Takaful operator,176 
but is not responsible for business decisions.177 
In practice, Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSBs) may not have been established in some 
countries so there is no certainty of whether particular insurance products are Sharia-
compliant.178 For example, some Takaful operators in Saudi Arabia have no SSBs,179 and 
there is currently no requirement that they do so under the insurance regulations. The absence 
of a SSB might lead some practices to be non Sharia-compliant. In order for SSBs to perform 
and function properly, SSBs must be independent.180 In practice, some Boards of Directors in 
Islamic banks have pressured SSBs for approval, and in some cases there has been a clear 
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conflict of interest which has led some SSB members to resign.181 Consequently, there is no 
oversight to determine whether Takaful operators may be engaging in Sharia-prohibited 
investments, or investing with a subsidiary or associated company that deals with Sharia-
prohibited investments. This issue is taken up in chapter 7 in the examination of some Saudi 
insurers’ investments through their annual reports. 
4.6.7. Governance Committee     
In a Takaful insurance operation, participants (policyholders) have no control or influence 
over their Takaful operator.182 In contrast, shareholders have more rights as they can 
represent their interests and concerns in various ways such as through the Board of Directors’ 
meetings and the general assembly meetings, and through reviewing annual reports to 
monitor the Takaful operator as well as appointing the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to 
manage the Takaful operation.183 The Takaful policyholders do not have these rights. 
Conflicts of interest thus may arise between the shareholders whose primary interest are in 
dividends and the policyholders.184 
This issue relates to agency problems. Conflicts of interest arise between agent (operator) 
with self interest and principal (policyholders) in which the policyholders/principal have no 
power to control the operator/agent.185 An example of agency problems occurs in cases where 
a Takaful operator accepts or deals in risky activities. It can happen that the operator, as a 
profit-motivated agent representing shareholders, may aim for high investment profits 
involving risky investments. The operator may also accept high risks, such as a risky 
insurance policy or policies that exceed its financial capacities.186 The interests of 
policyholders entitled to surpluses and profits compete with the interests of shareholders 
investing for profit and capital appreciation. It is in the interests of the Takaful company 
(where a wakalah or hybrid model is adopted) to charge maximum fees to the underwriting 
fund (PUF) and (where a mudharabah or hybrid model is adopted) to share maximum profits 
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from the investment fund (PIF) for benefit of shareholders.187 Otherwise, it would be very 
difficult to attract shareholders to invest in the Takaful company. 
In Saudi Arabia, this is, however, subject to the oversight of SAMA and the significant 
restrictions on the investment of insurance companies under the insurance regulations, see 
chapter 3.2. 
To resolve such issue of conflicts of interest, good corporate governance mechanisms must be 
applied to Takaful operators.188 The ideal Takaful insurance structure allows policyholders 
the right to participate in general meetings, vote for appointments of the Board of Directors, 
and be involved in decision-making in Takaful management.189 This cannot be achieved 
through the institution of the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB), mentioned above, as the SSB 
does not deal with corporate governance issues which require certain definite skills and 
specialities.190 
It has been recommended that Takaful insurance companies, through the Board of Directors, 
establish an independent “governance committee”.191 Members of the governance committee 
are composed of one or more independent non-executive Director/s, a Sharia jurist, and an 
actuary. The chair of the governance committee should be an independent non-executive 
Director.192 The independence of the governance committee is essential to avoid pressures 
and stresses from the Board. 
Although the Board of Directors has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring good corporate 
governance and controlling internal policies,193 it is important to keep in mind that the Board 
is the Takaful shareholders’ representative with fiduciary duties to its shareholders. As for 
policyholders, they have no representative. This can create conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and policyholders.194 A governance committee, thus, will be able to improve 
good corporate governance practices by minimizing issues related to conflicts of interest 
between stakeholders.195 As policyholders are, in practice, the weaker party with no 
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representatives for their rights, they require special consideration and attention.196 As will be 
seen in chapter 7, there is no evidence that Saudi Takaful insurance companies have 
implemented this.  
The governance committee can play a special role in monitoring the management of 
surpluses distribution in the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) and the participants’ 
investment fund (PIF) where the operator may mismanage or be biased.197 This is not the 
position in Saudi Arabia as the Implementing Rules for the Cooperative Insurance Companies 
Law (IR) and Surplus Distribution Policy make detailed provisions for distribution of 
surpluses in the operations list, see 3.2.1. The governance committee monitors the corporate 
governance framework by working together with the other committees—for example, the 
audit committee, management committee, remuneration committee, and risk management 
committee.198 In theory, the governance committee’s role of complementing the work of 
other committees is very important. It prevents some complicated cases involving conflicts of 
interest where some committees might favor shareholders’ interests at the expense of 
policyholders’.199 
Chapter 7 examines the current practices of a selection of Takaful insurance companies in 
Saudi Arabia in relation to the establishment of governance committees. 
4.6.8. Decision-Making   
In Takaful insurance, participants theoretically participate in decision-making as 
policyholders under a co-operative model of insurance.200 Policyholders’ involvement in 
decision-making may be given effect by appointment of a representative to the Board of 
Directors to represent their rights,201 or as suggested in the previous discussion by the 
establishment of a governance committee. Such involvement in decision-making by 
policyholders is not feasible where Takaful insurance is offered through listed joint-stock 
companies (JSCs) and is subject to corporate law and corporate governance requirements. 
Nevertheless, a few Takaful insurance companies allow policyholder representation in the 
Takaful management by appointing one or two policyholders to attend the Board of 
Director’s meetings.202 
In Sudan, for example, the Takaful insurance company structure is a hybrid (stock structure 
plus mutual structure) like that of Takaful insurers in Saudi Arabia. However, the Sudanese 
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Takaful model gives policyholders more rights, especially control rights. Control rights allow 
policyholders to approve the Board of Directors’ reports, make suggestions for distribution of 
surplus, assign one or two representatives to the Board, represent their interests on relative 
matters, point out any mismanagement by the operator, and make any recommendations.203 
In practice in most jurisdictions, policyholders are not represented on the Board of Directors 
and are given no rights in relation to the company.204 Chapter 7 examines this issue further. 
4.6.9. Social Welfare 
There is a social welfare principle that Takaful insurance should not only benefit participants 
(the insured) but also society, for example, building new infrastructure, schools, or hospitals 
as well as protecting less fortunate members of society.205 It is important to clarify that social 
welfare services are paid from the net surplus. Other financial obligations paid under general 
or health insurance and those paid under zakat are not considered as social welfare services. 
Chapter 7 examines how this welfare principle operates in relation to Saudi Takaful insurers. 
4.7. Policyholders’ Rights under Takaful Corporate Governance 
In addition to policyholders’ rights in Takaful management and the Board of Directors, 
Takaful corporate governance provides policyholders with rights in the Takaful policy. 
Material and relevant information must be disclosed to policyholders206 which gives them the 
opportunity and the choice of whether to participate in decision-making in the Takaful 
operation.207 Such material information to be disclosed to policyholders is the investment 
policies and products which will give policyholders a right to get involved in the decision-
making process.208 Full disclosure on all products and investments is not feasible. There is, 
on the one hand, a duty to disclose to policyholders the details concerning their policy, 
responsibilities, and rights and to provide this information in language that policyholders can 
easily understand.209 But this is very different from requiring detailed disclosure regarding 
products and investments. Since full disclosure is not feasible, one possible approach is to 
require this kind of general information to be available through the company’s annual 
reports.210 
Usually, Takaful insurance policies favor the operator rather than the policyholder. There 
may be issues relating to clarity of rights and obligations that the Takaful operator must 
avoid.211 The IFSB’s principles require the Takaful company’s annual reports to make 
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relevant disclosures to stakeholders (particularly policyholders).212 This includes disclosures 
relating to the qard hasan (interest-free loan),213 reserves, separation of the Takaful fund, the 
surplus/profit distribution mechanism between the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) and 
the participants’ investments fund (PIF),214 sharing of surpluses, and the percentage of 
investment profits shared by the operator (under the mudharabah model).215  
The IFSB also recommends (not mandatory) that in the company’s annual reports or through 
its website, Takaful operators disclose to the public and stakeholders the type of the Takaful 
insurance model used by them and Takaful insurance products. This enables future 
participants to make informed decisions.216 In Saudi Arabia, insurance law requires more 
open disclosure than the IFSB recommends as it states ‘[Takaful] Companies must provide 
sufficient information to enable customers to make informed decisions when purchasing 
insurance products and services …’217 Chapter 7 examines whether Saudi Takaful insurance 
companies provide sufficient disclosure in their annual reports; and whether Saudi insurance 
law related to disclosure is enforceable and implemented. 
4.8. Summary 
This chapter examined the main and secondary sources of Islamic Sharia. It showed how 
Islamic principles have shaped the development of Takaful insurance, particularly the 
prohibited elements of riba (interest or money for money), gharar (uncertainty), and maysir 
(gambling). The now accepted view by the majority of Islamic scholars is that Takaful 
insurance is consistent with Sharia whilst conventional insurance, which involves Sharia-
prohibited elements, is not Sharia-compliant. The chapter also discussed the three forms of 
Takaful: the wakalah (agency) model, the mudharabah (profit-sharing) model, and the hybrid 
(wakalah and mudharabah) model. 
The chapter argued that Al-Zarqaa’s insurance approach that combines elements from 
conventional insurance with Takaful insurance is Sharia-compliant. Al-Zarqaa’s accepts 
conventional insurance as Sharia-compliant but subject to insurers avoiding Sharia-prohibited 
investment activities, such as investment in alcohol, riba, and so on. Although Al-Zarqaa’s 
view is a minority view, it is argued that Sharia accepts a diversity of views provided those 
views are not inconsistent with Islamic primary sources (the Holy Quran and the Sunnah). 
This chapter also considered issues relating to Takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia. These 
issues concern the conflicting interests of shareholders and policyholders. In this context, it 
questioned how the non-profit and social welfare principles apply to a joint-stock company 
(JSC) with shareholders; and whether surpluses in the policyholders underwriting account 
can be effectively isolated from the overall operation of the Takaful company. The chapter 
further considered how in Saudi Arabia, the statutory qard (loan) facility operates having 
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regard to the mandated statutory fund derived from the shareholders’ fund. Continuing on the 
theme of the potential conflict between shareholders and policyholders, it examined 
governance mechanisms and the extent to which policyholders can have a voice in the 
operations of the Takaful company. It moreover observed that the requirement of a Sharia 
Supervisory Board does not appear to have been implemented in Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi insurance companies are critically examined in chapter 7. The following chapter 
discusses the similarities and differences between Takaful insurance, mutual (co-operative) 




Conventional (Commercial) Insurance and Mutual (Co-operative) Insurance 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses three different forms of insurance—conventional (commercial), 
mutual (co-operative), and Takaful. It identifies how conventional insurance differs from 
mutual and Takaful insurance. The term conventional insurance is used to distinguish this 
form of commercial insurance operating under joint-stock companies (JSCs) from mutual 
insurance and Takaful insurance. Conventional (commercial) insurance is defined as:  
… a contract whereby one person, called the “Insurer”, undertakes, in return for the agreed 
consideration, called the “Premium”, to pay to another person, called the “Assured”, a sum of 
money, or its equivalent, on the happening of a specified event.1 
Mutual (co-operative) insurance is defined as:  
… an insurance company which is collectively owned by its members and which acts in the 
best interest of its members.2  
The chapter begins by defining conventional insurance, outlining its history and the types of 
insurance companies. It goes on to discuss conventional insurance pooling and insurance 
company groups as a risk management technique that reduces risks to society as a whole, and 
reduces the need for individuals and companies to maintain large reserves to protect against 
exposure to risk. It further explains conventional insurance contracts and principles 
(excluding life and health insurance). This is particularly important as all these principles 
similarly apply to Takaful insurance contracts.   
The chapter then discusses insurance company groups and mutual insurance or risk-sharing 
pools as ad hoc or temporary Islamic alternatives to conventional insurance to cover specific 
types of risks only. Similarly, instead of conventional re-insurance, insurance company 
groups can also form ad hoc Islamic alternatives to cover specific types of risks, see chapter 
6.  
The chapter then discusses how mutual insurance (also known as co-operative insurance, see 
5.3) differs from conventional insurance companies. Some mutual (co-operative) insurers in 
Western countries have demutualized, converting to conventional insurers under JSCs. 
Comparing and contrasting Takaful insurance and conventional insurance, the chapter 
identifies the main divergent points in which Takaful principles (discussed in chapter 4.6) do 
not apply to conventional insurance. Takaful insurance bears many similarities to mutual (co-
operative) insurance; the chapter makes explicit similarities and differences between them 
and then explores whether Takaful insurance can benefit from mutual insurance. The chapter 
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concludes by comparing and contrasting all three types of insurance: Takaful, conventional 
(commercial), and mutual (co-operative).  
The differences between the varying types of insurance are important in the context of 
Sharia-compliance which is based on risk-sharing rather than risk transfer. In examining 
whether insurance functions as a risk-sharing or risk transfer mechanism, the chapter raises a 
serious question: whether insurers in Saudi Arabia operate as genuine Takaful insurers, or as 
conventional insurers working under the name of “Takaful”. The chapter also investigates 
whether the Islamic principles and restrictions of Takaful insurance may prevent Takaful 
insurers from competing with conventional insurance in insurance markets.  
The next section discusses the definition and nature of conventional insurance. 
5.2. Conventional (Commercial) Insurance 
5.2.1. Definition of Conventional Insurance 
Insurance may be defined by reference to both individual and societal perspectives. From an 
individual point of view, insurance is:  
… an economic device whereby the individual substitutes a small certain cost (the premium) 
for a large uncertain financial loss (the contingency insured against) that would exist if it were 
not for the insurance.3 
From a societal perspective, insurance may be seen as: 
… an economic device for reducing and eliminating risk through the process of combining a 
sufficient number of homogeneous exposures into a group to make the losses predictable for 
the group as a whole.4  
Similarly, insurance has been defined as: 
… a social device for making accumulations to meet uncertain losses of capital which is 
carried out through the transfer of the risks of many individuals to one person or a group of 
persons.5 
And further, as: 
… a contract by which one party (the insurer) in consideration of a premium, undertakes to 
indemnify another (the insured) against loss.6 
                                                             
3 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance (John Wiley & Sons, 10 ed, 
2007) 34-35. Mohd Billah defines conventional insurance as: 
… an insurance policy is a contract of mutual financing in which one party is protected materially from 
any unexpected loss by the other party, in consideration of the payment of a particular amount as 
premium by the former.  
See Mohd Ma'sum Bilah, Applied Takaful and Modern Insurance (S&M Malaysia, 3 ed, 2007) 34. 
4 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 3, 41. 
5 Allan Herbert Willett, The Economic Theory of Risk and Insurance (The S. S. Huebner Foundation for 
Insurance Education, 2 ed, 1951) 72. 
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Takaful insurance, as established in the previous chapter, does not fit within these definitions 
of conventional insurance, as explained in this chapter.  
5.2.2. Brief History of Insurance 
As Takaful is a type of insurance, it is helpful to provide a brief overview of conventional 
(commercial) insurance, including aspects of mutual (co-operative) insurance. 
Insurance, in some form, has been in existence from about 3,000 to 4,000 BCE. Chinese 
traders adopted a simple insurance mechanism against losing shipments at sea by distributing 
the goods over a number of boats to share the risk of loss.7 A later development was the 
transfer of risks from traders to lenders known as the Contract of Bottomry.8 Under a 
Contract of Bottomry, money would be lent to traders in return for the repayment of the loan 
plus interest; if the shipment was lost at sea, the trader (borrower) would be released from 
repaying the loan. This type of transaction bears similarities to modern insurance in which the 
lender acts as the insurer providing protection to the trader against future losses. The trader is 
in the position of the insured, and the payment of interest represents premiums. This system 
of insuring against loss was later developed by the Phoenicians from around 1600 to 1000 
BCE, and by the Greeks from around the 4th century BCE, and then by the Romans in 600 
BCE.9 
In the 1200s, this type of marine insurance had spread to all of Europe. Individuals 
(shipowners or traders) used to enter into some types of marine insurance contracts.10 The 
first and oldest maritime insurance contract was written in Italy in 1347.11 By 1393, eighty 
insurance contracts had been entered into.12 The underwriting process started with traders 
writing full descriptions and information about the ships or goods, and shipowners or traders 
who accepted these risks would write down their names.13 In England, in the 1600s, 
transactions for marine and cargo insurance were entered into a ledger at Edward Lloyd’s 
coffeehouse in London which later became the famous Lloyd’s Insurance Company.14 
In the 1700s, fire insurance followed by property and liability insurance were developed.15 In 
1666, the Great Fire of London destroyed the city of London. During the reconstruction of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
6 William Searle Holdsworth, 'The Early History of the Contract of Insurance' (1917) 17(2) Columbia Law 
Review Association, Inc 85, 85. 
7 Bilah, above n 3, 12, 69; Andreas Schwepcke, Reinsurance: Principles and State of the Art - A Guidebook for 
Home Learners (Verlag Versicherungswirtsch, 2 ed, 2004) 1. 
8 The Contract of Bottomry is in one of its earliest form was the loan of money based on a mortgage of the 
vessel; under this arrangement if the ship were lost there would be no duty to repay the loan. See Emmett 
Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 3, appendix G4. 
9 Bilah, above n 3, 12-4, 69; Schwepcke, above n 7, 1.   
10 Bilah, above n 3, 15-6; Schwepcke, above n 7, 1. 
11 Holdsworth, above n 6, 88. 
12 Ibid 90. 
13 Bilah, above n 3, 15-6; Schwepcke, above n 7, 2. 
14 Edward Lloyd’s, Corporate History Lloyd’s <https://www.lloyds.com/about-lloyds/history/corporate-
history>. 
15 Bilah, above n 3, 15; Senior Scientists, Research of Senior Scientists in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [  ثاحبأ




the city, Nicholas Barbon (an English physician) started the first fire insurance company. 
Other types of insurance emerged over time. After 1711, property and liability insurance 
started in England and was established by two companies, the London Assurance Corporation 
and the Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation.16 In the 1800s, casualty insurance, known as 
accident insurance, was also available in England.17   
As insurance developed in the 18th century in England,18 insurance was similarly emerging as 
a business in the United States of America (USA). In 1752, the first mutual fire insurance 
company (The Philadelphia Contributionship) was founded.19 In 1792, the Insurance 
Company of North America was the first insurance joint-stock company founded, and was 
limited to fire and marine insurance. The first life insurance company was established in 1759 
and by 1820, 17 life insurance joint-stock companies had been established, all in New York. 
In 1800, casualty insurance (accident insurance) was available in the USA with new types of 
casualty insurance appearing later—such as forms of liability insurance (boiler explosion 
insurance, automobile insurance) and workers’ compensation insurance.20 
In the USA, insurance companies were divided into three classes: fire, life, and liability 
insurance where each insurer was permitted to sell only one particular class of insurance and 
prohibited from selling other insurance types. In 1940, however, insurers were allowed to 
combine property insurance with casualty insurance in one policy.21 Later, insurers were 
permitted to sell other classes of insurance on condition that they meet the capital and surplus 
requirements.22  
Some of these early forms of insurance were based on the principle of mutual insurance 
where the risk was shared between participants. As will be seen in this and following 
chapters, mutual or co-operative insurance—in which risks are shared—is a key principle 
underpinning Takaful insurance. Chapter 4 has discussed the origins of Takaful insurance in 
general, and in particular, the history of Takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia. 
5.2.3. Insurance—Transferring or Sharing of Risk? 
The development of risk management has led to new alternatives to conventional insurance—
including self-insurance programs, captive insurance, risk-retention groups, catastrophe 
bonds (also known as insurance-linked securities), and risk-sharing pools.23 The thesis does 
                                                             
16 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 3, 75, 79; Bilah, above n 3, 15-6.   
17 Bilah, above n 3, 16; Senior Scientists, above n 15, 39-40. 
18 Bilah, above n 3, 15; Senior Scientists, above n 15, 39. 
19 The Philadelphia Contributionship (PC), Dependable Insurance Partners Since 1752 PC <https://1752.com/>. 
20 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 3, 75; Bilah, above n 3, 16.   
21 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 3, 75. 
22 Ibid 75.   
23 Kai Wegrich and Martin Lodge, Managing Regulation: Regulatory Analysis, Politics and Policy (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 236-8; Michael Huber, 'Conceptualising Insurance: Risk Management under Conditions of 
Solvency' (2002) 9 Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR), 1-2. There are many other ways of 
dealing with risk. 
A risk-retention insurance group is also known as a “group-owned insurer” where liability risk is spread and 
retained among its members. The members of the risk-retention group are the policyholders and shareholders 
owning the group. The group is an official insurance company that can offer memberships to others. It can only 
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not consider all these alternative mechanisms but concentrates on conventional commercial 
insurance and mutual insurance that is formed as a risk-sharing pool.   
Whether insurance shares risk or transfers risk is an important issue. This is because Takaful 
insurance is typically seen as involving risk-sharing rather than risk transfer (see chapter 
4.6.2; also chapter 4.4.4 for Al-Zarqaa’s insurance views). Fundamentally, there is a common 
postulate that insurance transfers risk so that individuals exchange a certain amount of money 
(premiums) in return for future protection; this then indicates a risk transfer rather than a risk-
sharing.24 The opposing view of insurance is that insurance involves risk-sharing because 
insurance is a mechanism to reduce risks among insured individuals as a whole through 
sharing the insurance pool. Although the risks to which the insured individuals are exposed 
are literally transferred from the insured individuals themselves to the insurance pool, in 
essence the insurance pool itself involves and represents risk-sharing.25  
5.2.4. Insurance Company Groups (Insurance Pooling) 
Insurance company groups may operate as risk-sharing pools (insurance pooling), similar to 
mutual insurance (see 5.3). Some insurers have the same ownership of the insurance 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
be licensed in one state, but it can operate in other states by filing a request to the other state insurance 
authorities. 
A self-insurance group is similar to risk-retention insurance groups and sometimes these are hard to 
differentiate. However, the main distinctions between the two groups are the formal arrangements and specific 
conditions. 
Captive insurance is an insurance company that combines the features of risk-retention groups and risk transfer. 
A captive insurance company is established by a large firm with a primary intention to provide insurance to the 
firm and its affiliates against risks. There are two types of captive insurance: pure captives and association 
captives. A pure captive is when one firm establishes its captive insurance company to insure against its risks 
while an association captive is when a group of business companies set up an association captive insurance 
company to protect and insure against their risks. 
Catastrophe bonds also known as “insurance-linked securities” are related to the securitization of insurable risk. 
Catastrophe bonds are considered an alternative to re-insurance in which the insurance company shifts or 
transfers parts of its catastrophic risks to a third party (the financial market). Such catastrophic risks are 
hurricanes and earthquakes. The insurer does not transfer the catastrophic risks to a re-insurer, but rather to an 
investor (speculator) in a bet transaction. Under catastrophe bonds, insurance companies issue bonds to 
investors in which if the insured catastrophic risk occurs, the investor wins and the insurer loses and vice versa. 
See Ibid 67-71, 157-8. For further discussion about Catastrophe bonds (insurance-linked securities), see 
Christoph Weber, Insurance Linked Securities: The Role of the Banks (Gabler Verlag, 1 ed, 2011) 95-132; 
Michael Edesess, 'Catastrophe Bonds: An Important New Financial Instrument' (2015) 4(3) Chartered 
Alternative Investment Analyst Association 6; Artemis, What are Insurance-Linked Securities (or ILS)? (2019) 
<http://www.artemis.bm/library/what-are-insurance-linked-securities/>; PTA Reinsuarance Company (ZEP-
RE), Catastrophe Insurance Covers (2015) ZEP-RE <http://zep-re.com/index.php/media1/publications/61-
catastrophe-insurance-covers>; UNSW Business School, Disasters Downunder: Why Reinsurers are Heeding 
the Call of Catastrophe (2011) <https://www.businessthink.unsw.edu.au/Pages/Disasters-Downunder-Why-
Reinsurers-are-Heeding-the-Call-of-Catastrophe.aspx>; John D Pollner, Using Capital Markets to Develop 
Private Catastrophe Insurance (1999) World Bank Group 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282884-
1303327122200/197polln.pdf>. 
24 Sheila Nu Nu Htay et al, 'Insurance, Reinsurance, Takaful and Retakaful as Risk Mitigating Mechanisms' 
(2014) 6(27) European Journal of Business and Management 204, 206-7; Marcelo G Cruz, Gareth W Peters and 
Pavel V Shevchenko, Fundamental Aspects of Operational Risk and Insurance Analytics: A Handbook of 
Operational Risk (John Wiley & Sons, 2015) 688. 
25 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 3, 41. 
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company group, while other insurers are only members in the group.26 Such insurance 
company groups first started when an insurer was only permitted to sell one particular type of 
insurance, noted earlier, for which it was licensed and prohibited from selling other types of 
insurance. Through combining in an insurance company group, the insurers were able in 
effect to sell different types of insurance.27 Although insurance regulations have changed 
over the years, insurance company groups are still in existence.28 A specific example is 
Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Company (LMIC) in California,29 discussed below at 5.3.2, 
where some members (insurers) of the group aim to spread risks and share losses through the 
group, especially when underwriting policies exceed their financial capacity.30   
The concept and practice of insurance company groups are important for this thesis because 
some Takaful companies in Saudi Arabia operate in a similar way to insurance company 
groups, especially with insurers outside Saudi Arabia. For example, the Tawuniya company 
has associate companies or subsidiaries such as the United Insurance Company (UIC), 
founded and located in Bahrain, where Tawuniya owns 50 per cent of the UIC,31 see chapter 
7. Even if some Saudi Takaful insurers operate as a group as a way of spreading risk, Takaful 
insurers operating in Saudi Arabia are still required to comply with local regulations and 
rules. Operating insurance as a company group is criticized below at 5.3.2. Chapter 7 
discusses the question of whether Takaful insurers’ investments would be permissible under 
Sharia through such groups. Chapter 6 also examines whether insurance pooling through 
insurance company groups can be a Sharia temporary or ad hoc alternative to re-Takaful 
instead of using conventional re-insurance.  
The next section looks more specifically at conventional insurance contracts and principles 
followed by structured forms of insurance companies (mutual and joint-stock). 
5.2.5. Conventional Insurance Contracts and Principles  
Conventional (commercial) insurance involves a contract between an insurer and an insured. 
Insurance contracts like all contracts are subject to contract law.32 In addition to the usual 
requirements (offer and acceptance, consideration, capacity, and intention to create legal 
relations) for a valid contract, there are some special features of insurance contracts that 
                                                             
26 Ibid 85-6; Paseo De Recoletos, An Introduction to Reinsurance (Fundación Mapfre's (Mapfre Foundation) 
Institute of Insurance Sciences, 2013) 21. 
27 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 3, 85-6. 
28 Ibid 86.  
29 Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Company (LMIC), Company Information LMIC 
<https://www.lawyersmutual.com/company_information>. 
30 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 3, 86; Recoletos, above n 26, 21. In the U.S.A., for example, 
State Farm Mutual was established in 1922 and was limited to sell property and liability insurance. See State 
Farm Mutual, State Farm Story <https://www.statefarm.com/about-us/company-overview/company-
profile/state-farm-story>. This regulation development resulted in State Farm Mutual, in 1929, adding life 
insurance to its business. See State Farm Mutual, State Farm Companies <https://www.statefarm.com/about-
us/company-overview/company-profile/state-farm-companies>. 
31 Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), Annual Report for 2015 Tawuniya, 25 
<https://www.tawuniya.com.sa/docs/default-source/Related-Documents/About-Us/Docments-Library/Annual-
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should be discussed.33 There are six general principles applicable only to insurance contracts 
(excluding life and health insurance), namely (1) utmost good faith,34 (2) insurable interest,35 
(3) indemnity,36 (4) subrogation,37 (5) contribution,38 and (6) proximate cause.39 
These basic principles also apply to both Takaful insurance in general and Saudi insurance 
regulations in particular, as detailed below.     
(1) Utmost Good Faith (Uberrimae Fides)  
The principle of utmost good faith is the duty of both parties to be honest in disclosing all 
material facts related to an insurance contract. This principle is imposed equally on both 
parties, the insurer and the insured.40 The insured or the insured’s representative must make 
full disclosure to the insurer, and so must the insurer or its agent do to the insured.41 
The duty of disclosure requires the insured to disclose material information independently of 
any request by the insurer for information. Utmost good faith requires the insured to do so as 
the insured, unlike the insurer, is presumably familiar with the subject matter.42 Material facts 
that must be disclosed by both parties are defined as any important information related to the 
subject matter of the insurance contract that may have an effect on the decision of either party 
to the insurance policy.43 In addition to the importance of disclosure, the scope of utmost 
good faith includes the duty of correct representation as misrepresentation may mislead either 
party and negatively affect its decision.44 Misrepresentations must be based on material facts 
in order to be considered a breach of utmost good faith.45 Such materiality is considered a 
breach when the insured knows about it (actual knowledge) or should have known about it 
(presumed knowledge). In contrast, if the insured did not disclose a material fact because the 
insured did not know about it and could not have known about it, such materiality is not 
regarded a breach of the duty of utmost good faith.46  
Non-material facts that have no negative effect on the policy are not required to be 
disclosed.47 There is no list or definition of what are material or non-material facts.48 A fact 
that is considered material in a specific case might not be considered material in a different 
                                                             
33 Ibid 16; Bilah, above n 3, 64-5. 
34 Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 16. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid 17. 
37 Ibid 15. 
38 Robert Merkin, Colinvaux's Law of Insurance (Thomson Reuters: Sweet & Maxwell, 10 ed, 2014) 662. 
39 Sidney I Simon, 'Proximate Cause in Insurance' (1972) 10(1) American Business Law Journal 33, 33. 
40 Merkin, above n 38, 233; Peter Mann and Candace Lewis, Mann's Annotated Insurance Contracts Act 
(Thomson Reuters, 7 ed, 2016) 70; Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 234-5; Edward Richard Ivamy, Fire and 
Motor Insurance (London: Butterworths, Butterworths Insurance Library, 2 ed, 1973) 7. 
41 Ivamy, above n 1, 88-9; Ivamy, above n 40, 7-8. 
42 Ivamy, above n 1, 88, 90; Ivamy, above n 40, 8. 
43 Merkin, above n 38, 235, 254; Ivamy, above n 1, 87-8; Ivamy, above n 40, 7-8, 47; Derrington and Ashton, 
above n 32, 234-5.  
44 Merkin, above n 38, 235-6, 238; Ivamy, above n 1, 87-8; Ivamy, above n 40, 8. 
45 Merkin, above n 38, 250-1; Ivamy, above n 40, 47. 
46 Ivamy, above n 1, 90-1. 
47 Merkin, above n 38, 235; Ivamy, above n 1, 103. 
48 Merkin, above n 38, 235; Ivamy, above n 40, 47. 
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case.49 Nevertheless, facts considered either material or non-material are based on common 
sense or judgements by ordinary people.50 Such facts considered material, in property 
insurance for example, are the location, age, and uses of the insured property.51 Such non-
material facts to the insurance company are already known information or should be known,52 
information related to rights waived by the insurer,53 information expressed in the policy,54 
information reducing losses (e.g. a fire sprinkler system already installed),55 public 
knowledge information, and general legal information.56  
Non-disclosure, misrepresentation, or concealment may void the insurance contract.57 The 
insured has to answer all the policy questions in good faith in which judgement will be based 
on a rule of thumb usually known as “acting with reasonable care” or “exercising reasonable 
care”.58 A wrong answer or statement by the insured is not considered a misrepresentation if 
acted with reasonable care.59 There have been many cases where judgements were made 
based on the judges’ views of whether the breaches were material or non-material facts.60 
The principle of utmost good faith is not only a requirement when entering into the policy, it 
is also important to disclose material information and act in good faith (not to misrepresent) 
even after the commencement of the policy.61 In certain scenarios, some material facts might 
unexpectedly change before the insurance policy is signed. The insured is obliged to disclose 
to the insurer the material facts that are no longer correct. Failure to do so is considered non-
disclosure or misrepresentation and then a breach of the principle of utmost good faith. 
Similarly, during the renewal, the insured must disclose any new facts and changes occurring 
to previous information.62 Although misrepresentation may void the policy, in most 
situations, it would not be considered a breach of utmost good faith if the insured has 
misrepresented himself/herself but later on (after the policy goes into force) the insured 
corrects the misrepresentation. The only case where correction of misrepresentations would 
                                                             
49 Ivamy, above n 1, 97; Ivamy, above n 40, 47. 
50 Merkin, above n 38, 241-2, 248, 268; Ivamy, above n 1, 98. 
51 Merkin, above n 38, 1020-1. 
52 Ibid 297; Ivamy, above n 1, 104. 
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56 Bilah, above n 3, 230-1. 
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58 Merkin, above n 38, 253; Ivamy, above n 1, 137. 
59 Merkin, above n 38, 255. 
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products and the insurer rejected compensation claiming that Hershorn misrepresented and did not disclose 
material information. When he was asked about his records, he answered ‘See previous records Hershorn’ while 
he in fact had had a very bad history record. Considering the insured’s answer as a material misrepresentation 
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47-8. 
61 Merkin, above n 38, 234-5, 239; Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 235-6. 
62 Merkin, above n 38, 246. 
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not be accepted is that if the insured misrepresents a particular question that emphasises the 
serious consequences when falsely answered.63  
In Saudi Arabia, the principle of utmost good faith also applies. Saudi insurance laws require 
utmost good faith to apply to both the insured and insurer. The insured must provide all 
material facts related to the insurance policy64 but is only required to provide information that 
is considered relevant by an ordinary person.65 In relation to the insurer, Saudi insurance laws 
require insurance companies to inform the insured of the importance of disclosing important 
information throughout the duration of the policy.66 Companies also have a duty to act in 
good faith during the entire course of the policy, disclose all information related to the 
policy,67 and not to engage in misleading or deceptive statements or false advertising.68 Non-
compliance with Saudi insurance regulations by insurers, including disclosure provisions, 
will expose them to legal penalties imposed by SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency),69 
see chapter 3.2. 
(2) Insurable Interest  
The applicant for insurance must have an insurable interest, that is, a pecuniary interest in the 
insured property such that on the occurrence of the insured event, they will suffer financial 
loss (except in life insurance).70 An insurable interest can arise from either ownership or 
some proprietary right, which is the right to the property such as the rights of a mortgagee.71 
It is sufficient if the insured is in possession of the property.72 For example, an insurable 
interest arises when a depositary (bailee) promises to safely deliver certain goods.73 The 
precise quantification of the interest is not necessary.74  
                                                             
63 Ibid 245-6. 
64 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 2004 (Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia by Ministerial Order No. 1/596), art 55 (2); Insurance Consumer Protection Principles 2014 
(Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)), arts 2, 5 (1); Unified Compulsory Motor Insurance Policy 2018 
(Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)), arts 2 (16), 8 (2); Senior Scientists, above n 15, 59, 76. 
65 Insurance Market Code of Conduct Regulation 2008 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)), art 42. 
66 Ibid art 32. 
67 Insurance Consumer Protection Principles, above n 64, arts 4 (1), 11 (1). 
68 Ibid arts 4 (2), 6 (2), 9 (3), 9 (4); Insurance Market Code of Conduct Regulation, above n 65, art 28. 
69 Insurance Market Code of Conduct Regulation, above n 65, art 9; Insurance Consumer Protection Principles, 
above n 64, art 9 (4). However, these legal penalties imposed by Saudi insurance laws do not provide the 
insured with any remedy or resource when the insurance company breaches provisions related to the principle of 
utmost good faith. See Wissam Hachem et al, 'Insurance and Reinsurance in Saudi Arabia: Overview' (2018) 
Practical Law Country Q&A, [27]. 
70 Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 17, 83; Holdsworth, above n 6, 90, 92; Mann and Lewis, above n 40, 155, 
159; European Commission (EC), 'Final Report of the Commission Expert Group on European Insurance 
Contract Law' (2014) EC, art 201. 
71 Ivamy, above n 1, 19; Holdsworth, above n 6, 90, 92. An example of an ownership case is that a person 
cannot insure a house of another person as the first person has no insurable interest on that person’s house. In a 
non-ownership case, a house mortgage can create insurable interest on both parties (mortgagee as a bank and 
mortgager as a lender). See Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 3, 169-70. 
72 Merkin, above n 38, 172; Ivamy, above n 1, 19. 
73 Ivamy, above n 1, 20. 
74 Ibid 21, 23. It should be noted that there are some problematic issues in regard to this matter. 
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The purpose of this requirement of insurable interest is to prevent gambling and wagering.75 
If an insurable interest did not exist, a person could insure another person’s house and in the 
event of its damage or destruction, the insured would profit from the loss.76 The insurable 
interest precludes any one from having insurance if the person will not financially suffer from 
the loss occurrence.77 The requirement of insurable interest also reduces moral hazard where 
property is destroyed for profit.78 Insurable interest differentiates between the chance of 
ownership and actual ownership. Insurable interest does not arise in the case of expectations 
to own or possess a property in the future. Rather, insurable interest requires actual ownership 
or possession to a property or item.79   
It is worth noting that an insurable interest is required to exist at the time the risk occurs. This 
is sufficient even if there is no insurable interest at the commencement of the policy.80 
Conversely, there will be no compensation when the insured has no insurable interest at the 
time the risk occurs even if the insured had an insurable interest at the commencement of the 
policy.81 It is mandatory under insurance law that the insured and insurer cannot agree to 
waive the insurable interest requirement.82  
Under Takaful insurance the principle of insurable interest also applies in order to reduce 
moral hazard.83 It has been suggested that only one difference from conventional insurance is 
that an insurable interest in Takaful insurance, unlike conventional insurance, is required to 
exist prior to entering the policy.84  
                                                             
75 Ivamy, above n 1, 22. Wagering is the possibility of gain (either winning or losing). See Robert Merkin, 
Insurance Law - An Introduction: Practical Insurance Guides (Informa Law, 2007) 3. As discussed in chapter 3, 
insurance accepts pure risks where there is no possibility of gain is involved. 
76 Merkin, above n 38, 161. 
77 Ibid 165. 
78 Ibid 161-2. 
79 Ibid 174-5, 1336-7; Ivamy, above n 1, 20. 
80 Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 84, 1335; Mann and Lewis, above n 40, 155; Ivamy, above n 1, 25-7. 
81 Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 84; Mann and Lewis, above n 40, 155; Ivamy, above n 1, 25-6. 
Continuing of having an insurable interest in the policy is not required. See Ivamy, above n 1, 20. For example, 
no compensation for the insured if the insured has sold the insured car. See Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 
84. This is also applicable in theory as some jurisdictions do not even require the existence of insurable interest 
when signing the policy but it will be required only at the occurrence of the risk. See Merkin, above n 38, 993, 
1335. 
82 Merkin, above n 38, 165. 
83 Senior Scientists, above n 15, 47-8; W Jean Kwon, 'Islamic Principle and Takaful Insurance: Re-evaluation' 
(2007) 26(1) National Association of Insurance Commissioners 53, 68; Yusuf Abdul-Azeez and Abdullahi Saliu 
Ishola, 'Insurable Interest in Takaful: A Theoretical Contrivance for Islamic Insurers' (2016) 6(S3) International 
Journal of Economics and Financial Issues 109, 112. 
84 Abdul-Azeez and Ishola, above n 83, 112. This is based on the Prophet Mohammed’s (Peace be upon him and 
his family) speech stating: 
All of you are guardians and are responsible for your wards. The ruler is a guardian and responsible for 
his subjects; the man is a guardian and responsible for his family; the woman is a guardian and is 
responsible for her husband’s house and his offspring; and so all of you are guardians and are 
responsible for your wards. 
See Muslim Al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim [ ملسم حیحص ] (Dar Taibah for Publishing and Distribution, 2006) No. 1829; 
Mohammed Albukhary, Saheeh Albukhary [ يراخبلا حیحص ] (Dar Ibn-Katheer, 2002) No. 2558. 
By qiyas (reasoning by analogy as a Sharia source explained in chapter 4.3), an insured (who is a guardian) must 
have an insurable interest in the subject matter of insurance. An employer (also a guardian) must have an 
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In Saudi Arabia, although insurable interest is not defined by insurance laws,85 insurance 
laws recognise the principle of insurable interest on the subject matter of insurance when the 
contract is entered into.86 SAMA’s guidelines provide an example of the importance of 
having an insurable interest in insuring a car or house.87  
(3) Indemnity 
Insurance is usually a contract of indemnity as the insured is entitled to compensation from 
the insurer once the insured event occurs. The compensation payment is equivalent to the 
actual financial loss suffered by the insured and nothing more.88 Under the principle of 
indemnity, the insured must not profit from insurance but must be compensated only for the 
actual loss. This is based on the principle that the insured is to be put back in the same 
financial position as they were before the loss occurred (except in life insurance).89 If the 
insured has been partially compensated by the wrongdoer, the insured is responsible to notify 
the insurer so that the insured will not be over indemnified when compensated by the insurer. 
When the insured has been fully compensated by the wrongdoer, the insurer is not liable.90 
The insurer’s liability is up to the amount of actual loss.91 Thus, the principle of indemnity 
acts to prevent moral hazard such as an intentional destruction of property by an insured 
because under no circumstances would the insured gain from insurance; the insured will be 
indemnified for the actual loss only.92 
The indemnity principle is also recognised in Saudi Arabia. Saudi insurance laws state the 
objective of insurance ‘is to restore the insured party to his[/her] financial position 
immediately preceding the loss.’93 Depreciation is a feature related to the principle of 
indemnity and it considers the life consumption of the insured item when the loss is 
evaluated. This means that insurance coverage is calculated based on the actual value of the 
insured subject matter at the time of occurrence of the loss, and not at the time of 
commencement of the policy. Depreciation is an important feature of indemnity because it 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
insurable interest in the employer’s employees and a spouse (also a guardian) must have an insurable interest in 
the other party. See Abdul-Azeez and Ishola, above n 83, 113. 
85 Hachem et al, above n 69, [3]; Clyde & Co (C&C), 'Insurance and Reinsurance in Saudi Arabia: Overview' 
(2015) (C&C), [3]. 
86 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 64, art 55 (1). 
This article states:  
The basis of the information provided in the policy shall be the application submitted by the 
policyholder. When completing the insurance application, the following must be taken into 
consideration: 1- The existence of an insurance interest on the part of the insured party consisting of the 
possibility of his [or her] incurrence of a loss or liability due to damage to the object of the insurance. 
Islamic jurists in Saudi Arabia recognise insurable interest and provide further definitions and information on it. 
See Senior Scientists, above n 15, 54-5, 71. 
87 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), FAQs: General Insurance Information (2018) SAMA, [4] 
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/Insurance/Pages/FAQs.aspx>. Saudi insurance laws and guidelines do not 
provide any further information on the principle of insurable interest. 
88 Merkin, above n 38, 164-5; Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 18-9, 89; Ivamy, above n 1, 431-2. 
89 Ivamy, above n 1, 431-2; Andrew Blair-Stanek, 'Using Insurance Law and Policy to Interpret the Tax Code's 
Loss and Medical Expense Provisions' (2007) Yale Law and Policy Review 309, 321-2.  
90 Ivamy, above n 1, 431-2; Ivamy, above n 40, 9. 
91 Ivamy, above n 1, 435-6. 
92 Blair-Stanek, above n 89, 321. 
93 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 64, art 55 (3). 
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places the insured person in the same position as before occurrence of the loss. In Saudi 
Arabia, depreciation is recognised by SAMA’s insurance guidelines.94   
(4) Subrogation  
The principle of subrogation applies when an insured has been compensated by the insurer.95 
After the insured has been compensated, all the insured’s rights against the wrongdoer are 
transferred to the insurer. The insurer’s right of subrogation is limited to the compensation it 
has paid to the insured.96 The insurer, standing in the shoes of the insured, can bring all 
claims which could have brought by the insured in relation to that loss. The insured is no 
longer able to make these claims. As a consequence, subrogation prevents the insured from 
profiting from insurance through not allowing the insured to collect double payments.97 
Subrogation also prevents the wrongdoer, who is not a party to the insurance policy, from 
benefiting from the insurance policy.98 Take the example where an insured’s house has been 
destroyed by a wrongdoer and the insurer compensates the insured for the actual loss of the 
house. In this case, the insured is prevented from claiming compensation from the wrongdoer 
because this right has been transferred to the insurance company to sue the wrongdoer or the 
wrongdoer’s insurer. The insurer’s right for subrogation is only to the extent of compensation 
that it has paid to the insured.99 
The insurer is obligated to compensate the insured regardless of whether a cause of action 
exists against a third person.100 When the insured receives any amount from the wrongdoer 
before the insurance compensation, the insurer must take this into account so that 
compensation does not exceed the actual loss.101 Subrogation cannot apply until the insurer 
has fully compensated the insured (made the insured whole).102 
Where the insured’s rights to sue a wrongdoer are subrogated to the insurer, the lawsuit is 
brought under the insured’s name, and not the insurer’s.103 Importantly, this point protects the 
insurer’s rights from the possibility that the insured might waive their rights to recover the 
loss by relieving the wrongdoer from responsibility.104 An alternative for the insurer is to take 
a legal assignment from the insured. Under a legal assignment, the insured waives (or 
transfers) his/her rights to the insurer in order for the insurer to take over those rights. In that 
                                                             
94 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), above n 87, [9]. 
95 European Commission (EC), above n 70, art 182; Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 16; Mann and Lewis, 
above n 40, 553; Merkin, above n 38, 622. 
96 Merkin, above n 38, 623; Ivamy, above n 1, 415, 418. An exception of this is in an assignment recovery, 
discussed below. 
97 Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 16; Mann and Lewis, above n 40, 553; Merkin, above n 38, 622-3; 
Ivamy, above n 1, 415-8. 
98 Merkin, above n 38, 623. 
99 Derrington and Ashton, above n 32, 16. 
100 Merkin, above n 38, 622-3. 
101 Ibid 623; Ivamy, above n 1, 419. 
102 Merkin, above n 38, 627-8; Ivamy, above n 1, 419. This can simply apply to policies with a full coverage. 
But it gets complicated when the insured does not have a full cover insurance policy as the insurer is not 
obligated to make a full compensation and wants to go for subrogation. To solve this issue, the insurer will have 
to fulfil his liability in the policy by paying its duty of compensation and then going for subrogation. 
103 Merkin, above n 38, 622, 631; Ivamy, above n 1, 424. 
104 Merkin, above n 38, 623. 
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situation, the lawsuit against the wrongdoer will be filed under the insurer’s name, and not 
the insured’s.105  
Insurers favor legal assignments over subrogation for three reasons. First, where there is a 
legal assignment, the insurer is no longer required to have the insured involved in the lawsuit. 
This is particularly important if the insured has become insolvent which would result in the 
insurer losing its subrogation rights.106 Second, in a subrogation case, the insurer cannot sue 
the wrongdoer until the insured is fully indemnified. When the insured is not fully 
indemnified (under-insured), this raises an issue that the insured might compromise with the 
wrongdoer and accept a settlement that might be less than what the insurer has wished to 
achieve through litigation. This would not occur in a legal assignment case.107 Third, in the 
case of subrogation, the insurer exercises the insured’s right up to the amount compensated 
by the insurer. In certain scenarios, there will be some profit—such as those resulting from 
currency rates—which will belong to the insured. In a legal assignment case, however, the 
insurer will receive those profits.108 For instance, in 1945, a vessel that was insured for 
UK£72,000 sank in a Canadian port. The actual loss was Canadian $336,039. The rate of 
exchange in 1945 was 4.45 from the UK£ to the CA$ which equals UK£75,514 (CA$336,039 
÷ 4.45). The insurer paid the maximum limit of coverage (UK£72,000) to the insured and 
then sued the Canadian Government. By the time the insurer’s case was successfully settled 
in 1958, the currency rate had dropped from 4.45 to 2.639 so that the final compensation 
received by the insurer was almost UK£127,000 (CA$336,039 ÷ 2.639). Since the insurer had 
no legal assignment, the ruling was to pay the insurer UK£72,000 (insured sum) and pay the 
rest (UK£55,000) to the insured.109  
A type of subrogation is also recognised in Saudi Arabia. The Implementing Rules (IR) state: 
A power-of-attorney from the Insured to the Company [is required] to subrogate it in the 
following cases: a. Third party Liability for the loss. b. Defending the insured in repudiat[ing] 
liability or in determining the indemnity amount.110 
Taking a power-of-attorney from the insured has some features similar to that of an 
assignment save that an attorney normally acts as agent of the person granting the power-of-
attorney (the principal) so that proceedings are brought on behalf of the principal. Under 
Saudi regulations, proceedings against the third party will be under the name of the insurer 
(and not that of the insured).111 If it does not amount to an assignment, there are risks to the 
insurer as set out above. 
                                                             
105 Ibid 625; Ivamy, above n 1, 424-5. 
106 Merkin, above n 38, 625-6. 
107 Ibid 625-6; Ivamy, above n 1, 426-7. 
108 Merkin, above n 38, 626. 
109 Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Nisbet Shipping Co Ltd [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep 479. 
110 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 64, art 43 (7). 
111 This is evidenced by the Unified Compulsory Motor Insurance Policy issued in 2018 which emphasises the 
importance of the insured issuing a power-of-attorney to the insurer to subrogate the insured’s rights. See 
Unified Compulsory Motor Insurance Policy, above n 64, art 8 (5.c). 
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In practice, subrogation and legal assignments are recognised by the Insurance Quasi-Judicial 
Committee under SAMA, known as the Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and 
Violations, which deals with insurance disputes including subrogation112 (see chapter 3.3). In 
a power-of-attorney case, under a transportation insurance policy, the insured’s items were 
damaged by a transport company (third party and defendant) during delivery. Since the loss 
was covered under the insurance policy, the insurer fully compensated the insured, receiving 
a power-of-attorney from the insured. The insurer pursued the wrongdoer (transport 
company) who refused to reimburse the insurer. Based on the power-of-attorney, the insurer 
filed a lawsuit against the transport company before the Committee for Solving Insurance 
Disputes and Violations. The ruling was in favor of the insurer and confirmed by the 
Appellate Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations.113 
(5) Contribution 
The principle of contribution applies when an insured has taken out multiple insurance 
policies covering the same risk (known as double insurance). This would allow the insured to 
profit from multiple compensation if the insured event occurs.114 Under insurance law, an 
insured is allowed to take many insurance policies on one subject matter as long as the 
insured has an insurable interest.115 Based on the principle of indemnity, the insured must not 
gain from insurance, so under the principle of contribution the insured can claim for 
compensation only to the extent of the actual loss either from all insurers or from any one 
insurer.116 The total amount of compensation paid to the insured by all the insurers must not 
exceed the amount of loss. All the insurers contribute together to compensate the insured for 
the actual loss based on their proportionate share and obligations.117 
The principle of contribution applies when there are insurance policies covering the same 
risk. The contribution principle requires all insurance policies to insure the same subject 
matter, the same insured, and the same interest. All insurance policies must insure the same 
subject matter. The policies must also insure the same insured who has the loss of the same 
interest in the subject matter. If two separate insureds have an interest in the same subject 
matter, the contribution principle does not apply. This can occur in the cases of a mortgagor-
mortgagee, a bailor-bailee, a landlord-tenant, and an employer-employee. Each insured can 
insure their own interest as each insured’s interest differs from the other.118 
In the case of the mortgagor-mortgagee, the mortgagee has insured a dwelling under an 
indemnity policy while the mortgagor has insured the same subject matter under a 
replacement cost policy. This was not a case of double insurance because the interest in the 
building differed for each insured. The mortgagee’s interest was in the building only while 
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M/32), art 20. 
113 Insurance Company v Transporter Company [2016] 341711 Riyadh (Committee for Solving Insurance 
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the mortgagor had an additional interest in the building to compensate for additional cost 
such as the cost of re-building or the sum outstanding under the mortgage. Thus, the 
contribution principle did not apply.119 
As a general principle, the insured is not required to disclose additional insurance cover 
unless a possibility of fraud arises, especially when the subject matter of insurance is over-
insured.120 The permissibility of over-insurance encouraged the insured to commit a fraud for 
personal gains, e.g. intentional destruction of the insured property. The permissibility of 
choosing either insurer to make a full claim against also seemed unfair to the selected insurer 
to be, among the other insurers, the only insurer responsible for the loss. The principle of 
contribution has thus solved these concerns.121  
The principle of contribution is also recognised in recognised in Saudi Arabia. The 
‘Awareness Guide’ issued by the General Secretariat of the Committees for Resolution of 
Insurance Disputes and Violations refers to the principle of contribution which allows the 
insurer to require other insurers to pay their proportionate share in the case of multiple 
insurance.122 
(6) Proximate Cause (Causation) 
Insurance is meant to compensate for the risks that are the subject matter of insurance.123 
Identifying the cause of loss is important in each insurance policy as there are 
covered/insured risks and uncovered/uninsured or excluded risks.124 There is no difficulty if 
the loss can be attributed to a single cause.125 The issue occurs once there is more than one 
peril causing the loss where some perils are covered while the others are not. Here, the 
principle of proximate cause (causation) considers the nearest, closest, and direct peril that 
has caused the loss and ignores the remote cause.126 If the proximate or direct cause is insured 
against, the insurer is obligated to pay the claim while if the proximate cause is not covered, 
the insurer is not bound to compensate.127 For example, where a fire insurance policy 
excluded damages caused by war, if due to the actions of the military, the City Hall caught 
fire and the fire spread to the insured’s house, the proximate and direct cause of the fire 
would be the conduct of the military. Consequently, compensation would not be awarded to 
the insured on the ground that the military action was the proximate and direct cause which 
was excluded from the coverage.128 Also, a fire insurance policy covers a fire loss caused by 
                                                             
119 Merkin, above n 38, 666-7. For further examples, see Ivamy, above n 1, 442. 
120 Merkin, above n 38, 663. 
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either electrical short circuits or a third party. A fire caused by three perils occurs and 
damages the insured’s property. The court finds the proximate cause of the fire is a cigarette 
end, which is excluded from coverage, concluding that the loss is not covered.129 
It is difficult to establish standards or a list of rules for the principles of proximate cause.130 
This is because finding the proximate cause of loss, in certain cases, can be complex. As a 
general rule, the risk that occurs and damages the insurance subject matter is considered the 
proximate cause.131 For example, a ship avoids using a sea route known to be dangerous 
because of sea pirates and uses an alternative route whereupon the ship is destroyed by a 
severe storm. In such cases, the proximate cause will usually be the severe storm because it is 
the actual cause rather than the presence of sea pirates. Compensation will be based on 
whether storm risks are covered in the policy.132 
Concurrent causation (concurrent proximate cause) is related to the principle of proximate 
cause. Generally, it is feasible to determine the direct and nearest cause of loss where the 
proximate cause principle applies. In concurrent causation, where two or more perils cause a 
loss, it is impossible to decide which one of the perils is the proximate cause.133 A distinction 
is drawn between two types of concurrent causation. In the first type, there must be more than 
one peril causing a loss in which either peril can cause the loss on its own. The second type of 
concurrent causation is when there is more than one peril which causes the loss in 
circumstances where one peril cannot independently cause the loss without the other peril’s 
participation.134 In both these two cases, the insured can be compensated if at least one of the 
perils is insured against even if the other perils are not insured.135 
The principle of proximate cause is also recognised in Saudi Arabia. SAMA’s insurance 
guidelines adopt the principle of proximate cause under the title of “direct cause”.136 
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The basic general insurance principles, discussed above, are also reflected in the Saudi 
insurance regulations which state: 
Companies must act in an honest, transparent and fair manner, and fulfill all of their 
obligations to [insured] customers, which they [owe] under the laws, regulations, and SAMA 
guidelines. Where these obligations have not been fully codified, companies may follow 
internationally accepted best practices.137 
The Saudi insurance regulations also state: 
Companies must adopt the best practices internationally followed in meeting the [insured] 
consumers' obligations as to make such practices an integral part to the company's culture.138 
From a Sharia perspective, these same principles apply to Takaful insurance.139 Very little 
has been written on the application of these general insurance principles from a Takaful 
insurance viewpoint.140 By qiyas (reasoning by analogy as a Sharia source explained in 
chapter 4.3), these general principles apply to Takaful insurance, provided that they do not 
contradict Sharia rules. In practice, these general insurance principles do not breach Sharia in 
general or Takaful insurance principles in particular. Another justification for the 
permissibility of these conventional insurance principles is linked to the Islamic principle of 
ibaha, known as freedom of contract.141 Under Islamic contracts law, general contractual 
principles are accepted unless there is a specific statement mentioned by Sharia (the Quran or 
Sunnah) prohibiting or voiding a certain contract. If there is no particular Sharia text—a 
Quranic verse or Prophetic saying—forbidding or disallowing a certain contract, the contract 
will be lawful and permissible under Sharia based on the principle of ibaha (freedom of 
contract).142 Thus, the ibaha principle applies to validate these conventional general 
insurance principles. Chapter 7 examines whether the subrogation principle is inconsistent 
with Takaful principles. 
5.2.6. Differences between Takaful Insurance and Conventional Insurance 
(1) Introduction 
This section contrasts Takaful insurance and conventional (commercial) insurance. As will be 
seen, the key differences between Takaful insurance and conventional insurance are: Islamic 
principles and rules, sources of regulation, non-profit and social welfare, segregation and 
surpluses of underwriting funds, Sharia supervision, mutual co-operation (risk-sharing), 
decision-making, and Islamic re-insurance (re-Takaful). 
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As noted in chapter 4.4, Takaful insurance, unlike conventional insurance, is subject to Sharia 
restrictions, including the prohibitions of riba (interest/usury or money for money), gharar 
(uncertainty), and maysir (gambling).143 It was also discussed how conventional insurance 
contracts were perceived as breaching the prohibitions against riba, gharar, and maysir. To 
avoid reiteration, see chapter 4.4. 
(2) Sources of Regulation 
Takaful insurance is regulated by Sharia and government regulations,144 while conventional 
insurance is subject only to legal and regulatory requirements.145 Both Takaful insurance and 
conventional insurance contracts must be for a lawful purpose. However, Takaful insurance 
contracts must also comply with Sharia. For conventional insurance, the general law 
determines the lawful purposes for conventional insurance contracts.146 Takaful insurance 
prohibits contracts involving alcohol, pork, riba, maysir, etc because they are prohibited 
under Sharia. There are no similar restrictions on conventional insurance.147  
(3) Non-profit and Social Welfare 
With the exclusion of mutual insurance, conventional insurance is typically profit-based 
while Takaful insurance is intended to be non-profit.148 In Takaful insurance, participants are 
partners owning the Takaful pool while the insureds in conventional insurance have only 
contractual rights and no rights to surplus of the underwriting fund.149 Whether this principle 
is sustainable for Saudi shareholder JSCs is discussed in chapter 7. 
The social welfare principle also applies to Takaful insurance which should benefit all of 
society. No similar principle applies to conventional insurance.150 For Saudi Arabia, chapter 7 
examines insurance companies’ annual reports in order to determine how far the social 
welfare principle is being applied. 
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(4) Segregation of Underwriting Funds and Surpluses in the Underwriting Funds 
Conventional insurance, unlike Takaful insurance, is not required to separate the participants’ 
underwriting fund (PUF) from the participants’ investment fund (PIF).151 Takaful insurance 
requires segregation of the participants’ funds (PUF and PIF) and the shareholders’ funds, see 
4.6.5. This has implications in relation to capital solvency requirements in which capital and 
reserves may be higher than in conventional insurance,152 as explained in chapter 3.8. 
As discussed in chapter 4.5, in Takaful insurance, surpluses and profits go to the participants’ 
account so policyholders share in the surpluses and profits from the underwriting and 
investment funds (PUF and PIF).153 In conventional insurance, the insurer owns the 
premiums,154 so the insureds (unless mutual insurance) have no rights to share in surpluses or 
profits155 which belong to the company and its shareholders.156 
In Takaful insurance, the operator will receive a fee from the participants’ contributions (in 
wakalah model), share the profit from the investment fund with the participants (in 
mudharabah model), or both receive a fee and share the profit (in hybrid model), see 
discussion at 4.5. The insurer in conventional insurance owns all premiums.157  
(5) Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) 
Unlike conventional insurance companies, Takaful insurance companies have a Sharia 
Supervisory Board (SSB) to monitor compliance with Sharia.158 Whether all insurance 
companies in Saudi Arabia comply with this requirement is discussed in chapter 7. 
(6) Mutual Co-operation—Risk Transfer or Risk-Sharing 
The principle of mutual co-operation is the basis of Takaful insurance but no similar principle 
applies to conventional insurance.159 So, in conventional insurance, the insured transfers risks 
to the company; but in theory, Takaful policyholders share risks rather than transfer them to 
the Takaful company,160 see discussion at 4.6.2.  
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(7) Conflicts of Interest 
Unique conflicts of interest can arise in Takaful insurance. In Takaful insurance, there is 
significant scope for possible conflict of interest between the shareholders, the operator, and 
the policyholders. This occurs in relation to distribution of profits, governance and decision-
making, and the non-profit principle. The potential for conflict has been discussed in chapter 
4.6.7 and 4.6.8. 
In conventional insurance, the insureds do not own the insurance company so these conflicts 
of interest do not arise.161 Consequently, there is no duty of the Board of Directors to take the 
insureds’ interests into account in making decisions. If the premiums are higher than 
competitors and policyholders are not accorded appropriate customer care, the remedy is to 
take their business elsewhere. 
(8) Re-insurance 
An additional distinction is that Takaful insurance companies are required to deal with re-
Takaful companies and not conventional (commercial) re-insurance. Since the Takaful 
insurance industry is very recent with its first approval in Sudan in 1979, there are few re-
Takaful companies capable of re-insuring Takaful companies, so that Takaful companies re-
insure with conventional re-insurance,162 see discussion in chapter 6. 
These differences are important in discussing whether the beneficial principles of Takaful 
insurance inhibit its ability to compete with conventional insurance and provide a stable 
economic basis for Islamic insurance, see discussion in chapter 7. 
5.3. Mutual (Co-operative) Insurance 
It is important to provide a brief overview of mutual (co-operative) insurance because 
Takaful insurance builds on early ideas of mutual insurance. 
In 1752, mutual insurance was set up in Western countries. In the 18th century, shipowners 
were not satisfied with the insurance costs (premiums) underwritten by Lloyd’s insurance. 
This resulted in the creation of mutual insurance associations, which later became “protection 
and indemnity clubs”, with fewer costs.163 In the USA in 1752, the first mutual insurance 
company was founded.164 Since then, mutual insurance has been spread globally. Mutual 
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insurance plays a sensitive and important role in insurance markets and is considered a strong 
competitor.165 
Mutual insurance, also known as co-operative insurance, does not have a specific 
international definition. Mutual and co-operative insurance are often used interchangeably 
with variations across jurisdictions. The International Co-operative Alliance (COOP) defines 
co-operative (mutual) insurance as: 
[A]n autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, 
social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically 
controlled enterprise.166 
The COOP also describes co-operative (mutual) values as: 
Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, 
equity and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, co-operative members believe in the 
ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others.167 
Mutual insurance is also defined as: 
Insurance in mutual companies, that is, companies without stockholders or capital stock. All 
risks and all profits are the property of the policyholders. They are sometimes classed as 
cooperative insurance companies.168 
In order to avoid confusion or misunderstanding between mutuals and co-operatives, the 
International Cooperative and Insurance Federation (ICIF) changed its name to the 
International Cooperative and Mutual Insurance Federation (ICMIF).169 This confusion 
between mutual insurance and co-operative insurance results from mutual insurance as a non-
profit insurance company operated by the insurer and providing protection for all types of 
insurance. Co-operative insurance is the smaller and primitive version of mutual insurance 
formed by a small group of members (not a company) to protect themselves against a specific 
type of risk. Once the idea of co-operative insurance developed and the number of the 
members increased and the types of risks insured against broadened, co-operative insurance 
needed a company structure and a manager to run the operations.170        
Mutual insurance is based on risk-sharing pools. Risk-sharing pools, where all members are 
exposed to the same risk, are used to managing risks. The risks are insured by the mutual 
group (the risk-sharing pool). The members (the insureds and insurer) together share the risks 
and the losses in the group. This pooling group does not have to be formally structured as an 
insurance company. The risk-sharing pool can be classified as either risk transfer 
(transferring risk from members to the pool) or risk retention (risks are retained by a member 
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in addition to accepting other members’ risks).171 Mutual insurance is created to benefit 
certain groups. For example, the French mutual MAIF (Mutuelle d’Assurance des Instituteurs 
de France) was created to insure primary school teachers172 or typically used for industry 
groups such as manufacturers in a particular industry. The Association of Mutual Insurers and 
Insurance Cooperatives in Europe (AMICE) was established to ensure that the rights and 
interests of all mutual (co-operative) insurers in Europe are met and considered.173  
Mutual insurance companies have some important characteristics which distinguish them 
from other insurance structures. The policyholders are the owners of the mutual insurance 
company and thus receive the profits as owners. A mutual insurance company does not have 
paid-up capital or capital stock.174 This causes difficulties as capital adequacy is a crucial 
requirement for the financial stability of financial institutions, see discussion at chapter 3.4. 
This problem is overcome by mutual insurers’ retention of profits as a reserve to protect 
against future losses. Any profits after meeting these reserves are distributed to the 
policyholders.175 Further, payment of premiums can be required either in advance or after 
losses occur  (known as a post-loss assessment). But with premiums in advance, additional 
premiums can be required later if losses have exceeded risk expectations and the accumulated 
profits, surpluses, and reserves have not been sufficient to pay all claims.176 
Although the policyholders appoint and elect the members of the Board of Directors and 
employ the managers of the mutual insurance company,177 conflicts of interest may occur 
between the policyholders and the managers. In relation to ownership of the mutual insurance 
company, the policyholders theoretically own the company but they cannot exercise their full 
ownership rights. They do not practise day to day management as the company is operated by 
the managers.178 The policyholders exercise their rights as owners in the case of liquidation 
only. Once an insurance policy is cancelled, has expired, or is not renewed, their ownership 
rights cease.179  
5.3.1. Demutualization  
Demutualization, common in Western countries,180 is defined as the process by which a 
mutual insurance company converts its structure to that of a capital joint-stock company 
(JSC). The main reason for demutualization is the desire to access capital. A mutual company 
cannot issue shares as it has no equity (stock) funding or capital, and this inability to enter 
capital markets reduces the opportunities for a mutual insurance company to grow and 
compete. A capital joint-stock company (JSC) is permitted to issue shares of stock to raise 
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capital, so demutualizing the mutual insurance company solves the issue.181 For example, a 
couple of mutual insurance companies in the USA and in the UK have demutualized and 
converted to capital joint-stock insurance companies.182 In Australia, the National Roads and 
Motorists' Association (NRMA) was demutualized in 2000.183 Conversely, some insurance 
joint-stock companies (JSCs) have mutualized (converted) to mutual insurance companies, in 
a process of “mutualization".184  
The process of demutualization requires issuing stock to the policyholders as they are the 
owners of the mutual insurance company. Policyholders may be offered the option of whether 
to accept stocks in the new demutualized capital joint-stock insurance company or be paid 
cash.185  
Demutualization has relevance to this thesis since the requirement that all Takaful companies, 
in Saudi Arabia, be registered as JSCs. Now, the key problem is whether this status as a JSC 
is compatible with Takaful principles and rules. This is discussed further in chapters 6 and 7.  
The next section, 5.3.2, compares conventional insurance and mutual insurance companies. 
Section 5.3.3 discusses the differences between Takaful insurance and mutual insurance. 
Finally, section 5.4 summarises key differences between conventional insurance, mutual (co-
operative) insurance, and Takaful insurance.   
5.3.2. Differences between Conventional Insurance and Mutual Insurance 
Table 5.1 below summarises the differences between conventional (commercial) insurance 
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 Equity structure Stockholders [Shareholders] Owned by policyholders 
Risks underwritten Full spectrum (insures higher 
risk)187 
Typically restricted to low-
volatility risk (insures more 
anticipated risk)188 
Risk mitigation  Risk transfer, need for capital 
to guarantee claim payouts 
Risk sharing, available capital 
limited generally to retained 
surpluses 
Alignment of shareholder 
interest 
Weak between stockholders 
[shareholders] and 
policyholders 
Policyholders are also 
stockholders [shareholders]; 
managing the managers can 
be an issue 
Cost of coverage Need to service capital from 
surpluses 
All things being the same, 
cheaper, because no 
stockholder [shareholder] 
capital to service 
Demand for management189  Higher because shareholders 
aim for dividends190 
 Less because no shareholder 
dividends191 
Profitability192 Profitable companies193 Non- profitable companies194 
 
Table 5.1 shows the key differences between conventional insurance companies and mutual 
insurance companies. The first difference is the ownership of the insurance fund. In a mutual 
insurer, the profits and losses are borne by the participants (policyholders), whereas for 
conventional companies, shareholders bear the risk of profits and losses. Unlike conventional 
insurance companies, a mutual insurance company has no shareholders195 so that no 
dividends are paid to shareholders. Consequently, a mutual insurance company can retain a 
large reserve of profit.196 Mutual insurance companies are non-profit organisations, unlike 
conventional insurance companies.197 The result is that the costs of purchasing mutual 
insurance are likely to be cheaper than in conventional insurance.198 Another difference is 
that conventional insurers are more likely to insure higher risks because capital requirements 
enable them to carry more risks. Mutual insurers are more likely to insure clearly identifiable 
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and anticipated risks.199 Also, mutual insurers (as policyholders) are inside the mutual pool so 
they acknowledge and can accurately recognise their risks better than conventional insurers 
who are outside the conventional pool.200 In Saudi Arabia for example, minimum capital 
requirements for insurers and re-insurers, as joint-stock companies (JSCs), are significant 
(see discussion at 3.2.1). Because of shareholders’ desire for profits and dividends in JSCs, 
the need for management is higher for conventional insurers than for mutual insurers.201 
Since insured members of mutual insurance are the owners, mutual insurance has a stronger 
relationship with its members than conventional insurance.202 In mutuals, policyholders can 
vote to elect and dismiss members of the Board of Directors and appoint the managers. These 
rights do not apply with conventional insurance.203 Hence, management is loyally devoted to 
policyholders in mutuals more than managers of conventional insurance are to 
shareholders.204 Moral hazard is thereby less likely to occur in mutual insurance as it involves 
self-interest with policyholders being the owners, unlike the case of conventional insurance. 
The main purpose of risk management in mutual insurance, in general, is to minimize risks; it 
is thus more effectively beneficial compared to conventional insurance.205  
Based on the mutuality principle (risk-sharing), when conventional insurance does not exist 
or is unavailable in the insurance market, mutual insurance proves to be the best solution for 
managing risks.206 For instance, in the 1970s, conventional insurance companies in California 
faced financial difficulties and losses with insuring legal malpractice policies so the insurers 
stopped offering these policies. At that time, lawyers and their clients wanted and needed 
insurance protection which led to creating a mutual insurance company. This company, still 
operating, is known as the Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Company (LMIC) where the 
policyholders are the owners.207 The LMIC is thus a strong example of insurance company 
groups (insurance pooling), discussed above, covering limited and particular types of risks 
only.  
A further point of difference relates to investment. Some mutual insurers manage and invest 
the fund in accordance with religious affinity although this would not be common in non-
Takaful companies. In contrast, conventional insurers manage and invest funds based on 
increasing the total returns and profits.208 Premiums paid to conventional insurers are fixed 
during the current insurance period while premiums for mutual insurance may be increased if 
existing premiums are insufficient to cover claims and losses.209 
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Based on the above discussion, mutual insurance and conventional insurance each has its own 
characteristics and unique features. The relative advantages and disadvantages identified in 
the academic literature are summarised as follows. 
First, it is said that insurance operating under joint-stock companies (JSCs) is supported by 
capital which enables conventional insurance to cover all risks and perform better than 
mutual insurance. The opposing view is that regardless of lack of capital, mutual insurance 
operates better than conventional insurance as it holds more reserves, surpluses, and profits 
than conventional insurance. The majority opinion is that mutual and conventional insurers 
provide equal protection. To operate under either mutual structures or conventional 
stockholding structures, the circumstances of each insurance company—such as the effect of 
local regulations, the types of risks, political environment, etc—must be taken into account. 
Thus, in the USA in the early part of the 19th century, some conventional insurance 
companies under JSCs mutualized to mutual structures, while in the mid-19th century some 
mutual insurance companies demutualized to conventional companies under JSCs.210   
It can be concluded that insurance is effective under mutual insurance to protect against 
particular, limited, and restricted types of risks but not with all risks, see the above example 
of the Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Company (LMIC). In order to cover all types of risks 
efficiently, insurance should operate under joint-stock companies (JSCs). The conclusions are 
important in assessing whether Takaful using mutual structures can provide effective 
coverage of risk for the community, see below at 5.3.3.  
The next section 5.3.3 compares mutual insurance with Takaful insurance, and section 5.4 
then compares the three forms of insurance (Takaful, mutual, conventional) with each other. 
5.3.3. Differences between Mutual (Co-operative) Insurance and Takaful Insurance 
Table 5.2 below summarises the differences between Takaful insurance and mutual (co-
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 Takaful [Insurance] Mutual [Co-operative] 
Insurance 
Contract  Hybrid structure with a combination of 
donation and agency or profit-sharing 
contracts. 
Risk-sharing contract between 




Premiums owned by policyholders. 
However, there is an operator seeking 
profit from insurance business. 
Premiums owned by 
policyholders. However, there is 
no other party demanding a share 
of the profit [No shareholders or 
dividends]. 
 Purpose for 
Establishing 
the Company 
[Non-profit insurance. But] the takaful 
operating company [is] establishe[d] to 
maximise profits for shareholders. 
Established to provide 
policyholders with low-cost 
insurance, [not-profit]. 
Control of the 
Company 
The Board of Directors is elected by 
shareholders, who own the operating 
company. However, participants own 
the takaful fund. Participants [in 
practice] do not have the right to 
change the management and Board of 
Directors. 
The Board of Directors is elected 
by policy-holders [members], 
who own the mutual company 
[and] have the right to change the 




[Underwriting fund has access to a loan 
from share income where the 
underwriting fund is in deficit.] Access 
to share capital by takaful operator. 
No access to share capital, but 
access to debt with possible use 
of subordinated debt.  
Investment Assets invested [in] Sharia-compliant 
instruments.  
 No restriction[s] apart from those 
imposed for prudential reasons. 
Management Takaful operator [and Board of 
Directors of Takaful company.] 
Management appointed by the 
policyholders [members]. 
Capital Takaful operator sets up capital for 
company [subject to rules and 
regulations]. 












Risk allocation differs between Takaful insurance and mutual insurance. The first difference 
is in relation to operational risk, as explained at 3.6. In Takaful, the company (operator) is 
responsible for operational risk as it manages and operates the Takaful company. There is 
also the requirement of separate policyholders underwriting and investment accounts, see 
discussion at 4.6.5. In mutuals, operational risk is borne by the policyholders and 
management212 as there are no shareholders.213 
In relation to underwriting risk (explained at 3.6), in both Takaful insurance and mutual 
insurance, policyholders share risks and so are responsible for the underwriting risk. 
However, if there is a deficit, there is an important difference between Takaful and mutual 
companies. In Takaful insurance as a joint-stock companies (JSC), the operator has to 
provide a qard hasan (interest-free loan) to the risk pool,214 but this is recouped out of 
subsequent premiums. So, ultimately policyholders, in both Takaful insurance and mutual 
insurance, will bear the costs of deficits in the underwriting fund. Note that under Saudi 
insurance regulations, all Takaful companies are required to have reserves against such 
contingencies (see discussion at 3.2.2), with provision for, what is in effect, a statutory qard 
facility.215 In mutual companies, this issue does not arise as there are no shareholders.216 But, 
as discussed above, policyholders effectively bear the risk of deficit through premium 
increases and calls or through the utilization of contingency funds set aside for these 
purposes.  
In respect of investment risk, investments of Takaful insurance premiums are always subject 
to Sharia rules and restrictions, discussed in chapter 4.4, while some investments (not all) of 
mutual insurers are not subject to any affinity or religious restrictions.217 Unlike mutuals, 
Takaful has shareholders who aim for profits so Takaful is more expensive to purchase than 
mutuals.218 
In relation to corporate governance, policyholders of mutuals have more rights than 
policyholders in Takaful. In mutuals, policyholders can vote to elect and dismiss members of 
the Board of Directors and appoint the managers.219 These rights do not apply to Takaful 
policyholders in practice as they do in theory.220 
In relation to capital, policyholders in mutuals are both the owners of the insurance fund and 
the capital provider. Policyholders in Takaful are also the owners of the Takaful fund but do 
not provide the capital which is provided by shareholders.221 
                                                             
212 Gönülal, above n 143, 26. 
213 Ibid 21, 27; Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 174, 53; Alsaati, above n 149, 119. 
214 Gönülal, above n 143, 27-30. 
215 Ernst & Young (EY), 'Global Takaful Insights 2013: Finding Growth Markets' (2013) EY, 12, 79. 
216 Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 174, 53; Gönülal, above n 143, 27. 
217 Gönülal, above n 143, 27. 
218 Tolefat and Asutay, above n 211, 45. 
219 Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 174, 56, 60; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 'Guiding 
Principles on Governance for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings' (2009) IFSB, art 22. 
220 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 219, arts 20, 22. 
221 Tolefat and Asutay, above n 211, 45. 
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Unlike Takaful, payments in mutuals are similar to conventional insurance contracts which 
are not based on a tabarru basis. This may expose mutuals to a breach of the three Sharia 
prohibited elements,222 see 4.4. A Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) provides a further point of 
difference between Takaful and mutuals; Takaful insurers are required to set up an SSB, 
discussed in chapter 4.6.6, while no such requirement applies to mutual insurers.223  
The concern here is whether Takaful insurance can learn and benefit from mutual (co-
operative) insurance. The aim of mutual insurance is to provide, not for profit, insurance 
protection at lower cost (low premiums) than conventional insurance. This is because the 
policyholder in mutuals is both the insured and insurer. Moral hazard is reduced in mutuals 
because the policyholders are the insurer who compensates for the risk occurrence. In 
mutuals, there are no additional costs of shareholders entitled to dividends or rights on 
liquidation or share surpluses or profits with the policyholders. So, gharar (uncertainty), 
discussed in 4.4.2, in mutuals is minor (not severe) and is consistent with Takaful rules. Thus, 
the characteristics of mutuals resemble Takaful and reflect some of the basic fundamentals 
for Takaful.224 
As noted earlier at 5.3.2, insurance cannot operate optimally under mutual structures due to 
the inability to cover all types of risks. Since Takaful insurance is similar to mutual 
insurance, this can negatively affect Takaful insurance by eliminating one Sharia alternative 
that operates under mutual structures while maintaining stability, sustainability, and 
competitiveness.  
5.4. Main Differences between Conventional, Mutual (Co-operative), and Takaful 
Insurance 
Table 5.3 below summarises the differences between conventional insurance, mutual 









                                                             
222 Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 174, 152. 
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224 Alsaati, above n 149, 118-9; Masud, above n 148, 1152; Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 174, 
151-2; Khorshid, above n 163, 97, 169. 















Risk is transferred 
from the insured to 
the insurer 
Mutual risk sharing 
amongst members 
[participants] 
Mutual risk sharing 
amongst participants 
Governing law Secular law and 
regulation[s] 
Secular law and 
regulation[s] 
Secular law and 
regulation[s] and 
Islamic law 
Ownership Shareholders of 
insurance company 
Members 
[participants of the 
mutual] 
Participants of 
Takaful own their 
underwriting and 
investment funds 
(PUF and PIF) while 
shareholders own 
their fund (operator’s 
fund)226 












based on principles 
of tabarru (donor). 
So is the hybrid 
model.227 
Investment No restrictions on 
equity/debt 
investments  
No restrictions on 
equity/debt 
investments 
All investments must 
be in accordance 
with Sharia 
principles excludes 
all debt and some 
equity investments  





The members of the 
mutual are 
collectively 
responsible for the 
payment of claims 
The participants are 
collectively 
responsible for the 
payment of claims 
and may be asked to 
                                                             
226 Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 174, 14-5, 58; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 
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claims payments and may be asked to 
contribute in the 
event of shortfall 
contribute in the 
event of shortfall if 
the Takaful operator 
does not provide 
qard hasan (interest 
free loan). This is in 
theory.228 In practice, 
however, the Takaful 
operator is required 
to provide a qard 
hasan (interest free 












subject to surplus 
sharing mechanism 
in Saudi Arabia.] 
 
5.5. Summary 
This chapter discussed conventional (commercial) insurance, mutual (co-operative) 
insurance, and Takaful insurance and then illustrated the main differences between them. 
These differences are important because they highlight the essential character of Takaful 
insurance. The underpinning general insurance principles apply to both conventional 
insurance and Takaful insurance. These include utmost good faith, insurable interest, 
indemnity, subrogation, contribution, and proximate cause. In Saudi Arabia, insurance 
regulations require Takaful insurance companies to follow internationally recognised 
practices including the general conventional insurance principles.231  
The chapter is important because it is clear that many of the principles applying to Takaful 
insurance can also be found in mutual insurance. Takaful insurance companies, with some 
additional requirements, could establish their Takaful insurance based on the fundamental 
structure of mutual insurance. A mutual insurance company can convert to a joint-stock 
company (JSC), through the process of demutualization. Chapter 6 goes a step further and 
examines whether it would be best for Takaful insurance companies in Saudi Arabia to 
remain as JSCs or to be restructured as mutual companies in order to be modernised and 
Sharia-compliant at the same time. 
                                                             
228 Eisenberg, above n 158, 281-2. 
229 Ibid; Kwon, above n 83, 64, 68; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 226, arts 50-51. 
230 In relation to the surplus rules applying in Saudi Arabia, see Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies, above n 112, art 15; Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies, above n 64, art 70 (2.g); Surplus Distribution Policy 2015 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA)), art 1. 
231 See chapter 3.3 for Saudi insurance cases dealing with the application of these principles. 
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The chapter highlighted the topic of insurance company groups, which operate as mutual 
insurance. It raised a key issue related to re-Takaful (Islamic re-insurance), whether Takaful 
insurers can deal with conventional re-insurance companies instead of re-Takaful companies. 
This is important because of the consideration that insurance companies working together as 
a group in a respective jurisdiction could provide Sharia mutual re-insurance to members of 
the group, and thus temporarily resolve this issue in that particular jurisdiction by protecting 
against limited risks only, and not all types of risks. 
The following chapter 6 examines re-Takaful and conventional re-insurance in detail. One of 
the obstacles encountered by Takaful insurance companies relates to compliance with Sharia 
investment restrictions. For examples, a Takaful insurance company might deal with 
international conventional insurers whose investments are not restricted to Sharia. This may 
commingle the Takaful participants’ investment fund (PIF) with non-Sharia investments of 
international conventional insurers which then falls under the risk of Sharia non-compliance, 
as discussed in chapter 3.6. In Saudi Arabia, there are some Takaful insurers that deal with 
outside insurers and re-insurers, noted above, and chapter 7 examines that case further.  
The next chapter examines re-Takaful (Islamic re-insurance). It shows how Al-Zarqaa’s 





Conventional (Commercial) Re-insurance and Re-Takaful (Islamic Re-insurance) 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a basic overview of conventional (commercial) re-insurance and re-
Takaful (Islamic re-insurance) to highlight the key principles of re-insurance and re-Takaful 
as they directly relate to answering the central research question of whether Saudi Takaful 
insurers are Sharia-compliant. It is not intended, however, to provide a comprehensive 
examination of re-insurance and re-Takaful. 
It is first important to define “re-Takaful” which is derived from the term “Takaful” to 
provide protection for Takaful operators. This is more fully elaborated below at 6.3.1. Re-
Takaful is a traditional Sharia alternative to conventional re-insurance which is accepted by 
the majority of Islamic jurists. As explained in chapter 4.5, the Takaful insurance pool is 
separated into the Takaful participants’ funds—participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) and 
participants’ investment fund (PIF)—and the Takaful operator’s fund. This chapter examines 
how in re-Takaful, the Takaful participants’ funds, particularly the participants’ underwriting 
fund (PUF) must be Islamically re-insured (re-Takafuled). Similar to Takaful insurance, the 
re-Takaful pool is, in theory, separated into the re-Takaful participants’ funds—re-Takaful 
underwriting fund (RUF) and re-Takaful investment fund (RIF)—and the re-Takaful 
operator’s fund (see Table 6.5). 
Re-Takaful is an inseparable part of Takaful insurance activities because without it a Takaful 
insurer is unable to spread risk and ensure the stability and sustainability of Takaful insurance 
activities, as explained below at 6.3. The issue in Saudi Arabia is especially important as 
large catastrophic risks would, as a matter of prudent management, need to be spread through 
reinsurance.1 One of the issues addressed in the latter part of this chapter is whether the Saudi 
insurance and re-insurance market is capable of providing insurance for potentially 
catastrophic risks while simultaneously strictly complying with Takaful principles.2 If the 
answer is “no” (see discussion at 6.4.1), by default this automatically and negatively affects 
the Saudi re-insurance market. 
In this chapter, a critical analysis of the current re-Takaful structure, applied by Islamic 
countries in general and Saudi regulations in particular, is examined. The chapter examines 
how re-Takaful principles are practiced by Takaful insurance companies in Saudi Arabia. It 
examines the argument that, similarly to Takaful joint-stock companies (JSCs), in order to 
comply with re-Takaful principles, there are serious problems as re-Takaful operates through 
JSCs. In Saudi Arabia, all re-insurance companies (re-insurers) are required under Saudi 
insurance/re-insurance regulations to be structured under JSCs. This chapter questions 
                                                             
1 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 2004 (Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia by Ministerial Order No. 1/596), art 69 (f). This art requires a technical allocation for catastrophes.  
2  Note the requirements of seeking SAMA’s approval to obtain re-insurance outside Saudi Arabia, see 
discussed below at 6.8.  
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whether Saudi re-insurance companies and re-insurance regulations are in compliance with 
re-Takaful principles.  
As with conventional re-insurance, operating re-Takaful under joint-stock companies (JSCs) 
is regarded as essential for the re-Takaful industry in order to provide stability, sustainability, 
and competitiveness, see 6.3. As applying re-Takaful under JSCs is practically difficult, this 
chapter examines alternative solutions based on Sharia. It is suggested that a Sharia 
alternative to re-Takaful may be to operate re-Takaful under mutual structures, where there 
are no shareholders. Mutual structures, according to some views, are not as powerful and 
reliable as JSCs; this is because insurance/re-insurance mutual structures are not capitalized, 
see full discussion in chapter 5.3.2. These difficulties in operating re-Takaful under JSCs, 
mutual re-insurers, and conventional re-insurance structures may be avoided by adopting Al-
Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach. This thesis argues, based on Al-Zarqaa’s insurance 
approach discussed in chapter 4.4.4, that a modified form of conventional re-insurance should 
be regarded as Sharia-compliant and as an alternative to re-Takaful (operating under JSCs), 
mutual re-Takaful (operating under mutual structures), and conventional re-insurance 
(operating under JSCs). Al-Zarqaa’s view permits re-Takaful to be operated under JSCs 
similar to conventional re-insurance with the qualification of excluding any Sharia prohibited 
investment activities.   
It is important to note this chapter does not consider conventional (commercial) retrocession 
which is insurance for re-insurance (a re-insurer cedes some parts of the risk to another 
insurance party)3 nor does it consider retro-Takaful which is a Sharia alternative to 
conventional retrocession.4 
As noted in chapter 5.2.2, one of the earliest known conventional insurance contracts was 
issued in Italy in 1347.5 Following this, one of the first known conventional re-insurance 
contracts was written in 1370.6 Re-insurance started with direct insurers becoming re-insurers 
by jointly sharing particular risks now known as pooling. Each insurer would be responsible 
for bearing a loss based on its share and percentage.7 As described in 5.2.2, in the late 17th 
century, business traders met at Lloyd’s coffeehouse in London to write insurance and re-
                                                             
3 Colin Edelman and Andrew Burns, The Law of Reinsurance (Oxford University Press, 2 ed, 2013) 7; Andreas 
Schwepcke, Reinsurance: Principles and State of the Art - A Guidebook for Home Learners (Verlag 
Versicherungswirtsch, 2 ed, 2004) 13; International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 'Insurance 
Core Principles' (2015) IAIS, [13.0.3]; Christoph Weber, Insurance Linked Securities: The Role of the Banks 
(Gabler Verlag, 1 ed, 2011) 55; National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), Reinsurance (2018) 
NAIC <https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_reinsurance.htm>; Stefan Pohl and Joseph Iranya, The ABC of 
Reinsurance (VVW-Verlag Versicherungs, 2018) 142; Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel-Karim and Volker 
Nienhaus, Takaful Islamic Insurance: Concepts and Regulatory Issues (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) 167.  
4 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 'Guiding Principles for Retakaful (Islamic Reinsurance)' (2016) 
IFSB, art 4 (i); Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 3, 162. 
5 William Searle Holdsworth, 'The Early History of the Contract of Insurance' (1917) 17(2) Columbia Law 
Review Association, Inc 85, 88. 
6 Schwepcke, above n 3, 1; Paseo De Recoletos, An Introduction to Reinsurance (Fundación Mapfre's (Mapfre 
Foundation) Institute of Insurance Sciences, 2013) 3. A sea cargo from Spain to Flanders was insured. The 
insurer could not take on all the risk, so it transferred parts of the risk to another insurer. This process is now 
known as re-insurance. 
7 Schwepcke, above n 3, 2; Recoletos, above n 6, 4. 
135 
 
insurance contracts.8 In 1609, the first re-insurance regulation was issued in the Low 
Countries.9 By the early 18th century, re-insurance had spread across Europe and to 
England.10  
The next section commences with a brief overview of conventional re-insurance.  
6.2. Conventional (Commercial) Re-insurance 
6.2.1. Definition and Functions of Re-insurance 
Re-insurance is an essential part of the operation of insurers. Its purpose is to allow the 
insurer to spread its risks particularly in relation to catastrophic events by taking out 
insurance against those risks.11 
Re-insurance has been defined as ‘insurance for insurers’.12 It is: 
an agreement between an insurer (cedent) and a reinsurer: the reinsurer agrees to indemnify 
the cedent against all or part of a loss which the ceding company may incur under certain 
policies of insurance that it has issued. In turn, the cedent pays a consideration, typically a 
premium, and discloses information needed to assess, price and manage the risks covered by 
the reinsurance contract.13 
Re-insurance does not, in law, transfer the risk to the re-insurer in the same way as novated 
contracts although that may be its practical effect.14 This is important to the issue of risk 
transfer in Islamic insurance (Takaful), see chapter 4. 
Similar to the risk facing an insured who seeks insurance, re-insurance is concerned with 
risks facing the insurer who wishes to be re-insured, known as the ceding insurer.15 Ceding 
insurance companies are exposed to risks such as sudden catastrophic events, or unexpected 
levels and costs of claims; re-insurance helps to spread those risks.16 With catastrophic risks 
such as hurricanes and earthquakes, insurance-linked securities, known as catastrophe bonds, 
                                                             
8 Schwepcke, above n 3, 2. 
9 The Low Countries are Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. See Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance (John Wiley & Sons, 10 ed, 
2007) 155. 
12 Patrizia Baur and Antoinette Breutel-O'Donoghue, 'Understanding Reinsurance: How Reinsurers Create 
Value and Manage Risk' (2004) Swiss Reinsurance Company: Economic Research & Consulting, 4. 
13 Ibid. 
14 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), above n 3, [13.0.13]. A novated contract has been 
defined as: 
[A] legal term used usually to describe the act of replacing a party to a contract with a new party. A 
contract that is transferred by the novation process transfers all rights and obligations from the original 
party to the new party. Agreement between all parties concerned is necessary in order to [a]ffect a 
novation. 
See Liberty International Underwriters, Novated Contracts and their Insurance Implications (2015) 
<http://assets.liuasiapacific.com/?LinkServID=46293DC9-5056-A25B-C6E0ECE0DC0D63EF>. 
15 Schwepcke, above n 3, 7; Weber, above n 3, 55. 




are a protection mechanism using marketplace bonds,17 see 5.2.3. This chapter does not 
discuss those types of risk protection arrangements. Re-insurance is the standard mechanism 
for spreading risks.18 When the ceding insurer takes on a risk larger than its capacity to cover 
that risk, it spreads the risk to a re-insurer who bears a portion of the risk. This gives the 
ceding insurer the capacity to take on more business and more risk.19 Without this capacity to 
share risk, ceding insurers may be reluctant to develop new lines or products in the insurance 
business or may exclude certain types of risk from its coverage.20 
Although the ceding insurer can spread risks to the re-insurer, the ceding insurer is the one 
responsible for compensating the original insured even if the re-insurer breaches the re-
insurance contract. This is because the original insured deals directly with his/her ceding 
insurer as the insured has no relationship with the re-insurer.21 An exception to this is a claim 
in insolvency if the ceding insurer becomes insolvent; the standard practice here is that the 
original insured can seek payment from the re-insurer.22 In Saudi Arabia, if the ceding insurer 
becomes insolvent, the success of a direct claim from the original policyholder to the re-
insurer is dependent upon the provisions of the insurance and re-insurance policies.23 
To ensure the financial stability of ceding insurance companies, reliable and appropriate re-
insurance is an important part of insurance operations. Under the internal control system and 
risk management, the ceding insurance company would, as a matter of ordinary prudence, 
seek an appropriate re-insurer to re-insure at least some of its risks.24 Re-insurance is 
considered as one of the capital requirements for ceding insurance companies.25 Inadequate 
protection against risk taken by a ceding insurer may lead to additional capital requirements. 
For adequate risk management, the ceding insurer is required to choose a well-known and 
highly rated re-insurer. Dealing with a poor and less qualified re-insurer can be considered 
poor risk management where additional capital might be imposed by the local regulator26 (see 
discussion of risk management and capital solvency requirements in chapter 3.4). The Board 
of Directors and senior management of the ceding insurer are responsible for applying the re-
                                                             
17 Weber, above n 3, 95-132. Since insurance-linked securities (catastrophic bonds) have a different direction 
from this thesis, the thesis is not going to discuss them.  
18 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), above n 3, [13.0.15]; National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), above n 3; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 10. 
19 Weber, above n 3, 55; Aamer Al-Attoom, '  Does Takaful Insurance] ؟يراجتلا نیمأتلا نع يلفاكتلا نیمأتلا فلتخی لھ
Differ from Conventional Insurance?]' (2013)(2) Magazine for Finance and Banking Studies under the Arab 
Academy for Banking and Financial Sciences 6, 8; Rodolfo Wehrhahn, 'Introduction to Reinsurance' (2009)(2) 
The World Bank: Primer Series on Insurance, 2-3. 
20 Schwepcke, above n 3, 26-7; International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), above n 3, [13.0.16].  
21 Al-Attoom, above n 19, 8; Schwepcke, above n 3, 7; International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS), above n 3, [13.5.2]. 
22 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 19. 
23 Wissam Hachem et al, 'Insurance and Reinsurance in Saudi Arabia: Overview' (2018) Practical Law Country 
Q&A, [26]; Clyde & Co (C&C), 'Insurance and Reinsurance in Saudi Arabia: Overview' (2015) (C&C), [26]. 
Saudi insurance regulations have not referred to this issue, and no precedent legal cases have been directly filed 
against a re-insurer where a ceding insurer has been insolvent (up to 2015 when the study took place). 
24 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 17; International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), above n 3, [13.0.8], 
[13.0.9], [13.1.1]. 
25 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), above n 3, [13.0.12], [13.1.1], [13.1.9]; National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), above n 3.  
26 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 16. 
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insurance risk management strategy and ensuring compliance with the regulations.27 Under a 
re-insurance contract, the two parties (ceding insurer and re-insurer) should consider the 
jurisdiction and applicable law if a dispute arises among them.28 In Saudi Arabia, insurance 
regulations require ceding insurers to have re-insurance as a part of the capital requirements29 
and to deal with recognised re-insurers.30 Appropriate protection against risk is also 
mandatory for ceding insurers. Inadequate risk management exposes ceding insurers to legal 
penalties. See full discussion of the Risk Management Regulation (RMR) and the Regulation 
of Reinsurance Activities (RRA) in chapter 3.2. 
6.2.2. Types of Re-insurance Agreements  
There are three types of re-insurance treaties: facultative, automatic, and facultative-
obligatory. The first two treaties (facultative and automatic) are common while the third 
treaty (facultative-obligatory) is not.31 Summaries Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 are provided 
below. 
The first re-insurance type is a facultative treaty in which the re-insurance transaction (risk) is 
dealt with on a case-by-case basis and not as a group.32 The ceding insurance company 
(ceding/direct insurer or cedent) accepts the risk (an insurance policy) and transfers part of 
the risk to the re-insurer. The ceding insurance company has the right either to transfer or not 
to transfer the risk to the re-insurer. Similarly, the re-insurer also has the right either to accept 
or reject re-insuring the transferred risk.33 The re-insurance policy commences (takes effect) 
as soon as the re-insurer accepts the risk.34  
A facultative treaty is problematic for the ceding insurance company (ceding/direct insurer). 
This is because the ceding insurer bears the entire risk as soon as the insurance policy is 
accepted until a re-insurer is found who agrees to re-insure and bear some of the risk.35 To 
resolve this problem, a second type of re-insurance treaty (automatic or obligatory) has been 
created.36 
An automatic (also known as obligatory) treaty is the second type of re-insurance. Under an 
automatic treaty, the re-insurer is automatically obliged to accept any insurance policy (risk) 
                                                             
27 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), above n 3, [13.1.3], [13.1.4], [13.1.6]. 
28 Ibid [13.4]; Wehrhahn, above n 19, 19. Excise tax on re-insurance applies but differs from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. Exemptions may apply. For example, re-insurance contracts between the U.S.A. and the UK 
involve no excise tax. See Wehrhahn, above n 19, 19. 
29 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 1, art 40 (2, 3). 
This art requires insurers to re-insure at least 30 percent of premiums within Saudi Arabia unless SAMA’s 
approval is given. 
30 Regulation of Reinsurance Activities 2010 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)), art 16. 
31 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 6; Recoletos, above n 6, 29; Schwepcke, above n 3, 99; Weber, above n 3, 55; 
Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 13, 22; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 8. 
32 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 6-7; Recoletos, above n 6, 29; Schwepcke, above n 3, 99, 113; Weber, above n 3, 58; 
Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 13; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 8, 65. 
33 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 6; Schwepcke, above n 3, 97, 113; Recoletos, above n 6, 28; Weber, above n 3, 58; 
Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 13; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 8, 65. 
34 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 6; Schwepcke, above n 3, 99, 113. 
35 Recoletos, above n 6, 41; Weber, above n 3, 58; Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 14; Pohl and Iranya, above n 
3, 65.  
36 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 11, 155.  
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signed by the ceding insurer.37 The percentage portion borne by the re-insurer is based on the 
agreed terms and conditions between the two parties (ceding insurer and re-insurer). The 
ceding insurer is obligated to transfer the risks (insurance policies) to the re-insurer, and the 
re-insurer is obliged to accept any risk transferred to it based on their agreement contract.38 
This automatic treaty is problematic for the re-insurer as it is not possible to control or trace 
the risks (insurance policies) accepted by the ceding insurer.39     
A facultative-obligatory (also known as semi-obligatory) treaty is a third type of re-insurance. 
It combines some features from both the facultative and automatic treaties. Under this 
arrangement, the facultative treaty applies only to the ceding insurer (cedent) and the 
automatic treaty applies only to the re-insurer. It is optional for the ceding insurer to transfer 
risks (insurance policies) to the re-insurer (similar to the facultative treaty) while the re-
insurer’s acceptance to the transferred risks is obligatory and compulsory (similar to the 
automatic treaty). This means that the ceding insurer is given more rights and freedom than 
the re-insurer. This is because the ceding insurer has absolute freedom either to cede the risk 
to the re-insurer or to retain it, whereas the re-insurer does not enjoy the same equivalent 
right as it is compulsorily obligated to accept all ceded risks with no right to reject.40 There is 
also another type of re-insurance, known as an obligatory-facultative treaty, that is not very 
common. This treaty is the opposite of the facultative-obligatory treaty. The obligatory-
facultative treaty obligates the ceding insurer to cede all risks while it gives the re-insurer 
absolute freedom either to accept or reject the risk.41 
6.2.3. Risk-Sharing Arrangements under Re-insurance Agreements 
Of the types of re-insurance agreements or treaties discussed above, two risk-sharing 
arrangements are used by the ceding insurer and the re-insurer to spread risks.42 When the re-
insurance contract (facultative, automatic, or facultative-obligatory) has been accepted, the 
risk-sharing arrangements determine each party’s responsibility towards the occurrence of 
agreed losses (risks) and calculate the shared premiums and the exact payments of claims 
borne by both parties (ceding insurer and re-insurer). See the summaries Table 6.3 and Table 
6.4 provided below. The two risk-sharing arrangements are as follows. 
Proportional Re-insurance 
The first arrangement is proportional re-insurance in which the re-insurer is required to share 
in each occurrence of an insured loss based on an agreed percentage. Under this arrangement, 
the re-insurer shares claims payments and premiums receipts. A proportional re-insurance 
                                                             
37 Schwepcke, above n 3, 98, 113; Wehrhahn, above n 19, 6; Recoletos, above n 6, 41; Weber, above n 3, 56; 
Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 16-7. 
38 Schwepcke, above n 3, 98; Recoletos, above n 6, 41; Weber, above n 3, 56; Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 
16-7. 
39 Schwepcke, above n 3, 98-9; Weber, above n 3, 57. 
40 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 6; Schwepcke, above n 3, 97; Recoletos, above n 6, 50; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 
22-3; Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 22; Weber, above n 3, 58. 
41 Schwepcke, above n 3, 102; Weber, above n 3, 59. 
42 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 7; Recoletos, above n 6, 32, 57, 115; Schwepcke, above n 3, 100; Edelman and Burns, 
above n 3, 11; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 9. 
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arrangement can be either a quota share treaty or a surplus line treaty.43 An example of a 
proportional quota share treaty is an agreement that where for each risk that occurs, the 
ceding insurer and the re-insurer each bears 50 per cent of the loss in return for the re-
insurer’s receipt of 50 per cent of the insured’s premiums.44 
A proportional surplus line treaty is similar to the quota share treaty, but with the surplus line 
treaty, the ceding insurer retains a specific amount of risk (known as net retention or liability 
up to a threshold) and does not transfer (cede) that amount of risk to the re-insurer. If the loss 
exceeds the net retention agreed on, the ceding insurer bears the amount of loss up to the net 
retention (liability up to a threshold) while the re-insurer covers the remaining loss exceeding 
the net retention.45 An example of a surplus line treaty is when the parties agree to a $10,000 
net retention in the case of a loss. The ceding insurer pays on each claim up to $10,000. 
Losses exceeding that are paid by the re-insurer. If the loss is $50,000, the ceding insurer is 
only responsible for paying the net retention amount ($10,000), and the re-insurer covers the 
balance of the loss ($40,000).46 This example is illustrated in the following Table 6.1. 
Table 6.147 
$50,000 Loss Liability for Loss 
$0 – $10,000 Ceding insurer pays $10,000 
More than $10,000   Re-insurer pays $40,000 
 
Depending on the re-insurance agreement, the ceding insurer may be allowed to share profits 
in the re-insurance business from the re-insurer. The motivation here may be to encourage the 
ceding insurer to be selective when accepting insurance policies with definite risks.48  
Non-proportional Re-insurance 
The second arrangement is non-proportional re-insurance which can be either excess-of-loss 
or stop-loss. Under non-proportional excess-of-loss, the re-insurer is required to share the 
risks with the ceding insurer only if the insured loss reaches or exceeds an agreed 
percentage/amount (a net retention or liability up to a threshold), with a maximum liability 
limit (cover limit) set for the re-insurer.49 If the loss does not exceed the agreed amount (net 
                                                             
43 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 7, 9; Recoletos, above n 6, 32, 45-6, 58; Schwepcke, above n 3, 101, 113; Weber, 
above n 3, 59; Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 11; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 14. 
44 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 11, 155-6; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 14. 
45 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 8; Recoletos, above n 6, 46; Schwepcke, above n 3, 135-6; Weber, above n 3, 61-2; 
Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 17-8. 
46 Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 11, 156. 
47 The Table is made by the thesis researcher. 
48 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 7; Al-Attoom, above n 19, 9; Abdullateef Abdulraheem Janahi, 'Towards the Market 
of Islamic Re-insurance' (Paper presented at the Wethaq First Conference for Takaful Insurance [  لوألا قاثو رمتؤم
يلفاكتلا نیمأتلل ], Kuwait, 19-20 February 2006) 24 
<https://www.wethaq.com/app_themes/Wethaq/conferences/Conference1/conf1_subject_1_research_id_1_1_3.
pdf>. 
49 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 10; Recoletos, above n 6, 32, 115; Schwepcke, above n 3, 101, 137-8; Weber, above n 
3, 62-3; Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 11, 16, 19; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 27-8. 
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retention), there is no liability for the re-insurer;50 if it does, the re-insurer is bound to pay the 
amount exceeding that net retention but up to the agreed maximum cover limit.51 For 
example, if the re-insurer’s net retention (liability up to a threshold) is $20,000, the maximum 
cover limit is $100,000, and the loss is $130,000, the ceding insurer pays the first $20,000 
(net retention) and the re-insurer pays $100,000 (maximum liability limit). The remaining 
$10,000 loss will be paid by the ceding insurer.52 This example is illustrated in the following 
Table 6.2. 
Table 6.253 
$130,000 Loss Liability for Loss 
$0 – $20,000  Ceding insurer pays $20,000 
$20,001 – $120,000   Re-insurer pays $100,000 
More than $120,000 Ceding insurer pays balance ($10,000) 
 
Based on the above description, it seems that the surplus line (second arrangement of 
proportional re-insurance) and excess-of-loss (first arrangement of non-proportional re-
insurance) treaties are similar. They both require the ceding insurer to bear a net retention 
agreed amount with the re-insurer’s liability only above that amount. The only difference 
between them is the maximum liability limit (cover limit) set for the re-insurer under excess-
of-loss where no such cover limit applies to the re-insurer under surplus line. 
The second arrangement of non-proportional re-insurance is stop-loss which is similar to non-
proportional excess-of-loss. The only difference is that a stop-loss arrangement applies and 
protects the entire value of claims as a total amount during the year. Unlike excess-of-loss, 
stop-loss does not involve an agreement with the re-insurer to accept a specific proportion of 
premiums and claims in relation to each risk occurrence. Under a stop-loss arrangement, the 
re-insurer will compensate the ceding insurer if all the claims, as an aggregate, exceed a 
specific percentage agreed on while excess-of-loss applies to each individual claim or event 
separately.54  
The purchase of non-proportional re-insurance (excess-of-loss and stop-loss) is cheaper than 
that of proportional re-insurance (quota share and surplus line). This is because in 
proportional re-insurance, all risks and claims are shared between the re-insurance parties 
with no maximum liability limit (cover limit) although the ceding insurer, under surplus line, 
bears the costs of small risks below the agreed amount (net retention). In contrast, in relation 
to non-proportional insurance, small risks below an agreed amount (net retention) and large 
risks above the maximum limit are not covered.55 The effect is that re-insurers are exposed to 
                                                             
50 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 11; Schwepcke, above n 3, 138; Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 16. 
51 Weber, above n 3, 62; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 28; Emmett Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, above n 11, 
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52 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 10. 
53 The Table is made by the thesis researcher. 
54 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 11-2; Recoletos, above n 6, 49-50; Schwepcke, above n 3, 145-6; Weber, above n 3, 
64; Edelman and Burns, above n 3, 21; Pohl and Iranya, above n 3, 36. 
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more risks under proportional re-insurance as there is no maximum liability limit. This 
exposure to large risks explains why proportional re-insurance is more costly. 
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 are summaries of the types and arrangements of re-insurance.56 
Table 6.3 
[Types] of re-insurance 
(contractual relationship) 
Facultative re-insurance 
The [ceding] insurer has the option of ceding specific, usually large risks. 
The re-insurer can choose whether to accept or decline each cession. 
 
Obligatory [automatic] re-insurance 
Formal agreement whereby the [ceding] insurer undertakes to cede all risks 
matching a specific description. The re-insurer is obliged to accept all 
cessions offered by the [ceding] insurer under the treaty. 
 
Semi-obligatory [facultative-obligatory] re-insurance 
Combination of option to cede coupled with obligation to accept (fac./obl.) 















                                                             
56 These Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 are taken from Schwepcke, above n 3, 102. The original source has these 
Tables under one Table. However, this thesis separates the original Table to two Tables for a better illustration 




[Arrangements] of re-insurance 
[coverage of risk] 
Proportional re-insurance 
Baseline: (original)57 sum insured. 
 
Premium calculation: pro-rata (proportional) splitting of original premium. 
 
Main treaty types: quota share [&] surplus [line]. 
• Quota share: ceding insurer & re-insurer jointly share losses and 
receive premiums, based on the contractual percentage.58 
• Surplus line: ceding insurer retains liability up to specific amount 




Baseline: the loss amount forms the basis of arrangement.60 
 
Premium calculation: [un]related to original premium (non-proportional). 
 
Main treaty types: excess of loss [&] stop loss. 
• Excess-of-loss: ceding insurer liable up to a certain amount (net 
retention); re-insurer liable for losses exceeding net retention but 
with a maximum cover limit for re-insurer.61 
• Stop-loss: similar to excess-of-loss but excess-of-loss is calculated 
on a case by case basis whilst stop-loss is calculated on the entire 
pool of claims.62  
 
The types of re-insurance agreements and risk-sharing arrangements recognised by Saudi 
Takaful insurance regulations are discussed below at 6.8. These agreements and 
arrangements are contrasted with pooling arrangements. This is important as it is clear that 
pooling arrangements are consistent with Islamic principles (see discussion at 6.3.5). Whether 
other re-insurance arrangements are Sharia-compliant is discussed below at 6.5. 
The next section discusses pooling as a mechanism for re-insurance of risks. 
6.2.4. Pooling 
Pooling is one of the earliest forms of re-insurance. Similar to insurance company groups 
(insurance pooling) discussed in chapter 5.2.4, insurance companies can work together co-
operatively in a re-insurance pooling group to re-insure specific types of risks. The insurers 
                                                             
57 Ibid 101. 
58 Ibid 101, 117; Wehrhahn, above n 19, 7; Recoletos, above n 6, 32, 45-6, 58. 
59 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 8; Recoletos, above n 6, 46; Schwepcke, above n 3, 135-6. 
60 Weber, above n 3, 62. 
61 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 10; Recoletos, above n 6, 32-3, 115; Schwepcke, above n 3, 137-8. 
62 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 11-2; Recoletos, above n 6, 49; Schwepcke, above n 3, 145-6. 
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(members of the re-insurance pooling group) become the re-insurer. The responsibility of 
each insurer in the re-insurance pooling group is based on a proportional share arrangement. 
Each insurer is responsible for its own agreed share only and not jointly responsible.63 An 
insurance (or re-insurance) pool is defined as: 
[A] risk-sharing community in the legal form of a non-trading relationship. The members of 
the pool undertake to submit all risks falling under the terms of the pooling agreement into the 
pooling. In return, they participate according to a pre-defined distribution (quota share) in the 
entire volume of business brought into the pool.64 
This pooling has many similarities to mutual insurance where members/individuals co-
operatively combine to protect against risks, see chapter 5.2.4. A similar principle can apply 
to re-Takaful. Paragraph (6.3.5.) of this chapter discusses whether the pooling group can be 
used by ceding Takaful insurers as an alternative to re-Takaful and conventional re-insurers.   
The next section discusses and critically analyzes re-Takaful (Islamic re-insurance) in general 
and Saudi re-insurance companies and Saudi re-insurance regulations in particular. It 
demonstrates the problems of applying re-Takaful to joint-stock companies (JSCs). In the 
next section, it may appear that operating re-Takaful under mutual structures might resolve 
many issues facing re-Takaful but mutual structures, as chapter 5.3.2 has shown, might not 
provide a comprehensive alternative for all types of risks and are dependent on the size of re-
insurers. The section then discusses Al-Zarqaa’s modified approach as a Sharia re-insurance 
alternative to re-Takaful under JSCs, mutual re-Takaful, and conventional re-insurance.  
6.3. Re-Takaful (Islamic Re-insurance) 
The term “re-Takaful” is a word derived from the term “Takaful”. Just as conventional re-
insurance is insurance for insurers, re-Takaful (Islamic re-insurance) is Takaful for Takaful 
operators.65 
Re-Takaful is very recent in the Islamic financial world. Malaysia pioneered re-Takaful in 
1997 when it established Asean Retakaful International, which is a subsidiary of the first re-
Takaful operator in the world, Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad.66  
Similar to Takaful insurance discussed in chapter 4, re-Takaful is an Islamic or Sharia re-
insurance alternative to conventional (commercial) re-insurance.67 It has been assumed that 
this means all the Takaful insurance rules and principles similarly apply to re-Takaful.68 
Whether the same rules should in fact apply is critically discussed below at 6.5. The purpose 
                                                             
63 Wehrhahn, above n 19, 16; Recoletos, above n 6, 21; Schwepcke, above n 3, 15-6. 
64 Schwepcke, above n 3, 15. 
65 Serap O Gönülal, Takaful and Mutual Insurance: Alternative Approaches to Managing Risks (World Bank 
Publications, 2013) 175. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid 108; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 4; David M Eisenberg, Islamic Finance: 
Law and Practice (OUP Oxford, 2012) 291; Mohammed Burhan Arbouna, 'The Operation of Retakaful (Islamic 
Reinsurance) Protection' (2000) 15(4) Arab Law Quarterly 335, 341. 
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of re-Takaful, similar to the purpose of conventional re-insurance discussed above at 6.2.1, is 
to maintain the stability and sustainability of ceding Takaful operations and protect the 
interests of ceding Takaful policyholders.69 Re-Takaful enables ceding Takaful insurers to 
undertake and accept additional risks larger than their actual financial capacity. This reliance 
on re-Takaful helps the expansion of ceding Takaful insurance undertakings70 and provides a 
level of protection against very large claims.71 Re-Takaful operators can also act as technical 
advisors to the ceding Takaful insurer because of their more extensive experience across a 
range of industries and sectors.72 
Just as Takaful insurance is based on Islamic principles, so also re-Takaful provides for risk-
sharing and not risk transfer (see discussion at 6.3.2). Re-Takaful requires a Sharia 
Supervisory Board (SSB), discussed in chapter 4.6.6, to ensure that all activities of the re-
Takaful operator are Sharia-compliant.73 To comply with Sharia, ceding Takaful insurers are 
required to undertake re-Takaful protection, wherever possible, instead of conventional re-
insurance,74 as discussed further at 6.3.5. 
It is important for re-Takaful operators to have effective risk management plans. The Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) standards for effective risk management for Takaful 
insurance can similarly apply to re-Takaful operators.75 To avoid repetition, see full 
discussion of risk management for Takaful companies in chapter 3.6. 
While the participants in ceding Takaful insurance are either individuals, groups, business 
companies, or other organisations, re-Takaful participants (policyholders) are usually the 
Takaful companies (ceding Takaful insurers).76 Each ceding Takaful insurer is an agent 
representing its original policyholders and is considered one policyholder of the re-Takaful 
operation.77 Similar to the division of funds in Takaful, discussed in chapters 4.5, the re-
Takaful fund is divided into the re-Takaful operator’s fund (shareholders’ fund) and the re-
Takaful participants’ fund. The re-Takaful participants’ fund composes of i) the re-Takaful 
underwriting fund (RUF) and ii) re-Takaful investment fund (RIF),78 which are created by 
                                                             
69 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 'Guiding Principles on Governance for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) 
Undertakings' (2009) IFSB, art 91; Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), 
'Shari’a Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions' (2010) AAOFII, 739, 741, [3.2], [6.2]; Arbouna, above n 
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70 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 13; Gönülal, above n 65, 179; Arbouna, above n 67, 
338, 342. 
71 Gönülal, above n 65, 179; Arbouna, above n 67, 337. 
72 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, arts 14, 28 (iii). 
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75 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, arts 88, 90, 112.  
76 Ibid arts 4 (i), 28 (i). Retro-Takaful can also be as re-Takaful participants. Retro-Takaful and retrocession are 
excluded from this thesis; Eisenberg, above n 67, 290-1; Arbouna, above n 67, 337. 
77 Eisenberg, above n 67, 291 n 48. 
78 Ibid 291; Gönülal, above n 65, 182-3. 
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ceding Takaful insurers (see Table 6.5).79 Each ceding Takaful insurer uses the contributions 
of its participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) to fund the re-Takaful funds (RUF and RIF).80 In 
order to create the RUF, these ceding Takaful insurers mutually and co-operatively 





















                                                             
79 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 4 (i, ii); Accounting and Auditing Organisation For 
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80 Eisenberg, above n 67, 291; Gönülal, above n 65, 182-3. 
81 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 4 (i, ii); Accounting and Auditing Organisation For 
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Investment Fund (RIF) 
Re-Takaful Participants’ 




If the same principles apply to re-Takaful as apply to Takaful, the operation and function of 
the funds in ceding Takaful, discussed in chapter 4, will similarly apply to re-Takaful funds. 
Contributions (premiums) are paid to the re-Takaful underwriting fund (RUF) and are 
invested by the re-Takaful operator in the re-Takaful investment fund (RIF).83 The role of the 
re-Takaful operator is to invest the RIF and manage the RUF, where payments are paid out 
of, to protect the ceding Takaful insurers (re-Takaful participants) from specified risks and 
losses.84 The re-Takaful operator is also responsible for managing the re-Takaful company 
and the interests of the shareholders of the re-Takaful company.85 This may be assumed to 
apply to a single re-Takaful operator if the risks are related to normal circumstances. But with 
very large risks, discussed further below at 6.3.5, the distribution of risks from one ceding 
Takaful insurer to multiple re-Takaful operators can be expected. 
In return for management of the re-Takaful participants’ funds (RUF and RIF), the re-Takaful 
operator is remunerated on the basis of the re-Takaful models:86 a wakalah/agency fee (under 
the wakalah model) from the re-Takaful underwriting fund (RUF), a share in the investment 
profits from the re-Takaful investment fund (RIF) and not from surpluses in the RUF with the 
ceding Takaful insurer (under the mudharabah/profit-sharing model), or a combination of 
both a wakalah fee and a share in the investment profits (under the hybrid model).87 Yet 
under Saudi Arabian re-insurance regulations, there is no reference to these re-Takaful 
models, as discussed in the critical analysis below at 6.8.  
The re-Takaful operator is not responsible for any deficit arising out of the re-Takaful funds 
(RUF or RIF) unless the deficit results from its negligence or misconduct.88 The re-Takaful 
operator (effectively its shareholders) is, however, responsible and required to provide the 
RUF (re-Takaful underwriting fund) with a qard hasan (interest-free loan) if the operating 
fund is in deficit.89 This may be set up as a reserve fund and constitute part of the capital of 
the re-Takaful corporation. Such a qard hasan will be repaid to the re-Takaful shareholders 
(or the reserve fund) from future surpluses and profits from the re-Takaful participants’ 
funds.90 In relation to the re-Takaful structure, a critical analysis of the qard hasan 
mechanism is discussed further below at 6.5. In Saudi Arabia, a statutory legal reserve 
operates as a qard hasan is also critically analysed below at 6.8. 
The role of the re-Takaful operator, noted above, can raise agency problems in relation to 
properly managing the conflicting interests between policyholders (ceding Takaful 
companies) and the re-Takaful shareholders. This issue requires the re-Takaful operator to set 
up good corporate governance mechanisms in its management plans.91 This issue is similar to 
                                                             
83 Eisenberg, above n 67, 291; Gönülal, above n 65, 182-3. 
84 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 4 (i, ii); Eisenberg, above n 67, 291. 
85 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, arts 5, 35. 
86 Ibid art 35. 
87 Ibid arts 17, 35, n 10-11; Gönülal, above n 65, 183. 
88 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 35. 
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91 Ibid arts 36, 41. 
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the agency problems arising in Takaful corporations discussed in 4.6.7. A critical analysis of 
the agency problems in re-Takaful is examined below at 6.5. 
Re-Takaful participants (all ceding Takaful companies) pay contributions (premiums) to the 
RUF. Similar to the Takaful principle of tabarru (charity/donation), these contributions 
(premiums) in re-Takaful are paid as tabarru in order to avoid the three prohibited elements 
in Islamic contracts law: riba (interest/usury or money for money), gharar (uncertainty), and 
maysir (gambling),92 (see full discussion of tabarru in 4.6.1). To permit re-Takaful contracts 
under Sharia, similar principles should apply. Again, a critical argument discussing 
substantial differences in the nature of Takaful and re-Takaful is analysed below at 6.5. 
In Saudi Arabia in 2016, at least four ceding Takaful companies were licensed to provide re-
Takaful products but only one has so far provided re-Takaful.93 The Saudi Re for Cooperative 
Reinsurance Company is the only re-Takaful company, and its business is exclusively re-
Takaful,94 (see Table 3.1 in chapter 3.1). There are three Takaful companies providing re-
Takaful products along with their usual Takaful services. These companies are the 
Mediterranean and Gulf Cooperative Insurance and Reinsurance Company (MEDGULF),95 
the Malath Cooperative Insurance & Reinsurance Company,96 and the Arabia Insurance 
Cooperative Company (AICC).97 In providing re-Takaful, these three companies are 
associated with international conventional re-insurance companies that offer re-Takaful 
services such as Munich Re, Swiss Re, and Hannover Re,98 which are critically examined at 
6.5.   
Saudi insurance and re-insurance regulations require all re-Takaful companies to operate 
through JSCs,99 as noted in chapter 3.1. Saudi re-insurance regulations and types of re-
Takaful and re-Takaful risk-sharing arrangements recognised by Saudi insurers/re-insurers 
are discussed below at 6.8.  
 
 
                                                             
92 Ibid art 4 (i, ii); Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), above n 69, 739, 
[2.1]. 
93 Aljazira Capital, Insurance Sector Report (2016), 3 <http://www.aljaziracapital.com.sa/report_file/ess/SEC-
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Cooperative Insurance & Reinsurance Company, above n 96; Arabia Insurance Cooperative Company (AICC), 
above n 97. 
99 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 2003 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree 
M/32), art 3 (1); Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 
1, art 1 (13). 
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6.3.1. Definition of Re-Takaful  
There is no formal definition of re-Takaful in the Saudi legislation. Instead, Saudi insurance 
regulations recognise and define re-insurance,100 see 6.8. In comparison, the Malaysia 
Takaful Act 1984 recognises re-Takaful and defines it as: 
[A]n arrangement consistent with sound takaful principles for re-takaful of liabilities in 
respect of risks incurred or to be incurred by the takaful operator in the course of his carrying 
on takaful business.101 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) refers 
to re-Takaful as:  
[T]he agreement among insurance companies, on behalf of the insurance funds under their 
management, to devise a mechanism for avoidance of part of the risks which the insurance 
funds may encounter. On the basis of such agreement a reinsurance fund which has a distinct 
legal personality and independent financial liability is formed [sic] through making 
contributions out of the insurance funds paid by the insurance clients on the basis of donation. 
The reinsurance fund, thus formed, assumes the task of covering part of the risks encountered 
by the insurance funds.102   
6.3.2. Re-Takaful and Conventional Re-insurance Contrasted 
While there is a claim that re-Takaful (Islamic re-insurance) in general and conventional 
(commercial) re-insurance are indistinguishable, many Islamic scholars refute the claim.103 
Conventional re-insurance is a profit-oriented business exchange contract between the ceding 
insurer and the re-insurer. In contrast, re-Takaful is intended to be a non-profit agreement 
based on the principle of tabarru (charity/donation) and not a business exchange contract.104 
This thesis argues below that the structure of JSCs involving the need to pay dividends to 
shareholders makes the principle of non-profit an issue difficult to apply in a modern 
financial system. 
Other key differences are that under re-Takaful, risks are shared among the ceding Takaful 
insurers and the re-Takaful operator based on the principle of mutual co-operation (risk-
sharing and not risk transfer).105 Under conventional re-insurance, risks are transferred.106 
The principle of mutual co-operation is also important because conventional re-insurance 
functions either to re-insure the original subject matter insured under the insurance policy or 
to re-insure the ceding insurer’s liabilities towards the insured persons based on risk transfer. 
                                                             
100 Saudi insurance regulations define re-insurance as: 
Transfer of the insured's risk from the insurer to the reinsurer and to indemnify the insurer by the 
reinsurer for any payments made to the insured against damages or loss. 
See Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 1, art 1 (8). 
101 Takaful Act 1984 (Malaysia), art 2. 
102 Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), above n 69, 739, [2.1]. 
103 Gönülal, above n 65, 179-80. 
104 Al-Attoom, above n 19, 9; Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), above 
n 69, 739, [2.2]; 
105 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 120 (i). 
106 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), above n 3, [13.0.15]. 
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Based on the principle of mutual co-operation, re-insuring the ceding insurer’s liabilities 
towards the insured does not apply to re-Takaful as this involves risk transfer (i.e. transferring 
liabilities from the ceding insurer to the re-insurer).107  
Unlike re-Takaful, conventional re-insurance does not have to comply with Islamic principles 
and may involve investments prohibited in Sharia.108 The re-Takaful fund is separated, 
whereas no funds separation is required for conventional re-insurance.109 In conventional re-
insurance, the ceding insurance company itself contracts with the re-insurer while in re-
Takaful the ceding Takaful company is, in theory, only an agent representing the original 
policyholders’ interests.110 Based on the principle of surplus distribution, discussed in 4.6.3, 
surpluses in the re-Takaful underwriting fund (RUF) and profits in the re-Takaful investment 
fund (RIF) belong to the re-Takaful participants’ funds, and eventually to the ceding Takaful 
policyholders’ funds, and not to the re-Takaful operator’s fund (re-Takaful shareholders’ 
fund).111 In contrast, a conventional re-insurance corporation holds one pool of funds, noted 
earlier, with surpluses and profits available for dividends to shareholders. The insureds have 
no rights to any surpluses or profits.112   
One issue is whether the Takaful participants’ funds (PUF and PIF) or the Takaful operator’s 
fund is re-Takafuled (Islamically re-insured). As discussed in chapter 4.5, the Takaful pool is 
divided into the Takaful participants’ funds (PUF and PIF) and the Takaful operator’s fund. 
The PUF, not the Takaful operator’s fund, is the account into which premiums are deposited 
and from which claims are paid out.113 It can be argued that the risk represented in the PUF is 
re-Takafuled (Islamically re-insured) regardless of the types and risk-sharing arrangements of 
re-Takaful.114 As noted earlier, this does not apply to conventional insurance because as there 
is no regulatory requirement to segregate accounts.115 This is distinct from how standard 
accounting practice operates in dealing with shareholders’ funds and accounts as distinct from 
operational accounts. In relation to re-Takaful funds, the issue continues to be important for 
payment of surpluses and profits as dividends under the Takaful principle of surpluses. In this 
regard, Saudi re-insurance regulations are examined below at 6.8. 
                                                             
107 Eisenberg, above n 67, 290. 
108 Al-Attoom, above n 19, 9; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 'Guidance Note on the Recognition of 
Ratings by External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIS) on Takaful and Retakaful' (2011) IFSB, art 65. 
109 Gönülal, above n 65, 180. 
110 Al-Attoom, above n 19, 9; Archer, Abdel-Karim and Nienhaus, above n 3, 158-60. 
111 Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), above n 69, 742, [9]; Arbouna, 
above n 67, 341-2; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, arts 85 (ii), 99. 
112 Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), above n 69, 742, [9]; Eisenberg, 
above n 67, 290. 
113 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, arts 4 (i), 56, n 16. Under re-Takaful contracts, 
contributions (premiums) are first deposited at the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) in ceding Takaful 
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Takaful operator heavily relies upon retro-Takaful. Since retro-Takaful is excluded, the thesis will not further 
pursue this point. See Gönülal, above n 65, 182. 
114 Eisenberg, above n 67, 290-1; Gönülal, above n 65, 108-9. 
115 Gönülal, above n 65, 108-9. 
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The above discussion is based on the majority opinion of Islamic jurists in relation to re-
Takaful. However, a later discussion at 6.6 suggests a Sharia alternative to re-Takaful under 
JSCs, mutual re-Takaful, and conventional re-insurance. 
6.3.3. Types of Re-Takaful    
Similar to conventional re-insurance, re-Takaful consists of two types of contracts: facultative 
(also known as selective) re-Takaful and automatic (also known as treaty, comprehensive, or 
obligatory) re-Takaful.116 The third type of conventional re-insurance, the facultative-
obligatory treaty, may not be permissible under re-Takaful,117 as discussed below at 6.3.4. 
Summaries are set out in Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 below. 
Under facultative re-Takaful (the first type of re-Takaful contracts), the ceding Takaful 
insurer voluntarily (not mandatorily) offers the risk under each individual policy to the re-
Takaful operator. The re-Takaful operator can accept or reject the risk. The specific portions 
shared between the ceding Takaful insurer and the re-Takaful operator are based on the terms 
and conditions of the re-Takaful contract,118 as explained below at 6.3.5. This would appear 
to be completely inefficient unless very large risks were involved. 
Under automatic re-Takaful (the second type of re-Takaful contracts), the agreement between 
the two parties (ceding Takaful insurer and re-Takaful operator) mandatorily requires the re-
Takaful operator to accept, with no option to reject, any risk undertaken under the agreement 
with the ceding Takaful insurer.119 It also requires the ceding Takaful insurer to share, with 
no option to retain, all risks (insurance policies) with the re-Takaful operator.120 Similar to 
conventional re-insurance, under both types of re-Takaful (facultative and automatic), the 
exact share of the re-Takaful operator is based on proportional (quota share or surplus line) 
and non-proportional (excess-of-loss or stop-loss) arrangements,121 as discussed in the 
following paragraphs.  
The system of re-insurance types applying in Saudi Arabia is discussed and examined in the 
critical analysis part below at 6.8. 
 
                                                             
116 Ibid 183; Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), above n 69, 740, [4]; 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 27. 
117 Art 27 of the IFSB and paragraph 4 of the AAOFII only refer to two types of re-insurance (facultative and 
automatic) with no reference to permitting facultative-obligatory. See Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 
above n 4, art 27; Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), above n 69, 740, 
[4]; Dr. Kwon argues that facultative and automatic re-insurance may not be permitted under Sharia. See W Jean 
Kwon, 'Islamic Principle and Takaful Insurance: Re-evaluation' (2007) 26(1) National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners 53, 69-70. 
118 Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), above n 69, 740, [4.1]; Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 27 i (c)-(d); Gönülal, above n 65, 183. 
119 Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), above n 69, 740, [4.2]; Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 27 i (a)-(b). 
120 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 27 i (a); Gönülal, above n 65, 183. 
121 Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Institutions (AAOFII), above n 69, 740, [5]; Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 27 i (e); Eisenberg, above n 67, 291; Arbouna, above n 67, 343. 
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6.3.4. Re-Takaful Risk-Sharing under Re-Takaful Types 
Under the two re-Takaful types (facultative and automatic) discussed above, risks shared 
between the ceding Takaful insurer and the re-Takaful operator are the subject of specific 
arrangements. These risk-sharing arrangements can either be proportional or non-
proportional,122 as discussed in the next paragraph. Summaries Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 are 
provided below.  
Proportional Re-Takaful 
As in conventional re-insurance, a proportional re-Takaful arrangement (also known as risk-
sharing) is an agreement between the ceding Takaful insurer (cedent) and the re-Takaful 
operator. The re-Takaful operator shares an agreed percentage of the loss in return for 
receiving a percentage from original policyholders’ contributions (premiums) in the ceding 
Takaful policy.123 A quota share treaty and a surplus line treaty are the two general forms of 
proportional re-Takaful arrangements.124 
In a proportional quota share treaty, the re-Takaful operator bears a predetermined 
percentage of the risk and receives the same predetermined percentage from the contributions 
(premiums) in the ceding Takaful policy. If the predetermined percentage is 40 per cent, the 
re-Takaful operator pays (covers) 40 per cent of total losses (payouts) and receives 40 per 
cent of total contributions (premiums) paid to the ceding Takaful insurer. The ceding Takaful 
insurer  bears the other 60 per cent of the losses and keeps the other 60 per cent of 
contributions.125 So risks, losses, and profits are shared. 
Under a re-Takaful proportional surplus line treaty, similar to the surplus line treaty in 
conventional re-insurance discussed earlier at 6.2.3, the ceding Takaful insurer retains small 
risks (a net retention or liability up to a threshold) without sharing them with the re-Takaful 
operator. The ceding Takaful insurer shares large risks and risks exceeding certain amounts 
(exceeding the net retention) with the re-Takaful operator. For example, the ceding Takaful 
insurer bears the first $20,000 loss (net retention) agreed on while the re-Takaful operator is 
responsible for the remaining loss (the amount exceeding the $20,000 net retention).126 Some 
Islamic jurists argue that re-Takaful parties should have more contractual freedom by 
allowing them to add a “maximum cover limit” to the re-Takaful surplus line contract so that 
the re-Takaful operator’s liability is limited to amounts over the net retention and below the 
maximum cover amount.127 For example, a surplus line treaty may require the ceding Takaful 
insurer to retain the first $20 million (net retention) in losses and the re-Takaful operator to 
bear losses exceeding $20 million up to the maximum cover limit of $120 million. This 
                                                             
122 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 27 i (e); Eisenberg, above n 67, 291; Aznan Hasan, 
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125 Ibid. 
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means that risks exceeding $120 million are borne by the ceding Takaful insurer.128 This is 
illustrated in the following Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6129 
Losses Liability for Loss 
$0 – $20 million Ceding Takaful insurer 
$20,000,001 – $120 million   Re-Takaful operator 
More than $120 million Ceding Takaful insurer 
 
This view, which allows adding an agreed maximum cover limit, adopts most (but not all) of 
the features of the non-proportional re-Takaful excess-of-loss, as explained next. 
Non-proportional Re-Takaful 
Similar to the conventional non-proportional re-insurance arrangement, a non-proportional 
re-Takaful arrangement allows the ceding Takaful insurer to be compensated by the re-
Takaful operator when the losses exceed the agreed amounts or percentage (net 
retention/liability up to a threshold) with a maximum liability limit (cover limit).130 The two 
common forms of a non-proportional re-Takaful arrangement are excess-of-loss and stop-
loss. In the non-proportional re-Takaful excess-of-loss, the re-Takaful operator in a specific 
contract is obligated to compensate the ceding Takaful insurer when the losses exceed the net 
retention agreed on. The re-Takaful operator’s financial liability is limited to an agreed 
maximum amount/percentage of loss.131 For instance, a non-proportional re-Takaful excess-
of-loss policy states that the first $20 million is the net retention/threshold and $30 million is 
the total re-Takaful cover. In this case, the ceding Takaful insurer bears losses up to $20 
million (the net retention/threshold). The re-Takaful operator bears the next $30 million of 
losses, account for a total loss of $50 million.132 This is illustrated in the following Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7133 
Losses Liability for Loss 
$0 – $20 million Ceding Takaful insurer 
$20,000,001 – $50 million   Re-Takaful operator 
More than $50 million Ceding Takaful insurer 
 
The non-proportional re-Takaful stop-loss operates similarly to the non-proportional re-
Takaful excess-of-loss. The only difference is that the non-proportional re-Takaful excess-of-
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130 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 27 ii (b). 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 The Table is made by the thesis researcher. 
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loss is based on each individual policy while the non-proportional re-Takaful stop-loss is 
calculated based on the entire (aggregate) policies during an agreed designated time period.134 
Based on the above re-Takaful literature, the below Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 summarise the 
types and arrangements of re-Takaful protection. 
Table 6.8135 
Types of re-Takaful 
(Contractual Relationship) 
Facultative re-Takaful 
The ceding Takaful insurer has the option of ceding (sharing) 
specific, usually large risks. The re-Takaful operator can 
choose whether to accept or decline each risk. 
 
Obligatory (automatic) re-Takaful 
Formal agreement whereby the ceding Takaful insurer 
undertakes to cede (share) all risks matching a specific 
description. The re-Takaful operator is obliged to accept all 
risks offered by the ceding Takaful insurer under the treaty. 
 
Facultative-obligatory re-Takaful which is not accepted 
by re-Takaful rules 
Combination of option to cede (share) coupled with 
obligation to accept (facultative/obligatory), or obligation to 
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Risk-Sharing Arrangements of Re-Takaful 
(Possibilities for Covering Risk) 
Proportional re-Takaful 
Baseline: original sum insured.  
 
Premium calculation: pro-rata (proportional) splitting of 
original contribution/premium. 
 
Main treaty types: quota share & surplus line. 
• Quota share: ceding Takaful insurer & re-Takaful 
operator jointly share losses and receive premiums, 
based on the contractual percentage.  
• Surplus line: ceding Takaful insurer retains liability 
up to specific amount (net retention); re-Takaful 
operator covers losses exceeding net retention 
amount. A maximum cover limit for re-Takaful 
operator is optional.  
 
Non-proportional re-Takaful 
Baseline: the loss amount forms the basis of arrangement. 
 
Premium calculation: unrelated to original premium (non-
proportional). 
 
Main treaty types: excess-of-loss & stop-loss. 
• Excess-of-loss: ceding Takaful insurer liable up to a 
certain amount (net retention); re-Takaful operator 
liable for losses exceeding net retention but with a 
maximum cover limit for re-Takaful operator. 
• Stop-loss: similar to excess-of-loss but excess-of-loss 
is calculated on a case by case basis whilst stop-loss 
is calculated on the entire pool of claims. 
 
Again, the system of re-Takaful risk-sharing arrangements under re-insurance types applying 
in Saudi Arabia is discussed and examined at 6.8. 
6.3.5. Ceding Takaful Insurers and Conventional Re-insurance 
Is it permissible for ceding Takaful insurers to purchase conventional (commercial) re-
insurance? This depends upon whether conventional re-insurance is Sharia-compliant and if 
not, whether there is a Sharia-compliant equivalent of conventional re-insurance. 
The previous discussion at 6.3.2 distinguished between conventional re-insurance and re-
Takaful. As conventional re-insurance does not apply re-Takaful principles, the predominant 
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Sharia view regards conventional re-insurance as not Sharia-compliant.137 But as explored in 
chapter 4.4.4, a Sharia insurance alternative was proposed by Al-Zarqaa. The same argument 
is modified to apply to re-insurance, as later discussed at 6.6.    
In relation to the second issue, whether there is a Sharia-compliant equivalent of conventional 
re-insurance, re-Takaful is (in theory) the Sharia-compliant equivalent of conventional re-
insurance. As noted above, the Takaful principles applying to ceding Takaful insurance also, 
by assumption, apply to re-Takaful. So, re-Takaful, in theory, applies the same three ceding 
Takaful operational models: wakalah—which is no longer available in Saudi Arabia—,138 
mudharabah, and a hybrid model (wakalah and mudharabah),139 as discussed in chapter 4.5. 
Whether these re-Takaful models are applied by the current regulations in Saudi Arabia is 
discussed at 6.8. 
In relation to whether ceding Takaful insurers are allowed to buy conventional re-insurance, 
some particular issues need to be discussed. Since re-Takaful, as assumed, applies the same 
Islamic principles as Takaful insurance, re-Takaful is also based on the principle of tabarru 
(donation/charity) in which the ceding Takaful insurance contracts are unilateral, not 
bilateral, as discussed in chapter 4.6.1. Since the ceding Takaful insurer has, in theory, no 
obligation to pay the claims, this raises the issue that conventional re-insurance may require 
the ceding Takaful insurer to provide proof of a liability to the actual insured. Based on a 
technicality, the conventional re-insurer could reject liability.140 This difficulty might cause 
ceding Takaful insurers to deal only with re-Takaful companies or other re-Takaful 
alternatives. Under joint-stock companies (JSCs) where the structures of re-Takaful 
corporations are compulsory, such as in Saudi Arabia, this characterisation of unilateral 
contracts is problematic. This is because the structure of JSCs involves shareholders as well 
as the obligation for the re-Takaful operator to pay covered claims, see chapter 3.3 for 
insurance cases in Saudi Arabia. 
Ceding Takaful insurers have been permitted to purchase conventional re-insurance by the 
majority of Islamic scholars on the grounds that there are no re-Takaful operators available in 
the market.141 Their reasoning is based on the Islamic principle of darura (necessity or dire 
need). This principle of darura, examined further below, considers that the ceding Takaful 
insurer is unable to bear all the losses without the intervention of conventional re-insurance, 
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so it permits ceding Takaful insurers to purchase conventional re-insurance.142 Contrary 
arguments are presented below.  
Some re-Takaful products are sold by conventional re-insurers (i.e. conventional re-insurance 
companies providing re-Takaful services).143 Well known conventional re-insurance 
companies such as Munich Re, Swiss Re, and Hannover Re, noted earlier, have entered into 
the re-Takaful market and have been offering re-Takaful.144 This may lead Islamic jurists to 
prohibit the use of conventional re-insurance145 as the Islamic principle of darura (necessity 
or dire need) does not apply since re-Takaful is now available. Whether these known 
conventional re-insurance companies are Sharia-compliant is critically examined below at 
6.5. 
Although most Islamic scholars permit ceding Takaful companies to deal with conventional 
re-insurance under the Islamic principle of darura (necessity or dire need), other Islamic 
scholars reject this approach on the grounds that the principle of darura applies only to 
important matters of life and death. They argue that this darura principle cannot permit any 
matter (such as buying conventional re-insurance) that is explicitly impermissible by 
Sharia.146 The effect of this view may be that a Takaful insurer is only able to offer very 
limited forms of insurance so that Takaful can only perform a very limited role in the market. 
A few Islamic scholars reject the use of conventional re-insurers.147 Some require ceding 
Takaful insurance companies to deal only with re-Takaful companies. Ceding Takaful 
insurers are Islamically prohibited from dealing with conventional re-insurers even if re-
Takaful companies are not in existence or not financially able to take on (Islamically re-
insure) such a risk. In the hypothetical case where there are no existing re-Takaful companies, 
ceding Takaful companies are obligated to act co-operatively as a re-Takaful company. All 
ceding Takaful companies must pay their contributions as tabarru (charity/donation) into a 
specific pool under specific agreed management terms. In the case of loss, each ceding 
Takaful company will pay compensation based on its contractually proportionate obligation. 
In the case of gain, profits and surpluses are distributed to all ceding Takaful companies 
based on their contributions (based on each company’s proportionate contribution).148 This 
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view is similar to the risk-sharing pools (insurance company groups or insurance pooling), 
discussed in chapter 5.2.4, and only operates under mutual structures which are subject to 
criticism, as discussed below at 6.7. 
In order to determine whether the Islamic principle of darura (necessity or dire need) can 
permit purchasing conventional re-insurance, darura must be comprehensively examined 
from a Sharia viewpoint. The darura principle is derived from the Holy Quran which 
explains that in certain situations eating forbidden food is permissible under the darura 
principle. The Holy Quran says: 
He [Allah] has forbidden you carrion, and blood, and the flesh of swine, and what was 
dedicated to other than God. But if one is forced by necessity without wilful disobedience 
[baghi] nor transgressing due limits [aadee], then there is no sin on him. God is Forgiving 
and Merciful.149 
The Holy Quran also says: 
And why should you not eat of that over which the Name of God is pronounced, when He 
[Allah] has detailed for you what is prohibited for you, unless you are compelled by 
necessity.150 
It further provides: 
Prohibited for you are carrion, blood … But whoever is compelled by severe hunger 
[makhmasah], with no inclination to sin [mutajanif liithm]— God is Forgiving and 
Merciful.151 
Based on these Quranic verses, Islamic jurists have set up rules for using darura (necessity or 
dire need) that allows the breaking or violation of a Sharia prohibition. These include the 
situation of being in makhmasah (starvation/severe hunger) with the avoidance of baghi 
(desiring/craving/wilful disobedience), aadee (transgressing/exceeding the limit), and 
mutajanif liithm (inclination to sin/ inclining wilfully to sin). The darura (necessity or dire 
need) may occur during a time of makhmasah (starvation/severe hunger) where no normal 
food is available. The rules in such a circumstance allow eating forbidden food as a result of a 
darura (necessity or dire need) where there is no intent to commit a sin (mutajanif liithm) and 
no desire to do so and no other option available (baghi). The rules also require the person to 
only eat a small quantity sufficient to ensure survival (aadee).152 
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By qiyas (reasoning by analogy, see chapter 4.3), the permissibility of dealing with 
conventional re-insurance does not meet the requirements (terms) of the principle of darura 
(necessity or dire need). A Sharia standard rule can be derived from the above Quranic 
verses, as follows. A time of makhmasah (starvation/severe hunger) indicates a high level of 
necessity which is not reflected in the case of ceding Takaful insurance dealing with 
conventional re-insurance. The avoidance of mutajanif liithm (inclination to sin/ inclining 
wilfully to sin) and baghi (desiring/craving/wilful disobedience) indicates no personal 
willingness to violate the prohibition with no other available choices.153 This does not apply 
to ceding Takaful insurers as there are other Sharia-compliant options, e.g. insurance 
company groups (insurance pooling), noted above and discussed in chapter 5.2.4. The 
avoidance of aadee (transgressing/exceeding the limit) does not apply to ceding Takaful 
insurers because they do not deal with conventional re-insurance out of necessity for survival 
or that is practically impossible to do so. On this view, the principle of darura (necessity or 
dire need) does not permit ceding Takaful insurers to deal with conventional re-insurance. 
This also applies to the Saudi insurance industry, see discussion below at 6.4. 
Regardless of the principle of darura, a differing viewpoint can be derived from the approach 
of Al-Zarqaa, as discussed in chapter 4.4.4. Al-Zarqaa’s modified approach permits buying 
conventional re-insurance if Sharia prohibited investments are avoided. This view is 
addressed further below at 6.6.  
It is important to point out that Islamic principles require effective risk management for 
Islamic corporations. On an Islamic financial basis, a basic principle encourages international 
co-operation. From an insurance perspective, large catastrophic risks can only be managed by 
being distributed very widely with each re-insurer taking just a small portion of the risk. This 
is important to the development and growth of the Takaful insurance industry domestically 
and globally.154 
Based on the Islamic principle of international co-operation, ceding Takaful companies can 
mutually and co-operatively form international insurance company groups (international 
insurance pooling) similar to insurance company groups (insurance pooling), as discussed in 
chapter 5.2.4. These international insurance company groups (international insurance 
pooling) must be Takaful insurance companies (not conventional insurers) for the ceding 
Takaful insurers, in a particular jurisdiction, to be Sharia-compliant. 
                                                             
153 This Sharia standard rule is also reflected in the example given by Al-Suyuti, an Islamic Imam 1445-1505. 
Al-Suyuti explained that during a war caused by an enemy attack, and as a general rule, taking anything from 
the spoils of war (war booty) by the troops is prohibited as all the spoils (booty) belongs to the public treasury 
(all the community). However, under the darura (necessity or dire need) principle, troops or soldiers are allowed 
to eat from the spoils but only as much as they need to survive until they return home. After return, it is not 
allowed to eat from the spoils anymore. See Abd-Alraḥman (Jalal Al-Din) Abi-Bakr Al-Suyuti, The Analogies 
and Isotopes in the Rules and Branches of the Shafii's Jurisprudence [ ةیعفاشلا ھقف عورفو دعاوق يف رئاظنلاو هابشألا ] (Dar 
Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyah, Beirut, 1 ed, 1983) 84. Ahmed Al-Zarqaa, the father of Prof. Mustafa Ahmed Al-Zarqaa, 
further illustrated that under the darura (necessity or dire need) principle, a person is permitted to eat other 
people’s food the needed portion to avoid misery (avoiding aadee) without mutajanif liithm (inclination to sin/ 
inclining wilfully to sin). See Ahmed Mohammed Al-Zarqaa, Explanation of Jurisprudential Rules [  دعاوقلا حرش
ةیھقفلا ] (Dar Al-Qalam Damascus, 2 ed, 1989) 187-8. 
154 Aly Khorshid, Islamic Insurance: A Modern Approach to Islamic Banking (RoutledgeCurzon: Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2004) 112, 164-5. 
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In a particular jurisdiction, it might be difficult or just not feasible for ceding Takaful insurers 
to engage in insurance/re-insurance pooling as a Sharia alternative to re-Takaful. For 
example, potential pool participants might not share similar types of risks; or insurance/re-
insurance pooling operates under a mutual structure where there is only a very small potential 
pool incapable of managing large catastrophic risks. Thus, if it was not possible to acquire 
protection against large catastrophic risks through dealing with domestic insurance company 
groups, ceding Takaful insurers could deal with international insurance company groups 
through international insurance pooling to cover some (not all) of those large catastrophic 
risks. While this may be theoretically possible, there are significant obstacles to this 
occurring. 
To take an example, Takaful insurers in Saudi Arabia can co-operate with Takaful insurers in 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Sudan, and so on. All governments’ intervention is required to regulate 
a mechanism for dealing with such international insurance company groups (international 
insurance pooling) and enact specified re-insurance laws and regulations. All laws and 
regulations must be Sharia-compliant. Perhaps, it would be more efficient for the operation of 
the re-Takaful industry if governments could co-operate by mutual agreements to issue 
similar fundamental rules and standards such as those adopted by the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB). 
These re-Takaful alternatives—re-Takaful products offered by international conventional re-
insurance companies (e.g. Munich Re, Swiss Re, Hannover Re), insurance company groups 
(insurance pooling), or international insurance company groups (international insurance 
pooling)—can help avoid or mitigate the risk of Sharia non-compliance, as discussed in 
chapter 3.6. On one view, if conventional re-insurers invest in non Sharia products which 
mixes the Takaful underwriting funds with the conventional re-insurance fund, the ceding 
Takaful insurer must purify (get rid of or divest itself of) any non Sharia-compliant 
income.155 This issue does not occur when applying these re-Takaful alternatives. This is 
because the re-Takaful alternatives used by the ceding Takaful insurer are Sharia-compliant 
without the need for conventional re-insurance. It should be noted that purification under 
Sharia is a complicated matter that is disputed amongst Islamic jurists.156 Nevertheless, the 
existence of the purifying mechanism to remove Sharia-prohibited income can be seen to 
have a positive side; it demonstrates the flexibility of Sharia and encourages the 
modernisation of Islamic finance. It also indicates that adoption of Western systems is 
                                                             
155 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 28 (v).  
156 According to some Islamic jurists, the purifying mechanism is a Sharia technique used in Islamic finance to 
remove some Sharia-prohibited income involved in an Islamic investment or portfolio. The purifying 
mechanism is accepted to make the Islamic investment (portfolio) Sharia-compliant. For example, riba 
(interest/usury) is prohibited under Sharia. When an Islamic investment deals with a conventional bank that 
distributes riba to the investors, the purifying mechanism allows the investor to purify or remove (or divest itself 
of) the riba from its fund by donating it (to charity). See Mark Brendan Mulcahy, 'Purifying Islamic Equities: 




recognised and acceptable by Sharia in modern Islam.157 Consequently, this can be used to 
modernise re-Takaful through the adoption of Al-Zarqaa’s views.  
It is important to emphasise that these re-Takaful alternatives which operate under mutual 
structures have serious limitations, see below at 6.7. The most efficient alternative is to adopt 
Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach, see below at 6.6.  
 6.4. A Sharia-Compliance Analysis of Saudi Ceding Insurers and Re-insurers 
In Saudi Arabia, ceding insurance companies retain significant risk rather than re-insuring 
through international conventional re-insurance companies. In 2015, Saudi ceding insurers’ 
retention ratio of Gross Written Premiums (GWP) was 83 per cent increasing to 84 per cent 
in 2016.158 Risk retention in 2017 was 84.4 per cent159 increasing to 86.2 per cent in 2018160 
which breaches the regulatory requirements referred to below. 
This shows high risk retention ratios in the Saudi insurance market which suggests that 
sufficiently prudent re-insurance is not undertaken by Saudi insurance companies either with 
re-Takaful operators or conventional re-insurers. See discussion of risk retention in chapter 
3.2.4. There is also the question whether nationally significant risks are insured, such as 
pipelines, oil, and electricity infrastructures, owned by large Saudi corporations—e.g. the 
Saudi Aramco Company (Aramco), the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), and the 
petrochemical manufacturing company (SABIC). What is unclear is whether these large risks 
are self-insured in the case of Saudi owned assets and infrastructure or insured with overseas 
insurers or not properly protected by insurance. What is also unclear is whether Takaful 
companies in Saudi Arabia are capable of covering such significant risks, see 6.4.1 below. 
This can negatively affect the Saudi finance and business market. Foreign investors consider 
re-insurance, or country risk discussed in 3.2.4, as a major factor to protect their investments 
from risk exposure. Foreign investments may be constrained by the knowledge that the Saudi 
insurance market lacks stability and sustainability and may not be able to cover them for their 
future losses. Retaining significant risk by Saudi ceding insurers (83% in 2015, 84% in 2016, 
84.4% in 2017, and 86.2% in 2018) also indicates that the remaining percentage (17% in 
2015, 16% in 2016, 15.6% in 2017, and 13.8% in 2018) is, either wholly or partly, the Saudi 
ceding insurers’ ratio in dealing with domestic and international conventional re-insurance 
companies. This appears to breach Saudi insurance laws Implementing Rules, art 40 (2) 
which require ceding insurance companies to re-insure at least 30 per cent of total premiums 
                                                             
157 To read more about modernism in Sharia, see Mark W Meehan, Islam, Modernity, and the Liminal Space 
Between (Cambridge Scholars, 2013); Wael B Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to 
Sunni Usul Al-Fiqh [ ھقفلا لوصأ ] (Cambridge University Press, 1997); Muslehuddin, above n 146, 82-96. 
158 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 'Financial Stability Report' (2017) SAMA, 40. This report has the 
latest figures available. Retention ratio is the percentage of risk that an insurer accepts and maintains instead of 
transferring it to a re-insurer. Risk retention is one of the risk management strategies used to mitigate risk, see 
chapter 3.2.4.  
159 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 'Financial Stability Report' (2018) SAMA, 57; Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), 'Financial Stability Report' (2019) SAMA, 45. This 2019 report is the latest 
available. 
160 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 'Financial Stability Report' (2019), above n 159, 45. 
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within Saudi Arabia.161 Commentators from the business sector suggest that ceding insurers 
in Saudi Arabia have not used re-insurance to protect against serious and potentially 
catastrophic risks.162 In order to achieve a stable, sustainable, and competitive insurance 
market, re-insurance is essential. But as pointed out above, domestic re-insurers may not be 
able to carry particular types of risks leaving the local Takaful insurers seriously exposed to 
the risk of failure. This thesis has argued that re-Takaful cannot be applied in practice and the 
only suitable alternative is Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach, see 6.6.  
In Saudi Arabia, the use of international conventional re-insurance may not be consistent with 
Sharia for the following reasons. Dealing with conventional re-insurance, on a narrow 
approach, is not supported by the Islamic principle of darura (necessity or dire need), see 
above at 6.3.5. This is because Saudi ceding Takaful insurers can use other re-Takaful 
alternatives: re-Takaful products offered by international conventional re-insurance 
companies (e.g. Munich Re, Swiss Re, Hannover Re, etc), insurance company groups 
(insurance pooling), or international insurance company groups (international insurance 
pooling). These re-Takaful alternatives are based on a re-Takaful perspective only, and they 
still involve unsolved issues, see below at 6.7. 
In Saudi Arabia, when dealing with conventional re-insurers, ceding Takaful insurers are also 
exposed to, and take the risk of, Sharia non-compliance, as discussed in 3.6. One of the 
principal difficulties is that conventional re-insurers breach Sharia investment rules. 
Compensation from conventional re-insurers to ceding Takaful insurers co-mingles funds 
from the conventional re-insurer with the ceding Takaful funds. 
Moreover, conventional re-insurers do not apply the Takaful principle of tabarru. So, it is 
practically impossible for Saudi ceding Takaful insurers to enter into a contract with a 
conventional re-insurer on a tabarru basis. 
The Takaful principle of mutual co-operation is further breached by Saudi ceding insurers. It 
is practically impossible for them to share risks with the conventional re-insurer whose risk 
system relies and applies a risk transfer mechanism rather than risk-sharing. 
Therefore, on one view, ceding Takaful insurers in Saudi Arabia, using conventional re-
insurance instead of re-Takaful, are not Sharia-compliant.   
The next section examines the risks borne by the Saudi insurance market. It examines 
whether the insurance market, including re-insurance, is largely undeveloped and has not 
matured to providing coverage for large risks. The issue is whether the Saudi insurance 
market needs reform; and whether this can be achieved whilst complying with Sharia. The 
examination will show that the Saudi insurance market may be unable to cover potentially 
catastrophic risks facing significant Saudi corporations (non-insurance companies) while, at 
the same time, complying with Takaful/re-Takaful principles and rules. 
                                                             
161 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 1, art 40 (2). 
162 Ernst & Young (EY), above n 138, 34. 
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6.4.1. Annual Reports Analyses of Saudi Significant Corporations with Large Risks 
(Non-Insurance Companies) 
It is important to examine how big corporations, particularly those managing nationally 
significant infrastructure—such as heavy industrials, petroleum pipelines, oil, electricity, 
etc—are insured in Saudi Arabia. It raises the question whether Saudi insurers are capable of 
insuring large risks, and can this be done competitively whilst complying with Sharia. Annual 
reports of the Saudi Aramco Company (Aramco), the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), and 
the petrochemical manufacturing company (SABIC) are examined below. 
The Saudi Aramco Company (Aramco) is a petroleum company producing oil, gas, and 
chemicals. It was until recently wholly owned by the Saudi government.163 In late 2019, 1.5 
per cent of Aramco’s shares were offered to the public and were listed on the Saudi stock 
exchange (Tadawul),164 see 2.6.4. In examining Aramco’s 2017 annual report,165 the latest 
available, it states that managing risk is at the top of the company’s strategy objectives.166 
However, the report makes no reference to insurance, either in Saudi Arabia or 
internationally. This might suggest that Aramco, as a Saudi owned company, self-insures 
rather than spreading the risk through insurance and re-insurance. What is not clear is 
whether this amounts to prudent management of Saudi assets. 
Similar to Aramco, the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) is the only utility (company) that 
provides electricity services in Saudi Arabia. The SEC is a joint-stock company (JSC) listed 
on the Saudi stock exchange167 with mixed government and private ownership.168 In 
examining the SEC’s 2017 annual report,169 the latest available, there is no reference to 
insurance. Although the report refers to some major risks facing the SEC (e.g. market risk 
                                                             
163 CNBC, What is Saudi Aramco? (2019) <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/10/what-is-saudi-aramco.html>. 
164 Saudi Investment Bank, Saudi Aramco IPO (2020) <https://www.saib.com.sa/en/aramco-ipo>; Al-Riyadh 
Newspaper, Aramco IPO ]2020) ]وكمارأ باتتكا) <http://www.alriyadh.com/1792012>; Al-Jazeera Newspaper, 
Aramco IPO ]2020) ]وكمارأ باتتكا) <http://www.al-jazirah.com/2019/20191206/ec5.htm>. 
165 Saudi Aramco Company, Annual Review 2017 Aramco <https://www.saudiaramco.com/-
/media/images/annual-review-2017/pdfs/en/2017-annualreview-full-en.pdf>. 
166 Ibid 16. 





168 Saudi Arabian Financial News (Argaam), [  يف ةكرشلا لام سأر يف ةموكحلل ةكولمملا مھسألا لیجست نع نلعت ءابرھكلل ةیدوعسلا
ةماعلا تارامثتسالا قودنص ةظفحم ] Saudi Electricity Announces the Registration of Government-Owned Shares in the 
Company's Capital in the General Investment Fund Portfolio (2017/09/17) Argaam 
<https://www.argaam.com/ar/article/articledetail/id/505109>; Reuters, Saudi Electricity to Set up Power 
Generation Subsidiary (2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/saudi-electricity-subsidiary/saudi-electricity-to-
set-up-power-generation-subsidiary-idUSL8N1Y11FW>. These resources indicate that the Saudi Electricity 
Company (SEC) is 74.3 per cent owned by the Public Investment Fund (PIF) of Saudi Arabia which is a Saudi 
government sector. 





including foreign currency, interest rate, price risks, credit risk, and liquidity risk, as 
discussed in 3.2.4),170 insurance is not mentioned in the SEC’s risk management framework.  
The 2017 annual report (the latest available) of the petrochemical manufacturing company, 
known as SABIC which is not listed on the Saudi stock exchange and its ownership is mixed 
government and private,171 shows that SABIC has in place strategies to manage risk.172 There 
is no information on the types of insurance, names of insurers, etc, and no disclosure of 
whether SABIC is insured with Saudi local insurers or international insurers.  
There is no evidence that large companies facing potentially catastrophic risks in Saudi 
Arabia insure against these potential risks with Saudi Takaful insurance companies. This 
might negatively affect foreign investors wishing to invest in Saudi Arabia and wishing to 
ensure that their investment is protected from future risks. Some investors might do business 
in Saudi Arabia but insure their businesses with international insurers, not locally with Saudi 
insurers. Both scenarios have a negative influence in the Saudi financial and economic 
market. The first scenario (investors not doing business in Saudi Arabia) affects the entire 
Saudi market in general. The second scenario (investors doing business in Saudi Arabia but 
insuring with international insurers) affects the Saudi insurance market in particular. 
There is no evidence either way whether large and even potentially catastrophic risks are 
insured either in Saudi Arabia or internationally. If these risks are not insured or externally 
insured, Saudi insurance (excluding health and life insurance) is effectively limited to the 
retail level. Two comments may be made. Firstly, it is not clear whether major Saudi 
infrastructures and facilities are insured against large, potentially catastrophic risks. 
Secondly, it is also uncertain whether the current regulatory framework may inhibit the 
operation of Saudi insurers. The involvement of the Bahrain market173 (discussed in chapter 
7.3.1), which is considered much more liberal, perhaps suggests that the Saudi insurance 
market is not sufficiently open. If the Saudi insurance market is constrained by Takaful 
requirements, this might imply that there is a need to consider what measures are necessary 
for the Saudi insurance industry to be competitive and stable. One of the problems may be the 
inability to comply with Takaful. The application of Al-Zarqaa’s re-insurance approach, see 
below 6.6, will more likely make Takaful insurance (and re-Takaful) in Saudi Arabia Sharia-
compliant, making the Saudi insurance market more effective and competitive and able to 
take on a larger risk profile. This might eventually lead to improvement not only in the 
insurance industry but also across the entire economy by attracting international businesses to 
invest in Saudi Arabia. 
 
                                                             
170 Ibid 212-5. 
171 Sabic, Our Company (2019) <https://www.sabic.com/en/about>. SABIC declares that 70 per cent of its 
ownership belongs to the Saudi government and 30 per cent to the public. 
172 Sabic, Annual Report 2017, 56-7 <file://ad.uws.edu.au/dfshare/HomesPTA$/90932136/Downloads/SABIC-
Annual-Report-ENGLISH_tcm1010-12625.pdf>. 
173 Bahrain National Holding Company (BNH), Annual Report 2016 BNH 
<http://www.bnhgroup.com/upload/Annual%20Report%202016%20-%20English.pdf>; United Insurance 
Company (UIC), Overview UIC <http://www.uic.bh/default.asp>. 
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6.5. A Critical Analysis of Re-Takaful 
There is very little analysis and research on the Sharia permissibility of applying 
conventional re-insurance types of risk-sharing arrangements (proportional and non-
proportional) to re-Takaful contracts.174 This part critically examines re-Takaful based on re-
Takaful principles (not Al-Zarqaa’s views), and followed by a critical analysis of re-Takaful 
practiced in Saudi Arabia at 6.8. 
It has been argued that the facultative-obligatory treaty (the third type of re-insurance) may 
not be Sharia-compliant as it contains gharar (uncertainty), discussed in chapter 4.4.2, 
prohibited by Sharia. Under the facultative-obligatory re-insurance, gharar occurs when the 
ceding insurer has the option either to transfer or retain the risks while the re-insurer does not 
have the same freedom of choice as the re-insurer mandatorily accepts all risks.175 It should 
be noted that there is very little re-Takaful literature discussing and addressing this point, so 
this view requires justification. Under Islamic contracts, gharar occurs if there is a potential 
for severe financial harm to any party, for example the sale of an unborn calf of a pregnant 
cow and the advance purchase of fish still at sea, see chapter 4.4.2. Subject to the previous 
argument and based on re-Takaful rules, gharar exists when the re-insurer does not have an 
option to reject any risk, and the risk is unreasonably and excessively large (the re-insurer 
may incur severe financial harm). When the original risk (insurance policy) is offered, the 
ceding insurer has the right to accept or reject it so no gharar exists for the ceding insurer. 
The re-insurer does not have the same right to reject the policy so that the re-insurer may 
incur severe financial harm which may create prohibited gharar.176 This aligns with the 
Islamic jurists’ view on re-Takaful that only permits the first two types of re-insurance 
(facultative and automatic) and disregards the third type of re-insurance (facultative-
obligatory).177  
Another issue that needs to be addressed by Islamic scholars is whether to prohibit the 
automatic re-Takaful agreement (the second type of re-Takaful contracts). This is because the 
re-Takaful operator has the right either to accept or reject each individual risk (insurance 
policy) under facultative agreements while the re-Takaful operator cannot refuse to accept the 
risk under automatic agreements.178 This means that the re-Takaful operator, under the 
automatic agreement, is exposed to gharar (uncertainty) prohibited by Sharia as it is 
obligated to accept all future risks undertaken by the policyholder (ceding Takaful company) 
with no opportunity to refuse any particular risk. No similar gharar arises in relation to the 
policyholder (ceding Takaful company) as it has absolute freedom to reject any risk of the 
                                                             
174 Hasan, above n 122, 170-1. 
175 Kwon, above n 117, 70. 
176 An opposing argument is that domestic re-insurance laws can regulate this issue. For example, SAMA has 
oversight over the types of re-insurance arrangements. The premiums payable will reflect the level of risk 
undertaken. Re-insurers are likely to have significantly greater experience in risk assessment and risk 
management than the individual ceding insurer. The greater risks will also be reflected in the capital 
requirements of re-insurers which may be increased by SAMA where necessary. In addition, where there are 
significant risks, the re-insurer is likely to spread the risk by insuring its risk, retrocession (see above).  
177 Art 27 of the IFSB and paragraph 4 of the AAOFII only refer to the two types of re-insurance (facultative 
and automatic) with no reference to facultative-obligatory (see above 6.3.3). 
178 Hasan, above n 122, 168-9. 
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original policyholder (original insured). Under the facultative agreement, gharar does not 
seem to arise because both parties (ceding Takaful insurer and re-Takaful operator) have 
similar rights to accept or reject any risk. 
It is argued that proportional re-insurance (a quota share treaty and a surplus line treaty) is the 
only re-insurance risk-sharing arrangement that is Sharia-compliant because it avoids gharar 
(uncertainty). Non-proportional re-insurance (excess-of-loss and stop-loss) is not Sharia-
compliant on the grounds of severe gharar.179 This prohibition of non-proportional re-
insurance is based on the assessment that the two requirements—the net retention (for the 
ceding Takaful insurer) and the maximum cover limit (for the re-Takaful operator)—create 
excessive/severe gharar (not minor gharar), as discussed in chapter 4.4.2. This is evident 
when the ceding Takaful insurer bears all the risks in excess of the net retention while no 
financial responsibility is borne by the re-Takaful operator. Referring back to the previous 
example in Table 6.7,180 the net retention (threshold) means that the ceding Takaful insurer 
covers the entire loss below the net retention. The re-Takaful operator bears no responsibility 
for losses below the net retention or above the maximum cover limit. This probably leads to 
the ceding Takaful insurer bearing most of the loss which may create forbidden gharar 
(uncertainty). Not only does gharar apply to the ceding Takaful insurer, it may also apply to 
the re-Takaful operator. For example, assume the net retention is $20,000 and the maximum 
cover limit is $20 million, see Table 6.10 below. If the ceding Takaful insurer is exposed to a 
large risk, for example $15 million, the ceding Takaful insurer bears only the first $20,000 
(net retention) while the re-Takaful operator bears the rest which creates prohibited severe 
gharar for the re-Takaful operator, regardless of whether the re-Takaful operator is covered 
by retro-Takaful (Islamic retrocession). 
Table 6.10181 
$15 Million Loss Liability for Loss 
$0 – $20,000  Ceding Takaful insurer pays $20,000 
$20,001 – $20 million   Re-Takaful operator pays $14,980,000 
More than $20 million Ceding Takaful insurer is responsible. 
But in this case pays nothing 
 
Gharar (uncertainty) that occurs as a consequence of the evaluation and assessment of loss in 
non-proportional re-insurance (excess-of-loss and stop-loss) is not entirely dissimilar to the 
gharar which exists in a surplus line treaty, the second risk-sharing arrangement of 
proportional re-insurance. As explained above at 6.3.4, in re-Takaful, the surplus line treaty 
operates similarly to the excess-of-loss treaty which includes the two requirements: net 
retention (for the ceding Takaful insurer) and maximum cover limit (for the re-Takaful 
operator). Since non-proportional re-insurance (excess-of-loss and stop-loss) is prohibited 
based on gharar, noted in the earlier argument, the same argument should be applied to 
prohibit the use of surplus line treaties. In this scenario, under re-Takaful, quota share is the 
                                                             
179 Kwon, above n 117, 69-70. 
180 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, art 27 ii (b). 
181 The Table is made by the thesis researcher. 
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only risk-sharing arrangement of re-insurance that does not involve prohibited gharar while 
the others (surplus line, excess-of-loss, and stop-loss) do.  
A contrary argument, based on re-Takaful perspectives, is that the principle of tabarru 
(donation/charity) can apply to avoid the prohibition of gharar (uncertainty) in those three re-
insurance risk-sharing arrangements (surplus line, excess-of-loss, and stop-loss) so that they 
are Sharia-compliant. When premiums are paid as a tabarru, gharar is no longer a problem. 
The uncertainty of the exact amount of reimbursement is not important, so gharar does not 
affect them (surplus line, excess-of-loss, and stop-loss) and thus does not apply to re-Takaful. 
To avoid reiteration, see full discussion of tabarru in chapter 4.6.1.  
Although the principle of tabarru may avoid forbidden gharar (uncertainty) to permit the 
three re-insurance risk-sharing arrangements (surplus line, excess-of-loss, and stop-loss), 
there are additional issues related to Sharia-compliance, as follows. 
The first issue is related to the Takaful principle of mutuality (risk-sharing and not risk 
transfer), see chapter 4.6.2. The issue here is whether under the three re-insurance risk-
sharing arrangements (surplus line, excess-of-loss, and stop-loss), there is Sharia-compliant 
risk-sharing. From an individual case, the ceding Takaful insurer (policyholder) does not 
share the entire risk of loss (Takaful policies) with the re-Takaful operator. The ceding 
Takaful insurer shares with the re-Takaful operator only risks falling between the net 
retention and maximum cover limit; other risks are not mutually shared. These other risks are 
borne solely by the policyholder (ceding Takaful company) where, according to the mutuality 
principle, risk is supposed to be mutually and co-operatively shared among all members 
(ceding Takaful insurer and re-Takaful operator) of the pool. Thus, the Takaful principle of 
mutuality may be breached.  
The second issue is whether the three risk-sharing arrangements of re-insurance, excluding 
quota share, are based on the Islamic principle of “avoiding doubtful matters”. The Prophet 
Mohammed (Peace be upon him and his family) said:  
Both legal and illegal things are obvious, and in between them are (suspicious) doubtful 
matters. So whoever forsakes those doubtful things lest he may commit a sin, will definitely 
avoid what is clearly illegal; and whoever indulges in these (suspicious) doubtful things 
bravely, is likely to commit what is clearly illegal …182  
The Prophet (Peace be upon him and his family) also said: 
Sometimes when I return home and find a date fallen on my bed, I pick it up in order to eat it, 
but I fear that it might be from a Sadaqa [for charity or for the poor], so I leave it [to the 
sadaqa].183 
The above Prophetic sayings establish the Islamic principle of avoiding doubtful matters. It 
indicates that obviously permissible things include things like eating fruit, vegetables, 
                                                             
182 Muslim Al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim [ ملسم حیحص ] (Dar Taibah for Publishing and Distribution, 2006) No. 1599; 
Mohammed Albukhary, Saheeh Albukhary [ يراخبلا حیحص ] (Dar Ibn-Katheer, 2002) No. 52, 2051.  
183 Al-Hajjaj, above n 182, No. 1070; Albukhary, above n 182, No. 2055, 2432. 
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mutton, lamb, etc while obvious prohibitions are alcohol, pork, riba, etc. Doubtful 
(suspicious) matters are related to things that have been permitted by some Islamic jurists and 
prohibited by others such as eating the meat of horses, mules, donkeys, and so on.184 Chapter 
4.4.4 has provided examples of pluralism and conflicting fatwas (Sharia decisions over a 
case) in Islamic Sharia. Committing or doing a doubtful (suspicious) thing is not Islamically 
forbidden nor regarded as a sin but avoiding it is highly recommended and regarded as a 
matter of piety.185  
Based on the Islamic principle of avoiding doubtful matters, the three re-insurance risk-
sharing arrangements (surplus line, excess-of-loss, and stop-loss), excluding quota share, may 
be considered as doubtful (suspicious) matters since their permissibility and prohibition have 
been debated among Islamic scholars. These arrangements may be considered “unpleasantly 
disliked” or “reprehensible” so they ought to be avoided in order to avoid any possibility of 
committing a sin. It should be noted that the principle of darura (necessity or dire need), 
according to some scholars, cannot apply to permit these three re-insurance risk-sharing 
arrangements as there is a permissible arrangement, quota share, which already exists and is 
accepted by Islamic scholars. Therefore, it can be concluded that under re-Takaful, quota 
share is permissible while the three re-insurance risk-sharing arrangements (surplus line, 
excess-of-loss, and stop-loss) are unpleasantly disliked (reprehensible) but not classified as 
prohibited. 
A further critical issue is in connection with the nature and principles of both Takaful 
insurance and re-Takaful. It may be argued that re-Takaful has some unique features which 
are different to Takaful insurance.186 As discussed in chapter 4.2, this thesis argues that the 
basic concept of Takaful insurance is that the original policyholders (participants) co-
operatively create a Takaful pool to protect them against future risks. To illustrate, if an 
insured risk occurs, the Takaful pool covers the entire loss. For example, if an original 
policyholder has insured his/her $1 million house and the house has been partially damaged 
with losses of $200,000, the Takaful pool (after consideration of a deductible for a claim if 
any)187 covers these losses. In contrast, the situation with re-Takaful is different. Re-Takaful 
refers to Takaful companies formed to co-operatively create a re-Takaful pool that re-insures 
their Takaful pools (policies) against future specified risks. In a quota share treaty, if a 
policyholder (ceding Takaful company) is exposed to a risk, both parties (the policyholder 
and the re-Takaful operator) will cover the loss based on the agreed proportionate share. 
The main concepts of Takaful and re-Takaful differ in practice. The Takaful pool 
compensates for the entire covered loss suffered by the policyholder (participant) who bears 
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no financial responsibility except payments of contributions (premiums) and a deductible for 
a claim if required. In contrast, the re-Takaful pool pays partial compensation to the Takaful 
company and does not cover the entire loss. Depending on the arrangement and 
predetermined percentage (e.g. a quota share treaty where the ceding Takaful insurer and the 
re-Takaful operator each bears 50 per cent of the loss), the re-Takaful parties (ceding Takaful 
insurer and re-Takaful operator) are jointly responsible for covering the covered loss. The 
policyholder (ceding Takaful insurer) is responsible for payments of premiums to the re-
Takaful operator as well as sharing with the re-Takaful operator in covering the loss. This 
view differs from the earlier re-Takaful literature that stated that there were no differences in 
the substantial concept of Takaful and re-Takaful except for the changing terminology of 
participants (individual under Takaful and Takaful company under re-Takaful).188 It is argued 
that there are differences in substance which may go beyond the terminology. Consequently, 
the principles applying to Takaful may not necessarily apply in the same way to re-Takaful. 
There are also some financial or actuarial issues that may occur with proportional and non-
proportional re-Takaful, particularly a quota share arrangement. In a hypothetical case, the 
ceding Takaful pool pays the re-Takaful pool 50 per cent out of its Takaful pool (for risk-
sharing). The ceding Takaful pool also pays its ceding Takaful operator a 10 or 20 (more or 
less) per cent wakalah (agency) fee for managing and investing the ceding Takaful funds, 
assuming that a wakalah model189 is used. In this case, limited funds may be left for claim 
payouts and future investments. Some ceding Takaful insurers charge the original 
policyholders a high wakalah fee, so that there are limited funds left in the Takaful 
policyholders’ funds. This could lead to the failure of the ceding Takaful insurance company. 
It can be argued that this issue may also be the position with the mudharabah and hybrid 
models. 
The agency problems among policyholders (ceding Takaful companies) and re-Takaful 
shareholders, referred to earlier at 6.3, cannot be solved properly by corporate governance 
mechanisms. This is because the Board of Directors represents re-Takaful shareholders and 
thus has a fiduciary responsibility to them rather than to individual policyholders. Similar to 
the views explored in 4.6.7 that in order to solve agency problems facing ceding Takaful 
insurers, establishing a “governance committee”—which is different from the Sharia 
Supervisory Board (SSB)—in re-Takaful operators can assist resolution of this issue. To 
avoid reiteration, see full discussion of the governance committee in chapter 4.6.7. 
In relation to the use of re-Takaful services offered by international conventional re-insurers, 
some conventional insurers/re-insurers may operate a window under the name of “re-
Takaful” but its operation may not be Sharia-compliant in practice. For example, Swiss Re, 
noted earlier, is a conventional re-insurance company that offers re-Takaful products.190 In 
                                                             
188 Arbouna, above n 67, 336-7; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 4, arts 18-20. 
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See chapter 4.5.1. 
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examining the Swiss Re company, especially its 2017 financial report,191 business report,192 
and corporate responsibility report,193 there is no mention of re-Takaful. The main principles 
of Takaful/re-Takaful such as segregation of funds (separating the re-Takaful participants’ 
funds from the re-Takaful operator’s fund) and Sharia investment requirements do not appear 
to be considered in these reports. This suggests that, in practice, the re-Takaful pool is not 
separated from its conventional re-insurance pool. This is contrary to re-Takaful principles. 
Therefore, when dealing with a conventional re-insurer offering re-Takaful, a ceding Takaful 
insurer must make sure the conventional re-insurer provides genuine re-Takaful and not just 
conventional re-insurance under the name of re-Takaful. 
The next discussion now goes to an alternative re-insurance approach under Sharia. 
6.6. A Sharia Alternative Approach to Re-Takaful and Conventional Re-insurance 
As discussed in chapter 4.4.4, Al-Zarqaa proposes an alternative view where conventional 
(commercial) insurance, with some modifications, is acceptable under Sharia.194 By qiyas 
(reasoning by analogy, see chapter 4.3), this view can also apply to validate conventional 
(commercial) re-insurance. 
Applying Al-Zarqaa’s insurance approach in chapter 4.4.4 to conventional re-insurance, Al-
Zarqaa’s modified view can also permit conventional re-insurance, as follows. The principle 
of mutual co-operation applied to Al-Zarqaa’s insurance view can similarly apply to 
conventional re-insurance. According to Al-Zarqaa’s insurance view, the three Sharia 
prohibited elements (riba, gharar, and maysir) are not breached by conventional insurance 
contracts nor, by parity of reasoning, are they breached by conventional re-insurance 
contracts. Furthermore, the argument dealing with the abolition of the principle of surplus 
distribution from conventional insurance can similarly apply to conventional re-insurance. 
This means that conventional re-insurers distributing surpluses to their shareholders instead 
of policyholders does not breach Sharia. As Al-Zarqaa likens conventional insurance 
contracts to other forms of Islamic contracts, e.g. alawaqel (compensation for unintentional 
killing), conventional re-insurance contracts can also be likened to the same Islamic 
contracts. Al-Zarqaa also applies Islamic sale contracts, in particular, to permit conventional 
insurance contracts. Similarly, under Islamic sale contracts, validating conventional re-
insurance contracts does not imply that all the conditions and provisions are automatically 
validated. If a condition in a conventional re-insurance contract breaches Sharia, e.g. 
investment in alcohol products, the condition is considered void while the conventional re-
insurance contract itself remains and is Islamically permissible. This means that according to 
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Al-Zarqaa’s modified view, the only requirement for permitting conventional re-insurance is 
the avoidance of any dealings prohibited by Sharia. 
As Al-Zarqaa’s insurance view could lead to three forms of insurance, Al-Zarqaa’s modified 
view could also lead to three forms of re-insurance: re-Takaful (accepted by the majority of 
Islamic scholars),195 conventional (commercial) re-insurance (rejected by the majority of 
Islamic scholars),196 and Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance (accepted by qiyas—reasoning 
by analogy—with Al-Zarqaa’s insurance approach). This thesis argues that Al-Zarqaa’s 
modified re-insurance approach should be accepted based on pluralism and different fatwas 
(Sharia decisions) which accept that there may be a divergence of opinion between scholars 
and schools in Islamic Sharia (see examples in chapter 4.4.4).197 Even though re-Takaful is 
preferred, the thesis argues that Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach allows a further 
Sharia alternative to the standard re-Takaful. 
6.7. The Way Forward for Re-Takaful 
The current re-Takaful risk-sharing arrangements (surplus line, excess-of-loss, and stop-loss) 
are taken from conventional re-insurance. If these re-Takaful risk-sharing arrangements are, 
on the thesis’s view discussed above at 6.5, unpleasantly disliked (reprehensible), but not 
prohibited, under Islamic principles and rules, they ought to be avoided, and proportional 
quota share should be used instead. But if it is not commercially viable to use quota share, the 
other three arrangements should be used. 
As suggested earlier, the re-Takaful alternatives—re-Takaful products offered by 
international conventional re-insurance companies (e.g. Munich Re, Swiss Re, Hannover Re), 
insurance company groups (insurance pooling), or international insurance company groups 
(international insurance pooling)—could be used instead of conventional re-insurance 
companies. However, it should be noted that there are still some critical issues related to 
these alternatives. Some re-insurance companies offer conventional re-insurance but under 
the name of re-Takaful, as indicated earlier. Also, in order for them to be workable and 
viable, they must operate through mutual structures which this thesis argues that this is not 
practically possible where they are required to operate as re-Takaful under a joint-stock 
company (JSC) structure.  
Operating re-Takaful through a mutual structure instead of a JSC structure can resolve many 
issues arising in re-Takaful operating under JSCs, particularly the problems related to 
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shareholders sharing in surpluses, providing qard hasan, and complying with solvency 
standards.      
For instance, re-Takaful shareholders in JSCs expect dividends, but this is inconsistent with 
the Takaful principle of non-profit. Shareholders own and control the re-Takaful company 
which is against the principle of mutual co-operation. These principles are practically 
impossible to implement where re-Takaful operators are JSCs owned and controlled by 
shareholders. 
Operating re-Takaful through mutual structures (including the re-Takaful alternatives 
provided above) is subject to criticism. One especially important issue concerns large 
catastrophic risks—e.g. pipelines, petroleum, mines—undertaken by ceding Takaful insurers 
for which a re-Takaful operator in a mutual structure may be, on some views, incapable of 
providing re-insurance protection. Mutual insurers who share common risks, such as the 
Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Company (LMIC)198 (explained in chapter 5.3.2) shows a 
successful example of insurance and re-insurance operated under mutual structures with 
similar risks. However, there is the argument that re-Takaful cannot operate properly and 
survive except through joint-stock companies (JSCs) with shareholders. This is because 
shareholders provide the re-Takaful company with the capital requirements for the 
infrastructure and operations (see chapter 5.3.2). 
Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance view avoids all these issues. It is argued that Al-Zarqaa’s 
approach should be considered for adoption as the best Sharia re-insurance alternative. Al-
Zarqaa’s approach contributes to the re-Takaful industry through providing re-Takaful with a 
reasonable resolution and acceptable compromise which avoids all issues facing re-Takaful 
under JSCs with shareholders and issues facing re-Takaful under mutual structures with no 
shareholders.  
6.8. A Sharia-Compliance Analysis of Saudi Re-insurance Regulations 
This section critically discusses the main re-insurance regulations in Saudi Arabia as well as 
other related re-insurance provisions contained in Saudi insurance laws, regulations, 
implementations, and policies. This examination is based on Takaful and re-Takaful 
principles. It then elaborates how Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance view can overcome all 
the issues of concern in Saudi re-insurance laws. 
In Saudi Arabia, re-insurance regulations have yet to be fully developed. The main regulation 
controlling Saudi re-insurance activities is the Regulation of Reinsurance Activities199 (RRA) 
issued in 2010, as discussed in chapter 3.2.5. The RRA appears to be similar to conventional 
re-insurance regulations. For example, it does not directly refer to the different risks-sharing 
arrangements of conventional re-insurance: proportional (quota share and surplus line) and 
non-proportional (excess-of-loss and stop-loss). There are indirect references, for example art 
21 of the RRA states:  
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199 Regulation of Reinsurance Activities, above n 30. 
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The form of the reinsurance arrangement may affect the level of the retention. For instance, a 
per risk retention under a quota share arrangement may be higher than that under an excess of 
loss.200 
The Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 
(IR) issued in 2004 directly indicates some types of conventional re-insurance and some 
risks-sharing arrangements of conventional re-insurance. The IR  refers to “facultative re-
insurance”, “automatic re-insurance”, “quota share”, and “excess-of-loss” by providing a 
definition for each of these.201 Similarly, the IR adopts the language of conventional re-
insurance. This is apparent when the IR uses the term “re-insurance” instead of “re-Takaful”. 
There is no mention of re-Takaful in any insurance and re-insurance regulations. Likewise, 
the Regulation of Reinsurance Activities (RRA) requires Saudi re-insurance to comply with 
international best practice.202 The terms used in Saudi re-insurance contracts are taken from 
international conventional re-insurance in general and London re-insurance in particular.203 
This indicates a certain correspondence between Saudi re-insurance regulations and those for 
conventional re-insurance. It also indicates that Saudi re-insurance is largely obtained through 
conventional re-insurers and not through re-Takaful.  
The RRA, along with the IR, allow Saudi re-insurers to undertake re-insurance agreements 
with international conventional re-insurers outside Saudi Arabia on condition of obtaining 
SAMA’s approval.204 This further demonstrates how Saudi re-insurance regulations 
authorise, without restrictions, the dealings with conventional re-insurers and without 
explicitly taking into account Islamic principles in general or re-Takaful principles in 
particular. This indicates that the Saudi regulations function in similar fashion to 
conventional re-insurance regulations. The arguments over whether this is Sharia-compliant 
are referred to above. 
The IR, together with the Surplus Distribution Policy issued in 2015, breach the Takaful/re-
Takaful principle of mutuality (risk-sharing and not risk transfer) when both transfer risk 
from the ceding insurer to the re-insurer. The IR defines re-insurance as ‘Transfer of the 
insured's risk from the insurer to the reinsurer ...'205 The Surplus Distribution Policy states ‘… 
as the insurer of record by issuing a policy, but then passes the entire risk to a reinsurer in 
exchange for a commission.’206 This implies an acceptance that appropriate insurance may 
not be possible without resort to appropriate re-insurance, especially when dealing with 
catastrophic risks or risks related to infrastructures required for electricity e.g. transmission 
lines, oil infrastructures e.g. refineries and pipelines, and ports. This also indicates pragmatic 
re-insurance law-making in Saudi Arabia. This is apparent when the RRA, the IR, and the 
Surplus Distribution Policy have been enacted by internal regulations (SAMA or Ministerial 
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orders) instead of Royal decrees, see discussion of Royal decrees and Ministerial orders in 
chapter 2.2. This further raises the issue of SAMA combining the supervisory authority and 
legislative (regulatory) authority; this issue is explored in the next chapter 7.   
The RRA, together with other Saudi related insurance regulations, does not refer to the three 
re-Takaful operational models—wakalah (agency), mudharabah (profit-sharing), and 
hybrid—nor does it refer to the qard hasan (interest-free loan). As noted in chapter 3.2.1, re-
insurance laws and regulations effectively provide a statutory qard facility to be set aside out 
of shareholders’ income. The Saudi rules and regulations make no reference to the re-Takaful 
operational models (wakalah, mudharabah, hybrid) so that—with the exception of a statutory 
reserve (a statutory qard facility)—re-insurance laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia are 
similar to those in conventional re-insurance and thus are not consistent with the re-Takaful 
principles. 
The distribution of surpluses and payment to shareholders’ income are referred to in Saudi 
insurance regulations. As examined in chapters 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, Saudi insurance regulations 
allocate 90 per cent of the net surplus to the ceding Takaful operator’s fund (shareholders’ 
account) and 10 per cent for the ceding Takaful participants’ funds.207 Since the Law on 
Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (LSCIC) and its Implementing Rules for 
the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law (IR) were enacted to regulate insurance as well as 
re-insurance,208 it can be assumed, by parity of reasoning, that the same regulations will apply 
to re-Takaful operations. This is where 90 per cent of the net surplus will be distributed to the 
re-Takaful operator’s fund (re-Takaful shareholders’ account) and 10 per cent of the net 
surplus will go to the re-Takaful policyholders’ funds.209 These Saudi re-insurance provisions 
are not consistent with the re-Takaful principles related to surplus distribution where profits 
and surpluses belong to the re-Takaful policyholders and not to the re-Takaful operator 
(shareholders).  
Since all re-insurance operations in Saudi Arabia are required to operate as JSCs210 and re-
Takaful principles are not consistent with the operation of JSCs, this chapter concludes that 
Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach can apply to re-insurance operations and re-
insurance regulations in Saudi Arabia; this can avoid all the issues facing the Saudi re-
Takaful industry. Thus, this thesis asserts that Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach 
represents the best Sharia solution to apply to Saudi re-insurance companies and regulations.      
6.9. Summary  
The chapter discussed the main functions of conventional (commercial) re-insurance and how 
it operates. Re-insurance assists ceding insurance companies in spreading risk. Re-insurance 
plays an essential part in capital solvency, the risk management strategy, and the growth and 
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survival of ceding insurance. The chapter also discussed conventional re-insurance and re-
Takaful (Islamic re-insurance). It highlighted the types of re-insurance agreements 
(facultative, automatic, and facultative-obligatory), the types of arrangements to share risks 
(proportional including quota share and surplus line treaties, and non-proportional including 
excess-of-loss and stop-loss), and the concept of pooling as a type of re-insurance.  
This discussion of conventional re-insurance provided important background context to re-
Takaful that functions similarly to conventional re-insurance, but with some unique 
exceptions. It was noted that pooling arrangements provide a Sharia-compliant alternative to 
conventional re-insurance. The chapter discussed the two types of re-Takaful contracts 
(facultative and automatic) and explained why facultative-obligatory contracts may not be 
Sharia-compliant. The chapter proposed that automatic re-Takaful contracts might be 
prohibited under re-Takaful rules as they contain Sharia prohibited gharar (uncertainty) for 
the re-Takaful operator that is obliged to accept all future risks undertaken by the 
policyholder. This means that facultative re-Takaful would be the only accepted type of re-
Takaful contracts. This view is contrary to the majority opinion of Islamic scholars who 
permit both facultative and automatic re-Takaful contracts. 
The chapter discussed how Takaful requirements have been applied to re-Takaful with its 
requirements related to policyholders’ underwriting and investment funds and the rules 
relating to surpluses and profits in these funds. It also discussed how the Takaful models 
(wakalah/agency, mudharabah/profit-sharing, and hybrid) have been applied to re-Takaful. 
The re-Takaful operator, as the manager of the policyholders’ underwriting and investment 
funds, is remunerated through either a wakalah fee, a mudharabah share, or combination of a 
mix of a wakalah fee and a mudharabah (hybrid) share for managing and investing the re-
Takaful participants’ funds. The chapter argued that the application of the three Takaful 
models is problematic from a financial and actuarial viewpoint. 
The chapter then highlighted the main differences between re-Takaful and conventional re-
insurance and the issues of Sharia-compliance. Sharia-compliance requires the Takaful 
principles and rules to apply to the re-Takaful operator, e.g. avoiding the three Sharia 
prohibited elements: riba (interest/usury or money for money), gharar (uncertainty), and 
maysir (gambling), and applying payment of premiums as tabarru (donation/charity), 
separation of re-Takaful funds, risk-sharing and not risk transfer, avoidance of Sharia 
prohibited investments, and so on. 
In particular, the chapter examined the Islamic principles of darura (necessity or dire need) 
and its elements: makhmasah (starvation/severe hunger), baghi (desiring/craving/wilful 
disobedience), aadee (transgressing/exceeding the limit), and mutajanif liithm (inclination to 
sin/ inclining wilfully to sin) in relation to re-Takaful. Although the majority opinion of 
Islamic scholars permits ceding Takaful insurers to buy conventional re-insurance instead of 
re-Takaful, the chapter argued the Sharia impermissibility to do so. It also identified three 
alternative approaches available to ceding Takaful insurers as equivalent to re-Takaful: re-
Takaful products offered by international conventional re-insurance companies, insurance 
company groups (insurance pooling), or international insurance company groups 
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(international insurance pooling). However, the first alternative was demonstrated to operate 
only under the name of “re-Takaful”, and the mutual structures of the other alternatives were 
subject to criticism and unresolved issues.  
The chapter critically analysed re-Takaful operated by the re-Takaful industry globally and in 
Saudi Arabia in particular. It demonstrated that three risk-sharing arrangements of re-Takaful 
contracts (surplus line, excess-of-loss, and stop-loss) are compatible with the conventional re-
insurance industry but, on one view, may be contrary to re-Takaful principles. On the other 
hand, these risk-sharing arrangements of re-Takaful fall under doubtful matters which are 
unpleasantly disliked (reprehensible) to use, but not necessarily considered contrary to re-
Takaful principles. The chapter also analysed actuarial (financial) and qard hasan (interest-
free loan) issues facing the current re-Takaful industry. 
The chapter concluded that some re-Takaful activities of ceding Takaful insurers in Saudi 
Arabia as well as some provisions of Saudi re-insurance laws and regulations may not be 
consistent with re-Takaful principles and rules. It found major issues facing re-Takaful and 
concluded by discussing how they can be overcome. One of these issues relates to dealing 
with conventional re-insurance. Another issue facing re-Takaful is its operation under JSCs. 
A further issue is the operation of re-Takaful under mutual structures. To overcome these 
issues, the alternative is conventional re-insurance based on the modified re-insurance 
approach as advocated by Al-Zarqaa which would Islamically permit conventional re-
insurance with the condition of avoiding all dealings prohibited by Sharia, e.g. investing in 
alcohol and gambling. The adoption of Al-Zarqaa‘s modified re-insurance approach can 
resolve many issues facing the re-Takaful industry such as the risk of non Sharia-compliance 
when dealing with conventional re-insurance as well as the risk of re-insuring large 
catastrophic risks, e.g. pipelines, which are beyond the capacity of mutual re-Takaful 
operators. Therefore, Al-Zarqaa‘s modified re-insurance approach overcomes the issues 
facing conventional re-insurance, mutual re-Takaful, and re-Takaful under JSCs. 
The next chapter provides a critical analysis of insurance regulations and Takaful insurance 




Sharia-Compliance and Takaful Insurance in Saudi Arabia 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the Takaful insurance industry in Saudi Arabia and Sharia-compliance. 
In this context, it examines SAMA’s powers in relation to insurance and insurance 
regulations. A critical analysis examines the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)’s 
core insurance laws and regulations from a Sharia perspective.1 
Insurance companies in Saudi Arabia are also critically examined based on established 
Takaful principles and rules. Three Saudi Takaful insurance companies’ annual reports are 
chosen to illustrate the problems in applying Takaful principles to the insurance industry in 
Saudi Arabia. The selection has been limited to three insurers as most insurers annual reports 
are not formally published on their websites and the examination of three insurers allows 
sufficient critical examination. The discussed annual reports are those of Tawuniya (the 
largest part government owned insurer), one medium size insurer, and one small insurer. This 
examination elucidates the practical application of Takaful principles (excluding from 
consideration health and life insurance, see chapter 1.6).  
It is argued that Saudi insurance regulations recognise that modernising influences are 
inevitable as a consequence of Saudi insurance companies having to operate through joint-
stock companies (JSCs). It further argues that Al-Zarqaa’s insurance model is the key to 
operating a modern Takaful insurance system. For the purposes of this chapter, references to 
Takaful also include re-Takaful. 
In order to highlight the nature of Saudi Takaful insurance, reference to Sharia-compliance of 
the Takaful insurance industry in other Islamic countries and in countries where conventional 
insurance companies offer Takaful and re-Takaful products is also made. The chapter 
concludes that Saudi Takaful companies, which are required to operate through a joint-stock 
company (JSC), are unable to consistently comply with the tenets of Sharia law and Takaful 
and re-Takaful principles. This is discussed in detail in chapter 6.5.  
7.2. Insurance Laws and Regulations in Saudi Arabia: An Analysis from a Sharia 
Perspective 
Chapter 4 discussed how Takaful has slowly been adapted to the needs of businesses and the 
community in the insurance industry. This section critically examines whether the insurance 
regulations and rules in Saudi Arabia comply with Sharia law and Takaful principles. It 
examines SAMA’s insurance laws: the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies (LSCIC), the Implementing Rules (IR), the ICGR (Insurance Corporate 
Governance Regulation), the RMR (Risk Management Regulation), and the RRA (Regulation 
                                                             
1 These insurance laws and regulations are the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 
(LSCIC), the Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies (IR), the 
ICGR (Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation), the RMR (Risk Management Regulation), and the RRA 
(Regulation of Reinsurance Activities). 
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of Reinsurance Activities), as discussed in 3.2. It should be noted that this examination is only 
based in Sharia and does not consider Western approaches. 
Insurance regulations in Saudi Arabia reflect the problems faced in applying Takaful 
principles to insurance. Modern business and finance cannot operate without adequate 
insurance as part of prudent management and business. Nor is it feasible for Takaful insurers 
to operate under mutual structures as unincorporated entities, see 5.3.2 and 6.7. Once it is 
accepted that Takaful insurance companies can legally and effectively only operate as JSCs, 
the problem is how to balance the rights of shareholders with that of policyholders based on 
Takaful principles. As noted previously, Saudi insurance regulations provide that Takaful 
insurers are required to distribute 10 per cent of the net operational surplus to the 
policyholders and 90 per cent to the shareholders.2 This may breach the surplus principle of 
Takaful, as explained in chapter 4.6.3. 
Under Saudi insurance regulations, the total surplus from the operations list is calculated as 
the difference between premiums (donations) minus compensation and other administrative 
expenses.3 The net surplus is calculated as the difference between the total surplus minus 
policyholders’ investment returns.4 The following Table 7.1 sets out the formula for 
determining surpluses in the operations list. The operations list, although not titled 
policyholders’ underwriting fund (PUF), may perform the same functions as it is concerned 
with the costs, expenses, and technical allocations to be paid from premium receipts. 
Table 7.15 
Total surplus = premiums – (compensation6 & administration costs) 
Net surplus = total surplus +/– policyholders’ investment returns 
Net surplus distribution = 10% policyholders, 90% shareholders 
 
The insurance regulations do not provide detailed information about what counts as 
investment returns or how the policyholders’ portions of investment returns are determined. 
Investment returns most likely refer to returns from the investment of premiums paid to the 
investment fund (PIF). Art 70(2d) of the IR provides that: 
The net surplus shall be arrived at by adding to, or subtracting from, the total surplus, the 
insured parties’ investment return share after calculating the insured parties’ earnings and 
subtracting what they owe in expenses realized.7 
                                                             
2 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 2004 (Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia by Ministerial Order No. 1/596), art 70 (2.e); Surplus Distribution Policy 2015 (Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA)), art 1. 
3 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 70 (2.c). 
4 Ibid art 70 (2.d). 
5 The Table is made by the thesis researcher. 
6 This is assumed to be sums received by way of re-insurance. 
7 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 70 (2.d). 
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This provision sets out the formula for determining the net surplus. This is then used for the 
distribution mechanism in art 70(2e) of the IR which provides that the net surplus is to be 
distributed 10% to policyholders and 90% to the shareholders’ income account. 
There are detailed procedures in the Surplus Distribution Policy for returning individual 
policyholders’ shares in the net surplus. This is either through direct payment or by way of 
premium reduction in the following. An examination of the selected Saudi Takaful 
companies does not indicate how these distributions were affected or the figures for 
determining the net surplus, see below 7.3. 
Takaful principles require formal segregation between the shareholders’ fund and the 
policyholders’ funds—participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) and participants’ investment 
fund (PIF), see chapter 4.6. Although the LSCIC (Law on Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies) and the IR (Implementing Rules) do not directly require fund 
segregation of these funds, the LSCIC require separate accounts and the IR requires separate 
financial lists. The LSCIC states: 
… there are accounts for shareholders and other separate accounts for the insured persons and 
insurance operations.8 
The IR provides: 
Financial lists shall include the financial position list for insurance operations and 
shareholders, the insurance operations surplus (deficit) list, the shareholders’ income list, the 
shareholders’ equity list, the insurance operations cash flow list, and the shareholders’ cash 
flow list.9 
Consequently, there appears to be, notionally at least, some separation between insurance 
operations and shareholder income and equity but it is not clear whether this satisfies the 
Takaful principle of segregation (see 4.6.5). According to the Ernst & Young 2013 report, 
although Saudi insurance regulations require segregation between the policyholders’ funds 
and the shareholders’ fund10 and may require separate financial lists for investment and 
underwriting funds,11 there is no actual and tangible separation.12 This may breach the 
Takaful principle of segregation, see chapter 4.6.5. No later information is available at the 
time of writing. 
Under SAMA’s regulations and guidelines, SAMA requires Saudi insurers to comply with 
‘the requirements of the insurance law, the Implementing Rules [IR] and other SAMA 
                                                             
8 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies 2003 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree 
M/32), art 2 (2a). 
9 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 70 (1). 
10 Ernst & Young (EY), 'Global Takaful Insights 2013: Finding Growth Markets' (2013) EY, 79. 
11 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 70. This 
art requires a financial position list for insurance operations and shareholders, insurance operations surplus 
(deficit) list, the shareholders/income list, the shareholders/equity list, and cash flow lists for insurance 
operations and shareholders. 
12 Ernst & Young (EY), above n 10, 79. 
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regulations.’13 As discussed in chapter 3.6, there are two types of risk of non-compliance that 
Saudi insurers must avoid. These are risk of non-compliance with local regulations (legal 
non-compliance) and risk of non-compliance with Sharia. It is apparent that SAMA is only 
concerned with insurers’ compliance with its insurance laws and regulations and not with 
Sharia-compliance. For example, insurance and re-insurance regulations make no mention of 
Takaful or re-Takaful models. The Implementing Rules for the Cooperative Insurance 
Companies Law (IR) provides a list of risks that insurance companies must consider in their 
risk management policies.14 However, the risk of non-compliance with Sharia is not 
mentioned. These issues are discussed below. 
Other less important issues, although necessary for the operation of a modern economy, are 
contestable as they may be inconsistent with Sharia. These include limitation periods for 
bringing claims,15 contributions paid to SAMA for supervision and inspection costs,16 and the 
imposition of a value added tax (VAT) on goods and services.17 These are not considered in 
this thesis as they are marginal to the key research questions. 
                                                             
13 Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation 2015 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)), art 4; Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), FAQs: General Insurance Information (2018) SAMA, [35], [37] 
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/Insurance/Pages/FAQs.aspx>. 
14 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 60. 
15 Insurance regulations in Saudi Arabia require and restrict the insured to bring a legal insurance action before 
the Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Violations within a five-year period of time from the 
awareness of the accident. This may violate the Sharia statute of limitations. See Unified Compulsory Motor 
Insurance Policy 2018 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)), art 7 (8.b); Wissam Hachem et al, 
'Insurance and Reinsurance in Saudi Arabia: Overview' (2018) Practical Law Country Q&A, [18]; Clyde & Co 
(C&C), 'Insurance and Reinsurance in Saudi Arabia: Overview' (2015) (C&C), [18]-[19]; Senior Scientists, 
Research of Senior Scientists in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [ ةیدوعسلا ةیبرعلا ةكلمملاب ءاملعلا رابك ةئیھ ثاحبأ ] (General 
Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta (GPSRI), 4 ed, 2014) vol 7, 161, 201-2, 207-8; Islamweb, 
Determined Legal Rights shall not be Subject to a Statute of Limitations [ مداقتلاب طقست ال ةررقملا ةیعرشلا قوقحلا ] 
Fatwa No. 49395 (2004) 
<http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&lang=A&Id=49395>; 
Islamweb, Does the Right be Revoked Based on a Statute of Limitations [ نامزلا مداقتب قحلا طقسی لھ ] Fatwa No. 
134846 (2010) <http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=134846>; 
Islamweb, The Right shall not be Subject to a Statute of Limitations even if the Hearing of the Claim has been 
Rejected [ ھب ىوعدلا لوبق طقس ولو مداقتلاب قحلا طقسی ال ] Fatwa No. 129103 (2009) 
<http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&lang=A&Id=129103>; 
Meziane Mohamed Amine, 'Rules of the Statute of Limitations in Islamic Sharia' (2014) 15(24) Islamic 
Civilization Journal 15, 15-6.  
16 Insurance regulations in Saudi Arabia require insurers and re-insurers to pay some fees of total underwriting 
premiums to SAMA for supervision and inspection costs and impose fines for payment delay. This may violate 
Takaful principles, particularly surpluses belonging to policyholders and the principles of tabarru 
(charity/donation) as Takaful is meant to be non-profit. See Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 36; Regulations for Supervision and Inspection Costs 2009 
(Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)). 
17 The Value Added Tax Law (VATL) and its implementation (the Value Added Tax-Implementing 
Regulations) impose a value added tax (VAT) of 5 per cent on insurance products while life insurance and life 
re-insurance are tax-free. This raises some issues and concerns such as what is the legal basis that excludes life 
insurance from taxes but not general insurance; and whether imposing taxes on general insurance breaches the 
Takaful principle of tabarru (charity/donation) as Takaful is non-profit. See Value Added Tax Law 2017 
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by Council of Ministers (Cabinet)); Value Added Tax-Implementing Regulations 
2018 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by General Authority of Zakat and Tax (GAZT)); General Authority of Zakat 
and Tax (GAZT), What Is VAT [Value Added Tax] (2017) GAZT <https://www.vat.gov.sa/en>; General 
Authority of Zakat and Tax (GAZT), Goods and Services Subject to VAT [Value Added Tax] (2017) GAZT 
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The issue of Sharia non-compliance is also evident when comparison is made with other laws 
enacted by Saudi Arabia. For instance, the LSCIC (Law on Supervision of Cooperative 
Insurance Companies), issued by Royal Decree, emphasises the importance of compliance 
with Sharia. Its introduction requires insurance in Saudi Arabia to be ‘in accordance with the 
principles of Islamic Shari[a].’18 In striking contrast, the ICGR (Insurance Corporate 
Governance Regulation), issued by SAMA, cites compulsory compliance with a very long 
list of laws19 but makes no mention of Sharia-compliance. Further, the RMR (Risk 
Management Regulation), issued by SAMA, aims to ‘promote high standards of risk 
management’20 and requires compliance with the LSCIC and its Implementing Rules (IR). 
The RMR states ‘This Code [RMR] must be read in conjunction with the Law on Supervision 
of Cooperative Insurance Companies [LSCIC] and its Implementing Rules [IR].’21 But no 
such emphasis is given to Sharia-compliance. Similarly, the RRA (Regulation of Reinsurance 
Activities), issued by SAMA, emphasises promoting and implementing high re-insurance 
standards and compliance with the LSCIC and the IR.22 Similarly, there is no mention of  
Sharia-compliance. 
Although the LSCIC (Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies) indicates 
the importance of obeying Islamic principles,23 there are no mechanisms for reporting and 
enforcing Sharia-compliance, such as the imposition of penalties for violations. Art 2 (2a) of 
the LSCIC delegates to the IR (Implementing Rules) the setting of rules for the distribution of 
surplus, taking into account the separation between the shareholders’ fund and policyholders’ 
funds.24 Yet, more generally the LSCIC does not seem to take into account most Takaful 
principles. 
On examination of LSCIC’s Implementing Rules (IR), there is no reference to Takaful 
principles. The IR regulates Takaful insurance companies in much the same way as with 
conventional insurance. For example, under definitions, the IR defines a “Company” as ‘A 
public joint stock company conducting insurance and/or reinsurance activities’, an “Insurer” 
as ‘An insurance company that accept[s] insurance contracts directly from insured(s)’, and an 
“Insured” as ‘A natural person or juristic entity, which has entered into an insurance 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
<https://www.vat.gov.sa/en/vat-rate>; Standard Convention for Value Added Tax in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council Countries 2016 (Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (GCC)). 
18 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 8, art 1. 
19 Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation, above n 13, art 4. 
20 Risk Management Regulation 2008 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA)), art 2. 
21 Ibid art 3. 
22 Regulation of Reinsurance Activities 2010 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)) arts 2-3. 
23 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 8, art 1. 
24 Ibid art 2 (2.a). It states:  
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (the "Agency") [SAMA] shall, in the course of implementing the 
Regulations, have the following powers: 2- To supervise technically the operations of insurance and re-
insurance in accordance with the principles specified by the Implementing Rules [IR] of the Law and 
with the methods of supervision used by the Agency, and in particular: a) Regulating and approving the 
rules of investment in insurance and re-insurance operations and establishing a formula for the 
distribution of the surplus of insurance and re-insurance operations between the shareholders and the 
insured persons after giving regard that there are accounts for shareholders and other separate accounts 
for the insured persons and insurance operations. 
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contract.’25 Under Takaful insurance definitions, the “company” is the same as the operator, 
the “insurer” and the “insured” are the policyholder, see discussion in chapter 4.6.1. The IR 
definitions adopt conventional insurance definitions. The IR also adopts conventional 
insurance definitions of “Re-insurance” as ‘Transfer of the insured’s risk…’26 rather than the 
re-Takaful principle of mutuality, see chapter 6.3.2.  Similarly, the RMR (Risk Management 
Regulation) states ‘Reinsurance risk is the risk associated with transferring part of the risk to 
another company.’27 
Nor does the IR require insurance companies to have a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) 
which should ensure Sharia-compliance. The IR defines an “Insurance Supervisor” as ‘A 
government agency or public institution responsible for the supervision and control of the 
insurance sector’, an “Insurance Advisor” as ‘A natural person or juristic entity who provides 
insurance consultative services’, and a “Compliance Officer” as ‘A natural person that is 
concerned with regulatory work to ensure compliance with all rules and regulations.’28 
The IR (Implementing Rules) defines “Contribution (Premium)” as the ‘Amount offered by 
the insured to the insurer in exchange for the insurer’s acceptance to indemnify the insured 
for loss/damages resulting directly from a covered risk.’29 This does not reflect the concept of 
tabarru (charity/donation), see chapter 4.6.1. Under Takaful, the contribution (premium) is 
not offered in exchange for compensation. The premium is paid as tabarru for mutual co-
operation in which the Takaful pool, not the insurance company, will compensate the 
policyholder.  
With respect to the distribution of surplus and the non-profit principles, the IR defines 
“Surplus Distribution” as a ‘Method by which profit of insurance and reinsurance companies 
is distributed among shareholders and policyholders.’30 The IR also states: 
10% of the net surplus shall be distributed to the policyholders directly, or in the form of 
reduction in premiums for the next year. The remaining 90% of the net surplus shall be 
transferred to the shareholders’ income statement.31 
This is not consistent with the Takaful principle of surpluses, see 4.6.3. This is because 
surpluses must be distinguished from profits. Surpluses are whatever premiums 
(contributions) are left in the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) after payment of costs 
and claims and making provision for reserves; shareholders (or the operator) cannot share in 
these surpluses under all Takaful models. Profits are the investment earnings in the 
participants’ investment fund (PIF) in which the operator and, consequently the shareholders, 
is permitted to share, under the mudharabah (profit-sharing) and hybrid (mixed) models only. 
                                                             
25 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 1 (13, 
14, 16). 
26 Ibid art 1 (8). 
27 Risk Management Regulation, above n 20, art 30. 
28 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 1 (6, 25, 
39). 
29 Ibid art 1 (18). 
30 Ibid art 1 (34). 
31 Ibid art 70 (2.e); Surplus Distribution Policy, above n 2, art 1. 
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Yet, the IR allows shareholders (operator) to share in both surpluses and profits. Further, 
profits in the PIF should, under Takaful principles, belong to the policyholders. If under the 
mudharabah and hybrid models, the operator is entitled to share in the investment fund, 
Islamic scholars have argued that the operator should be limited to 10 per cent of profits, see 
discussion at 7.3. The IR applies this in reverse by allocating the larger share of profits to the 
operator (which are available to shareholders through dividends) and less to policyholders. 
This furthermore creates other issues where Takaful insurance companies in Saudi Arabia 
operate for profit, see discussion in 7.3.1.   
It is apparent that the IR (Implementing Rules) does not reflect other Takaful principles. 
Where there is a deficit, neither the IR or Saudi insurance regulations oblige Takaful 
operators to provide a qard hasan (interest-free loan), see 4.5. The qard hasan is no longer 
available in Saudi insurance,32 but a statutory qard (loan) facility is required instead, see 
3.2.2. Also, a governance committee should be called upon to prevent conflicts of interest 
between policyholders and shareholders, see 4.6.7. Yet, this is not required by the IR. In 
relation to decision-making, the IR does not recognise any role for policyholders to play in 
decision-making for the Takaful company. As far as social welfare services are concerned, 
the IR does not consider such matters as part of its primary purposes.33 Art 4 of the IR 
provides a list of requirements for granting insurance licences (permits);34 there is no 
reference to, or reflection on, Takaful principles in the list. The IR also allows domestic 
insurers to deal with foreign insurers in relation to risks that are not insurable in Saudi 
Arabia.35 This provision is not in line with Takaful principles since foreign insurers offer 
conventional insurance, and not Takaful. The IR further allows insurers to deal with re-
insurers outside Saudi Arabia under certain criteria.36 This is also not in accord with Takaful 
principles as all the required criteria are secular and involve dealing with recognised insurers 
but do not take Takaful principles into account.  
In Saudi Arabia, insurance regulations are not consistent with Takaful principles. This is 
because Saudi insurance companies operate under JSCs. Chapters 5.3.2 and 6.7 have 
                                                             
32 Ernst & Young (EY), above n 10, 12, 79. 
33 The IR states its objectives as: 
1. Protection of policyholders and shareholders. 2. Encouraging fair and effective competition. 3. 
Enhancing the stability of the insurance market. 4. Enhancing the insurance sector in the Kingdom [of 
Saudi Arabia], and provide training and employment opportunities to Saudi nationals. 
See Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 2. 
34 Ibid art 4. 
35 Ibid art 14. This states: 
The Company and all Insurance and Reinsurance Services Providers shall obtain prior written approval 
of SAMA before dealing with Lloyd’s insurance brokers or foreign companies to cover risks that 
cannot be covered through a licensed Company in the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia]. 
36 Ibid art 42 (1, 2). The criteria that must be met are: 
a) The foreign reinsurer is licensed and authorized to transact the kinds of insurance proposed in the 
Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] in its country of domicile. b) The insurance supervisor of the foreign 
reinsurer must authorize the exchange of relevant information with SAMA. c) The foreign reinsurer 
must maintain separate records and financial statements of all Saudi operation and be ready to provide 
SAMA with any related information upon request. d) The Company shall provide SAMA with the 
reinsurer’s financial statements related to the most recent financial year. e) The Company must provide 




indicated that Takaful insurance may be put into effect through a simpler structure such as a 
mutual insurance company, although it must be noted that the mutual insurance structure may 
not work with all types of risks because of the lack of capital and limitations on the types of 
insurance available using mutual insurance. To avoid these issues, the thesis argues that Al-
Zarqaa’s insurance model (see 4.4.4 and 6.6) should apply in Saudi Arabia as a Sharia 
alternative to Takaful, mutual insurance, and conventional insurance. 
In summary, many of SAMA’s insurance laws and regulations are not consistent with 
Takaful principles. It is significant to note that SAMA’s insurance laws and regulations may 
not be consistent with Al-Zarqaa’s insurance view either. This is because Al-Zarqaa’s view 
requires compliance with Sharia investment activities which are not reflected in SAMA’s 
insurance regulations. Rather, SAMA’s insurance regulations are typically based on 
conventional insurance, with no limitation requiring Takaful insurance companies to avoid 
Sharia prohibited investment activities. For Saudi Takaful insurers, they are forced to comply 
with SAMA’s insurance laws and regulations. It is argued, to the extent, that modern 
insurance companies can (consistently with their duties to shareholders) comply with Sharia, 
they should do so. It is argued that Al-Zarqaa’s model, which prohibits non Sharia-compliant 
investments, should be adopted by SAMA’s insurance laws and regulations.  
7.3. Takaful Insurers: An Analysis from a Sharia Perspective 
This section critically examines whether Takaful insurers in Saudi Arabia comply with Sharia 
and Takaful principles. 
In relation to investment compliance with Sharia, it is very difficult for joint-stock companies 
(JSCs), particularly Takaful companies listed on the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul), 
discussed in chapter 2.6.4, to avoid all Sharia prohibited investments. Investments related to 
stock markets are more likely to involve activities or investments that are prohibited in Sharia 
such as riba. Takaful companies might also have investments that are initially acceptable but 
later engage in Sharia prohibited investments.37 This can occur where there are investments in 
a subsidiary (associated) company involved in Sharia prohibited activities, see examples 
below. In these examples, the focus is on major prohibited investments rather than 
investments that might be avoided by the Sharia purification, see chapter 6.3.5.   
The following section examines whether Takaful insurance companies in Saudi Arabia 
comply with Takaful principles. 
7.3.1. Annual Reports Analyses of Saudi Insurance Companies 
This section examines the annual reports of three Saudi Takaful insurance companies 
representing a large insurer, a medium and a small insurer to determine whether these 
companies’ operations comply with Takaful principles. A Table of all insurance companies is 
provided in Table 3.1 in chapter 3.1. The examination relies on the insurance companies’ 
annual reports which are not all available on their websites nor in English, despite the duty to 
                                                             
37 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 'Guiding Principles on Governance for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) 
Undertakings' (2009) IFSB, art 94. 
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produce annual reports to the public (see chapter 3.2.1).38 The examination concludes by 
proposing a Sharia alternative solution (Al-Zarqaa’s insurance approach) that should be 
adopted to ensure Sharia-compliance.39 
In connection with the disclosure of financial information, Saudi laws and regulations under 
the Capital Market Authority (CMA) require JSCs, which are listed on the Saudi stock 
exchange (Tadawul), to publish their annual reports through the publication in electronic 
services including their websites.40 Al-Kahtani’s study, explained below at 7.4, stated that the 
majority, not all, of listed JSCs have published their annual reports on their websites.41 But 
this did not refer explicitly to insurance companies. The reality is that many Saudi insurers do 
not publish their annual reports on their websites despite being in breach of Saudi insurance 
laws which require insurers’ annual reports to be published online, particularly on their 
websites42 (see 3.2.1). The majority of insurance companies listed on the Saudi Tadawul do 
not do so; few do.43 This suggests the regulator, which is SAMA, has been inactive in 
enforcing and implementing the insurance laws and regulations.44 This may negatively affect 
                                                             
38 As annual reports were not available on insurance companies’ online websites, the thesis scholar had to make 
a field trip to Saudi Arabia to collect these annual reports. The latest available annual reports, at the time of this 
thesis, are up to 2018. To limit the examination, selections of recent annual reports (from 2015 to 2018) have 
been used. It must be noted that these annual reports are available in Arabic only.  
39 The figures used in the analyses are the Saudi Arabian Riyal (SAR) with the US$ equivalent in brackets based 
on a conversion rate of US$1 equals SAR3.75. The exchange rate is up to 21 March 2020 where this thesis takes 
a place.  
40 Listing Rules 2004 (Capital Market Authority (CMA), Amended in 2012), art 42 (c); Corporate Governance 
Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2006 (Capital Market Authority (CMA), Amended in 2010), art 4 
(b). 
41 Faleh Salem Al-Kahtani, Current Practices of Saudi Corporate Governance: A Case for Reform (PhD Thesis, 
Brunel University, 2013) 170 <https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/7382/3/FulltextThesis.pdf>; Faleh 
Salem Al-Kahtani, 'Current Disclosure and Transparency Practices in Saudi Corporate Governance' (2014) 
28(2) Arab Law Quarterly 176, 180. 
42 Law On Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 8, art 10; Implementing Rules for the Law 
on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 73 (2, 3); Insurance Corporate Governance 
Regulation, above n 13, art 21. Not publishing their annual reports on their websites is also a breach of Takaful 
rules set by the IFSB (Islamic Financial Services Board). See chapter 3.6 and Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB), above n 37, arts 64, 66; Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 'Standard on Solvency Requirements 
for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings' (2010) IFSB, arts 72-73.  
43 Despite personal visits to the insurers’ head offices in Saudi Arabia, in 2018 and 2019, annual reports were 
not forthcoming. 
44 In Saudi Arabia, a legal case between a shareholder and a telecommunication company, known as ZAIN, was 
tried before the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes under the CMA. ZAIN declared a general 
assembly meeting on the stock exchange’s (Tadawul) website and local newspapers; it decided to decrease 65 
per cent of ZAIN’s capital and of each shareholder’s shares. The plaintiff argued that ZAIN was required to use 
modern technologies (e.g, email and text messages) to inform him as well as sending him a copy of its decision. 
This is based on art (5) of the Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR) and art (51) of the Listing Rules (LR). 
The Committee and the Appellate Committee did not consider these laws and ruled in favor of ZAIN on the 
grounds that ZAIN had declared the meeting on Tadawul’s website. This judgement violates capital market 
laws/regulations (CMLs). 
In relation to insurance, the same dispute can arise between an insurance company and its shareholders where 
the legal case will be tried before the same Committee and not before the Committee for Solving Insurance 
Disputes and Violations under SAMA. This is because all Saudi insurers are listed joint-stock companies (JSCs) 
and the CMA has a jurisdiction over disputes related to securities and shares of listed JSCs and any violations of 
its laws and regulations, see chapter 2. Thus, the insurance sector in Saudi Arabia is exposed to harm and 
danger. See Corporate Governance Regulations, above n 40, art 5 (c); Listing Rules, above n 40, art 51; 
Abdullah Barakat v Mobile Telecommunications Company Saudi Arabia (ZAIN) [2016] 46/37 Decision No. 
1796/L/D (Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes); Abdullah Barakat v Mobile 
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the insurance industry in Saudi Arabia as potential investors and existing shareholders are 
unable to readily access critical information concerning the Takaful company.  
Nowadays corporations in countries like the UK, USA, and Australia often acknowledge that 
a corporation’s duties are not exclusively to maximise returns to shareholders. They also owe 
duties to the community and to relevant stakeholders. It is now regarded as part of the 
corporation’s social licence to act responsibly towards the community and stakeholders. This 
is known as corporate social responsibility (CSR). This involves voluntarily (without legal 
obligation) taking responsibility to prevent harm and costs to the community caused by their 
operations (negative externalities).45 For example, the corporation should remediate and 
compensate for any environmental damage caused by corporate activities. In some 
developing countries, governments have imposed levies on large corporations to positively 
contribute to welfare. For example, in India, large corporations must pay a 2 per cent levy for 
designated welfare programs.46 In Western countries, there is no precedent for corporations to 
pay significant sums for community welfare. It would very likely meet serious objections 
from shareholders and dismissal of the Boards of Directors if this occurred. 
Takaful welfare principles differ from Western countries where social welfare is not required, 
and also differ from the CSR in requiring positive contributions to social welfare. While there 
is no set benchmark to determine a suitable amount to satisfy the welfare principle of 
Takaful, examples suggest building new infrastructure, schools, hospitals, etc (see chapter 
4.6.9). It is argued that a welfare amount should not be low in comparison with profits earned 
by the Takaful company as this would not satisfy such a key principle in Takaful.  
There are other difficulties with Takaful operating under JSCs. Under the mutuality and non-
profit principles underpinning Takaful, there is no scope for shareholders’ dividends. In 
practice, if the Takaful welfare principle applies, shareholders are unlikely to invest in or 
establish Takaful companies. If the welfare principle is disregarded, Takaful would be 
breached. This conundrum can be resolved by adopting a Sharia alternative, see below.  
Under Takaful principles, explained in chapter 4.5, the Takaful operator is required to enter 
into an agreement with the policyholders under wakalah (agency), mudharabah (profit-
sharing), or hybrid models. Based on Takaful principles, Ali Daghi argues that under the 
wakalah (agency) model, it is Islamically acceptable for the Takaful operator to receive a fee 
of 10 per cent of gross premiums as administrative fees for managing the Takaful operation. 
It is not acceptable, however, to receive large sums for fees for administration as that 
breaches the non-profit principle of Takaful. Under the wakalah model, the 10 per cent fee 
Islamically permitted to be received by a Takaful operator is considered a reasonable sum for 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Telecommunications Company Saudi Arabia (ZAIN) [2016] 46/37 Decision No. 1114/LS (Appellate Committee 
for the Resolution of Securities Disputes). 
45 Joon Soo Lim and Cary A Greenwood, 'Communicating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Stakeholder 
Responsiveness and Engagement Strategy to Achieve CSR Goals' (2017) 43(4) Public Relations Review 768, 
768-70; Noam Noked and HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, The Corporate 
Social Responsibility Report and Effective Stakeholder Engagement (2013) Harvard Law School 
<https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/12/28/the-corporate-social-responsibility-report-and-effective-
stakeholder-engagement/>. 
46 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited (DTTL), 'Taxation and Investment in India' (2018) DTTL. 
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running the Takaful operation while also being a modest sum for maintaining and abiding by 
the non-profit principle.47 It is unclear how this applies to the hybrid model. However, by 
qiyas (reasoning by analogy as one of the Sharia secondary sources explained in chapter 4.3), 
the same conceptual idea applies to the mudharabah model. The Takaful operator is allowed 
to share in the profits (from the investment fund, PIF, only) and must only receive a 
reasonable sum as administrative fees for running the Takaful operation. Similar to Daghi’s 
view for wakalah’s fees, fees charged under mudharabah should not exceed 10 per cent of 
the profit in the investment fund. Also by qiyas, Daghi’s view applies to the hybrid model 
where the operator’s fee should not exceed 10 per cent of gross premiums. It can also be 
derived, from Daghi’s view, that the 10 per cent acceptable fee covers payment of dividends 
to shareholders as well as any expenses related to management e.g., rewards, salaries, and 
bonuses paid to the Board of Directors, executives, and committees’ members. It can be 
concluded, according to Daghi’s modified view, that fees charged under all Takaful models 
should be reasonable. Fees should not exceed 10 per cent of gross contributions (premiums) 
from the underwriting fund (PUF) on the wakalah model, profits from the investment fund 
(PIF) on the mudharabah model, or gross premiums from the PUF and profits from the PIF 
on the hybrid model. 
There is no indication in the analysed annual reports that any of these models have been 
adopted and applied. This may be explained on the basis that the existing Saudi insurance 
regulations, rules, and policies appear to be inconsistent with the application of these Takaful 
arrangements. The Implementing Rules (IR) and Surplus Distribution Policy set out the rules 
applying to how the net surplus in the operational account is to be determined and how it is to 
be distributed, see discussion above at 7.2. In relation to the wakalah and hybrid models 
which allow a fixed percentage fee from gross premiums, the Implementing Rules make no 
provision for deducting a fixed percentage agency fee from gross premiums. Although 
administrative costs are deducted in determining the total surplus, it is difficult to see how a 
fixed percentage wakalah fee could apply where there are statutory requirements for technical 
allocations (reserves) to be made prior to determining the surplus available for distribution, 
see chapter 3.2.2. The wakalah fee provided for the costs of administration as well as a profit 
margin to the Takaful operator is inconsistent with the Implementing Rules which remunerate 
the operator (company and shareholders) through the deduction of costs in determining the 
total surplus and through allocation of 90% of the net surplus to the shareholders’ income 
account.  
In relation to the mudharabah and hybrid models, it is also argued that the Implementing 
Rules are inconsistent with the Takaful operator (company and shareholders) having a fixed 
percentage of profits from the policyholders’ investment account (PIF). The formula for 
determining the net surplus requires that profits or losses from investment returns be brought 
into account in determining the net surplus for distribution to policyholders and shareholders 
accounts, see above.  Profits (or losses) from investment returns are a component of funds 
                                                             
47 Ali Mohey Aldeen Daghi, 'Cooperative Insurance its Definitions and its Principles and its Obstacles [  نیمأتلا
ھتاقوعمو ھطباوضو ھتیھام ينواعتلا ]' (Paper presented at the International Islamic Foundation for Economics & Finance 
(IIFFEF) and Islamic Research Training Institute (IRTI) [ يمالسالا ملاعلا ةطبار–لیومتلاو داصتقالل ةیملاعلا ةیمالسالا ةئیھلا ], 
InterContinental Riyadh, 22-25/1/2009) 81-2 <http://www.kantakji.com/media/1011/001.pdf>. 
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available for distribution, with 10% going to policyholders and 90% to the shareholders’ 
income account. 
Under Takaful, remuneration and compensation and large salaries paid to top management 
(Board members, CEOs, committees, etc) must be modest and not excessive. Here, the 
standards judging what is “excessive” are solely based on the Takaful principles that a 
Takaful company is non-profit and surpluses are owned by policyholders. The amounts paid 
to top management of a Takaful company would be considered very modest and not 
excessive based on standards of Western corporations and even of Islamic corporations other 
than Takaful companies. It has also been observed that Takaful operators, in theory, operate 
differently from Islamic non-insurance joint-stock companies (JSCs). In Takaful, the 
remuneration and salaries policy is subject to the non-profit principle and the surplus 
principle, discussed in chapter 4.6, while it is not the case in other Islamic non-insurance 
JSCs. For example, Islamic banks are permitted under Sharia to be profitable and to receive 
high remuneration and large salaries, see chapter 3.4.1.    
As pointed out in the preceding paragraphs Takaful principles relating to operating account 
surpluses are not capable of operating under the current regulatory framework in the context 
of a joint-stockholding company (JSC) with investors looking for returns on their investment. 
If Takaful non-profit and mutuality principles limit the profitability of a Takaful operator, 
there is no incentive for companies to enter the Takaful business nor for investors to invest so 
as to provide the capital necessary for establishment. These Takaful principles are effective 
where policyholders mutually insure specific types of risks (particularly small risks) with the 
operator only required to undertake administration. The limitations of mutual insurance, 
particularly in relation to large catastrophic risks, have been discussed in chapters 5.3.2 and 
6.7. From the point of view of the corporation and shareholders, there is no incentive to 
invest in a JSC Takaful insurer if the non-profit and mutuality principles apply. Ultimately 
this may mean that the only insurers are those who do not have to account to shareholders 
such as government owned corporations which currently do not exist in Saudi Arabia. 
The next sections turn to examine the three selected Takaful insurers in Saudi Arabia 
commencing with the part government owned insurance company, Tawuniya. 
(1) The Tawuniya Insurance Company (Tawuniya) 
Tawuniya is the largest company in the Saudi Takaful insurance industry and the only 
insurance company with partial government ownership. As such, it is given greater attention. 
The assessment provided below draws upon the 2015 report which has the most detailed 
information available. The 2015 annual report of the Tawuniya insurance company, under the 
heading of future prediction of the company’s achievements, states that it will expand its 
work and focus on profit growth.48 As previously discussed in chapter 4.6, the Tawuniya 
company breaches the non-profit principle which is a core principle of Takaful.  
                                                             





The same report describes the duty of Tawuniya to provide social welfare, see 4.6.9, to 
support the community. This includes voluntarily—supporting the Prince Fahd Society For 
The Care of Patients With Renal Failure (known as Kelana), participating in Awareness Of 
Breast Cancer Disease, distributing devices for diabetic patients, and providing monthly 
medical advice for chronic diseases.49 These services are funded out of the company’s profit; 
they are considered as voluntary social welfare rather than obligations under health insurance, 
nor are they related to the required zakat, see 4.3.1. The available evidence suggests that 
Tawuniya provides low levels of support for community welfare. In relation to supporting 
Kelana, Tawuniya (from 2006 to 2015) paid 420,000 applications costing SAR207 million 
(US$55 million) and benefitting around 1,500 patients.50 According to the social welfare 
principle of Takaful, this outcome is a very low rate of assistance provided to society, see 
discussion above. From 2006 to 2015, providing assistance to 1,500 patients (166 patients per 
year) at a cost of SAR207 million (US$55 million) is equivalent to SAR23 million per year 
(US$6 million per year). This may be considered a very low level for welfare services in 
comparison with the company’s annual net surplus of SAR598,428,000 (US$160,000,000) 
for 2015. These welfare services are about 3.84% of the 2015 annual profit.51 This is 
illustrated in the following Table 7.2. 
Table 7.252 








Percentage of Annual 
Profit Paid as Welfare 
Health Assistance in 2015 
SAR598,428,000 
(US$160,000,000) 
1,500 166 3.84% 
 
The amounts paid in welfare by Tawuniya, 3.84 per cent, would appear low in comparison to 
the profits earned and may not satisfy the social welfare principle of Takaful.53 But, as noted 
earlier, these welfare amounts would be regarded in Western economies as a very large sum 
out of shareholder funds. The duty to provide welfare severely restricts Tawuniya’s capacity 
to attract investors and to be competitive in the global market. 
Another issue with Tawuniya is the distribution of surpluses. The Tawuniya’s 2015 report 
declares that the surplus profit was distributed 90 per cent to shareholders and 10 per cent to 
                                                             
49 Ibid 21. 
50 Al-Riyadh Newspaper, [ يلاوتلا ىلع عساتلا ماعلل انالك ةیعمج عم اھنواعت لصاوت ةینواعتلا ] Tawuniya Continues its 
Cooperation with the Organization of Kelana for the Ninth Year Successively (05//07/2015) Al-Riyadh 
Newspaper <http://www.alriyadh.com/1062504?print=1>. The figures used in the analyses are the Saudi 
Arabian Riyal (SAR) with the US$ equivalent in brackets based on a conversion rate of US$1 equals SAR3.75. 
The exchange rate is up to 21 March 2020 where this thesis takes a place. 
51 Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), above n 48, 23-25, 44, 45. 
52 The Table is made by the thesis researcher. 
53 The 2018 Tawuniya Board of Directors’ annual report refers charity support without providing precise details 
or accurate figures of numbers. Similar to the 2015 annual report, this does not show enough evidence for 
fulfilling the social welfare principle of Takaful. See Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), The Board 




policyholders, as required by SAMA’s regulations54 (see above and 3.2.1). As previously 
discussed this contravenes the Takaful principle that surpluses in the underwriting fund (PIF) 
belong to policyholders. 
The Tawuniya company shares surpluses in the operations list as required under the 
Implementing Rules for the Cooperative Insurance Companies Law, see chapters 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2. The report does not indicate whether a separate investment fund invests the balance of 
premiums after technical allocations and payments have been made. It is assumed that this is 
dealt with according to standard international accounting principles. The formula for 
determining the net surplus appears to indicate that the investment fund (PIF) might be 
separate as it is a component to be brought into account in determining the net surplus, see 
above 7.2. Consequently, it is not clear how far there is a formal segregation of accounts as 
required under Takaful principles. It has been assumed that the operations list broadly 
represents the participants/policyholders’ underwriting fund (PUF) which violates Takaful 
principles. 
In relation to Takaful investments, the Tawuniya company’s 2015 annual report (which has 
more detail than later annual reports) identifies some investments such as those in foreign 
money markets, in foreign capital markets, and in the USA and Europe.55 Foreign 
investments (money markets and capital markets) and American and European investments 
are more likely to be engaged in Islamic prohibited businesses or products such as alcohol, 
pork, riba, gharar, maysir, etc. This is because foreign investments and markets in America, 
Europe, and other countries are subject to their laws and not restricted to Sharia law. Thus, 
the investments of Tawuniya may not be in compliance with Takaful investment standards.56 
The 2015 annual report also identifies associate (or affiliate) companies or subsidiaries of the 
Tawuniya company such as the United Insurance Company (UIC) that is founded and located 
in Bahrain.57 The UIC is owned by six insurance companies, including the Bahrain National 
Holding Company (BNH).58 The BNH’s 2016 annual report indicates that its operations are 
not Sharia-compliant with the following being in breach of Takaful principles. 
1- BNH declares that its aim is to maximise profit;59 
2- it shows no separation of funds (policyholders’ from shareholders’) and indicates only one 
account for shareholders who are eligible for most surpluses (policyholders did share 
                                                             
54 Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), above n 48, 25, 50. The 2018 Board of Directors’ annual report 
repeats the statement but declares no surplus or profit were distributed to policyholders. See Ibid 44. There was 
no response from SAMA in relation to this. 
55 Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), above n 48, 58-59, 74, 78. 
56 The Tawuniya insurance company’s annual report for 2015 does not provide detailed information about the 
types of foreign investments that it is associated with or the names of the European and American investments 
that it deals with. Thus, purification, discussed in chapter 6.3.5, cannot apply here because the exact amount to 
be purified cannot be determined and purification applies to a Sharia investment that is involved in a small 
portion of prohibited business but not in large and complicated investments.  
57 Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), above n 48, 25. 
58 United Insurance Company (UIC), Overview UIC <http://www.uic.bh/default.asp>. 




investment profits,60 but the report does not provide precise details about whether 
policyholders received a payment or reduced premiums in the following year); 
3- the BNH company’s method for insurance risk management is to transfer risks to 
international re-insurance companies.61 Transferring risks breaches the mutuality principle 
(sharing risks instead of transferring risks), and mixing the Takaful funds with conventional 
international re-insurance funds also breaches the basic rules for compliance with Takaful 
and re-Takaful (see chapters 4.6 and 6.3); 
4- BNH invests in international stock markets as well as investing in deposits and bonds at 
fixed-interest rates (riba);62 and 
5- BNH deals with other subsidiary and joint-venture companies on a normal commercial 
basis (not Sharia basis).63 
Thus, the investments of the Tawuniya company do not meet Takaful principles as its 
investment fund is mingled with other subsidiary investments (UIC and BNH) which are not 
consistent with Takaful principles. 
Further, the Tawuniya’s annual report does not refer to a particular or any Takaful model. 
This is because, as argued above, the adoption of these models may be inconsistent with the 
current regulations. This suggests Tawuniya deals with its policyholders just like 
conventional insurance. 
With respect to re-Takaful (Islamic re-insurance), Tawuniya’s 2015 annual report indicates 
the company holds commercial re-insurance. Tawuniya seeks commercial re-insurers who 
have a good reputation and are highly ranked,64 as required under the Implementing Rules 
(IR).65 According to Sharia rules, Tawuniya has to deal with re-Takaful companies or Al-
Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach, as explored in chapter 6.6. It does not appear that 
Tawuniya considers seeking Sharia alternatives. Also, Tawuniya deals with insurance risks 
by transferring Takaful insurance policies to re-insurance companies.66 Applying Takaful, the 
Tawuniya company breaches the mutuality principle (sharing risks) of Takaful, as discussed 
in chapter 4.6.2.  
(2) The Arabian Shield Cooperative Insurance Company (Shield) 
The Arabian Shield cooperative insurance company (Shield) is privately owned with no 
government ownership.67 Shield is an associate (or affiliate) of the Bahrain National Holding 
                                                             
60 Ibid 50-54, 109. 
61 Ibid 94-95. 
62 Ibid 104-109. 
63 Ibid 110. 
64 Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), above n 48, 72. The rankings for re-insurance companies are 
done by international credit rankings companies such as Standard and Poors (S&P). 
65 Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance Companies, above n 2, art 42 (1, 2). 
66 Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), above n 48, 52-53. 





Company (BNH) in which BNH owns 15 per cent of Shield’s shares.68 Whilst the United 
Insurance Company (UIC) is an associate of Tawuniya and BNH is one of the UIC’s owners, 
BNH is the connection and meeting point between Shield and Tawuniya, see Table 7.3 below 
for further illustration. Thus, the observations made above related to Tawuniya’s investment 
violations dealing with BNH also apply here. This is because Shield is an associate and 
invests with BNH (a non Takaful compliant company); thus renders Shield’s practice non-
compliant with Takaful investment standards. This suggests that Saudi Takaful companies, in 








The Shield company’s 2018 net surplus—after payments of all claims, salaries, 
administration costs, awards, etc—was SAR22,898,000 (US$6,100,000). The remuneration 
paid to Shield’s CEOs, Board, and committees members was SAR8,142,000 (US$2,171,200) 
in total.70 This indicates that the Shield company is profitable. It has been argued that 
excessive remuneration may breach Takaful principles, see discussion above at 7.3.1.  
SAR27,069 (US$7,220) was expended on social welfare services in 2018;71 this is about 
0.001 (0.1%) of the net surplus which is considered very low, especially when compared to 
remuneration and compensation paid to the CEOs, Board, and committees as well as the net 
surplus, see discussion above at 7.3.1. This is illustrated in the following Table 7.4. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
zBEKDEJDLYEKjJ0DA11MjQzcTfW99KPSc_KTIGZllJQUWKkaqBqUJKYklpfmqBroRyXn5xYk5lUGV-
Ym5QMVWRiYG-iHEzK1IDsop6zSUREA2mmnRA!!/#chart_tab5>. 
68 Bahrain National Holding Company (BNH), above n 59, 20, 70; Arabian Shield Cooperative Insurance 
Company (Shield), Board Report, Auditors' Report, and Financial Statements for 2016 Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul), 7 <https://www.tadawul.com.sa/Resources/fsPdf/491_2017-03-15_07-30-17_Arabic.pdf>; Arabian 
Shield Cooperative Insurance Company (Shield), Board Report, Auditors' Report, and Financial Statements for 
2018 Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), 24 <https://www.tadawul.com.sa/Resources/fsPdf/491_2019-06-13_09-
05-13_Arabic.pdf>. 
69 The Table is made by the thesis researcher. 
70 Arabian Shield Cooperative Insurance Company (Shield), Board Report, Auditors' Report, and Financial 
Statements for 2018, above n 68, 11, 14, 19. Five CEOs were paid SAR6,882,000 (US$1,835,200) in total, 
Board’s and committees’ members were paid SAR1,200,000 (US$320,000) in total, and the secretary of the 
Board was paid SAR60,000 (US$16,000). These five CEOs members are the executive chief, chief financial 
officer, and the other three executives. 
71 Ibid 15. 
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  US$7,220 ÷ 







Similar to Tawuniya, the Shield company shares 90 per cent of the net surplus required by 
law. This breaches Takaful principles. The comments made in relation to Tawuniya also 
apply here. 
(3) The Alsagr Insurance Company (Alsagr) 
The Alsagr insurance company (Alsagr) is a private company with no government 
shareholding.73 The Alsagr company indicates that it deals with international re-insurance 
companies.74 As noted in chapter 6.4, this breaches Takaful principles. Alsagr company’s 
2018 annual report does not have any subsidiary or associated companies within or out-side 
Saudi Arabia.75  
The Alsagr company’s 2018 net surplus (after payments of all claims, salaries, administration 
costs, awards, etc) was SAR40,000,000 (US$10,666,666). With respect to remuneration and 
salaries, the total amount paid to Alsagr’s Board members, CEOs, and committees members 
was SAR6,417,750 (US$1,711,400).76 Similar to the Shield company, Alsagr’s remuneration 
and salaries (paid to the Board members, CEOs, and committees) are considered high and, on 
a restrictive view, may breach Takaful principles, see discussion above at 7.3.1. Finally, the 
expenditure on social welfare services in Alsagr’s report was SAR50,000 (US$13,300)77 
which does not satisfy the Takaful welfare principle. 
Similar to Tawuniya and Shield, the Alsagr company, in accordance with Saudi regulations, 
receives 90 per cent of the net surplus. The comments made in relation to Tawuniya and 
Alsagr also apply here. 
                                                             
72 The Table is made by the thesis researcher. 







74 Alsagr Insurance Company (Alsagr), Board of Directors’ Report (2018) Alsagr, 27 
<https://www.tadawul.com.sa/Resources/fsPdf/502_2019-03-31_22-37-38_Arabic.pdf>.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid 20-22, 33.  
77 Ibid 24. 
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Takaful requires a Takaful company to establish a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) that 
ensures investment activities are in accordance with Sharia, see chapter 4.6.6. The analyses 
above have shown that Saudi insurers may be involved in Sharia prohibited investment 
activities and make no mention of SSBs in their annual reports. This suggests that SSBs have 
not been appointed by Saudi insurers as required under Takaful principles.   
7.4. Conflicts of Interest between Policyholders/Participants, Shareholders, and Takaful 
Companies/Operators in Saudi Arabia 
The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), discussed in chapter 3.5, indicates that the 
application of good corporate governance to Takaful operations should resolve the issue of 
conflicts of interest. This is because Takaful good corporate governance grants policyholders 
the right to participate in the general meetings, vote for appointments of the Board of 
Directors, and be involved in management decision-making,78 see chapter 4.6.7. Takaful 
companies in Saudi Arabia are subject to Takaful standards and the Saudi Insurance 
Corporate Governance Regulation (ICGR), see chapter 3.5. This section highlights the main 
issues related to conflicts of interest in Takaful, particularly those arising in Saudi Arabia. It 
concludes by proposing a Sharia alternative solution. 
In 2013 and 2014, Faleh Al-Kahtani examined the compensation and remuneration amounts 
paid to members of the Board of Directors in all Saudi joint-stock companies (JSCs) listed on 
the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul).79 Al-Kahtani’s study found that compensation and 
remuneration paid to the Board members of ‘almost, if not all’ the listed JSCs were not 
explicitly disclosed in their annual reports which is contrary to the laws and regulations of 
Saudi Arabia.80 Al-Kahtani’s study also found that the compensation and remuneration policy 
used by JSCs favored the Board members and top executives over shareholders and other 
                                                             
78 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 37, arts 20-24. 
79 Faleh Salem Al-Kahtani, 'Current Practices of Saudi Shareholder's Rights: A Case for Reform' (2013) 27(3) 
Arab Law Quarterly 231; Al-Kahtani, 'Current Disclosure and Transparency Practices in Saudi Corporate 
Governance', above n 41; Faleh Salem Al-Kahtani, 'Corporate Governance from the Islamic Perspective' (2014) 
28(3) Arab Law Quarterly 231. 
80 Al-Kahtani, 'Current Disclosure and Transparency Practices in Saudi Corporate Governance', above n 41, 
186-7. 
These Saudi laws and regulations, under the CMA, are the Listing Rules 2004 and the Corporate Governance 
Regulations (CGR) 2006. Art 43 of the Listing Rules titled ‘Board of Directors’ Report’ states: 
The board of directors’ report must contain the following: … 16) the number of meetings of the 
directors held during the last financial year and the attendance record of each meeting listing names of 
the attendees; … 19) a description of any arrangement or agreement under which a director or a senior 
executive of the issuer [company] has waived any salary or compensation. 
Art 9 of the Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR) titled ‘Disclosure in the Board of Directors’ Report’ 
states:  
In addition to what is required in the Listing Rules in connection with the content of the report of the 
Board of Directors, which is appended to the annual financial statements of the company, such report 
shall include the following: … e) Details of compensation and remuneration paid to each of the 
following: 1. The Chairman and members of the Board of Directors. 2. The Top Five executives who 
have received the highest compensation and remuneration from the company. The CEO and the chief 
finance officer shall be included if they are not within the top five. 
…. “compensation and remuneration” means salaries, allowances, profits and any of the same; annual 
and periodic bonuses related to performance; long or short- term incentive schemes; and any other 
rights in rem. 
See Listing Rules, above n 40, art 43; Corporate Governance Regulations, above n 40, art 9. 
194 
 
stakeholders. Some JSCs distributed compensation and remuneration to the Board members 
and top executives even when losing money and the companies were in deficit with no 
dividends paid to shareholders.81 In 2011, according to the same Al-Kahtani’s study, 33 JSCs 
were suffering losses but nevertheless paid total bonuses of US$32,000,000 to their Board 
members.82 Al-Kahtani’s study suggested that the payment of these large bonuses involved 
corrupt practices. He questioned whether Saudi corporations should imitate global 
corporations, particularly the UK model, in relation to compensation being paid to Board 
members even when the corporations were suffering losses.83 Al-Kahtani’s study showed 
conflicts of interest favoring Board members and top executives over shareholders of Saudi 
JSCs. The study did not specifically refer to conflicts of interest in Takaful insurance 
companies e.g. favoring the top management or the Takaful operator charging large fees from 
the underwriting fund. Nevertheless, these conflicts of interest must be considered and apply 
to Saudi Takaful insurance companies as all of them are JSCs listed on the Saudi stock 
exchange, see 2.6.4 and 3.1. This would mean that Saudi Takaful insurance companies favor 
Board members and top executives over shareholders and, particularly, policyholders who are 
the main concern of this thesis. 
Art 11 of the Saudi Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation (ICGR) states:84 
The [Takaful] Company must put in place a remuneration and compensation policy in 
accordance with this Regulation, duly approved by its Board of Directors, and submit a copy 
of the policy to SAMA … In addition, the Board must review the Company’s remuneration 
policy and consider any necessary amendments on an annual basis … 
Also, art 34 of the ICGR states:85 
The [Takaful] Company’s articles of association shall specify the remuneration for the 
Chairman and Board members for their services. Board members[’] remuneration can be 
modified only by the extraordinary general assembly. 
In examining the Saudi Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation (ICGR) and Takaful 
companies’ practices in accordance with Takaful principles, a remuneration, compensation, 
and salary policy (paid to Board members and top executives) in the ICGR might be 
excessive according to Takaful principles. But as pointed out earlier these payments would 
not be regarded as extravagant according to Western standards and not extravagant in relation 
to other industries such as the banking sector, as noted above at 7.3.1. 
Similar to the Arabian Shield cooperative insurance company and the Alsagr insurance 
company discussed earlier, the Tawuniya’s 2015 and 2018 annual reports indicate that high 
remuneration and large salaries are paid to the company’s top management. In 2015, the 
Tawuniya’s report shows that the remuneration and salaries of the Board of Directors and the 
                                                             
81 Al-Kahtani, Current Practices of Saudi Corporate Governance: A Case for Reform, above n 41, 163-4. 
82 Ibid 164. 
83 Ibid 163-4. 
84 Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation, above n 13, art 11. 
85 Ibid art 34. 
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CEOs only (not including ordinary employees) are SAR15,282,000 (US$4,000,000)86 out of 
the net surplus of SAR82,883,000 (US$22,102,000).87 In 2018, the Tawuniya’s annual report 
shows that the remuneration amounts paid to the company’s top management were 
SAR20,724,000 (US$5,526,400)88 although Tawuniya was in deficit for SAR427 million 
(US$114 million).89 Al-Kahtani’s study (referred to above) suggested that Board members of 
all Saudi companies should not receive huge amounts of reward.90 Under Takaful, it is 
Islamically acceptable (according to Daghi noted earlier at 7.3.1) for a Takaful operator (in 
all models including Board members, top executives, and shareholders) to receive up to 10 
per cent fees—of contributions (premiums) in a wakalah model or equivalent to 10 per cent 
in mudharabah and hybrid models—for managing the Takaful funds and keeping the 
operation running. However, overpayment and high levels of remuneration and salaries paid 
to the top management (especially during a deficit) are considered inconsistent with Takaful, 
particularly the non-profit principle. 
Thus, some of the practices of the ICGR and the Tawuniya company, along with the Shield 
and Alsagr companies, appear to somewhat deviate with the non-profit principle and the 
surplus principle. As discussed above, Takaful operates differently from Islamic non-
insurance joint-stock companies (JSCs). Therefore, while the ICGR may work well with 
conventional insurance operated through JSCs, this is not the case for Takaful operators as 
Takaful requires specific considerations different from those in conventional insurance and in 
Islamic non-insurance JSCs.  
In Saudi Arabia, the Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR) art 15, the Companies Law 
(CL) art 76, and the Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation (ICGR) art 34  indicate 
that the remuneration method for Board members is determined by either the Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee or the articles of association.91 In contrast, the ICGR art 35  
indicates that the Board of Directors of insurance companies proposes remuneration for their 
members based on the recommendation of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee.92 
This situation where the Board is authorised to make a remuneration proposal for its members 
creates obvious conflicts of interest in which the Board favors itself against stakeholders, 
particularly policyholders. This conflict of interest goes against the non-profit principle. 
Again, Takaful based on non-profit and mutuality principles operates differently to other 
forms of JSCs. 
In relation to the ownership of a Takaful company, policyholders own the Takaful funds 
(underwriting and investment) while the operator manages the Takaful operation, as 
explained in chapter 4.5. However, Takaful, in practice, operates through a JSC that is owned 
by shareholders. This creates conflicts of interest as, arguably, policyholders and shareholders 
                                                             
86 Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), above n 48, 68. 
87 Ibid 69. 
88 Cooperative Insurance Company (Tawuniya), above n 53, 21-23. 
89 Ibid 44. 
90 Al-Kahtani, Current Practices of Saudi Corporate Governance: A Case for Reform, above n 41, 162-3. 
91 Corporate Governance Regulations, above n 40, art 15; Companies Law 2015 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by 
Royal Decree No. M/3), arts 76, 81; Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation, above n 13, art 34. 
92 Insurance Corporate Governance Regulation, above n 13, art 35.  
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have different goals. Policyholders may want to invest in low risk investments since their 
principal concern is that funds are available to pay out claims.  Shareholders may wish to take 
on greater risk for the opportunity for the company to earn higher profits resulting in an 
increase in dividends.93 In Saudi Arabia, this problem is ameliorated under the current 
regulatory requirements. As noted in chapter 3.2.2, the rules require significant technical 
allocations to be set aside as reserves to meet claims. Also noted in chapter 3, the rules 
relating to investments take a very conservative approach so that there is little scope for any 
form of risky investment. For example, Takaful corporations cannot invest in derivatives 
without SAMA’s approval; if no investment plan is approved by SAMA, a minimum of 40% 
of investments must be in cash or government bonds.  
Although under the mutuality principle, policyholders own the Takaful funds (PUF and PIF), 
in practice, policyholders play no role in decision-making; Sudan is the exception94 (see 
4.6.8). Policyholders have no role in managing the Takaful operation and have no say in 
investment decisions made by the Takaful operator. This will more likely create conflicts of 
interest between policyholders and shareholders.95 
Conflicts of interest do not arise if Al-Zarqaa’s insurance approach is adopted and 
implemented as a modernised approach to Takaful, as suggested previously in 6.6. In a 
modern financial community, save in exceptional circumstances, insurance is only feasible 
through a JSC. This is recognised by Al-Zarqaa’s insurance approach that operates Islamic 
insurance through JSCs on the condition of avoiding Sharia prohibited investment activities. 
Unlike Takaful, Al-Zarqaa’s insurance approach operates in the same ways as Islamic non-
insurance JSCs which allows Takaful companies to be competitive in the insurance market 
and meet the needs of both policyholders and shareholders. 
7.5. Evidence from other Islamic Countries: Takaful Insurers and Sharia-Compliance 
Alsaati examines Takaful companies in Islamic countries.96 He argues that Takaful 
companies globally are similar to conventional insurance, paying lip service to compliance 
with Takaful97 so that Sharia-compliance is a formality and on paper only,98 as this thesis 
asserts above. Alsaati’s argument is summarised as follows: 
7.5.1. Profit Making Insurance 
Takaful insurance companies globally are profit making commercial insurers. Based on the 
articles of association of Takaful companies, their main goal is to make profits for their 
                                                             
93 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 37, art 92. 
94 Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel-Karim and Volker Nienhaus, Takaful Islamic Insurance: Concepts and 
Regulatory Issues (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) 63-4; Abdulrahman Khalil Tolefat and Mehmet Asutay, Takaful 
Investment Portfolios: A Study of the Composition of Takaful Funds in the GCC and Malaysia (John Wiley & 
Sons Singapore, 1 ed, 2013) 44. 
95 Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), above n 37, art 93. 
96 Abdulrahim Abdelhamid Alsaati, '[ ؟يراجت مأ ينواعت نیمأت بكرملا يمالسإلا نیمأتلا لھ ] Is Traditional Islamic 
Insurance a Commercial Insurance?' (2009) 22(2) King Abdulaziz University Journal: Islamic Economy 125. 
97 Ibid 125. 
98 Ibid 151. 
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shareholders.99 Takaful companies never intend to meet the Takaful principle of mutual co-
operation between policyholders,100 discussed in 4.6.2, nor the principle of tabarru 
(donation/charity), see 4.6.1. Since a goal of Takaful companies is for profit which is similar 
to conventional insurance, they are not entitled to receive premiums as tabarru 
(donation/charity). The principle of tabarru only applies to non-profit insurance 
companies.101 In practice, premiums are not paid as tabarru but are paid as a business 
transaction in return for the company’s obligation to compensate against losses arising from 
insured events.102  
7.5.2. Risk Transfer 
Takaful insurance companies, in practice, transfer risks and do not share risks among 
policyholders. Takaful companies do not allow policyholders to share in the ownership of 
Takaful companies, so policyholders do not share the risks among themselves. This violates 
the Takaful principle of mutual co-operation that requires sharing risks between 
policyholders.103 
7.5.3. Risk of Loss 
Compared to conventional insurance companies, Takaful companies/operators (including 
shareholders) bear fewer risks and gain more profits. Conventional insurers invest premiums 
with shareholders reaping the benefits or detriments of profits and losses. Takaful companies 
invest policyholders’ contributions (premiums) in the PIF. Depending on the Takaful model, 
the Takaful operators (shareholders) share profits from the PIF but not losses.104 In the case 
of a deficit, conventional insurers bear and pay the losses from their capital and reserves 
while Takaful policyholders bear and pay the losses. If the deficit still exists, Takaful 
operators provide a qard hasan (interest-free loan) that is repaid out of later premium 
receipts. Eventually, the losses are borne by the Takaful participants’ funds (PUF and PIF) 
and not Takaful operators.105 
The only risk Takaful operators may encounter is the qard hasan not being repaid in the 
future, see chapter 3.6. In some Islamic countries where the qard hasan has been abolished, 
there may be a statutory reserve equivalent to a qard facility, as is the case in Saudi Arabia, 
see chapter 3.2.2.106 
                                                             
99 Ibid 140. 
100 Ibid 146. 
101 Ibid 141-2, 148. 
102 Ibid 149-150. 
103 Ibid 140. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. In Saudi Arabia, these Takaful principles are affected by the insurance laws and regulations, see chapter 
3.2. 
106 In Saudi Arabia, if the Takaful operator (company and shareholders) have no duty to loan funds to the 
underwriting fund (PUF), it is likely that the Takaful company will be insolvent so ultimately shareholders bear 
the risk. Again, as noted in chapter 3.2.2, the provision of significant technical allocations and solvency margins 
should reduce the risk of underwriting funds being in deficit. The current position is that policyholders have 
significantly reduced benefits and participation rights in Saudi Takaful companies. 
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7.5.4. Superficial Sharia-Compliance 
Takaful insurance companies may create a Takaful fund (policyholders’ fund including the 
PUF and PIF) in order to provide the appearance of compliance with Takaful requirements. 
This Takaful fund may appear in their annual reports but, in practice, may not exist as a 
separate fund,107 as examined above 7.3.1. Also, Takaful companies/operators themselves 
(not the Takaful policyholders’ funds) are obligated to compensate for policyholders’ claims. 
In a disputed case, the policyholder sues the Takaful company and not the Takaful 
policyholders’ funds (the PUF and PIF),108 see 4.6.5.  
In relation to deficits in the underwriting fund, under Takaful principles, deficits are borne by 
policyholders’ funds and not the Takaful operator’s (company/ shareholders), see chapter 
4.6.4. 
7.5.5. Mutual Co-operation 
The parties to a Takaful policy are individual policyholders and the Takaful company. This 
contrasts with the mutual co-operation principle of Takaful, see chapter 4.6.2. Under Takaful, 
mutual co-operation requires policyholders to share risks among the policyholders and not to 
transfer risks to a third party (the company). Mutual co-operation positions the policyholders 
(insured) as the insurer, but in practice, the policyholders in Takaful companies are not the 
insurers.109    
7.5.6. Relationship between Takaful Company and Policyholders 
According to Takaful, the relationship between Takaful companies and their policyholders is 
an agency relationship, see chapter 4.5. Under agency relationships, the policyholders 
delegate management of Takaful operations to Takaful operators (as JSCs) and as principal 
they could, in theory, change the agent (Takaful operators). In practice, however, the 
relationship between the parties is based on an insured-insurer relationship.110 Takaful 
policyholders are not involved in decision-making related to Takaful companies,111 as noted 
in the examination above. In order to solve agency problems including decision-making (or 
improve good corporate governance in Takaful companies), Takaful requires a Takaful 
operator to establish a “governance committee” that provides policyholders with rights to 
participate in decision-making, see 4.6.7.  
The conclusion drawn is that Takaful insurance companies are not Sharia-compliant based on 
Takaful principles. But it is argued that these Takaful principles have now evolved, based on 
Sharia, in the context of community needs and the modern financial system, see chapter 6.  
Khorshid argues that Takaful insurance models globally do not apply to joint-stock 
companies (JSCs) as these models violate the mutuality principle of Takaful (the insured is 
                                                             
107 Alsaati, above n 96, 141-2. 
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the insurer). In all models, the policyholders are not mutually involved in the insurance JSC 
and their premium payments give them no legal or other interest in the JSC.112 
In Algeria for example, Berrahlia criticises the Algerian surplus distribution.113 Under the 
Algerian insurance regulation, surpluses are determined according to normal balance sheet 
procedures after all expenses and costs are deducted and any necessary contingency 
provisions are made.114 Berrahlia argues that the Algerian insurance regulation by necessity 
also includes dividends and remuneration paid to Board members. This regulation is not 
Sharia-compliant as the underwriting surplus and the investment profits  are not fully 
available to the policyholders.115 Similarly, what surplus in the PUF and profits in the PIF are 
left for policyholders in Takaful companies in general, and in Saudi Arabia in particular, 
considering that the Saudi insurance regulation requires 90 per cent of net surplus to be 
distributed to the shareholders’ income list, as previously discussed.  
In relation to the qard hasan (interest-free loan), discussed in 4.5, the issue of breaching the 
Takaful principle of risk-sharing (mutual co-operation) can arise. To avoid reiteration, see 
discussion in 6.5 and 6.8.  
The above discussion indicates that Takaful insurance is impossible to apply where the 
insurer is a JSC. The alternative for Takaful insurance is to operate through Al-Zarqaa’s 
insurance approach, as discussed in previous chapter 6.6. 
7.6. Overview of Takaful in Saudi Arabia 
As the difficulties and issues related to the Takaful insurance industry in Saudi Arabia have 
been considered in several chapters, this section provides an overview of the problems facing 
the Saudi Takaful insurance industry. The findings of the thesis are that most, if not all, 
Takaful principles and rules are not applied by Takaful insurance companies and insurance 
laws in Saudi Arabia.  
7.6.1. The Principle of Tabarru (Charity/Donation) and Non-Profit 
Saudi Takaful insurance companies operate in a way similar to conventional insurance 
companies on a profit basis favoring shareholders. Consequently, Takaful companies do not 
receive premiums (contributions) as tabarru. As investment of contributions is encouraged by 
Takaful with some Sharia investment restrictions, Takaful companies may however invest in 
non-Sharia activities and deal with subsidiaries (associated companies) that may be involved 
in Sharia prohibited investment activities (see 4.6.1).    
 
                                                             
112 Aly Khorshid, Islamic Insurance: A Modern Approach to Islamic Banking (RoutledgeCurzon: Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2004) 135, 137-8. 
113 Badreddine Berrahlia, 'Conventional Insurance Companies and Takaful Insurance Institutions between 
Theoretical Bases and the Practical Experiment' (Paper presented at the International Forum, Algeria, 25-
26/04/2011) <http://eco.univ-setif.dz/seminars/takaful/9.pdf>. 
114 Model Basic Law for Mutual Insurance Companies 2009 (Algeria No 09/13), arts 33-34. 
115 Berrahlia, above n 113, 16-7. 
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7.6.2. Mutuality (Mutual Co-operation) 
Under the mutuality principle, policyholders are the owners of the Takaful pool with mutual 
sharing of risks (see 4.6.2). Saudi Takaful insurance companies do not operate on the basis of 
mutual co-operation. Policyholders do not own the Takaful funds so that under the current 
regulatory framework, the company and shareholders share in the surpluses from Takaful 
funds. Mutual risk-sharing by policyholders has been supplanted by risk transfer to the 
Takaful company instead.116 
7.6.3. Surpluses and Social Welfare 
Surpluses in the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) belong to policyholders, as owners of 
the Takaful pool (see 4.6.3). In practice, the surplus principle is not applied by Saudi Takaful 
companies. After payment of costs of management and all expenses including remuneration 
to Board members, etc, the surplus is available for distribution to shareholders based on the 
Surplus Distribution Policy and the Implementing Rules. Very little, sometimes nothing, is 
paid or provided for social welfare services, a key Takaful principle (see 4.6.9).   
7.6.4. Deficits in the Participants’ Underwriting Fund (PUF) 
Takaful requires deficits and losses in the underwriting fund be borne by policyholders, and 
not by shareholders (see 4.6.4). This is subject to a repayable loan from the shareholders’ 
fund (a statutory reserve) to cover such a deficit. Saudi insurance laws require substantial 
statutory reserves and technical allocations to cover contingencies, see 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. The 
effect is that where the operations list continues to be in deficit after utilizing technical 
allocations and the legal reserve (statutory qard facility), unless other measures are taken 
ultimately the company will fail causing losses to shareholders as well as the risk of failure to 
pay claims of policyholders. 
7.6.5. Segregation of Participants’ Funds (PUF and PIF)  
This principle requires the Takaful pool to have policyholders’ funds (participants’ 
underwriting fund, PUF and participants’ investment fund, PIF). Shareholders are allowed to 
share in the PIF only and are prohibited from sharing surpluses in the PUF (see 4.6.5). There 
is no evidence that Saudi Takaful companies have formally segregated policyholders’ 
accounts for the underwriting fund (PUF) and investment funds (PIF). There are, however, 
regulatory requirements that Takaful companies keep separate lists for operations, 
shareholder equity and income etc, see above. The Surplus Distribution Policy and the 
Implementing Rules allow shareholders to share in surpluses from the operations list. This, it 
is assumed, bears much of the features of the policyholders’ underwriting fund (PUF). 
7.6.6. Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) 
There is no available evidence that Saudi Takaful companies have established a Sharia 
Supervisory Board (SSB) that is required under Takaful principles (see 4.6.6). 
                                                             
116 Al-Zarqaa’s insurance approach argues that risks are shared by being pooled, see discussion in chapter 4.4.4. 
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7.6.7. Policyholders, Governance Committees, and Decision-Making 
Under a joint-stock company (JSC), a governance committee may diminish conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and policyholders by allowing policyholders’ representation on 
the Board of Directors, so that policyholders can be involved in decision-making (see 4.6.7 
and 4.6.8). In practice and unlike in Sudan, governance committees do not exist in Saudi 
Takaful companies in which policyholders have no forum to represent their interests and have 
no right to participate in decision-making. It is not clear how far having a representative on 
the Board would, in reality, take into account policyholders’ interests. 
7.6.8. Disclosure of Annual Reports 
Despite Takaful rules to publish the annual reports on their online websites, most Saudi 
Takaful companies do not do so, see 7.3.1. 
7.6.9. Qard Hasan (Interest-Free Loan) 
Takaful requires a qard hasan (interest-free loan) to be provided by the Takaful 
company/operator where there is a deficit in the underwriting fund. This is repayable. 
Effectively, this would be recouped out of future premiums in subsequent periods (see 4.5.1). 
If it could not be recouped, the loss effectively lies with the Takaful company and its 
shareholders. Saudi Takaful companies do not apply the requirement of qard hasan. Instead, 
they are required to provide a statutory qard facility, see 3.2.2, and technical allocations to 
reduce the risk of underwriting funds being in deficit, see 3.2.2. 
7.6.10. Takaful Models 
Saudi Takaful companies do not refer to the various types of Takaful operational models 
(wakalah, mudharabah, and hybrid). Takaful models are not applied in practice. As noted 
earlier, they are inconsistent with modern corporate structures for this to occur and 
inconsistent with the Surplus Distribution Policy and the Implementing Rules. 
7.6.11. Re-Takaful (Islamic Re-insurance) 
Takaful requires Takaful insurance companies to deal with re-Takaful. The limited available 
evidence suggests that Saudi Takaful companies do not re-insure with re-Takaful but instead 
use conventional (commercial) re-insurance. There is no evidence that Saudi re-Takaful 
companies apply re-Takaful operational models (wakalah, mudharabah, and hybrid). They 
appear to operate similarly to conventional re-insurance. the Regulation of Reinsurance 
Activities (RRA) set out requirements for re-insurance, see 3.2.5.  
7.7. Conclusion 
This chapter critically examined the Takaful insurance industry in Saudi Arabia and its 
compliance with Takaful principles based on Sharia law. It highlighted the difficulties and 
issues involved in the application of Takaful under joint-stock companies (JSCs). It 
concluded the impossibility of Takaful application in practice. 
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The discussion above and in previous chapters indicates that Saudi Arabian insurance laws 
and regulations reflect modernising influences on Takaful rules made necessary by the 
operation of insurance through JSCs. This is an inevitable consequence of operating a modern 
insurance system where conflicting interests of policyholders and shareholders occur. This is 
why some provisions of Saudi insurance laws and regulations may not reflect Takaful 
principles and may appear to be similar to conventional (commercial) insurance laws. Saudi 
insurance laws and regulations do not require contributions (premiums) to be paid as tabarru 
(charity/donation) nor enforce mutual co-operation (risk-sharing) among policyholders as the 
owners of the Takaful pool but, on one view, allow risk transfer instead.117 Saudi insurance 
laws do not require that underwriting surpluses be treated as belonging exclusively to 
policyholders. Nor do current laws require insurance companies to make welfare payments to 
benefit the community.  
Although Saudi insurance laws require separate lists for the operational account and the 
shareholders account, there is no evidence that Takaful companies formally segregate 
policyholders’ funds from shareholders’ funds. This may reflect the need for modernising 
Takaful principles. 
In a case of deficits in the underwriting fund, Saudi insurance laws do not require the qard 
hasan to be provided by the Takaful company, but instead require a statutory qard facility to 
be set aside, see 3.2.2. In relation to compliance with Sharia investments, insurance laws do 
not require Takaful insurance companies to establish a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB). 
Whilst some Takaful insurance companies have invested in non-Sharia activities, examined 
above, insurance laws do not impose penalties for a violation of Sharia investment rules. 
With respect to policyholders’ rights under JSCs, insurance laws do not allow policyholders 
to be involved in decision-making and do not require establishing a governance committee to 
represent and protect policyholders’ rights on the Board of Directors. Although many Takaful 
insurance companies have not complied with disclosure rules by publishing their annual 
reports on their online websites, SAMA and the CMA have taken no action to the rules. 
Saudi insurance laws do not refer to Takaful models. Insurance laws refer to conventional re-
insurance and no mention of re-Takaful or re-Takaful models. The risk of non-compliance 
with Sharia is not mentioned either. 
This non-compliance with Takaful, by Takaful insurance companies and Saudi insurance 
laws, is more likely to be related to the impractical requirement to operate Takaful under the 
structure of a joint-stock company (JSC) and be compliant with Takaful principles. These 
difficulties are also noticeable when examining the six general principles of insurance 
contracts (utmost good faith, insurable interest, indemnity, subrogation, contribution, and 
proximate cause). As discussed in chapter 5.2.5, these principles can apply to Takaful as they 
are consistent with Sharia rules. 
                                                             




Arguably, the principle of subrogation causes some issues with Takaful. Where the insurer 
has compensated the insured, the insurer is entitled to exercise the rights of the insured to 
recoup those costs from the wrongdoer who has caused the harm to the insured. This prevents 
the insured from receiving double compensation from the insurer and the wrongdoer. In 
theory, subrogation does not apply to Takaful, particularly the principle of mutuality. 
According to Takaful, when the Takaful operator has fully compensated the policyholder and 
has recouped compensation paid from the wrongdoer, the policyholder practically benefits 
twice. First is from compensation paid and then from recouped compensation as part of the 
mutual pool. The compensation goes to the Takaful participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) 
which belongs and is owned by policyholders based on the mutuality principle of Takaful, 
see 4.6.2. 
Another issue relates to the principle that governs the Board of Directors of JSCs which 
requires them to act in the best interests of the insurance company, particularly shareholders. 
This directors’ duty, in theory, conflicts with Takaful principles and models that consider the 
Takaful operator (company) as an agent who manages policyholders’ funds. This situation 
would require the Board to act in the best interests of shareholders as well as policyholders 
which is impractical, creates conflicts of interest, and violates directors’ duties. It can be 
argued that the governance committee, under Takaful, aims in theory to solve this issue of 
conflicts of interest. The governance committee may, arguably, do so.118 But the directors’ 
duty to the Takaful company and shareholders is still at odds with Takaful principles and 
models. 
These difficulties and obstacles can be avoided by applying Al-Zarqaa’s insurance model. 
As Saudi Arabia is required by its legislation to comply with Islamic Sharia, if Takaful 
principles are enforced, it is not clear whether the Saudi Takaful insurance industry would 
survive bearing in mind that two Saudi Takaful insurers have failed (see chapter 3.1). There 
is no evidence that potentially catastrophic risks to infrastructure are insured or re-insured by 
Saudi Takaful insurers. This may restrict foreign investment in Saudi Arabia as well as 
failing to provide prudent management of assets and risks. The chapter proposed to solve the 
key difficulties by arguing that Al-Zarqaa’s insurance approach be adopted as an alternative 
making it Sharia-compliant and meeting community and business needs.   
The following chapter is the conclusion. 
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Directors and governance committee) involved in decision-making. The Board of Directors represents 
shareholders and the governance committee represents policyholders. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the conclusion. A key research question for the thesis is whether 
Takaful insurance companies in Saudi Arabia are Sharia-compliant according to Takaful 
principles. It finds that Saudi Takaful insurers have struggled to comply with Takaful 
principles. The difficulties arise because of the legal requirement that Takaful insurers 
operate as a joint-stock company (JSC). This pits the interests of shareholders against the 
rights of policyholders under Takaful principles. Difficulties are also caused by the regulatory 
provisions which seem more consistent with conventional insurance, as discussed in chapter 
seven. Provision for prudent re-insurance or re-Takaful also appears to be a problem (see 
chapter 6). 
The legal context for the discussion of whether Saudi Arabian Takaful companies are Sharia-
compliant is particularly important. Chapter 2 outlined the legal framework in Saudi Arabia 
where the King has absolute authority and where all laws are required to comply with Sharia 
law. The key agencies involved in supervising and regulating the Takaful industry are the 
Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI), the Capital Market Authority (CMA), and the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). Despite the duty for all laws to comply with 
Sharia law, it is clear that SAMA, as the agency responsible for monitoring and supervising 
insurance companies, has largely adapted the regulations to reflect conventional insurance 
rather than reflecting the requirements for Takaful insurance. This is evident from the 
discussion in chapters 6 and 7. 
Takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia is governed by detailed regulations and rules.  It is 
governed by standard risk management as outlined in chapter 3. The chapter made it clear 
that for Takaful insurance to thrive in Saudi Arabia, all insurers must be financially stable; 
this includes meeting capital adequacy requirements. Whilst there are international standards 
such as that used by the European Union Solvency II, Saudi Arabia has implemented its own 
particular rules which restrict and limit its financial risks. These rules appear to be 
particularly conservative and have the effect that Saudi insurance companies are unlikely to 
be globally competitive and risk being largely a retail insurance market. 
Central to the thesis is the examination in chapter 4 of the requirements for Takaful 
insurance. The majority view of Islamic jurists is that Takaful insurance is permitted while 
conventional insurance is prohibited as it involves riba (interest/usury or money for money), 
gharar (uncertainty), and maysir (gambling). The chapter argued that a broader view, that of 
Al- Zarqaa, provides the conceptual underpinning for accepting conventional insurance as 
Sharia-compliant subject to the requirement that it does not engage in Sharia prohibited 
investments. Under this approach, Takaful insurance can operate under JSCs similar to 
conventional insurance, provided that the Takaful insurer avoids Sharia prohibited 




Since Takaful insurance is relatively modern, the foundation principles were conservative in 
their approach. The requirement that premiums were to be regarded as donations (tabarru) 
was intended to avoid potential problems relating to riba, gharar, and maysir. The 
scholarship of Al-Zarqaa set out in chapter 4 demonstrates that conventional insurance does 
not breach these rules.  Moreover, the requirements that the Takaful insurance company 
should be non-profit and expend significant sums on community welfare are inconsistent with 
the operation of a modern JSC with investors and the need to be competitive and profitable in 
the insurance market. Takaful principles need to adapt to modern business needs whilst 
maintaining their distinct nature. 
Takaful rules draw on principles of mutuality so that Takaful insurance is not for profit and 
its policyholders are both the insurers and insured and have an important role in decision-
making for the Takaful insurer. This is further exemplified by the rules relating to segregation 
of funds in which the participants’ underwriting fund (PUF) (and its surpluses) and 
investment of premiums fund (PIF) belong to the policyholders (participants). Insurance 
requires a Takaful operator to run the business, and this necessitates arrangements for 
remuneration of the Takaful operator. The three principal remuneration models (wakala, 
mudharabah, and hybrid) are an adaptation of existing forms of commercial relationships. 
The thesis argued in chapter 7 that because Takaful insurers are JSCs with shareholders and 
because of the current Saudi regulations, particularly the Surplus Distribution Rules, there is 
little room for these different types of remuneration models to apply. 
Chapter 5 discussed the unique nature of Takaful and how it compares with conventional 
(commercial) insurance and mutual (co-operative) insurance. But as indicated whilst Takaful 
may most closely approximate mutual insurance, there are serious limitations on how far 
mutual insurance developed for particular types of risks can meet diverse insurance needs of 
modern businesses. Mutual insurance may be suitable where members are subject to 
particular types of risks, such as manufacturers in a particular industry. Mutual insurance may 
not be able to provide protection for potentially catastrophic risks. Insurance based on a 
mutual structure may be unable to meet the needs of a modern economy and the needs of the 
community, businesses, and the public. 
The problems for Saudi Takaful insurers to operate under Takaful rules is further illustrated 
in relation to re-Takaful (Islamic re-insurance) in chapter 6. The problems encountered with 
Takaful were also replicated in relation to re-Takaful, particularly as all Takaful companies in 
Saudi Arabia must operate as JSCs. The problems are particularly acute where there is 
limited availability of re-Takaful, particularly for large catastrophic risks. If Takaful insurers 
have to resort to conventional re-insurance, Sharia-compliance is at risk. Resort to the Islamic 
principle of darura (necessity or dire need) may not be possible on either of two grounds: that 
re-Takaful is available or that the principle does not extend beyond physical necessity. But as 
pointed out in chapter 6, it is likely that the needs for re-insurance may not be able to be 
covered by existing re-Takaful operators and that a broader view of necessity should prevail 
which would permit Takaful insurers in Saudi Arabia to utilize conventional re-insurance. 
Other alternatives based on mutual insurance appear not to be feasible. The current Saudi 
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regulations setting out requirements for re-insurance reflect conventional re-insurance, see 
chapter 6. 
What solutions can be found to these problems in re-Takaful? Chapter 6 argued that Al-
Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach is an appropriate a Sharia alternative. Under Al-
Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance model, it is Islamically permissible to use conventional 
(commercial) re-insurance with the qualification of avoiding any Sharia prohibited 
investments. Using Al-Zarqaa’s modified re-insurance approach, re-Takaful can operate 
under JSCs similar to conventional insurance and Islamic non-insurance businesses e.g., 
Islamic banks with the conditions that all Sharia prohibited investment activities must be 
avoided. 
In chapter 7, the thesis examined Sharia-compliance of Takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia. 
Central to this chapter is the critical exploration of annual reports, particularly from 
Tawuniya, Shield, and Alsagr insurance companies. The chapter concluded that Takaful 
principles and models are very difficult, if not impossible, to enforce in practice especially 
under the structure of JSCs. These difficulties and obstacles are reflected in the Takaful 
industry in Saudi Arabia, including insurance regulations and insurance companies. It further 
concluded that these difficulties can be avoided by adopting Al-Zarqaa’s models for Takaful 
insurance. 
8.2. Conclusion 
This thesis demonstrates that the regulation and practices of Takaful insurers in general and 
Takaful insurance in Saudi Arabia in particular reflect a modern approach to Takaful 
insurance. It recognises that the extensive capital requirements and stability of Takaful 
insurers mean that modern insurance can only, efficiently, competitively, and profitably 
operate through joint-stock companies (JSCs). It is also clear that it is not possible to comply 
with strict Takaful principles if insurers are to meet the needs of investors, policyholders, and 
the community.   But this brings with it the potential for conflicts between the interests of 
policyholders and the interests of investors under Takaful principles. Insurance companies, in 
general, will only survive if they are profitable and dividends are sufficient to attract 
significant capital investment. Takaful principles reflect a mutual insurance model whereby 
members share risks and are both insurers and insured and profits (and losses) accrue to its 
members. But, as this thesis highlights, mutual insurance has significant limitations. Mutual 
insurance is an effective method of risk-sharing when used for particular industry groups with 
particular types of common shared risks but not a suitable model for general insurance or for 
all types of risks.   
This thesis argues that modern Takaful insurance can be aligned with Sharia law by adopting 
the model proposed by Al-Zarqaa subject to the limitations relating to prohibited investments. 
This model proceeds on the premise, accepted in this thesis, that modern insurance can be 
viewed as a risk-sharing mechanism and not in breach of fundamental Islamic principles. 
This is subject to the caveat that the insurance company must not engage in prohibited 
investments. In general, this view is consistent with the existing regulatory approach adopted 
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in Saudi Arabia. It is also consistent with what occurs in practice. The thesis in its review of 
selected insurers’ annual reports finds that those reviewed Takaful companies did not appear 
to adopt formal arrangements governing the relationship between the Takaful companies and 
their policyholders. The same proposed approach can be adopted in relation to re-insurance. 
It is clear that both the regulations and the practice of Takaful insurers in Saudi Arabia reflect 
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